IR 05000482/1989015

Insp Rept 50-482/89-15 on 890501-31.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status,Followup on Previous NRC Identified Items,Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance Observation & Monthly Maint Observation

ML20246A016
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	06/23/1989
From:	Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246A014	List: IR 05000482/1989015 ML20246A010
References
50-482-89-15, NUDOCS 8907060108
Download: ML20246A016 (14)

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I APPENDIX

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U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 REGION IV-NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/89-15 Operating License: NPF-42

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Docket: 50-482 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear.0perating Corporation (WCNOC)

P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 J ' Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

• Inspection At: WCGS,' Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted: May 1-31, 1989

. Inspectors: B'. L. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector Project Section~ D, Division of Reactor Projects

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M. E. Skow, Resident Reactor Inspector

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Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects D. M. Hunnicutt Senior Project Engineer Project Section D, Division of Reactor

, Projects Approved: MV E. J. Holler, Chief. Profect Section D 'Date/

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Division of Reactor Projects

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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted May 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-482/89-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status,

, f ollowup on previously HRC identified items, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, and review of licensee event report Results: The licensee was observed to promptly followup an issue identified at another plant regarding preventative maintenance and testing of fan discharge duct doors associated with containment air coolers (paragraph 4). The licensee demonstrated good planning and coordination in identifying and repairing a main condenser tube leak (paragraph 4).

8907060108 890623

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v One apparent violation was identified when a valve required to be closed was Lfound to be open by an NRC inspector. For the reasons discussed in-

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paragraph.4,:no citation will be issue ,

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DETAILS Persons Contacted l

. Principal Licensee Personeel l

+ J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Operations

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G. D. Boyer, Plant Manager

• R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications

+ L~. Maynard, Manager of Regulatory Services

• B. McKinney, Manager, Operations

+* G. Williams. Manager, Plant Support

+ C. E. Parry, Manager, QA, WCGS

• K. Peterson,' Supervisor, Licensing G. Pendergrass, Licensing

• C. W.: Fowler, Manager, Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

• R. D. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering

• R. S. Benedict; Manager, Quality Control s *W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor, QA

+*J. Pippin,- Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE)

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+*S. Wideman, Licensing Specialist III

• N. Hoadley, Manager, System NPE

• C. Sprout, Section Manager, NPE The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issue * Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on June 6,

-199 + Denotes those personnel in attendance'at the exit meeting held on June 2, 198 . Plant Status During the inspection period, the licensee operated at 100 percent powe There were no reactor trips or turbine trip . Followup on Previously Identified NRC Items Open, Unresolved Items, and Bulletins (92701)

(Closed) Open Item (482/8634-03): Thermal-Hydraulic Anomaly -

In' December 1986, the licensee confirmed the presence of a flow instability in the reactor vessel This instability was characterized by changes in reactor coolant system (RCS) flow, incore and excore nuclear instrumentation, core exit thermocouple, and reactor vessel level instrumentatio The licensee's reactor vendor's safety evaluation stated that, "The

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RCS flow ~ anomaly is a core inlet flow maldistribution attributed to the presence of an periodically occurring vortex type flow disturbance in the reactor vessel lower plenum." The vendor also issued WCAP-11528, "RCS Flow Anomaly Investigation Report,"

in April 1988. This report discussed the flow anomaly and the results of the investigation including other facilities that

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have this anomaly. The safety evaluation concluded that although there was a reduction in departure'from nucleate boiling. ratio margin following some accident scenarios, the margin of safety had not been reduced. The NRC inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation and WCAP-1152 This open item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (482/8715-03): Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Nitrogen Accumulator Pressure Switches Were Not Properly Environmentally Qualified - During an environmental qualification (EQ) review of certain equipment, the licensee determined that the MSIV Barksdale Model BDB1TA65SS switches were not EQ qualified properly. A review of the EQ of the switches identi#ied a potential failure mechanis The licensee issued Plant Modification Request (PMR) No. 02261 and Plant Modification Package (PMP) No. E668W. These documents provided instructions and documentation on installation of field routed and field supported conduit The pressure switches were isolated from their safety-related DC power supply by use of Class 1E auxiliary relays. These modifications ensured that, if any of these pressure switches failed, the failure would not affect the respective MSI The licensee removed the safety group designation for the eight pressure switches. This item is close ,

