IR 05000529/1985025

Insp Repts 50-529/85-25 & 50-530/85-19 on 850624-28.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on IE Circulars,Followup of Previously Identified Items, Const Deficiencies & Observation of Hot Functional Testing

ML20133C365
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	07/05/1985
From:	Miller L, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133C359	List: IR 05000529/1985025 ML20133C355
References
50-529-85-25, 50-530-85-19, IEC-80-05, IEC-80-5, IEC-81-02, IEC-81-04, IEC-81-2, IEC-81-4, NUDOCS 8508070025
Download: ML20133C365 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No /85-25 and 50-530/85-19 Docket No and 50-530

' Construction Permit Nos. CPPR 142 and 143 Licensee: Arizona Nuclear Power Project Post Office Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 2 and 3 Inspection at: Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted: June 24-28, 1985 b!

Inspector: . 7 /J /$5

• R. C. Sorenser, Reac r Indpector Dat6 Sfigned Approved By: 7[3/$[

L. F. NfIler, Jr. ,/ Cl/ief , '

Date Signed

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Reactor Projects S'e(tion 2 -

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Summary: ,

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Inspection on. June 24-28, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-529/85-25 and 50-530/85-19)

Areas Inspecied: R'odtine, ; unannounced inspect! ion by regional based inspector of licensee action on IE Circulars, follow-up of previously identified items, 50.55(e)'c^onstruction deficiencies, and-observation of hot functional testing (IIFT) in Unit 2. The inspection of Units 2 and 3 involved 44 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results: No violations or deviations were identifie e

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8500070025 850710 PDR ADOCK 05000529 Q PDR

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-DETAILS Persons Contacted Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP)

• L. Souza, Assistant Manager, Corporate QA/QC

• J. Bynum, Plant Manager

"*C. Russo, Manager, Quality Audits and Monitoring

• P. Brandjes, Unit Startup Manager

• T. Bloom, Licensing Engineer

• W. Montefour, ANPP QA C. Churchman, Unit Startup Manager Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

• D. Hawkinson, QA Manager

• H. Foster, Principal QC Engineer

• W. Murphy, Project Superintendent

• W. Miller, Construction Engineer

• Denotes those persons attending exit meeting, June 28, 198 The inspector also contacted numerous other licensee and contractor craft and engineering personnel during the course of this inspectio . Review of Licensee Responses to IE Circulars (IEC) "(Closed) IEC 81-02 -; Performance of NRC Licensed Individuals While on Duty

_ This Circular recommended review and revision of administrative controls, as necessary, to-prescribe performance requirements for licensed personnel. ' .

The licensee has developed and approved procedure 40AC-9ZZ02, Conduct of Shift Operations, which specifies. licensed individuals performance requirements and duties while on shif It also specifies prohibited activities while on duty. The inspector

. reviewed this procedure and found that it satisfactorily addresses the recommendations of this Circula In addition, the inspector personally observed control room activities and found that the

/ procedure'had been properly implemented. This Circular is closed r

for Units 2. and (Closed) IEC 81-04 - The Role of Shift Technical Advisors (STAS)

and Importance of Reporting Operational Events Recommendations _provided by this Circular included:

(1) Licensees should review their guidance to STAS and Shift Supervisors so that the use of STAS will be optimized. Also, licensees should suitably define the functional duties of the

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STA during operating and shutdown condition '

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(2) Licensees should review with their staffs the importance of ensuring information regarding off-normal events is reported to the NR 'The licensee developed the following procedures to address the recommendations of this Circular:

79IS-9ZZ01 - STA Shift Conduct 79AC-9ZZ02 - Licensee Event Report Preparation 7I405.02.01 - ISEG Operating Experience Review The inspector concluded that the above procedures acceptably addressed this Circula This Circular is closed for Units 2 and C. (0 pen) IEC 80-05 - Emergency Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and Onsite Supply ~

This Circular described an incident where five barrels of lube oil were added to the engine air box of an operating diesel generator through a mismarked drain connectio Recommendations provided by this Circular included:

(1) Verify the existence and adequacy of procedures or instructions for adding lubricating oil to safety-related equipment .

