IR 05000482/1999006

Insp Rept 50-482/99-06 on 990502-0612.Two Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violations.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20196K056
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	07/02/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196K055	List: IR 05000482/1999006 ML20196K050
References
50-482-99-06, 50-482-99-6, NUDOCS 9907080131
Download: ML20196K056 (17)

Text

4.

.

ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-482-License No.: NPF-42 Report No.: 50-482/99-06 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: 1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas Dates: May 2 through June 12,1999 Inspectors: F. L. Brush, Senior Resident inspector B. A. Smalldridge, Resident inspector Approved By: David N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENTS: Supplemental Information

~

9907000131 990702 PDR ADOCK 05000482 G PM

.

.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Wolf Creek Generating Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50-482/99-06 Operations

A control room operator and a maintenance technician did not correctly perform a Technical Specification required surveillance procedure during the main turbine generator startup. The causes of the error were an inadequate prejob briefing and poor communications during the test. The licensee successfully reperformed the surveillance procedure. The failure to properly perform the surveillance test is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-1847 (Section O4.1).

. The licensee's process and requirements for controlling excessive overtime were effective. Licensee personnel did not exceed the work-hour limitations specified in the governing procedure without first receiving authorization from the plant manager or designee (Section 06.1).

. During performance of the corrective actions for the failure to include Valve EGV-0105 in the locked valve program, the licensee discovered an additional 49 component cooling water system valves that were not included in the program. The licensee revised the appropriate procedure to include the additional valves. The licensee determined that the safety significance was low. The failure to include the valves in the locked valve program was an additional example of Noncited Violation 50-482/9902-04 and is not being cited separately (Section 08.2).

Maintenance

• The inspectors concluded that the loose material found in the reactor building during the inspection prior to startup from the refueling outage was not of sufficient quantity to affect operation of the containment recirculation sumps. The reactor building overall material condition was good (Section M2.1).

. The licensee's new central work control process incorporated just in-time work package preparation, up-to-date work package review, work package approval by a senior reactor operator for current plant conditions, and inclusion of the work package in the approved daily schedule. The licensee realized an overall increase in personnel safety and reactor safety by reducing the opportunity for work to be accomplished outside of the comprehensive work planning, scheduling, and approval process (Section M6.1). l

l

- From November 1997 to May 6,1999, the licensee failed to demonstrate the operability of all the auxiliary shutdown panel controls. This was a violation of Technical Specification Section 4.3.3.5.2. The contacts were subsequently tested and found to be ,

satisfactory. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action l program as Performance improvement Request 99-1777 (Section M8.1). I

.

-2-

. On April 9,1999, the licensee entered Mode 6 without first performing an analog channel operational test for the source range neutron flux rnonitors. The failure to perform these tests, before entering Mode 6, violated the surveillance requirement of Technical Specification Section 4.9.2.c. This is a noncited violation and is in the l

'

licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-1244 (Section M8.2).

Enaineerina

• The inspectors conducted an abbreviated review of Year 2000 activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction 2515/141, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K)

Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." Conclusions regarding the Year 2000 readiness of this facility are not included in this summary. The results of this review will be combined with reviews of Year 2000 programs at other plants in a summary report to be issued by July 31,1999 (Section E1.1).

Plant Succort

• Health physics personnel provided thorough coverage of the reactor building closecut inspection prior to startup from the refueling outage. The licensee implemented effective radiological controls (Section R4.1).

. The licensee's use of the RADS monitoring system to monitor radiological work in the containment building during the refueling outage greatly improved the licensee's efforts to maintain dose as low as reasonably achievable. RADS was comprised of a combination of radio communications, teledosimetry, and video monitoring in a single system. This enabled health physics technicians to monitor work in containment from a remote location. The licensee reported that the overall dose received during the outage was approximately 141 REM, which was the lowest dose received since Refueling Outage 2 (Section R6.1).

I

I i

.

.

