ML17279A448

Forwards Response to Unresolved Items Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/87-02.Corrective Actions:Independent Insp by Consultants Confirmed That Detection Sys Meets Requirements for safety-related Areas

ML17279A448
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	05/27/1987
From:	Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML17279A446	List: ML17279A448
References
GO2-87-179, TAC-63528, NUDOCS 8708110520
Download: ML17279A448 (6)

Text

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM r

P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 rt May 27, 1987 G02-87-179 Docket No. 50-397 Mr. J. B. Martin Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, Cal i forni a 94596

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSE NO. NPF-21 NRC INSPECTION REPORT 87-02

Dear Mr. Martin:

The Plant Staff has reviewed the above subject inspection report. Although no response was necessary, I feel their comments provide a timely update on this issue. Many of the items are ready for your review and closure.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours, G. C. So ensen Regulatory Programs Manager GCS: 1 p Att achment cc: R. T. Dodds (NRC) - 901A 8708k 10520 870804 PDR ADDCK 05000397 PDR

NRC INSPECTION REPORT 87-02 2.B Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-03) - Allegation File RV-86-A-027-04 The Supply System did not,commit to any modification prior to startup from our current refueling outage. The Supply System intends to add one (1) isolation valve during the current outage, since it is inaccessible during operation. The remaining four (4) isolation valves and the proposed sleeving of the buried pipe will start after July 1, 1987. The analysis of the effects of a line break under the Diesel Generator Building has demonstrated no safety significance. It is our intent to complete this work by October 1987, if the work can be executed as our design change currently specifies.

2.C Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-04) - Design Change Packages Appear to ave equire ro ec ion o i rona a e u own ircui s a Were ot eporte sn o.

There have been approximately fifteen (15) Design Change Packages (DCPs) to implement this work (not the 100 reported). We are prepared to demonstrate the correlation between LER concern/fire area/design change package.

2. D Unresol ved I tern (50-397/86-25-05) - Analysi s of Safe Shutdown e ooogy (1) We believe the protection of Division I ADS valves to be adequate for a Control Room fire. Should this reference the Division II ADS valves (as described in Section 3)?

(2) The Supply System maintains that the closure of the MSIVs from the Control Room is the single most important action to be performed given a fire requiring Control Room evacuation. This action, which takes only seconds, can be performed at a single Control Room location.

This action conserves coolant inventory and provides additional operator response time for most transients. We will continue our dialogue with NRR on this topic.

(3) This design change is in progress and is expected to complete during thi s ref uel i ng outage.

2.E Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-06) - Safe Shutdown Procedures It is the Supply System's position that the difference in time to close the MSIVs versus a singular action to initiate a reactor scram will not jeopardize compliance with the ten (10) minute criteria. The revision to PPM 4.12.1.1, Control Room Evacuation, has been made and is available for your review. The design change to replace the shorting screws with transfer switches is in progress and is expected to complete during this refueling outage.

2.G Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-08) - Associated Circuits Hi-Low Pres-sure nter ace na yss s The Supply System is currently in discussion with NRR regarding this issue.

(

Reference:

Letter, Knighton (NRC) to Sorensen (SS), TAC No. 63528, Dated May 13, 1987) 2.J Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-11) - Cable S reading Room Design (1) A technical basis has been provided and is available for review.

(

Reference:

TSI-RFC-017)

(2) The fire protection in the Cable Spread Room is designed in accordance with NRC requirements, i .e., detection, automatic suppression, and 20 foot noncombustible area. Within the 20 foot separati on area, there are several dedicated Division II cables, which were provided with an one (1) hour barrier. This one (1) hour barrier was recently tested and proved to be adequate. The only outstanding issue in the area is the protection of some "heat flow path" steel, whi ch is in progress.

In the interim, appropriate Technical Specification requirements have been implemented.

2.L Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-13) - Inadequate Fire Detection System An independent inspection by an outside consultant has confirmed that our detection system meets requirements for safety-related areas. A copy of our consultant's report has been provided to you.

2.M Unresolved Item (50-397/86-25-14) - Inadequate Emergency Lighting Design changes are being implemented during our current refueling outage.

Interim correcti ve actions were previously taken.

3. Potential Failure to Adequately .,Protect Alternative Control Room Divi-sion an eve an ressure n ica son orcus s rom ire amage Design changes to protect the Division II ADS cable in the Control Room are in process. We expect to complete this modification during our current outage.

P