The licensee issued Mechanical Maintenance Instruction 19 which provides guidance in this are It identified where oil is to be added, what type to use, and the expected rise in site glass level for every barrel adde In addition, tags were attached to the emergency diesels in Unit 2, which identified the proper lube oil filling connection. The tags have not yet been attached in Unit 3. Specific instructions for other safety-related equipment was considered unnecessary based upon the journeyman level of experience of maintenance mechanic (2) Verify that personnel are trained in approved procedures and demonstrate an ability for using these procedures to add oil while the diesel generator is operating Procedure 91PE-1DG01, Appendix L, describes the procedure for adding lube oil to a running diesel generator. Lesson Plan NMC61-00-85-01 addresses this concern and shows that Circular 80-05 is read in class along with the Palo Verde procedure for lube oil addition.

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(3) Verify appropriate procedures exist on the proper addition of lube oil to other vital equipment The licensee incorporates instructions into Work Order packages -

as needed for filling equipment during Preventive or Corrective Maintenanc (4) . Verify the lube oil usage rate of each diesel under full load conditions. Maintain an adequate inventory of lube oil consistent with the Technical Specification required time period for fuel oil supply: ,

Palo Verde maintains'a more than adequate seven day supply of lube oil, conservatively established, onsite. ..In addition, they are able to have additional 11ube-oil, supplied to the site within 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> ;

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The inspector was satisfied with the,li'censee's actions concerning this Circular.~ Th'is Circular-is closed for Unit 2'

but will remain open for; Unit 3 until tags's'pecifying. lube oil addition points have been attached to the< Unit'3. diesel

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-3. Follow-up of Inspector Identifiedi ltems

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(Closed) Unresolved Items 50-529/84-15-01 and-50-530/84-09-01'

No Purchase Orders or Specifications for Receipt Inspections of Combustion Engineering (CE) Procured Items Previous Inspection The inspector had reviewed documentation packages of m'aterial procured by Combustion Engineering (CE) from vendors. He was unable to determine if the proper quality documentation, such as specifications, was available onsite. This quality documentation would enable the QC receipt inspector to reference the applicable requirements for material acceptabilit This Inspection The inspector randomly chose six purchase orders (PO) to verify that the applicable material specification, referenced on the P0, was available onsite for receipt inspector referenc P0s 9771149, 9870047, 9602929, 9971230, F156001, and F158941 were chosen. All specifications were found located in the Bechtel Design Document Control Center (DDCC) records are As a result-of this unresolved item, the licensee identified an additional problem with receiving inspections of CE procured materia When source inspections are not performed for CE procured items, receiving inspections must be performed that compare the quality documentation for the items with the requirements of the applicable specification Instances had occurred where this had not been don _

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The inspector verified through interview that QC receipt inspectors had been retrained to ensure they perform a receipt inspection of CE supplied material in accordance with the Receiving Inspection Plan and WPP/QCI 4.0, if a source inspection has not been performed. The

' inspector noted that the Receiving Inspection Plan hac been revised .to clarify the requirements for receipt inspection of CE procured item The inspector reviewed four more recent P0s for compliance and procedural requirements had been adhered t P0s F172524, F172355, F172328 and F172317 were reviewe The inspector is satisfied that these items have been resolved. -These items are close . Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Construction Deficiencies (DERs)

The following DERs were dispositioned by the licensee as being not reportable under the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e). The inspector reviewed the DERs described below for reportability and to-determine the thoroughness of the licensee's corrective actio (Closed) DER 84-69 - Reactor Protection System Shunt Trip Contacts Failed to Close Reactor Trip Breakers in CE reactor plants have both Shunt Trip and Undervoltage Trip contacts for redundancy to ensure the breakers ope '

