IR 05000528/1985032
| ML17299A887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1985 |
| From: | Bosted C, Fiorelli G, Miller L, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299A886 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-85-32, 50-529-85-31, NUDOCS 8512240017 | |
| Download: ML17299A887 (32) | |
Text
8512240017 851205 PDR ADOCZ 05000528
PDR U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
Licensee:
50-528/85-327 50-529/85-31 50-528, 50-529 License Nos: NPF-41; CPPR-142 Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 6 2 Inspection Conducted:
epte ber 9, - November 12, 1985 Inspectors:
Pop R.
Zimmerman, Seni r Residen Insp ctor Date i ned Ppp G. Fior lli, esident Inspector Pod C. Bosted, Re ident Inspector Date i ned tp.s 5'5 Date igned Date i ned Approved By:
t std P
K t I ' a) It l a II I t i t at a a t t ~ t responsible for the review of post trip data and information. The licensee's performance associated with post trip reviews has shown steady improvement as experience has been gained. (5) A letter was issued by the licensee that requested that Combustion Engineering (CE) and General Electric (GE) review the remaining tests associated with the power ascension program to insure that the test method does not lend itself to creating ,any unnecessary challenges to the plant safety features, or put the plant in an unsafe condition. CE had a representative involved in procedure reviews of all tests since low power licensing; however, the reviews now include concurrence from the windsor office prior to test approval. GE, which was not formally involved in the procedure reviews previously, now will review'hose test procedures associated with the performance of the main turbine (i.e. load rejection) prior to test approval. (6) The Operations Manager has reviewed the shift complement for the remaining tests and has increased manning levels for tests which could result in a significant transient. This action was evident during the October 24, loss of load test from 80% power. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. 8. Review of Prep erational Testin Activities - Unit 2 a. Ma or Test Activities During the inspection period, the Integrated Test of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) was completed following,22 days of testing. The testing was intended to confirm ghat 'th'q ESF functioned as designed. Mith minor exception, the'systems performed as required. Corrective actions were taken to resolve identified deviations. The plant is currently engaged in the, completion of design changes, corrective work items, and surveillance tests, needed as a prerequisite to. licensing. I ~ I b. Preo erational Test Mitnessin f The inspector'itnessed portions of theIIdntegrated-Test og'ngineered Safety Features'-<~93PE-2SAOl', yf The inspector verified that an approved procedure was used, test personnel were knowledgeable of the test requirements','nd data was properly collected. Procedure changes and "'t'est exceptions'ere identified and significant events were,'recorded=in the test log. Other test 'related activities, such as ':the, u'seof,calibrated, measuring and test equipment-(MME), and completion of~test~ prerequisites, were also verified to have been accomplished in accordance with administrative control procedures. I f '4 t L r 'p I c. Prep erational Test. Results Review The results of the Integrated Test of Engineered Safety Features 93PE-2SAOl were reviewed by the inspector. The inspector verified that activities such as test data acquisition, test exception resolution, test report issuance, test modifications and acceptance criteria verification had been accomplished in accordance with procedures. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. 9. S ra Pond Monitorin Section 6.8.4(f) of the facility Technical Specifications states that the monitoring of the Essential Spray Pond and piping is to be conducted in accordance with Procedure 73AC-SP01. The inspector confirmed that the licensee has issued the procedure entitled "Spray Pond Piping Verification" describing the monitoring program. The program includes maintaining and monitoring of spray pond chemistry, monitoring of corrosion coupons, inspection of spray piping welds and the monitoring of spray system pressures. The licensee has developed a correlation of pressure loss at the flow inlet to the spray nozzle piping with the loss of heat sink capability. This determination was made through a combination of engineering analyses by Bechtel and spray pond testing in which the amount. of nozzle bypass flow was correlated with pressure loss. The monitoring program established an alert limit of less than 6.2 psig and an action limit of less than or equal to 5.5 psig which represent decreasing ability of the spray pond to provide an adequate heat sink. Plots of weekly pressure measurements of the Unit 1 "A" and "B" trains of the Essential Spray Pond System show pressure values of 8.2 psig and 8.3 psig, respectively. The Unit 1 pressures taken over a period of six months since March 1985 show only a plus or minus 0.2 psig fluctuation; however, the trend is level. Although Unit 2 pressure valves have been monitored less frequently, the results are comparable and also indicate a flat trend. A review of two pressure instruments used to measure pressure drop revealed the MSTE instruments to have 0-15 psig ranges, accuracies of 0.5/ and to have current calibrations. An independent calculation by the inspector of temperature effect on pressure readings concluded that any effect was insignificant. The licensee's efforts in monitoring spray pond syst'm pressures appeared to be consistent with the provisions of Technical Specification 6.8.4(f) for early detection of piping degradation. The inspector noted that the longer time constant determinations of corrosion monitoring, and pipe weld and heat'exchanger inspections should also enhance the monitoring program. f I r r No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. jv r ir f 't iv ) ~ b d I 10. Licensee Action on CFR 50.55(e) Re orts a ~ (Closed) DER 85-20 "Diesel Generator Cracked Rocker Arm" - Unit 2 The problem