ML17285A846

Responds to Generic Ltr 89-13, Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Safety Sys Functional Insp Including Elements of Action IV Will Not Be Completed Until Dec 1990

ML17285A846
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	11/09/1989
From:	Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-89-13, GO2-89-205, NUDOCS 8911160233
Download: ML17285A846 (5)

Text

=ACCELERATED ISTRIBUTION DEMON TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8911160233 DOC.DATE: 89/11/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET I FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SORENSEN,G.C. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Responds to Generic Ltr 89-13, "Service Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A048D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L ENCL 0 SIZE:

TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal: Equipment Qualification NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA PD5 PD SAMWORTH,R INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OC/~ OGC/HDS2 EG FILE 01 RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: LPDR NRC PDR NSIC NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 19 ENCL

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 November 9, 1989 G02-89-205 Docket No. 50-397 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 GENERIC LETTER 89-13, SERVICE MATER SYSTEM PROBLEMS AFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED E(UIPNENT The reference (Generic Letter 89-13) included five recommended actions to be taken by addressees to ensure that their service water systems are, and will be, maintained in compliance with appropriate regulations. A reply within 180 days was requested to provide schedules and plans for the implementation of the various actions of the letter. We plan to accomplish one of the recommendations on a schedule different from that proposed in the letter. The purpose of this letter is to inform the NRC early of this plan. This is not the 180 day reply required by the generic letter.

Action IV of the generic letter requires confirmation that the service water system will perform its intended function in accordance with the licensing basis of the plant. The requested schedule is to have the confirmation completed before plant startup following the first refueling outage beginning nine months or more after the date of the letter (which is July 19, 1989).

Our next refueling outage is currently scheduled to begin in April 1990 which is nine months from the date of the letter. Thus this confirmation for WNP-2 would need to be completed by the end of this outage.

We plan to include the requested confirmation as part of a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) to be performed for this system. In view of the importance that has been assigned service water performance we plan to schedule the service water SSFI as our next system to be evaluated. We will include as part of the inspection the concerns mentioned in the generic letter with particular attention given to elements of recommended Action IV. Because an SSFI requires the study of many more factors than those raised in the generic letter, we know at this time that the SSFI including the elements of Action IV will not be completed until December 1990.

S9'iii60233 S9'ii09 PDR ADOCK 05000397 P PDC

g4 Page Two GENERIC LETTER 89-13, SERVICE MATER SYSTEM PROBLEMS AFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT We believe at this time that the significant concerns raised in the generic letter do not exist at WNP-2. In anticipation of receipt of the generic letter the Supply System elected to inspect three heat exchangers during the WNP-2 1989 spring refueling outage. In this outage we inspected visually and by eddy current the service water side (tube side) of the following representative heat exchangers:

RHR A Hydrogen recombiner B Diesel Generator 1A jacket water cooler No evidence of macrofouling was identified in any of these heat exchangers.

The eddy current testing did not reveal any tube wall thinning that would indicate a problem with erosion or corrosion. With regards to the potential for single failure vulnerability of the service water system mentioned in recommended Action V, the two systems for WNP-2 are well separated electrically, spatially and functionally and as such we do not expect to uncover any concerns for confirming this criterion is satisfied.

We therefore believe that the slight schedule extension is justified in view of the broader scope that will be recognized by the performance of the SSFI and the savings in resources that will be afforded by the performance of one study.

Very truly yours, G. C. orensen, Manager Regulatory Programs AGH/bk cc: JB Hartin - NRC Rv NS Reynolds - BCP&R RB Samworth - NRC DL Williams - BPA/399 NRC Site Inspector - 901A C Eschels - EFSEC