IR 05000482/1987010

Insp Rept 50-482/87-10 on 870401-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status, Operational Safety Verification,Emergency Safety Features Sys Walkdown & Physical Security Verification

ML20214E166
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	05/15/1987
From:	Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Hunter D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214E158	List: IR 05000482/1987010 ML20214E155
References
50-482-87-10, IEIN-85-035, IEIN-85-35, NUDOCS 8705210688
Download: ML20214E166 (13)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. e ., APPENDIX-U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/87-1 LP: NPF-42 Docket: 50-482

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Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCN00) P. O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)' Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site,.Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted:' April 1-30, 1987-Inspectors * M . N

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E. Cummins, Senior Resident Inspector, date' Operations

     > N B. L. Bartlett, Res'ident Reactor Inspector, 'Date Operations

. Approved: [[ 7 D. R. Hunter, Chief, Reactor Project Section B, Date Reactor Projects Branch

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8705210688 PDR 870515 G ADOCK 03000482-pop

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   -2-Inspection Sumary Inspection' Conducted April 1-30,1987 (Report 50-482/87-10)  ,
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' Areas Inspected:- Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status, j operational safety verification, emergency safety features system (ESF) 1 walkdown, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, review of licensee event reports,10 CFR Part 21 report followup, onsite event followup, physical security verification, and radiological protectio Results: Within the 10 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Two' unresolved items are identified in paragraph .

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DETAILS ,

- , Persons Contacted-
  . Principal Licensee' Person'nel -
  *J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services

  '.*R. M.' Grant, Vice President, Quality      .
  :* D.' Boyer, Plant Manager
  * 0.-L. Maynard, Manager, Licensing
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C. M. Estes, Superintendent of Operations M. D. Rich,. Superintendent of Maintenance

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  *M. G. Williams,~ Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative Service *W. J. Rudolph, QA Manager-WCGS
  *A.. A; Freitag, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE), WCGS
  *J. M. Pippin, Manager, NPE M. Nichols.-Plant Support Superintendent K..Peterson, Licensing
  *G. Pendergrass, Licensing    .
  *W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor, Quality Systems
  *C. J. - Hoch, QA Technologist-The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issue * Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on May 1, 198 . . Plant Status
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The plant operated in Mode-1 during the inspection period except during the time periods described below: _e o On April 19, 1987, the reactor tripped from approximately 60 percent power because of-problems in the rod control system. The plant was returned to power operations in Mode l'on April 19, 198 o On April 23, 1987; the reactor trip' ped from approximately 52 percent power because of problems in the rod' control system. The plant was returned to power operations in Mode 1 on April 24, 198 s Operationa'l Safety Verification

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  ' The NRC inspectors verified that;the facility. is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation of licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews.and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing ~ facility record .

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    -4-The NRC inspectors, by observation of randomly selected activities and interviews of personnel verified that physical security, radiation protection, and fire protection activities were controlled. By observing accessible components for correct valve position and electrical breaker position, and by observing control room indication, the NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of selected portions of safety related system The NRC inspectors also visually inspected safety components for leakage, physical damage, and other impairments that could prevent them from perfoming their designed function Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

o On April 10, 1987, during a routine tour of containment, the NRC inspector observed a section of aluminum scaffold flooring approximately five feet long under a walkway on elevation 2026 fee Licensee personnel removed the flooring. At the time the reactor was at 100 percent power. An engineering evaluation by the licensee has determined that the amount of the aluminum would not violate the total amount allowable inside containment and that the section of flooring would not block the surg screen o Westinghouse notified the licensee by letter, SAP 87-145, dated April 8,1987, that there may be an inconsistency between surveillance testing of the safety injection (SI) system, the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) safety analyses, and the Technical Specifications (TS). FSAR safety analyses were based on the time interval between SI actuation and injecting borated water into the reactor coolant system assuming that the refueling water storage tank (RWST) isolation valves open and the volume control tank (VCT) isolation valves shut simultaneously. However, at the WCS the VCT isolation valves are interlocked electrically to the RWST isolation valves so that they do not start shutting until the RWST isolation valves are open. During this interval of time, since the VCT is at a higher pressure, water of a much lower buron concentration than used in the analysis could be injected into the reactor coolant system (RCS). The time for actually injecting borated water of the analyzed boron concentration (approximately 2000 ppm) into the RCS was increased by 15 seconds due to the sequential rather than simultaneous valve logic used at WCGS. The steam line break event is the only safety analysis affected by this added time for valve operatio The licensee has performed a new safety analysis which addressed the increased SI delay time by incorporating the sequential operation of the valves into the analysis. The licensee has also submitted a change to Table 3.3-5, " Engineered Safety Features Response Times," of the TS to reflect the increased time delays in the operation of the RWST and VCT isolation valves. The NRC inspector discussed the new WCS/ Westinghouse safety analysis and the TS change request with

