ML17150A106

Forwards Info Re Physical Relation Between Reactor Core,Fuel Transfer Canal,Spent Fuel Storage Pool & Set Down Storage Areas for Heavy Load Moved on Refueling Floor.Fueling Procedures Encl

ML17150A106
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	07/17/1978
From:	CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC.
To:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17150A107	List: ML17150A106
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8008220423
Download: ML17150A106 (5)

Text

t SSINS No.: 6830 Accession, No.:

8008220243 IEC 80"23 UNITIED STATES NUCLEAR,REGULATORY COMMISSION

.OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 October 31, 1980 IE Circular No. 80-23: POTENTIAL DEFECTS IN BELOIT POWER SYSTEMS EMERGENCY A

GENERATORS BACKGROUND This circular addresses a potential deficiency involving the .field leads of generators manufactured by Beloit -Power Systems. It is known that the subject generators have been coupled with Fairbanks Morse diesel engines for use in nuclear power facilities; however, it is not known whether they have with other diesel engines for such. use. Accordin'gly, the intent of,been'oupled this circu7ar is to notify all nuclear power facilities of the potential defect and to assure that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if needed.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was first informed of 'the potential defect by a phone call from Mr. R. H. Beadle of the Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of Colt Industries to Mr. D. W. Hayes of Region III on September 19, 1980. On September 20, 1980, a conference call was held between the NRC Duty Officer, personnel from Prairie Island Nuclear Power Station, Mr. Beadle of Fairbanks Morse and Mr. C. Evenson of Beloit Power Systems, the principal spokesman.

The purpose of this call was to describe an inspection method which Prairie Island personnel could use to examine the field lead assemblies of their gen-erators for the potential defect. (We have since been informed by the Resident Inspector that the field lead assemblies of the Prairie Island generators did not have the suspected defects.)

In order to disseminate this information on .a timely basis, the NRC Duty Officer at Bethesda called those operating facilities which he knew were using the suspect generators on September 20 and 21, 1980. The information conveyed included a description of the potential defect and a description of the aforementioned inspection method. The operating facilities called were:

FACILITY NO. OF UNITS Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 3 Crystal River 3 .2 Hatch 1 and 2 5 Duane Arnold 2 North Anna 1 and 2 4 Millstone 1 and 2 3 Robinson 2 2 Prair ie Island 2 Vermont Yankee 2 Peach Bottom 2 and 3 4.

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 2

IEC 80"23

. October 31, 1980 Page 2 of 3 These phone calls were subsequently followed up with a Part 21 Report dated September 22, 1980 from Mr. J. M. Moriarty, Manager, Utility Sales, Fairbanks Morse Engine Division. Information conveyed in the Part 21 Report included the following excerpts:

"A Beloit Power Systems generator in commercial serv'ice at Sitka, Alaska lost its field because a lead between the collector rings and the field coils shorted to the rotor and burned in two pieces at the point of the short. Subsequent examination of another gener'ator of identical design at the same installation showed frayed insulation 'at a clamp (same loca<<

tion as the, burn through) which secures the lead to the rotor. This unit was operating satisfactorily but if the insulation damage were to progress the possibility of grounding the lead to the rotor exists."

"To determine if the problem might exist at other locations our chief electrical engineer was sent to Provo, Utah which has four generators of identical 'design. .He has reported by phone that two of the'four at Provo have frayed insulation at the clamp but that there was no indication of loss of field."

"Concurrent with our inspection at Provo, Beloit Power Systems was asked to evaluate the cause of frayed insulation and also if any other generators might have the same problem; Their verbal report to us is that the cause of fraying is poor workm'anship in instal.lation of the clamps and that 'there are other generators of identical design in this area. Specifically the eight generators shipped to Limerick (Phil'adelphia

.Electric) are of the identical design in the area where poor workmanship is known to have caused a problem."

"Oui plan is to inspect the Limerick generators and repair any poor workmanship 'which may be found. Beloit Power Systems also reports verbally that the design 'in this area for 5 and 6 frame alternators has been simil'ar for a number of years and it. is therefore pbssible that the problem may extend to operating units."

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS OR OPERATING LICENSES:

Determine whether or not your facility uses emergency generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems, having frame sizes 5 or 6, as part of the onsite emergency power system; matter further.

if not, you need not pursue this

2. If your facility uses generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems you should inspect the connect'ions between the .collector rings and the field coils in the field lead assemblies of'he generators .for frayed

'insulation at the clamps and make needed repairs per the enclosed instruc-tion sheet, "Inspection Procedures for, Generator Field Leads". The inspections should be completed as soon as practical and conducted within the constraints of the Technical Specifications.

3. If the inspection reveals the need for repair, or dressing of the leads, said repair should be initiated at operating facilities as soon as practicable after the need has been determined but no later than ten (10) days thereafter, provided the unit is capable of performing its function

IEC 80-23

'October 31, 1980 Page 3 of 3

, without the repair. Otherwise, the repair should be initiated immediately after the need has been identified. Needed repair work should be coordinated with Beloit Power Systems as stated in the inspec" tion procedure.

4. If the inspection reveals the need for repair or dressing of leads at facilities holding Construction Permits, said repair should be initiated at the,licensee's earliest convenience and coordinated with Beloit Power Systems.

Enclosure:

"Inspection .Procedure for Generator Field Leads"

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IE Circular 80-23 Enclosure 2 October 31, 1980

'RECENTLY ISSUED

. IE CIRCULARS Circular Date of No. Sub ect .Issue Issued to 80" 22 Confirmation of 10/2/80 All holders of a Employee equal ifications 'power reactor OL or CP 80" 21 Regulation of 9/10/80 All holders of Refueling Crews a power reactor OL or CP 80-20 Changes in Safe-Slab 8/21/80 All holders of Tank Dimensions a Part 50 or Part 70 Fuel Facility .License 80-19 Noncomp1iance with 8/26/80 All holders of Licensee Requirements a medical license 80"18 10 CFR 50.59 Safety 8/22/80 All holders of a Evaluations .for Changes to power reactor Radioactive Waste Treatment OL or CP Systems 80-17 Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water 7/23/80 All holders of a PWR Jet from Baffle Plate Corner power reactor OL or CP 80" 16 Operational Deficiencies In 6/27/80 All holders of a Rosemount Model 510DU Trip power reactor Units And Model 1152 Pressure OL or CP Transmitters 80-15 Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump 6/20/80 All holders of a Cooling and Natural Circula- power reactor tion Cooldown OL or CP 80"14 Radioactive Contamination of 6/24/80 All holders of a Plant Demineralized Water power or research System'and Resultant Internal reactor OL or CP, Contaminati'on of Personnel and fuel cycle licensees 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/18/80 All holders of a power Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies reactor OL or CP 80".12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 5/14/80 All holders of a May Fall Out of Place When power reactor Mounted Below Horizontal Axis OL or CP