Closed) Unresolved Item (482/8727-05): Operability of the Control Room Ventilation Isolation System - The licensee reviewed a problem with the control room ventilation isolation system-(CRVIS) identified at a similar plant and found the problem prevented pressurization of certain equipment rooms as  ;

required. The licensee performed an evaluation and testing of CRVIS. The testing determined that the emergency exhaust system removed more air from the auxiliary building than was required to maintain the auxiliary building at a negative pressure equal to or greater than 1/4-inch water gauge relative to the outside L

atmosphere during system operatio Modifications to the emergancy exhaust system and control room pressurization system were made and operation of both systems was verified. Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.6.e.3 was amended to address verification of control building positive pressure in all configurations, in particular with the emergenc" exhaust system operation in the post-loss of coolant

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accident (LOCA), safety injection (SI) alignment. TS 3/4.7.6,

" Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," contains the limiting condition for operation (LCO) and surveillance

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requirements. This item is close '

(Closed) Unresolved Item (482/8811-01): Need to Verify That Appropriate Acceptance Criteria Are Established in Test- ~

Procedures Regarding Check Valve 0]erability -. Some design calculations were found which esta)lished a flowrate of- 400 gpm to fully open the Check Valve BB 8949D. Other design-calculations established a system minimum flowrate of 116 gp Computer hydraulic analyses were performed to evaluate the performance of the safety injection (SI) system in the hot leg injection mode of operation. The objective of the analyses was

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to establish a basis for the flowrate value of 232 gpm in the acceptance criteria for the SI system or to provide a new acceptance criteria for. flowrate. Analyses results included:

4 (1) SI flowrate requirements under inservice testing conditions,

'(2)' SI Pump !'A" flowrates versus. reactor coolant system (RCS)

pressure under hot leg injection mode, and (3) SI Pump "B" ,

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flowrates versus RCS pressure under hot leg injection mod The present plant configuration was used in the analyses. The

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SI system in the hot leg injection mode of operation was verified to have the capability to deliver 190 gpm through each hot leg at the' testing conditions. The capability to deliver 190 gpm meets the requirement of the minimum SI flow at the postulated accident conditions (180 gpm). This SI' flowrate ensured adequate cooling flow to the reactor core 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after

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-a postulated LOC i The analyses indicated that the SI pumps in the hot leg injection mode of operation are able to deliver 250 gpm through each hot . leg at the testing conditions. Two hundred fifty gpm ensures adequate cooling flow (240 gpm) to the. reactor core after a postulated LOCA. A flow rate of 250 gpm also supported TS changes for increased refueling water storage tank (RWST)

boron concentration for Cycle 4 and future reactor refueling ,

This SI flowrate requirement is a result of the greater decay heat generation rejected to the RCS at the revised hot leg I recirculation switchover time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (instead of the '

previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) to cold leg recirculation after a postulated reactor tri The calculations and analyses support the design basis value of the SI flowrate under hot lec injection mode of operation with respect to the accen%nce criteria for the SI flowrates in WCGS Procedure STS CV21u, L CS Inservice Check Valve Test,"

Revision 4, dated September 8, 1987. The tests were performed in accordance with Procedure ADM 02-301, "ASME Code Testing of Pumps and Valves." The licensee is committed to ASME B&PV Cod _ - _ _ _ -

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g Section XI,1980 through Winter 1981 addenda. This surveillance test demonstrated operability of the emergency core cooling system check valves as required by TS 4.0.5. This item is closed.

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(Closed)UnresolvedItem(482/8727-03): Failure to Follow Procedure - This item was included in our enforcement action as part of a Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report 50-482/87-31, EA'87-213). As a result of the enforcement action, this unresolved item is close *

(Closed)UnresolvedItem(482/8710-02): Penetration Fire ,

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Barriers - This item was included as part of Licensee Event Report (LER)87-010 discussed in paragraph 7 of this report an pertained to inadequate penetration fire barriers. The ite identified by the NRC inspector appeared to be one of several that the licensee had' identified in the LER. The licensee formed a task force that developed a corrective action pla The licensee then implemented and completed that_ action pla This item is close *

(Closed) Bulletin 79-28: Possible Malfunction of Namco Model EA180-Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures - During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors determined that IE Bulletin (IEB)_79-28, "Possible Malfunction of Namco Model EA180

. Limit Switches at. Elevated Temperatures," had never been closed by NRC. NRC Inspection Report 50-482/83-04, issued March 25,

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i 1983, discussed IEB 79-28 but did not close it. The requested action of the IEB was for licensee's to determine which of EA180'