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    -5-the licensee and noted no apparent problems. Pending NRC_ approval-and implementation of this TS change, this is an unresolved item (482/8710-01).

o The licensee has identified penetration fire protection seals (originally installed by B&B Promatec) that were not installed in accordance with design specifications, making it questionable if the fire protection seals could have performed their design functio The seals were originally designed to be installed with a 1-inch dam at each end with the space between the dams filled with a minimum of six inches of foam material. The types of problems identified with the fire protection seals include:

 . Less than the required six inches of foa . Gaps between the foam and penetration walls or the pipe / conduit running through the penetratio Based on the above findings, the licensee has implemented fire watches throughout the plant to meet TS requirements for inoperable seal The licensee is forming a task force to investigate / evaluate thi problem. Pending resolution, including any required corrective action to insure the fire protection penetration seals are capable of performing their design function, this is an unresolved item (482/8710-02).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Safety Features System (ESF) Walkdown The NRC inspectors verified the operability of ESF systems by walking down selected accessible portions of the systems. The NRC inspector verified valves and electrical circuit breakers were in the required position, power was available, and valves were locked where required. The NRC inspectors also inspected system components for damage or other conditions that could degrade system performanc The ESF system walked down during this inspection period and the documents utilized by the NRC inspectors during the walkdown are listed below: System Documents Containment Spray System (EN) Drawing M-12EN01(Q), Revision 0,

    " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Containment Spray System" Checklist (CKL) EH-120, Revision 5,
'     " Containment Spray System Lineup" i
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Accumulator Safety ; DrawingM-12EP01(Q), Revision 0,

 . Injection-(EP)  " Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
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Accumulator Safety' Injection" i Drawing M-02HE01, Revis' ion 8. " Piping

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and Instrumentation Diagram Boron

>    Recycle System" Drawing M-13EP01(Q),' Revision 2,
    " Piping Isometric Accumulator Safety Injection System' Loop No. 1 & 4-
-     Reactor Building" DrawingM-13EPO4(Q), Revision 1,
    "Small Piping Isometric Accumulator Safety Injection System Loop 1-Reactor Building" CKL EP-120, Revision 3, " Accumulator Safety Injection Lineup"
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SYS EP-200, Revis' ion 4,." Accumulator Safety Injection Operations" 1 Selected NRC inspector observations:are discussed below: o A blind. flange located in the nitrogen' supply line to the accumulator injection tanks was not~ verified closed in CKL EP-120, Revision This item was discussed with'the. licensee. - o Valves EP C-001 through C-008-which isolate pressure

  - transmitters to each-accumulator tank were identified as:

instruments valves; however,lthese' appear to be roo valves. This-item was discussed with the licensee.> The licensee indicated that theidiscrepancy would be ~ resolve No violations or deviations were identifie ' Monthly Surveillance Observation The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of 1 surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed ~ surveillance test procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in accordance-with TS requirements ~ and administrative procedures. The NRC inspectors considered the following elements while inspecting surveillance

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i o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved procedur . The' surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirement . . - - - - -

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h Required test instrumentation was calibrate o ' Technical . Specification limiting ~ conditions for-operation (LCO)1were

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l satisfied.- o -Test data was accurate.and complete. Where appropriate,' the NRC inspectors performed independent calculations of selected test data to verify their accuracy. - >

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.o_ The performance of the surveillance' procedure conformed to applicable administrative procedure '

o The. surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the

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test results met the required ., limits; ,

Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed byfthe NRC inspectors are listed below: ~ o _ STS BB-004, Revision 4 "PCS Water Inventory Balance," performed on 4 , April 23, 1987.

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o STS CR-001, Revision 5, " Shift Log For Modes 1, 2, and 3," performed December 15, 1986, January 13 and February ~13, 198 o STS EJ-001, Revision 3. " Containment Inspection," performed from December 11, 1986 to April 10, 1987.

' o 'STS-EP-001, Revision 0, " Safety Injection Accumulator Discharge Valve Test," performed December 13, 1986, January 13, and February 13, 198 o STS IC-908A, Revision 1, " Channel Calibration Accumulator Level Transmitters," performed on December 15,.1986,

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o STS PE-013, Revision 5, " Personnel Airlock Seal Test," performed March 13, 198 o STS PE-014, Revision 2, " Containment Airlocks Test," performed August 28 and September 11, 196 o STS PC-014, Revision 3. " Containment Airlocks Test," performed December 9 and 10,1985, April 19, May 20 and 21,1986 . o STS PE-014, Revision 4, " Containment Airlocks Test," performed November 26 and December 10, 198 _ o STS SE-001, Revision 6, " Power Range Adjustment to Calormetrics," performed on April 23, 198 u