During preoperational testing, the response time of the shunt trip path was measured. The contacts for Channel C'undervoltage trip were jumpered to maintain power to the undervoltage ' coils. During the test, the undervoltage contacts did open, but the shunt trip contacts failed to close as; required and the Channel C Reactor Trip Breaker failed to ope It was discovered that a plastic plate' installed by the vendor, which served as a barrier to separate the various relays in the cabinet, had hindered the closing of the shunt trip contacts due to insufficient clearanc The licensee removed sufficient material from the barrier to provide a 1/16" clearance for the shunt trip contacts for all four channels'

in Unit 1, per Startup Work Authorization (SWA) 2554 Preoperational test 92PE-1SB17 was reperformed and all of the shunt relay contacts closed as required. This work was being tracked for Units 2 and 3 on Design Change Packages (DCPs) 2SJ-SB-047 and 3CJ-SB-047, respectively, and will be completed prior to licensing of the units. The licensee dispositioned this DER as Not Reportable due to the fact that the undervoltage trip contacts did open and the trip breaker would have opened had not temporary power been supplied to the undervoltage coils for the test. In addition, it was discovered during preoperational testing . The inspector agreed with the dispositioning of the DER as not reportable and this DER is close , - . .- .-

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,. - %e (Closed) DER 84-62 Load' Sequencer Did Not Function Properly During

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The"following deficiency was discovered durin'g :preoperational

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When the diesel generator is~run'ning; its breaker is'open, and

' closes on a loss of offsite power (LOP) condition. This causes.the 480V Load. Center'(LC) breaker and the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pump breaker to close 0.5~ seconds later. However, the LOP independently triggers a load shed signal of .one second duratio This provides.a simultaneous open and close signal to the LC and-HPSI pump breakers which causes thes'e breakers to lockout, due to their anti pump circuits, thus preventing the HPSI pump from starting as require ~

The licensee has~ devised an interim solution for Unit I which delays the closing of the diesel generator breaker for two seconds after an LOP signal. This also delays for two seconds the closing signal for the LC and HPSI breakers until the load shed signal passe Furthermore, both-breakers' closing springs have been readjusted to

,_ be recharged ~after the breakers shut instead of recharging after opening, thus eliminating a two to five second delay in closin These changes have been accomplished on Unit 1.per DCP 10E-PG-80 The proposed permanent solution involves adding an interlock toLthe

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HPSI pump circuit which delays the start signal until after the. load shed signal is cleare In addition, the load shed signal will be f eliminated from the LC breaker circuit thus maintaining this breaker shut; These. changes will be implemented in Units 2 and 3 per DCPs t 2SE-PG-023 and 3CE-PG-023 respectively prior to licensing these unit Implementation will occur in Unit 1 prior to-the warranty run per DCP 10E-PG-02 Again, this deficiency was discovered during'preoperational te' stin The inspector concurred with the disposition of this DER and it is close (Closed) DER 84-90 - Incorrectly Staked Reactor Vessel Snubber

Shim Pins

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Eighteen of twenty-four core stabilizing lug shim pins in Unit 2 were found to be improperly staked. Core stabilizing lug shims provide the required core support during a Design Basis Event.- The shims are removable (bolted) to accommodate field sizing and machining. The pins for the shims are used to prevent bolt ,

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rota tion.- The pins are secured by staking or upsetting the material

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The DER reported that the bolts were torqued in place and were i