. series limit switches that were in use had been manufactured between February 1979'and August 1979. . If any EA180 series limit switches were found, the licensee was to change out the cover gaskets. WCGS determined that EA180 series limit switches had been installed in several valves. Under normal conditions, sthe temperature specified in the IEB would'not be exceede Therefore, replacement of the limit switches was not require The licensee chose to replace these EA180 series limit switches. This licensee action was documented in Deficiency Report (DR) ISD 4335m. The NRC inspector reviewed DR ISD 4335m and verified that the subject limit switches were replace IEB 79-28 is close b. Violations / Deviations (92702)

(Closed) Violation (482/8813-02): Failure to Assutt That Conditions Adverse to Quality Are Prornptly Identified and Corrected - The root cause of this violation was a failure to detect a typographical error in WCGS Procedure. EMG C33, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture Without Pressurizer Pressure Control,"

Revision 1. The typographical error was corrected in Revision 2, dated December 20, 1988. The licensee issued a letter to all operations personnel and the licensee operator

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training supervisor. :This:1 tter instructed these' personnel in

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.theuse.ofthe;formaliprogram1 improvement;formtorequest

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. changes: to emergency operating procedures'(E0Ps). Training on.

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. Revision 2 to this E0P.had been completed and is documented in

{ LR0032300. This E0P was verified and validated as required by

the procedure generation package. This item is closed.

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H -(Closed) Violation (482/8815-01): Failure to Follow Procedures l

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.in Requisitioning .The licensee. reviewed applicable WCNOC m  : procedures,for weaknesses relative to the' proper classificatio , ~o f pressure boundary parts. Procedure 'KP-2140, " Material and'

Services Procureme'nt," Revision 2,' dated May. 11, 1988, was

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revised. 'Thisfrevision further clarified the procurement-

,T . requirements.in regard to requesting documentation when A

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procuring from Westinghouse., Procedure'ADM 01-036, "WCGS ASME)

'/ Section?XI Repair and Replacement Program," dated August'23, 1988, was revised (Revision 3) to require field personnel to Lobtain and review vendor supplied ASME Code documentation prior to installing ASME Section III (the licensee is committed t 'ASME B&PV. Code Section III, 1974 Edition and Addendum through.

~r Summer 1975) pressure boundary item "1 WCNOC supplier quality personnel performed a surveillance of a vendor.to investigate the cause and corrective action.taken.on the misclassification of a pressurizer: spray valve packing box

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, assembly. The. licensee discontinued the~use of a checklist-

? n which had caused erroneous.information to be. communicated to the vendor'on Augusts9, 1985. The licensee discontinued use.of this checklist when Revision 5 to ADM 01-048, " Material / Services -

Requisition," was issued on February 9, 198 c

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A safety evaluation by NRC dated May 2, 1988, approved relief from Section XI of the ASME Code'for the stem / disc assembly used

<5 as a replacement part in.the Code Class 2 RCP Seal Water Injection Throttling Valve BG-V200. The. licensee established that the assembly had been built with acceptable quality and that satisfactory service could be anticipated for Valve BG-V200. NRC also approved relief from Section XI of the i

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ASME Code for the packing box assembly. installed in Code Class 1 Pressurizer Spray Valve BB PVC 455B after the licensee

, adequately verified that the assembly would provide an acceptable level of safety for plant operatio Procedure KP-2140, " Material and Services Procurement," was

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revised (Revision 2) on May 11, 1988, to provide additional y~ ~ ,

instructions for procurement. Revision 2 of Procedure KP-2140

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' established the' responsibilities, requirements, and methods for the preparation, review, control, and approval of the procurement of items and services for the repair, replacement, maintenance, or modification of components, systems, and structures of WCGS as requisitioned by WCNOC personne .u

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During Refueling Outage III, the licensee replaced the stem / disc

. assembly for RCP Seal Water Injection Throttling Valve BG-V200

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.in accordance with the provisions stated in Work Request (WR) 01623-88. The replacement work on. Valve BG-V200 was. completed on November 2, 1988. The packing box assembly for Pressurizer Spray Valve BB PCV 455B was replaced in accordance with WR 02294-88 on December 1, .1988. The licensee had committed to replace these assemblies no later than Refueling 0utage III. .This item is close *

(Closed)Violatics(482/8705-02): Failure to Follow Procedure -

This item concerne6 #ailure to follow procedure when a l surveillance test result was found deficien Procedure ADM 02-300, evision 12 " Surveillance Testing," was