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o STS SP-001, Revision 7, " Process Radiation Monitoring System Source Check and Valve Stroke," performed on April 22, 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation The NRC inspector observed maintenance activities performed on safety-related. systems and components to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The following elements were considered by the NRC inspector during the observation and/or review of the maintenance activities: o LCOs were met and, where applicable, redundant components were operable, o Activities complied with adequate administrative controls, o Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were use o ; Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations) was made available when appropriat o Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certified, o Required radiological controls were implemented, o Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate, o Required alignments and surveillances to verify post maintenance operability were performe o Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when dppropriate and quality Control personnel observed designated Work activitie Selected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work requests listed below were observed and related documentation reviewed by the NRC inspector: N Activity o WR01344-87 ESW self-cleaning strainer local handswitch o WR01430-87 Urgent failure alarm for Rod Control Power Cabinets 1BD and 2BD i

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       -9-l 0 WR01475-87 Urgent failure alarm for' Rod Control' Power H    Cabinet 2BD.

i No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Event Reports >(LER) During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors performed followup on Wolf Creek-LERs. The LERs were reviewed to ensure: o Corrective action stated in the report has been properly completed or , work is in progress, Response to the event was adequat o Response to.the event met license conditions, commitments, or other applicable regulatory requirement The infonnation contained in the report satisfied applicable reporting requirement o Generic issues were identifie *~ The LERs discussed below were reviewed and closed: LER'482/86-061: TS Violation-Core Alterations Performed With Both Centrifugal Charging Pumps Out-of-Service This LER reported an event where core alterations-(unlatching of control rod drive shafts) were performed with both centrifugal chargin'g pumps out-of-service. This was a violation of TS 3.1.2.3 which required one centrifugal charging pump to be operable during the movement or manipulation of any component within-the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vesse This condition existed for approximately 2 hours and when identified, it was immediately corrected by racking in the appropriate centrifugal charging pump breaker. This event

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was discussed with the personnel involved and this LER was made required reading for operations personne LER 482/86-058: TS Violation Caused by Missed Hourly Fire Watch This LER reported-that a TS required hourly check of a fire protection impairment. The importance of insuring that fire checks of these impainnents are made was stressed to cognizant licensee personnel in subsequent training session LER 482/86-048: TS Violation Due to Halon Cylinder Weight Out of Specification A halon tank was removed from its rack for recharging and weight verification as required by TS 3.6.10.3. Personnel performing this activity reinstalled the halon tank without evaluating the weight dat ' -- __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .__ ____ _ ___ _J

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This error.was ' identified during the work instruction closeout .

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. approximately 2 months later. . At that time the weight data was evaluated

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~ halon' required by the TS.. The licensee has revised the appropriate work
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instruction to require positive verification that tank weight data.has been evaluated. In addition, this LER was made: required reading for-

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cognizant licensee personne . '10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup The NRC inspector, by review of documents and discussions with.

'. licensee personnel, verified that the 10 CFR Part 21 reports discussed below had been reviewed and appropriately acted on by the . licensee, p (Closed) Westinghouse-Errorsinthecoreexitthermocouplesystem during and after a high energy line break (HELB), dated May 9,1985 The 10 CFR Part 21 report reported that environmental qualification testing of the core exit thennocouple system showed that the system . may experience errors during and following a HELB. 'The licensee ' modified the system so that hot leg resistance temperature detectors.(RTDs) are used in lieu of the incore' thermocouple system , for providing temperature information for calculating the affected i' parameters. - This work was accomplished on WC WorkJ . Request (WR) No. 09977-85.- x .

  (Closed) Colt PC-2 series emergency diesel generators potential overspeed trip, dated February 4,' 1986 -

[ The 10 CFR Part 21: report reported a situation where the emergency

diesel generator (EDG) ~could trip on overspeed due. to the starting air pressure, which actuates the governor rack boost, not being

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, ,  terminated. This'causes the boost to'" fight" the governor and could result in an overspeed trip of the emergency diesel generator. The-licensee modified the EDG air start piping tol ensure prompt venting.

This work was accomplished on WC WR No. 02768-86 for EDG 'B' and WC-WR No. 02769-86 for EDG 'A'.