Report Details i

Summarv of Plant Status The plant began the report period on May 2,1999, with Refueling Outage 10 in progress. On May 9,1999, the licensee closed the main generator output breaker, ending the refueling outage. The plant reached 100 percent power on May 14,1999, and operated at essentially full

. power the remainder of the report perio f. Operations

.01 Conduct of Operations

>

01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work phns were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and noted no problem O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems:

• Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A, B, and T; and

. Emergency Diesel Generators A and Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptabl Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Failure to Correctiv Perform a Surveillance Procedure Durina Turbine Generator Startuo Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed the licensee perform portions of the main turbine generator startup using System Operating Procedure SYS AC-120," Main Turbine Generator Startup," Revision 44. The licensee also performed Surveillance Procedure STS IC-730C," Turbine Trip Response Time Stop Valve Closure," Revision 4, in conjunction with the turbine generator startu i I

l

.

.

-2-b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed the licensee perform Surveillance Procedure STS IC-730C and portions of Procedure SYS AC-120. The licensee performed Surveillance Procedure STS IC-730C to meet the turbine trip response time stop valve closure timing requirements of Technical Specification Section 4.3. The inspectors observed that, when the licensee performed Procedure SYS AC-120, step 6.2.4, in conjunction with Surveillance Procedure STS IC-730C, the control room operator tripped the main turbine using the control room manual trip button. Procedure STS IC-730C required the maintenance technician to generate the turbine trip at a local panel. Tripping the main turbine from the control room performs the trip at a different location in the circuitry than does tripping the turbine at the local panel as required by procedure. The inspectors informed the shift supervisor and control room operator of the observation. The licensee immediately halted the turbine generator startup and reviewed the status of the surveillance procedure. The licensee determined that Surveillance Procedure STS IC-730C had not been performed properl The note prior to Procedure SYS AC-120, step 6.2.4, stated:"If STS IC-730C, Turbine Trip Response Time Stop Valve Closure, is not current, instrumentation and control will perform it at the same time as step 6.2.4." Surveillance Procedure STS lC-730C, Section 1, stated, in part, that the manual turbine trip normally generated by Procedure SYS AC-120 is replaced by a simulated turbine trip on generator trip. A technician was required to generate a trip signal at a local panel rather than from the control roo Technical Sptt:fication 6.8.1.a required, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, a.'d maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 8.b, required that specific procedures for surveillance tests be implemente Operating Procedure SYS AC-120 required that the turbine generator be tripped from a local panel when performing Surveillance Procedure STS IC-730C in conjunction with the turbine startup. Contrary to the procedure, the turbine was tripped using the manual trip pushbutton in the control room instead of at a local pane The failure to follow Operating Procedure SYS AC-120 was a violation. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-1847 (50-482/9906-01).

I The licensee successfully reperformed Procedure SYS AC-120, step 6.2.4, and Surveillance Procedure STS IC-730C, The licensee determined that the root causes of the error were an inadequate prejob briefing and poor communication during the tes l The licensee briefed the operating crews on the error and the importance of good communication l

l l

l

.

J

-

.

-3- Conclusions A control room operator and a maintenance technician did not correctly perform a Technical Specification required surveillance procedure during the main turbine

. generator startup. The causes of the error were an inadequate prejob briefing and poor

, communications during the test. The licensee successfully reperformed the surveillance procedure. The failure to properly perform the surveillance test is a violation of-Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-184 l

' I

- 06 Operations Organization and Administration 0 Station Use of Overtime

, Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the use of overtime at the station preceding and during Refueling Outage 10. This review included the following:

.

Procedure AP 13-001," Guidelines for Wolf Creek Generating Station Staff Working Hours," Revision 5;

'

. NUREG-0737," Clarification of TMl Action Plan Requirements," dated November 1980; and

.

NRC Generic Letter 82-12," Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours," dated June 15,198 Findinas and Observations The inspectors found that the requirements of licensee Procedure AP 13-001, for work-hour limitations, was consistent with the requirements of NUREG-0737 and the guidance in Generic Letter 82-1 The inspectors reviewed overtime records for station personnel from the following departments:

. Operations;

. Maintenance;

. Integrated planning and scheduling; and

. Radiation protectio )

.