discussed in the report concerned a broken rocker arm which was detected in the 5R cylinder. of the "B" Diesel Generator. The condition was detected during the initia1 testing of the engine. From an inspection of the assembly, the test engineers determined that it was caused by the improper installation of the rocker arm assembly at the vendor's plant. The broken component was replaced. An inspection by the test engineers confirmed no additional engine damage existed. The inspector observed that the work document had been closed, and that Quality Control (QC) had signed off the work. Extensive engine testing, including a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> continuous run at 110% load, was subsequently conducted. No problems related to this deficiency were noted. This item is closed. b. (Closed) DER 85-25 "Auxilia Feedwater Pum Failed to Succ essfull Start Durin Hot Functional Testin " - Unit 2 The problem discussed in this report concerned overspeed tripping of the auxiliary feedwater turbine. The overspeed trips occurred during the testing of the auxiliary feedwater turbine driven pump conducted during the hot functional test. Corrective actions included shortening of the steam bypass valve opening time from 10 to 6 seconds, adjustment of the governor controls, and repair of steam condensate dump, valves in the steam supply lines to the turbine. Following the repairs, the turbine was successfully tested repetitively from cold start conditions as required by the test document. Flow and pump response criteria were successfully confirmed to meet design requirements. This item is closed. C ~ (Closed) DER 85-24 "Fracture of Emer enc Diesel Turbochar er Bolts" - Units 1 and 2. d. This report discusses the discovery of loose. and sheared bolts on the Unit 2 Train "B" diesel turbocharger. An engineering evaluation of the design concluded that the eight bolts in the vertical plane should be replaced with A-193, Grade B7 bolts with 3-1/4" threads and torqued to 110 foot pounds. The, inspecto'r reviewed the completed Unit 2 work order which installed these bolts, and noted a Quality Control sign off on the work. This work was also, completed on the two Unit 1 emergency diesels which,had,similar loose and sheared bolts. Reinspecti'on of the b'olts,'after repetitive starts and extended runs did not identify'ny~ further problems:. This item is closed. I/ (Closed) DER 84-81 "Re ortable Con'diti.on Relatin to Hi h Pressure Safet In ection (HPSI) Valves" - Unit 2 During the performance of Unit 2 preoperational test 91PE-2SI08, "SI Full Flow Verification Teqt," operational problems with the high pressure safety injection valves were encountered. Thes'e problems involved the failure of the valves to'close with HPSI pumps running E I I }, A N I II I I ( I If 'I N ~ e}.}>>l4 "k>>,.>>" j 1 E n E. E P.il I I L~ 1! ~l in the injection mode and the erosion of the injection valves due to flow induced cavitation. An evaluation of the problems led to corrective actions which included reversal of the valves from a "flow over" the seat orientation to "flow under" the seat orientation;(,installation of higher capacity motor operator switch spring packs; replacement of the pinion and gear in the motor operators; and the installation of a second orifice downstream of the originally installed orifice. The generic tests were repeated on the valves as was the retest of 91PE-2SI08. Successful performance of the valves was confirmed. The inspector confirmed the work documents issued to complete design change DCP-2SM-SI150 issued to correct the'problems has been closed out. Similar modifications"'ere made to the Unit 1 HPSI valves to enhance their performance,'and were planned at'Unit 3. This item is closed. I I No violations of NRC requirements'r dev'ietions were identified.. ll. Fuel Recei t - Unit 2 I '1 All of the 241 fuel element assemblies needed for'core loading have been received on site. The bundle which had been received with a broken grid strap spring, as reported in NRC Inspection Report -50-529/85-27, was evaluated by APS and Combustion Engineering'CE). CE's generic evaluation concluded that the broken spring would not adversely affect the integrity of the fuel assembly. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. 12. Post Core Testin Pro ram The inspector reviewed the post core testing program for Unit 2. The administrative controls such as test conduct, test procedure review and approval, test results review and approval, document control, test program organizational structure and administration, and use of measurement and test equipment were the same as those used at Unit l. Revisions to the procedures were limited to minor changes which did not affect FSAR commitments. Test controlling procedures associated with initial fuel load, initial criticality, post core hot functional testing, and power ascension testing will be the same as those used at Unit 1 with the exception that no low power physics testing will be conducted at 320 degrees F. This condition, as stated in CESSAR table 14.2-1, is only required for a "first of a kind" plant as was the case for Unit l. Specific power ascension test procedures to be used at Unit 2 are also the same as those used at Unit 1 with the exception that: 1) the following tests are not required to be performed; or 2) the licensee intends to submit an FSAR change to delete or modify specific tests, as follows: I II V II j I ~ I
- ,