  (Closed) Failure of air check valves to seat, dated March 21, 1985 I  The 10 CFR Part 21 report reported that main steam isolation valves may fail to close, as required, on a main steam isolation signal due i-  to a failure of instrument air check valves to seat in response to

gradually decreasing air pressure. :The licensee had corrected this i problem by replacing the check valves with more reliable fully tested check valves. This work was accomplished on WC WR No. 00166-8 , This item was also discussed in IE Information Notice No. 85-35,

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, (Closed)P21/86-13: Advisory on h'andling Foxboro NE-11~ and NE-13
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transmitters-

  'The licensee determined by a search of the .1nstrurent and control data base that these transmitters were not used at WCG .
  (Closed)P21/87-02:' Potential ' defect in new service water spray
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support system

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The licensee determined that WCGS has no components supplied by

  . Rockwell Engineering or Inland Steel Compan (Closed) P21/87-04: Weld Electrodes With Incomplete Flux Coating
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The licensee determined 1that Airco Products was not on the WCGS station vendor list and that WCGS did not receive a Heat Humber 72181. Welding. rods for WCGS were supplied by Alloy Rod-Compan (Closed) P21/87-05: Evidence of tip damage on anti-reverse rotation

-  device pins on Seimens-Allis engineering reactor coolant pumps WCGS has Westinghouse reactor coolant pumps', therefore, this 10 CFR
  .Part 21 report was not applicabl (Closed)P21/87-04: Weld Electrodes-With-Incomplete Flux Coating The licensee determined that Airco Products was not on the WCGS station vendor list and that wCGS did not receive a Heat Number 72181. Welding rods for WCGS were supplied by Alloy Rod Compan (Closed) P21/87-05: Evidence of tip damage on anti-reverse rotation
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device pins on Seimens-Allis engineering reactor coolar.t pumps LWCGS has Westinghouse reactor coolant pumps, therefece, this 10 CFR Part'21 report was not applicabl The NRC resident inspector provided copies of the 10 CFR Part 21

 . Reports listed below to the licensee for review and action, if require CFR Part 21s: 86-02, 86-03, 86-07, 86-09, 86-13, 86-14, 87-02,
  :87-03, 87-04, 87-05, 87-06, 87-07, 87-11, 87-11, 87-18, 87-19, 87-20, 87-25, 87-27, 87-28, 87-29, 87-30, and 87-3 . Onsite Event Followup A.-

The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that occurred during this report period. The NRC inspectors reviewed control room logs and discussed each event with cognizant personnel. The NRC

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- ins actors verified the licensee had responded to the events in accordance-

, t wit 1 procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as' required in a timely fashion. The events that occurred during this report period are listed in the table below. The NRC inspectors will review the LER for each of these events'and will report any findings in a subsequent NRC inspection repor Date Event *. Plant Status Cause 4/12/87 CRVIS Mode 1 Paper tape failed (100 percent) 4/19/87 Rx Trip Mode 1 Maintenance in rod (60 percent) control cabinets

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4/19/87 AFAS Mode 3 Personnel Error ' 4/23/87 Rx Trip Mode 1 Maintenance in rod [ (52 percent) control cabinets f

 * Event CRVIS - Control Room Ventilation Isolation System AFAS - Auxiliary Feedwate'r Actuation Signal Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

E o The reactor trips on April 19 and 23, 1987, both occurred while~ instrumentation and control technicians were troubleshooting a rod ' control urgent failure alarm in the rod control cabinets.= The.

, control rods were declared inoperable- and the plant was being b' orated !~ to shut it down to Mode 3, as required by TS 3.1.3.1.b. _The corrective maintenance performed after the; trip on April 19, 1987, - appeared to fix the problem and the' plant was returned to power.

l- ' After the trip on April 23, 1987, more thorough corrective-maintenance'was performed (i.e., all accessible control boards and associated power supplies in.the rod control cabinets were tested.and repaired, if required) prior to returning the plant to power. No further problems were experience as of the:end of this report period.

i o The AFAS that occurred on April 19 was due to an operator, while preparing the plant for restart, placing the AFW in permit prior to , resetting the main feedwater pumps.

7 , No violations or' deviations were identifie . 10. = Physical Security Verification The NRC inspectors verified that-the facility physical security plan (PSP) is being complied with.by direct observation of licensee facilities and i security personnel.

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The'NRC _ inspectors' by observation of randomly selected activities verified that search equipment was = operable, that:the. protected area barriers and vital area barriers.were well. maintained, that access control proceduires were followed and that appropriate compensatory measures were followed when equipment was inoperable.

No violations or. deviations were identifie ~

-1 Radiological Protection

By perfoming the following activities, the NRC inspectors verified that < radiological related activities were controlled in accordance~with the

licensee's. procedures and regulatory requirements: o Reviewed documents such as active: radiation work permits and the health physics shift turnover -log o Observed pe'rsonnel activities in the radiologically controlled area

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  . Use of the required dosimetry equipment
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Frisking" out of the RCA

  . Wearing of appropriate anti-contamination clothing where required

, o Inspected postings of radiation and contaminated areas o Discussed activities with radiation workers and health physics supervisors -

 -No violations or deviations were identifie . Unresolved Item
 . Unresolved items are matters about which more-information is required in

- order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. :Two unresolved items disclosed during the inspection. are discussed in paragraph '1 Exit Meeting

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 .The.NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection on May 1, 1987.

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