IR 05000482/1987013

Insp Rept 50-482/87-13 on 870501-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Followup on Previously Identified NRC Items,Operational Safety Verification & Monthly Surveillance Observation

ML20215E241
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	06/12/1987
From:	Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Hunter D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215E232	List: IR 05000482/1987013 ML20215E230
References
50-482-87-13, NUDOCS 8706190305
Download: ML20215E241 (12)

Text

e r- .,.

.

'

~ APPENDIX --

U. S.-NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSION I REGION IV-  !

.NRC.. Inspection' Report: LP: NPF-42

'

50-482/87-13 Docket:_ 50-482 Licensee: l Wolf.. Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)

P. 0. Box 411

.

Burlington, Kansas 66839

-'

~ Facility Name: ' Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

Ins'pection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted:' May 1-31, 1987 ,

I f' .

Inspector *

~

010/Yh/4 ' . L&nbWLv b S 0 l' ]

J E. Cummins, Schlor. Resident inspector, liate -l perations  !

'

s ///

mz n/M B. L. Bartlett, Resident Reactor Inspector, c/r/g >"

'Date Operations I a

Q Approved: It 87 D. R. Hunter, Chief, Reactor Project Section B Date Reactor Projects Branch ,

-

i

, 3 8706190305 B70615 l PDR ADOCK 05000482 G PDR

3

,-

'

M -- c  ;

i

^ , :.t ::L ,. [. ,

"y e o + i

. .

,

)

. Inspection S'ummaryX l Inspection Conducted' May 1-31,:1987 (Report 50-482/87-13)

'

<

(. Areas' Inspected:' Routine, unannounced' inspection including. plant status,

, followup;on previouslyeidentified NRC. items,. operational safety verification,

'

' monthly' surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, review of i '

licensee _ event" reports, 10 CFR Part 21. report followup, onsite event followup, 1 physical 1 security, verification, and radiological protection.-

--

',ResultsiL Within'the 10 areastinspected, no' violations or deviations wer identified... One unresolved-item is. identified'in paragraph /

?

k T

. . .-

.

. d,

>

w

.

- _ _ _ - _ _

.

..

L- f .

t DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel i

R. M. Grant, Vice President, Quality

• D. Boyer,' Plant Manager j

. O. L. Maynard, Manager, Licensing b C. M. Estes, Superintendent of Operations M. D. Rich, Superintendent of Maintenance

• G. Williams, Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative Services  !

'*W. J. Rudolph, QA Manager-WCGS

• A. A. Freitag, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE), WCGS

• Nichols, Plant Support Superintendent K. Peterson, Licensing q

• Pendergrass,' Licensing '

• M. Lindsay, Supervisor, Quality Systems

• J. Hoch, QA Technologist

~* A. Zell, Training Manager

• E. Lehmann, NSE Engineer

,

I

• J. Goode, Licensing Engineer

• A. S. Mah, Superintendent of General Training The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.

I

• Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on June 2, 198 . Plant' Status The plant operated in Mode 1 during the inspection period except during the time period described below:

On May 28, 1987, the plant tripped from 100 percent power due to a loss of electric power to the turbine electric-hydraulic control system (see paragraph 9). The plant was returned to power operations in Mode 1 on May 29, 198 . Followup on Previously Identified NRC Items (Closed) Violation (8617-01): Failure To Perform Activities In Accordance With Specified Procedure During a records review of vaulted surveillances, the NRC inspector observed that the wrong revision of a surveillance had been used for performance and that the procedure for the wrong train was used. The licensee counseled the technician who had performed the surveillance, made

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - -

. ,

ib

%

J

,

,

4-

'

-

e" .

the' violation required. reading.for chemistry, and uncontrolled: data. sheets, have been removed from chemistry files. This violation is closed.