The inspectors identified 167 occurrences of authorized overtime from February 1 I through April 26. Of these occurrences, the inspectors reviewed Form APF 13-001-01,

" Authorization to Exceed Work Hour Limitations," Revision 2, for 15 occurrences. Each of the forms reviewed was completed in accordance with Procedure AP 13-001 and )

authorized in advance of the individual exceeding the station's work-hour limitation I

- .

.

..

4 l The inspectors found that the licensee's process and requirements for controlling excessive overtime were effective. Licensee personnel did not exceed the work-hour limitations specified in Procedure AP 13-001 without first receiving authorization from j the plant manager or designe Conclusions f (

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's process and requirements for controlling i excessive overtime were effective. Licensee personnel did not exceed the work-hour limitations specified in the governing procedure, without first receiving authorization from the plant manager or designe I 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

l 08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-482/97-008-00: manual reactor trip due to a steam i leak in an extraction steam isolation valve. On May 20,1997, a third stage extraction steam isolation Valve AFLV0058C developed a body to bonnet leak. The licensee tripped the plant and shut the main turbine ctop valves to isolate the leak. The root

'

cause of the leak was a lack of guidance on the minimum and maximum seating stress and bolt torque for sheet gasket material In April 1993, the licensee replaced the original corrugated iron gasket material with compressed carbon fiber sheet gasket material The work package referenced a maintenance procedure for bolt torque for the valve. However, the amount of torquing did not meet the gasket vendor's required seating pressure. The vendor did not furnish the seating pressure requirements for the new gasket materialin the product description until 199 The licensee's corrective actions included:

. Replacing the gasket in Valve AFLV0058C with a metallic gasket supplied by the valve manufacturer;

. Identifying other valves in high energy systems where metal gaskets had been l replaced with sheet gaskets and the seating pressure did not meet the vendor's j requirements; j

- Replacing the gaskets on valves that did not meet the seating pressure requirements prior to Refueling Outage IX;

. Revising the appropriate maintenance procedures to ensure the seating pressure requirements are considered when using sheet gasket material; and

. Engineering will provide additional guidance on the use of composite sheet gasket materia E

.

s

5-All corrective actions have been completed. 'The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and have no further concern .2 (Closed) LER 50-482/99-001-01: additional valves were not included in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveillance procedure. On January 28, 1999, the licensee identified that the Technical Specification 4.7.3.a requirement for Component Cooling Water Valve EGV-0105, component cooling water to the excess letdown heat exchanger, position verification was not being met. . The licensee initiated Performance improvement Request 99-0258. NRC Inspection Report 50-482/99-02 issued a noncited violat!on for the failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 4.7. During performance of the corrective actions for the failure to include Valve EGV-0105 in the locked valve program, the licensee discovered an additional 49 component cooling water system valves that were not included in the program. The licensee revised the appropriate procedure to include the additional valves. The licensee determined that the safety significance was low. System parameters, such as flow and temperature indications and alarms, would have alerted the operators to a mispositioned valv The failure to include the valves in the locked valve program was an additional example of Noncited Violation 50-482/9902-04 and is not being cited separatel .3 (Closed) LER 50-482/99-004-00: failure to maintain closure of containment penetrations during fuel movement. On April 12,1999, with the plant in Mode 6, licensee personnel discovered that a direct air flow path existed between the containment building and the auxiliary building while fuel was being moved inside containment. The flow path had been established to support residual heat removal system work. The existence of a direct flow path from containment during fuel movement was a violation of Technical Specification 3.9.4.c. This Severity Level IV violation was treated as a noncited violation in Section 04.3 of NRC Inspection Report 50-482/99-03 and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-128 The licensee determined that, despite procedural and process barriers in place to prevent this occurrence, a series of personnel errors occurred during the implementation

- of the work controls process that resulted in a direct air flow path from the containment building to the auxiliary building during fuel movement. The inspectors found the licensee's corrective action adequate to prevent recurrenc :

!

i l

!

.

-6-II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments - Maintenance Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activity:

Work Order GEN 00-002, " Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby," Revision 46 Observations and Findinas I

All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. The i inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when require M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance Inspection Scope (61726)  !