' expected to retain .their preload against flow-induced vibratory l

loads with or without the pin In addition, the shims would still I

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be held in place in the unlikely event of a loss of preload in the bolts, due to the close tolerance between shim and bracket surface The licensee reinspected Unit I shim pins and found no other deficiencies. The shim pins have been properly staked in Unit 2 per CE site process sheet 808-650100. Unit 3 will be inspected in this area per CE site process sheet 807-65010 This DER is close (Closed) DER 84-39 - LPSI and Containment Spray Pumps Have Exhibited Abnormal Rumbling Noises The Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps exhibited cavitation about one foot below the pump casing in the flow range of 2800 gpm to 3400 gpm. Likewise, the containment spray pumps, of a similar design and suction piping configuration, exhibited cavitation in the same location at 1800 gpm to 2800 gpm. NCRs SM-4201 and SM-4229 described this deficienc The cavitati(n was manifested as a rumble and was apparently due to the suction piping configuration and prerotation of the inlet stream by the pump impeller. LPSI pumps are required to operate in this flow range during a LOCA only briefly, and containment spray pumps not at all. The licensee revised the procedure for shutdown cooling-operations to incorporate a warning not to operate the LPSI pumps in the 2500 gpm to 3500 gpm flow range during shutdown cooling operations. NCRs SM-4201 and SM-4229 were dispositioned use-as-i Responsibility for addressing this DER was transferred to NRR. They have concluded that the LPSI and CS pumps are qualified to carry out their intended safety functions without any modifications, as documented in SSER No. This DER is close e. (Closed) DER 84-106 - Spurious Lcad Shed o'f Balance of Plant (B0P)

ESFAS Two spurious electrical load sheds, due to the BOP.ESFAS, occurred in Unit 1 prior to fuel' load. The two loads shed were the Train B 4160V switchgear and the associated 480V load centers. It was determined by the licensee that the Train B load sequencer module had failed. Subsequent investigation showed that two integrated circuits and one voltage regulator within'the sequencer module had faile The vendor of the B0P ESFAS components reviewed these component failures and verified that they were indeed random and did not indicate any inherent design deficiencie The licensee replaced the sequencer module with a unit from spares, repaired the old module and returned it to spares. The inspector concurs with the not reportable disposition of this DER, due to the

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fact that the failure was random, could have occurred any time during plant life, and does not meet the reportability criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

This DER is close (Closed) DER 84-83 - Cavitation in the HPSI Injection Lines Originally, flow in the four safety injection lines from the HPSI pumps was controlled by throttle valve However, due to the unreliability of the valves' limit switch s'ettings and the consequent inability to reproduce flow consistently, a' flow orifice was installed upstream of each valve to balance flow between the lines, and allow more relidble control of HPSI flow. .This caused the flow velocity to increa'se significantly which resulted in~

cavitation in the downstream'90 pipe elbow.. The elbows Were opened

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and inspected. Slight cavitation damage in the form of pitting, less than two mils deep, was~ noticed. -This damage was' negligibl ,

This Schedule 160 piping would only be s'ubjected to minor damage of this nature during the short injection' phase o~fsHPSI flow during a LOC r-

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the licensee to attempt to correct this'roble p -DCPs ISM-SI'-150 and 2SM-SI-150, in Units'I and'2.re'spectively,lwere complete These added orifices downstream of the HPSI flow contro1> valve Also, these DCPs inverted the; flow' control valves themselves 180 s'o that flow moved under the valve' seat and dis >>

Cognizant startup engineers responsible for testing this system stated that these design modifications had apparently eliminated the proble .

These design modifications are being tracked for Unit 3 on DCP 3CM-SI-15 This DER is close . Observation of Hot Functional Testing in Unit 2 The inspector witnessed several aspects of Hot Functional Testing (HFT)

in progress in Unit 2 including: Attending morning startup meetings to assess the resolution of problems and briefing of plant status, Observing control room activities during plant heatup and the conduct-of various test procedure Review of the official Hot Functional Test controlling document, 90HF-22Z01. The inspector ensured all initial conditions, plant conditions, environmental conditions and prerequisites were signed off as applicable in the procedure. He also reviewed procedure steps to ensure they were signed off, data was properly collected,

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and the position of a sample of control room equipment was consistent with that required by the test procedur The inspector was satisfied that HFT 'was being conducted in an

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orderly fashion, in accordance with FSAR commitment No violations or deviations were identifie '

6. Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee personnel indicated in paragraph 1 on June 28, 1985. The scope and findings of the-inspection described in

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this report were discussed.