~

f(Closed) Violation (8618-01): Failure To Comply With Licensee's Temporary'

'

' Modification Procedure

,

' <

Durin'g a review.of two temporary modification orders, the NRC inspecto . identified-instances where-~the procedures had not been followed. The

. licensee' stressed the importance ~of: paying attention to detail to supervisory personnel:and made this. violation a part of operations, maintenance, Land instrumentation and control (I&C)' required reading. This

,,' violation is closed.= >

.(Closed).-Violation' (8618-02): .Failu're To-Lock Valve In Accordance With

. Procedure During a routine plant tour, the NRC inspector.found three valves improperly lockwired in the neutral position. The NRC inspector verifie that the valves were immediately pr_operly lockwired,- that distinctive blue tags'have'been-'added to locked neutral valves,-that the appropriate

. surveillance procedure has been-revised to clearly lockwire the valves, and that this. violation was made required reading.for operations-personnel. This' violation is close ' . Operational Safety Verification The NRC inspectors' verified that the facility is being operated. safely and

'in conformance with regulatory requirements by. direct observation of licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing facility record ~The NRC_ inspectors,.by observation of randomly selected activities and i..nterview of personnel verified that' physical security, radiation protection, and' fire protection activities were' controlle "

By observing accessible components for correct valve position and electrical: breaker position', and by observing control room indication, the NRC inspectors ~ confirmed the operability of selected portions of safety related systems. The NRC inspectors also visually inspected safet components for leakage, physical damage, and other impairments that could

~

prevent them from performing their designed function Niected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

During a review of surveillances to verify that air check valves were

'

periodically tested, the NRC inspector identified that the main steam

' isolation' valves (MSIVs) safety-related air check valves were not in the .

"

testing program. Licensee personnel stated that these valves were not l required-to be tested under ASME Section XI criteria. These same valves !

were replaced during the first refueling outage as a precaution since the WCGS MSIV/ air check valve arrangement was capable of failing in the same ;

.. ,

K L

manner as identified in IE Information Notice No. 85-35, " Failure of

-

Air Check Valves to. Seat." ~WCGS Operational Assessment Review Form (0AR)85-0176, stated that standardized nuclear unit power. plant system (SNVPPS) MSIVs were not subject to a similar failure since valve closure:would be initiated upon the beginning of the event and the

~

instrument air system would not have time-to slowly-depressurize prior to

~the valves being required to close. However, when questioned by the NRC inspector, the licensee was unable to identify the signal which would close the MSIVs. This will remain an unresolved item pending resolution of the need to periodically test the MSIV air check valves (482/8713-01). Monthly Surveillance Observation i; The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed surveillance test procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC.

'

inspectors considered the following elements while inspecting surveillance activities:

o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance-with an approved procedur o The. surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirement o Required test instrumentation was calibrated, o Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were satisfie o Test data was accurate and complete. Where appropriate, the NRC inspectors = performed independent calculations of selected test data to verify their accurac o The performance of the surveillance procedure conformed to applicable administrative procedure o The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the test results met'the required limit Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed below:

o STS KJ-005A, Revision 8, " Manual Auto Start, Synchronization, and Loading of Emergency Diesel Generator NE-01," performed on May 1, 198 o STS AL-101, Revision 5, " Motor Driven Aux FW Pump "A" Inservice Test," performed on May 7, 198 .

.

. ,

)

o 'STS SE-001, Revision 6, " Power Range Adjustment to Calormetric,"

performed on Nay 8, 198 _

o STS EJ-201, Revision 5, "RHR System Inservice Valve Test," (for EJ FCV611 only) performed on May 27, 198 o STS EJ-100B, Revision 1, "RHR System Pump 'B'_ Test," performed on May 27, 198 ;

o STS SG-001, Revision 4, " Seismic Instrumentation Channel Checks,"

performed on May 28, 198 o STS BG-001, Revision 3, " Boron Injection Flow Path Verification," i performed on May 28, 1987, o STS SE-002, Revision 0, " Manual Calculation of Reactor Thermal Power," performed on May 27, 198 o _STS BG-206, Revision 2, "RCS Inservice Valve Test," performed on April 1,198 No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation The NRC inspector observed maintenance activities performed on safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The following elements were considered by the NRC inspector during the observation and/or review of the maintenance activities:

o LCOs were met and, where applicable, redundant components were operable, o Activities complied with adequate administrative controls, o Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were use o Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations)

was made available when appropriat o Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certifie o Required radiological controls were implemente o Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriat e

l o Required alignments and surveillances to verify post maintenance I operability were performe )

o Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when  !

'

appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work activitie ' Selected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work ^f ~

requests listed below were observed and related documentation reviewed by the NRC inspector: ,

N Activity WR 50571-87, Monthly Inspection of Main Steam Isolation Valves ABHV011, 14, 17, and 20  !