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:

.

STS AL-104," Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Engineered Safety Feature Response Time Test and inservice Pump Test," Revision 6;

.

STS AB-201 A, " Main Steam isolation Valves and Bypass inservice Valve Test,"

Revision 4;

-

STS AL-211," Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Path Verification and Inservice Check Valve Test," Revision 11;

.

STS AL-212 " Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System Flow Path ;

Verification and inservice Check Valve Test," Revision 8; l

.

STN EN-1008," Containment Spray Pump B, Integrated Pump Test,"

Revision 12;

-

STS IC-730C, " Turbine Trip Response Time Stop Valve Closure," Revision 4; and

.

STS KJ-001B, " Integrated Diesel Generator & Safeguards," Revision 2 ;

-

,

.

-7- Observations and Findinas The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specifications with the exception of the procedure discussed in Section O4.1 of this repor M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tou Insoection Scooe (62707)

The inspectors performed an inspection of the reactor building prior to startup following the refueling outage. The reactor coolant system was at normal operating pressure and temperatur Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified the following items during a reactor building tour:

)

. Flashlight;

. Pens;

- Tie wraps;

. Air hose fitting clips;

. Numerous pieces of duct tape; and

. 3 mall amounts of trash and debri The licensee removed the items from the reactor building. The amount of material removed would not heve impacted the operability of the containment recirculation sumps. The inspectors did not observe any active boric acid leaks. The licensee properly secured the equipment used during the outag Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the loose material found in the reactor building during the inspection prior to startup from the refueling outage was not of sufficient quantity to affect operation of the containment recirculation sumps. The material was remove The reactor building overall material condition was goo M6 Maintenance Organization and Administration M6.1 Central Work Control and Processina Inspection Scope (62707) l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's change to the use of a new central work control proces l l

!

.

..

-8-

, ' Observations and Findinas 1The inspectors noted a change in the licensee's process for controlling and processing

' work during recent Refueling Outage 10. During discussions with the maintenance manager, the inspectors learned that the licent,ee planned to continue with this new process for normal nonoutage work in the plan The inspectors found that the new process electronically tied the approved work schedule to the creation and approval of the work packages for use in the plant. This increased the licensee's efficiency and accountability associated with work in the plan The inspectors noted that each. work package was prepared the day before being worked and the status of each work package was electronically tracked once it was J

' issued.- The inspectors also observed that each work package received a 100 percent review by central work control personnel to verify inclusion of the current versions of:

. Drawings and technical manual information;-

.- Work orders, procedures, and forms;

• Compensatory permits and permit numbers;

. Radiation work permits; and

. ' Clearance order numbers and clearance order This review was intended to reduce the amount of time maintenance technicians spend updating work packages before beginning work. The inspectors observed that this should also result in fewer work packages being issued with incorrect and incomplete

. Information, thus reducing the probability of errors that could impact safet The inspectors observed that the new work control psess also incorporated a -

preapproval process which prevented work packages from being issued without inclusion in the daily schedule and without being approved by a senior reactor operator for the current plant conditions. The work packages were required to be returned to the central work processing location immediately after the work was completed, accomplished in part, or not accomplished, in order to update the status of the work

. package.' Approved work packages were not allowed to reside outside of the central wc;t processing location if not being worked according to the schedule. This ensured thei each work package was authorized for a specific sequence, time, and duration; j reruiting in a decrease in the probability that work would be accomplished on the wrong i components, when prohibited by plant conditions, or outside of the approved daily work !

schedule. Specifically, the licensee's new central work control process should prevent

.

work from being accomplished without preapproval by the maintenance department and

'

j the shift superviso l

1The inspectors found that the licensee's new central work control process incorporated !

just-in-time work package preparation, up-to-date work package review, work package l

'

approval by a senior reactor operator for current plant conditions, and inclusion of the work package in the approved daily schedule. The inspectors concluded that this resulted in an overall increase in personnel safety and reactor safety by reducing the l

l

i

.