I q Jii V III, -I 7 I I I V l Ii' I I I I '1 V'. L 'I l I V w I l,i tV I a I I I I Ii V I ,II'I I, P a) These tests were only required for a "first of a kind plant" per CESSAR Section 14.1 and 14.2. 72PA-IRX18-72PA-1RX03-72PA-1RX02-72PA-1RX35-72PA-1RX30-72PA-1RZ47-72PY"1RX30 " CEA Shadowing Factor/Radial Peaking (thermal annealing portion only). Natural Circulation from,80$. ariable" Tave (20'/). Variable Tave (80%). Xenon Oscillation Testing (65%). L Dropped and Ejected CEA Test (100%). Psuedo Dropped and Ejected CEA Worth Te'st at 565 degrees F. b) 72PY-1RX30 - Shutdown CEA Group Worth Test at 565 degrees F. 'I The licensee stated that FSAR changes were expected to be submitted to delete or modify the following tests: 72PA-1RZ02 - Movable Incore Detector Test (20%) delete 72PA-1RZ11 - Movable Incore Detector Test (80%) - delete 73PA-1MT02 - Turbine Trip Test (100%) - delete 73PA-1SF05 - Control Systems Checkout Test (80%) modify The power ascension program implementing controls and procedures for Unit 1 had been previously reviewed by the inspector and found satisfactory. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. 13. Prep erational Testin Pro ram Controls - Unit 2 The controls used during preoperational testing and the program tests conducted were the same as those used during the preoperational testing of Unit. 1. The controls, which include procedure review and approval, Jurisdictional controls, test conduct, test results evaluation, work control, temporary modifications, design changes, document control, and FSAR testing commitments were modified during the Unit 1 recovery period following the shutdown of safety related testing in the fall of 1983. They have been.reviewed by the inspector. Some changes to the basic program have been noted; however, these revisions involved changes in organizational responsibility; clarification of instructions; and increased detail of the Test Working Group (TWG) reviews. The changes have not negated regulatory commitments made by the licensee. The test program is consistent with FSAR commitment V p ), kr f' 'I d ' ~ F '.(I'I 'l D No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. Plant Procedures - Unit 2 Plant procedures covering administrative controls, system operations, maintenance, emergency and abnormal conditions, and surveillance testing have already been developed, reviewed and approved for Unit 1, and have been implemented since the issuance of the Unit 1 operating license. Representative samples of these procedures have been reviewed by the inspector. These same procedures will also be used at Unit 2, and contain the same instructions, with differences being the use of Unit 2 equipment identification and procedure numbers. The incorporation of re-visions to the Unit 2 procedures, developed as a result of Unit 1 operating experience, has been completed and verified on a sampling basis by the inspector. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. Fire Protection Pro ram - Unit 2 The fire protection program for Unit 2 is the" same as that for Unit 1. This program has been in use since the issuance of the Unit 1 operating license and has been inspected by the NRC. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. Safet Committee - Unit 2 The Unit 2 onsite and offsite safety committee organizations are the same as those used at Unit 1. These programs have, been functioning since the issuance of the Unit 1 operating license and have been previously inspected by the NRC. The July minutes of the Plant Review Board (PRB) and Nuclear Safety Group (NSG) meetings were reviewed. The inspector verified that the safety committees were addressing the areas of responsibility delineated in the Technical Specifications, and that the meeting frequency and quorum requireme'nts were being satisfied. No PRB staff changes have transpired.. Two.'changes in committee membership have occurred in the NSG. Both individuals met the requirements of the facility Technical Specifications. )) No violations of NRC requirements or deviations'were,identified. 0 eratin Staff Trainin - Unit 2 The training program for the Unit 2 operating staff is the s'arne as that used for the Unit 1 operating staff. ~ This training program" has been implemented for several years and has been inspected by th'e NRC. The training records of 6 newly hired'mployees were reviewed by the inspector. The training received was'onsistent with time on the job. All had received site access and radiation protection training. Several had received specialized training in such areas as diesel operation, fire protection and Foxboro instrumentation maintenanc h Vt I 8I f I I, $1
A V l l' l ~ ~ ~ No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. 18. Post Core Testin ualit Assurance - Unit 2 A review of the monitoring and auditing program associated with Unit 2 post core testing confirmed that activities such as, test conduct, test exception identification and tracking, test data documentation control of measuring and test equipment were included in the program. Discussions with two of the Quality Assurance (QA) monitoring personnel confirmed their understanding of the program and the check sheets used to monitor testing activities. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. 19. Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts - Unit Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector. The following reports were reviewed: o Monthly Operating Reports for August and September 1985. o Notification of Unusual Events on September 12, September 30, October 3, October 7, and October 24, 1985. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified. 20. Information Notice 84-83 - Various Batter Problems This Information Notice discussed the potential for degradation of the Class lE DC power system through overloading by the addition of loads to the battery system, and the improper use of solvents on battery cases and covers. The inspector observed a communication written by the APS Engineering Manager stating that controls to prevent exceeding the design loading of the batteries through the addition of new loads is covered by generic Bechtel and APS engineering documents. These documents were identified in the communication. A review of the APS surveillance test procedures used to maintain and check battery performance confirmed the incorporation of statements that the only approved cleaning solution for batteries is demineralized water (or a solution of demineralized water and bicarbonate of soda). The licensee's actions adequately addressed the concerns in this Information Notice. This item is closed. 21. Exit Meetin The inspector met with licensee management repr'esentatives periodically during the inspection and held an exit on November 12, 1985. The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representative v 'ia ) I t t l