WR 52602-86, Safety Injection Pump PEM01B, 2-Year Maintenance No violations or deviations were identifie .

! Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER)

During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors performed followup on Wolf Creek LERs. The LERs were reviewed to ensure:

o Corrective action stated in the report has been properly completed or work is in progres l o Response to the event was adequat o Response to the event. met license conditions, commitments, or other applicable regulatory requirement o The information contained in the report satisfied applicable ,

I reporting requirement o Generic issues were identifie '

The LERs discussed below were reviewed and closed:

LERs 482/87-008 and 482/86-063: Control Room Ventilation Signal Caused by Chlorine Monitor Spurious Spike A spurious spike on Control Room Air Intake Chlorine Monitor GK AITS caused a control room ventilation isolation signal (CRVIS). The cause of- ;

the spike could not be determined and the monitor was returned to servic The licensee is working cn a design change to correct the unnecessary CRVISs generated by the chlorine monitor a

. .

LER 482/86-071: Engineered Safety Features Actuation-Control Room Ventilation Isolation An optics circuit bulb failed in Chlorine Monitor GK AITS-3 causing two CPVISs. Troubleshooting after the first CRVIS did not identify the failed optics circuit bulb as the cause. The licensee is working on'a design change to correct the unnecessary CRVISs generated by the chlorine monitor LER 482-86-064: TS Violation-Containment Isolation Valve Opened During Maintenance Activity Contrary to TS 3.9.4, Containment Isolation Valve EN HV-01 was opened while fuel was being moved in the core. The valve was open for approximately 55 minutes for maintenance. This LER was made requi red reading for licensed personnel who control operation of valve LER 482/86-065: Control Room Ventilation Isolating Signal Caused by Chlorine Monitor Tape Breakage The paper sensing tape broke in Chlorine Monitor GK AITS-3 causing a CRVIS. The licensee is working on a design change to prevent the unnecessary CRVISs generated by the chlorine monitor LER 482/86-069: Reactor Trip Caused By Failed Main Feedwater Flow Transmitter An equipment failure in a main feedwater (MFW) flow transmitter caused the

"A" MFW control valve to open greater than required, resulting in main turbine trip and MFW isolation on Hi-Hi steam generator (S/G) level and subsequent reactor trip and auxiliary feedwater actuation on Lo-Lo S/G level. The licensee replaced the failed transmitte LER 482/85-072: Reactor Trip Caused By Personnel Error A cognitive personnel error by a licensed operator in allowing insufficient time for S/G levels to stabilize following manual adjustment of MFW control valve positions resulted in Hi-Hi S/G water levels which caused a turbine trip /MFW isolation causing a subsequent reactor trip on Lo-Lo S/G water level during a plant startup. Operations management met with each Shift Supervisor to discuss this event and as the licensed operating staff has gained experience in startups, the number of S/G water level control problems has decrease LER 482/86-38: Reactor Trip Due To Lo-Lo Condenser Level Signal While performing a surveillance, a technician failed to completely close an isolation valve and when a level switch was vented a Lo-Lo condenser level signal was generated. The Lo-Lo condenser level signal initiated a trip of the condensate pumps and MFW pumps which in turn caused a reactor trip on Lo-Lo S/G water level. This surveillance will now be performed

. . . , .

'

while the unit is shutdown and a review of other surveillances (with the exception of calibration procedures) was performed to see if any schedule changes.were necessary. Calibration' procedures will be reviewed as they-are performed. In addition, a plant modification request was initiated to

~

change the standpipe arrangement and this LER was made required-readin LER 482/87-005: Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation (AFAS) Caused By Breaking

,

Condenser Vacuum On two se'parate occasions,. turbine generator (T/G) Hi vibration alarms were rece.ived and in.accordance with procedure control room personnel opened th'e vacuum breakers to slow down the T/G. As designed, the vacuum wasl lost and a.MFW isolation occurred resulting in an expected AFA Plant operating procedures were changed to remind operators of the expected AFAS on breaking condenser vacuu . 10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup .The NRC inspector, by review of documents and discussions with licensee personnel, verified that the 10 CFR Part 21 reports discussed below had been reviewed and_ appropriately acted on by the license (Closed) P21/87-11: General Electric HFA Relays Could Experience Incorrect Operations This Part 21 from General Electric reported that HFA auxiliary relays manufactured between January 1983 and October 1986 could fail to provide correct contact operation when deenergized after having been i continuously energized with AC power. The problem was caused by the incorrect installation of a stop tab in the rela The licensee determined that'six of the potentially bad relays were on site. The six relays had not been installed, they were spares. The relays were tested in accordance with General Electric instructions and determined to operate properly. Documentation of these activities is ,

contained in Wolf Creek Industry Technical Information Review and Evaluation No. 0027 (Closed) P21/87-35: High Moisture Can Affect Spec 200 Current to Voltage Cards 2AI-I2V and 2AI-I3V During Long Term Storage