.

opportunity for work to be accomplished outside of the comprehensive work planning, scheduling, and approval proces Conclusions The inspectors determined that the licensee's new central work control process incorporated just-in-time work package preparation, up-to-date work package review, work package _ approval by a senior reactor operator for current plant conditions, and inclusion of the work package in the approved daily schedule. This resulted in an overall -

increase in personnel safety and reactor safety by reducing the opportunity for work to be accomplished outside of the comprehensive work plannir,g, scheduling, and approval proces M8 ' Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902) -

M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-482/97-027-00: missed surveillance on the auxiliary shutdown panel. On May 6,1999, the licensee determined that on November 22,1997, maintenance technicians did not adequately perform the surveillance test on the auxiliary shutdown panel control circuits. The technicians did not check 16 switch contacts, as required. On May 5,1999, the licensee successfully tested the contact The licensee determined that the root cause for missing 15 contacts was personnel error when the surveillance procedure was revised in November 1997. The root cause for missing the remaining contact was that vendor wiring was not per a design document. The licensee corrected the procedure to include the 15 contacts in the surveillance test. The licensee initiated a work request to reland the vendor wiring on the correct terminal. The wiring error did not affect the operability of the circui Technical Specification Section 4.3.3.5.2 requires that the auxiliary shutdown panel controls be demonstrated operable every 18 months. From November 1997 to May 6, 1999, the licensee failed to demonstrate the operability of all the auxiliary shutdown I

panel controls. This is a violation of Technical Specification Section 4.3.3.5.2. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective

, action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-1777 (50-482/9906-02).

M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-482/99-003-00: source range nuclear instruments not tested before j entering Mode 6. On April 9,1999, the licensee entered Mode 6 without first performing 1 an analog channel operational test for the source range neutron flux monitors. The failure to perform these tests before entering Mode 6 violated the surveillance requirement of Technical Specification Section 4.9. )

t Technical Specification 4.9.2.c, in part, states that each source range neutron flux monitor shall be demonstrated operable by performance of an analog channel operational test at least once per 7 days. The failure to meet this surveillance requirement resulted in entry into an operational mode without meeting the limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements. This is a violation of Technical i

.

.

-10-Specification 4.0.4, which requires that the surveillance requirements be met before 1 entry into the operational mod This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance improvement Request 99-1244 (50-482/9906-03).

The licensee determined that inadequate training on the applicability of Technical Specifications 4.0.4 resulted in the improper mode change. The licensee also found that the surveillance procedures incorrectly stated that performance was not required ,

until 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> before core alterations and that the general procedure for refueling mode { '

operation proWded conflicting guidance on when the surveillances were required to be performe Overall, the safety significance of failing to perform the required tests was low because the surveillances were performed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after entering Mode 6. The inspectors found the licensee's corrective actions suitable to prevent recurrenc . Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 . Review of Year 2000 Proaram (Temoorary Instruction 2515/141)

The inspectors conducted an abbreviated review of Year 2000 activities and documentation using Temporary instruction 2515/141, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K)

Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." The review addressed aspects of Year 2000 management planning, documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Year 2000 testing and validation, notification activities, and contingency planning. Temporary Instruction i 2515/141 used NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency ,

Planning," as the basis for this revie j l

Conclusions regarding the Year 2000 readiness of this facility are not included in this summary. The results of this review will be combined with reviews of Year 2000 programs at other plants in a summary report to be issued by July 31,199 ) l E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E8.1 '(Closed) LER 50-482/97-020-02: failure to meet snubber Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation requirements. LERs 50-482/97-020-00 and -01 were closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-582/99-03 with a noncited violation. LER 50-482/97-020-02 updated the root cause and corrective action for Snubber BG02-R00 The inspectors did not identify any additional Technical Specification violation j

.

