ML17284A511

Forwards Response to IE Bulletin 88-005 & Suppl 2 Re Nonconforming Matls.Response Results from Intensive Program of Record Review,Testing & Analysis

ML17284A511
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	09/09/1988
From:	Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
GO2-88-194, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8809150207
Download: ML17284A511 (7)

Text

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ACCESSZuN NBR:8809150207 DOC.DATE: 88/09/09 NOTARZZED: YES DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION, SORENSEN,G.C. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Responds to IE Bulletin 88-005,Suppl 1 re nonconforming matls.

DZSTRZBUTZON CODE: ZE11D TITLE: Bulletin Response COPZES (50 DKT)

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NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 ~EG FIJI 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 22 ENCL 21

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 G02-88-194 September 9, 1988 Docket No. 50-397 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Statiion Pl-137 Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 88-05, NONCONFORMING MATERIALS

Reference:

IEB 88-05 Supplement 2, Dated August 3, 1988 In response to the subject IEB, the Supply System initiated an intensive pro-gram of records review, testing and analysis. The reference supplement allowed cessation of that effort effective August 3, 1988 and requested that the 120 day reporting requirements of the original bulletin be completed. Accordingly t

the attached repor provides this information.

Very truly yours, G. C. S ensen, Manager Regulatory Programs PLP'w Attachment cc: JB Martin NRC RV RB Samworth - NRC DL Williams - BPA/399 NRC Site Inspector - 901A NS Reynolds - BCP&R 8809i50207 880909 PDR ADO'5000397 PNU

It STATE OF WASHINGTON)

Subject:

IEB ResPonse 88-05

)

COUNTY OF BENTON )

I, G. C. Sorensen, being duly sworn, subscribe to and say that I am the Manager, Regulatory Programs for the WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, the applicant herein; that I have full authority to execute this oath; that I have reviewed the foregoing; and that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief the statements made in it are true.

DATE J ~C= , 1988 G. C. orensen, Manager Regulatory Programs On this day personally appeared before me G. C. Sorensen to me known to be the individual who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he signed the same as his free act and deed for the uses and purposes herein mentioned.

GIVEN under my hand and seal this ~dt's day o~ 1988.

Notary Pu sc sn nd or the S A E OF WASHINGTON Residing a

ATTACHMENT

1. IEB 88-05: "Provide a list of the HJM- and PSI-supplied materials that are found not to be in conformance with the applicable code requirements or procurement specifications and identify the applications in which the materials are used. Include the material specification, the nature of the component (e.g., pipe flange), size, and pressure rating; also indicate the chain of purchase."

~Res onse: As of August 3, 1988 one fitting in the plant was found to be nonconforming: A 10 inch blind flange, 300 lb, material type SA 105, heat number 473U, ASME Code Class 2, manufactured by HJM, purchased for use by the WNP-2 major mechanical contractor HBG from supplier, Gulfalloy Inc.,

(MTR date, June 19, 1981) and final field inspected December 13, 1982.

This flange provides a leak tight boundary when the Fuel Pool Cooling/

Residual Heat Removal cross tie spool piece is removed. The flange is isolated from containment by two isolation valves. The line the flange connects to 'is used only when the reactor is shutdown. The flange has no specific safety function. A justification for continued operation has been completed for the flange verifying acceptability for interim opera-tion. The replacement is scheduled for no later than the next refueling outage, spring, 1989.

The following table identifies additional material from the HNP-2 ware-house found to be nonconforming as of August 3, 1988 using the methodology and acceptance criteria described below in response to item 2. This material has been removed from stock and is i'n a "quality hold" status awaiting disp'osition, and as such is not available for use. The material, all SA 105, was initially purchased for use by the WNP-2 major mechanical contractor WBG, passed on by Bechtel (HNP-2 Construction Manager) to the Supply System upon construction completion.

Heat CMTR

~ua1 it Descri tion Number Date ~Su l i er 3 10", 300 lb, RF, Blind Flange 473U 6/19/81 Liberty 19 1", Sch 80, 300 lb, RF, Weld Neck 32D 11/2/81 Liberty 1 6", 900 lb, RF Blind Flange 473U 9/24/81 Liberty 3 lk", Sch 80,300 lb, RF, Weld Neck M1624 11/2/81 Liberty 1 4", Sch 80, 150 lb, RF, Weld Neck GDCH 3/5/82 Guyon 3 k", 150 lb, RF, Blind Flange J82D 7/7/80 .Liberty 3 3/4", Sch 80, 150 lb, RF Socket Weld 64C 11/2/81 Liberty

2. IEB 88-05: "Take actions that provi de assurance that al 1 r ecei ved materi al s comply wi th ASNE Code Sec ti on I I I, ASTN, and app1 i cab 1 e procurement specification requir ements, or that demonstrate that such materi al s are sui tabl e for the intended ser vi ce. For examp1 e, thi s program should include specific verification that austenitic stainless steels have been received in a non-sensitized condition."

~Res onse: In accordance with the agreement established between RUMARC and the HRC staff, WNP-2 has utilized the Equotip hardness tester for Brinell conversion to demonstrate the suitability of materials purchased from HJM and PSI for their intended purpose. By this agreement, confirmation of complete compliance to ASME and ASTN codes was not necessary. A Brinell hardness of 137 minimum per NUNARC recommendation was used for the acceptance criterion. However, for warehouse tested flanges the Supply System used a conservative minimum Brinell value of 141.

Accordingly, as of August 3, 1988 approximately 7000 purchase orders for safety and non-safety related material and all ASME and ANSI B31.1 safety related work packages had been reviewed for HJM and PSI materials. From that effort, no PSI flanges were found and 1225 WJN SA105 flanges were identified by purchase orders. Safety related HJM flanges installed in the plant accounted for 144 flanges with 121 hardness tested in the plant with one having an unacceptable low hardness and 23 determined inaccessible and another 25 left to field verify accessibility or manufacturer source prior to testing. An additional two flanges on a quality class II system found during plant hardness testing were also tested. Hardness testing and some chemical and physical properties verification tests were completed on 304 HJM SA105 flanges in the warehouse with 33 considered failing due to hardness or verification tests of which three would be acceptable based on 137 Brinell hardness and one by tension test. Approximately 139 additional flanges in the warehouse on excess hold were not hardness tested. With only one plant installed safety related flange identified as nonconforming and the NUMARC Generic Analysis conclusion that the WJN flanges do not present a near-term safety concern, reasonable assurance has been provided that the materials installed are suitable for their intended function.

3. IEB 88-05: "Replace all questionable fittings and flanges with materials that have been manufactured in full compliance with ASME Code Section III, ASTN, and the applicable procurement specification requirements."

~Res onse: As stated in the response to 1 above. the one nonconforming safety related flange will be replaced no later than the next refueling outage scheduled for spring 1989.

4. IEB 88-05: "For any PSI- or WJM-supplied materials having suspect CNTRs and used in systems that are not safety-related, take actions commensurate with the function to be performed."

~Res onse: As of August 3, 1988 no suspect CNTRs were specifically i denti fied for PS I- and H JN-suppli ed material s util ized in non safety-related systems, however two acceptable WJM flanges were hardness tested during plant testing as described in Item 2.

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