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reviewed by the NRC inspetor. 'The clarifications to ADM 02-300

'that were; discussed in thc licensee's response to the violation remain in the procedure.- nis violation is close . Operational Safety Verification (7170n The purpose of this inspection area was to ensure that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with license and. regulatory requirements. It also was to ensure that the licensee's management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation. The methods used to perform this inspection area included direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, . independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, corrective actions, and review of facility record Areas reviewed or observed during this inspection included, but were not limited to, control room activities, routine surveillance, engineered safety feature operability, radiation protection controls, fire protection, security, plant cleanliness, instrumentation and alarms, deficiency reports, and corrective action ,

Operating activities witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are discussed below:

• On May 3,1989, during a routine tour, the NRC inspectors observed Manual Ball Valve KJ V783B, " Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Waterbox Drain to 011y Waste," on Diesel Generator "B" open instead

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of in its required closed position. The cap to the drain downstream of KJ V7838 was in place and prevented any water leaking from the .

waterbox. At the time of discovery, Diesel Generator "B" was ~l required to be operable. ValveChecklist(CKL)KJ-121, Revision 6,

" Diesel Generators NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist," performed November ~ 15,1988, requires, in part, that Valve KJ V783B be in the closed position. Failure to have a valve in the position required by its checklist is an apparent violation. While the safety significance of this violation was minimal, because of the installed pipe cap, the

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l importance of placing and maintaining valves in their required positions deserves emphasis. This violation will not be cited because the' criteria specified in Section V.A of the General Statement of Policy ano Procedure for NRC enforcement actions were

. satisfied. No written response to this violation will be require The NRC inspectors reviewed an item identified at another plant that related to this licensee's containment ventilation. The item concerned failure to perform maintenance and testing of doors in the fan discharge duct and improper fusible links installed in the latch

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mechanism.. The doors were designed to fall open after a fusible link actuates during an event. The NRC inspector found that the licensee already had begun an audit in this area and was addressing the NRC concerns. identified at the other plant. The audit verified that undocumented preventive maintenance (PM) was being performed in addition to the maintenance that was required by the licensee's procedure in place at the time. The door gaskets are checked and the doors opened, in addition to the procedure requirement to lubricate the hinges. Procedure changes were subsequently issued to document 'l PM performance and to verify that the door will begin to open on demand. The licensee also found that the fusible links were proper originally installed equipmen There is concern by the licensee that, because of the weight of the door, repeatedly allcwing the door to freely and fully open may lead to structural failure of the vent duct. The door design is such that, if the door breaks its seal on the gasket, there is a reasonable assurance that it will fully open. The licensee, therefore, does not. allow the door to fully open when testing. The NRC inspectors considered the licensee's prompt identification and action on this: item as an example o' improved performance in the engineering. and' technical support functional are On May 14, 1989, the licensee had Jetermined that a main condenser tube leak had occurred. The operators prepared a temporary procedure to methodically isolate sections tif the condenser to identify the area of the tube leak to-establist plant conditions for tube plug installation. Operators received a detailed brief of the procedur These efforts contributed to a smooth evolution that successfully identified the leaking tube, drained the associated portion of the condenser, plugged the affected tube, and restored the condenser section to servic . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

~ The purpose of this inspection area was to ascertain whether surveillance of safety-significant systems and components were being conducted in accordance with TS. liethods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of licensee activities and review of record i

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'Itemsintbisinspectionareaincluded,but'werenot-limitedto,

[' e ' verification that:~

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1 Testing 1was~ accomplished by qualified personneliin accordance with an

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approved test procedur ,

The surveillance' procedure'was-in conformance to TS requir_ement The operating system [and test instrumentation was within its current'

, q L . calibration cycl '

Required administrative approvals'and clearances were obtained prio J

.to initiatingLthe tes *

Limiting' conditions.for operation were met and that the system wa's

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R m properly returned to servic i a e w-  ;* T t data we're accurate and complete and that the_ test results y , . met =TS' requirement .

m 'Surve111a'nces.witnes'sid and/or reviewed by the'NRC inspectors are listed .

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' N; JSTS IC-250B, Revision 7,." Analog Channel Operational Test Containment

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N - ' x Atmosphese and RCS Leakage Radiation Monitor GT. RE-31, performed ,

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, May 15, 198 ,

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STS BN-201, Revision 3, " Borated Refueling Water Storage System:

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Inservice Valve Test," performed May 16, 198 ,

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STS MT-018, . Revision 5, " Weekly' Inspection of.125 VDC Lead Calcium 3. .