-1l-IV. Plant SUDDort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practice Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found no problem R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance

. R4.1 Containment Buildino Closeout insoection Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors accompanied licensee personnel on the reactor building closeout inspection prior to startup from the refueling outag Observations and Findinas Licensee management personnel performed thorough prejob briefings for the reactor building inspection. The assigned health physics technician properly monitored radiological conditions. The health physics technician verified that personnel complied with the radiological work permit requirements. The inspectors observed that all personnel involved practiced as low as reasonably achievable principles. The inspectors had no concern Conclusions The inspectors concluded that health physics personnel provided thorough coverage of the reactor building inspection prior to startup from the refueling outage. The licensee implemented effective radiological control R6 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls Organization and Administration R6.1 Refuelino Outaae 10 As Low As Rasonably Achievable Review Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's dose expenditures for Refueling Outage 10 and the methodologies used to maintain dose as low as reasonably achievabl .

- - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _

O

.

-12- Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted before Refueling Outage 10 that the licensee implemented a combined electronic system referred to as RADS to help reduce the overall dos RADS was comprised of a combination of radio communications, teledosimetry, and video monitoring in a single system. This enabled health physics technicians to monitor work in containment from a remote locatio The remote monitoring stations enabled technicians to visually monitor the workers, to be in communication with the workers, and to track the worker's dose on a continuous basis. The licensee determined that the overall dose to the health physics department alone was reduced by 20 percent during the outage as a redult of using the RADS monitoring system. The overall reduction in dose to the site as a result of RADS was not yet determined. However, the licensee reported that the overall dose received during the outage was approximately 141 REM, which was the lowest dose received since Refueling Outage The inspectors found that the licensee's use of the RADS monitoring system to monitor radiological work in the containment building during the refueling outage greatly improved the licensee's efforts to maintain dose as low as reasonably achievable. With the lessons learned during the implementation and initial use of RADS, the licensee expects to further reduce the dose received during future refueling outage Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's use of the RADS monitoring system to monitor radiological work in the containment building during the refueling outage greatly improved the licensee's efforts to maintain dose as low as reasonably achievabl RADS was cornprised of a combination of radio communications, teledosimetry, and video monitoring in a single system. This enabled health physics technicians to monitor work in containment from a remote location. The licensee reported that the overall dose received during the outage was approximately 141 REM, the lowest dose received since Refueling Outage .

V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The exit meeting was conducted on June 10,1999. The licensee did not express a position on any of the findings in the report.

!

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie . _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ .

-

.

.

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED I Licensee M. J. Angus, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action G. D. Boyer, Chief Administrative Officer J. W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager R. Muench, Vice President Engineering S. R. Koenig, Manager, Performance improvement and Assessment C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering IP 61726 Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observations IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 92901 Followup - Operations IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance IP 92903 Followup - Engineering IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support Tl 2515/141 Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-482/9906-01 NCV Failure to Correctly Perform a Surveillance Procedure During Turbine Generator Startup (Section 04.1)

l 50-482/9906-02 NCV Missed Surveillance on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel

'

(Section M8.1)

50-482/9906-03 NCV Source Range Nuclear instruments not Tested Before Entering Mode 6 (Section M8.2)

l

.  ;

-2- l l

Closed

!

l 50-482/9906-01 NCV Failure to Correctly Perform a Surveillance Procedure During Turbine Generator Startup (Section 04.1)

50-482/9906-02 NCV Missed Surveillance on the Auxiliary Shutduwn Panel (Section M8.1)

50-482/9906-03 NCV Source Range Nuclear Instruments not Tested Before Entering Mode 6 (Section M8.2)

50-482/97-008-00 LER Manual Reactor Trip Due to a Steam Leak in an Extraction Steam isolation Valve (Section 08.1)

50-482/97-020-02 LER Failure to Meet Snubber Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation Requirements (Section E8.1)

50-482/97-027-00 LER Missed Surveillance on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (Section M8.1)

50-482/99-001-01 LER Additional Valves Were not included in the Locked Valve Program or Monthly Valve Position Verification Surveillance Procedure (Section 08.2)

50-482/99-003-00 LER Source Range Nuclear Instruments not Tested Before Entering Mode 6 (Section M8.2)

50-482/99-004-00 LER Failure to Maintain Closure of Containment Penetrations During Fuel Movement (Section 08.3)

)

i