{

l Foxboro Company reported that storage of the Spec 200 cards in an j environment of high moisture could result in excessive leakage in a i monolithic ceramic capacitors that were used on the cards that had j been manufactured up to August 1983. AtWolfgreek,thesecardsare i stored in Level A storage which exceeds the 40 and 95 percent j relative humidity environment that could cause the problem as stated 4 by Foxbor l l

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

..; , .

.

l The NRC resident inspector provided copies of the 10 CFR Part 21 reports listed below to the licensee for review and action, if require CFR Part 21s:

87-36: Limitorque Limit Switch Rotors Do Not Make Contact With Fingers 87-38: Morrison-Knudsen 130 VDC Relay Failure 87-41: Cooper-Bessemer Internal Diesel Generator Engine Failure

' 87-42: Basler Electric 0-Ring Cracking On Fairbanks Morse DG Exciters

-

87-44: Cooper Energy Services DG Engine Fire Due to Nuts Not As Specified 87-46: 'Isomedix Inc. Dose Rate Certification Questions Onsite Event Followup The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of a nonemergency event that occurred during this report period. The NRC inspectors reviewed control room logs and discussed the event with cognizant personnel. The NRC inspectors verified the licensee had responded to the events in accordance with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required in a timely fashion. The event that occurred during this report period is 1 listed in the table below. The NRC inspectors will review the LER for this event and will report any findings in a subsequent NRC inspection repor Date Event Plant Status Cause 5/28/87 Rx Trip Mode 1 Loss of Turbine Electric-Hydraulic Control l

!

Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below: 1 The reactor trip occurred when a nonsafety-related switchboard (PG11K),

which powered the turbine electric-hydraulic control (EHC) system, was lost due to a faulty circuit breaker. When electric power to the EHC system was interrupted, the turbine main steam control valves close This caused the steam generator water level to shrink below the Lo-Lo set point resulting in the reactor trip. It was determined from this trip and subsequent testing that a permanent magnet generator (PMG), which was an alternate electric power supply to the EHC system, would not supply the

. .

.

-

, ,

+c

.p . e .

x >

s

necessary power .to the EHC' system when power supplied from Switchboard PG11K~ was lost.: The. licensee'is inspecting the operation of the PMG and

• ' EHC' system when the alternate power source is los .

No violations or deviations were identifie . - Physical Security Verification The NRC inspectors verified that the facility physic'al security plan (PSP). g

>

was being' complied with by direct observation of licensee facilities and-

-

!

'

security personnel.

e The NRC inspectors, by observation of randomly. selected' activities, verified that search equipment was operable, that the' protected area barriers and vital area barriers were well maintained, that access control procedures were Lfollowed,'and that appropriate compensatory measures were followed

. _ .

when equipment was inoperabl No violations or deviations were: identifie ..

i 1 Radiological Protection'

By performing the following activities, the NRC inspe t ors verified that radiologically-related activities were controlled'in accordance with the licensee's procedures and regulatory' requirements:

o Reviewed documents such as active radiation work permits and the health physics shift turnover log o Observed 3ersonnel activities in the radiologically controlled area (RCA)suc1as:

. Use of the required dosimetry _ equipment

. -" Frisking out" of the RCA'

. Wearing of appropriate anti-contamination clothing where required o Inspected postings of radiation and contaminated areas o Discussed activities with radiation workers and health physics ;

supervisors ,

No violations or deviations were identifie . Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable item, items of noncompliance, or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph !

.-

-,

('f[. 3 w .#<, :,

r-

,s

1l

,

12 ,,

13. ' Exit' Meeting.' i

-The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and

'

findings of.this inspection on June 2, 198 i,

.q

!

!

i I

!

.

!

)

!

l

!

-

l I

f

!

!

!

i

!

i j