Batteries,"' performed May 17, 198 T b  !

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STS BG 1 100B, .Revisiori 6, " Centrifugal: Charging Pump "B" Train ,

' Inservice Pump Test,',' performed May 18, 198 "

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No. violations or deviations were identifie , ,

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> v Modthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

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[ The purpose of. inspections in this area were to ascertain that maintenance

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activities of' safety-related systems and components were conducted ir y' 'accordance with approved procedures and TS. Methods used in this inspection area included direct observation, personnel interview, and

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g record revie Items verified in this inspection area included: ,

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Activities did not violate limiting conditions for operation and '

{; redundant components were operable, Y \

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. Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained before

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initiating work

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' 1*- Rad ological controls were properly implemente Fire' prevention" controls were implemente *

! Required alignments- and surve';11ances' to verify postmaintenance l

operability were performe Replacement parts and materials used were properly certifie Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish'the designated task and

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additional technical expert?se was made available when neede *

Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used and quality- ~

control personnel observed designated work activitie *

Procedures used were adequate, approved, and up to dat Portions of selected maintenance activities on the work requests (WRs)

listed below were observed. The related documents were reviewed by the NRC inspectors:

N Activity WR.51086-89 Main step-up transformer, clean oil cooler coils WR 05533-88 Replaced Cell No.10 on Battery NK12

'WR 02373-89 D/G "B" lube oil filter change WR 01245-89 Install access platforms for D/G per PMR 01565 :

Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

Management involvement in the replacement of the battery cell (WR05533-88) was evident. The cell change out had to be c.ompleted within a 2-hour LCO. The cell was charged prior to stagging. Workers, equipment, and tools were availaule and ready to start work when the battery was taken out of service. Various supervisors were observed at the work location, monitoring activities. The cell was changed, the battery verified operable, and returned to service within the 2-hour LC0

. limit in accordance with preapproved work and surveillance procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (92700)

During this inspection period, the NRC ir.spectors performed followup on Wolf Creek LERs. The LERs were reviewed to ensure:

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• Corrective action stated in the report has been properly completed or

work is in progres <

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Response to the event was adequat Response to the event met license conditions, coninitments, or other  !

I applicable regulatory requirement * The information contained in the report satisfied applicable j reporting requirement Generic issues were identifie The LERs discussed below were reviewed and closed:

(Closed) LER 87-010: Technical Specification Violations -

Inoperable Fire Barriers Caused by Personnel Errors - This LER is related to Unresolved Item 482/8710-02 discussed in paragraph 3.a of this report. The licensee formed a task force that developed a corrective action plan. The licensee then implemented and completed that action plan. This LER is close (Closed)LER88-020: Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitors '

Inoperable with purge Valves Open Due to Personnel Error -

Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (CARM), GT RE-32, was out of service for maintenance activities. During the performance of an unrelated channel calibration surveillance test, CARM GT RE-31, the

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operable radiation monitor, lost sample flow. Loss of sample flow

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rendered the radiation monitor inoperable. The loss of sample flow was subsequently discovered by operations personnel. GT RE-31 was bypassed and the containment purge was secured. The licensee determined that the cause of this event was error on the part of an instrument and control (I&C) surveillance test technician. The technician acknowledged the loss of flow alarm on GT RE-31 without l

notifying the control room operators. The cause of the loss of I sample flow to GT RE-31 was a clogged filte At the time of this event, WCGS was in Mode 5 (cold shutdown). The f containment exhaust was monitored throughout this event by the I containment purge monitors. The uhaust flow was monitored by the l plant unit vent radiation monito The licensee discussed the importance of notifying the control room operator of alarms acknowledged during a test with the surveillance test performer involved in this event. This LER was aoded to the

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required reading for I&C personnel. Each I&C person signed and dated I a statement that he or she had re. viewed and understood the information in LER 88-020. The subject of this LER was added to the job qualification guideline for radiation monitoring calibratio This LER is close (Closed)LER88-025: Inadequate Oversight Leads to Failure to Maintain Operable Centrifugal Charging Pump and Boron Injection Pathway Causing Technical 5 specification Violation - On two occasions,

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of. approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> each, reactor fuel (core) alterations were continued when Emergency Diesel Generator "A" was removed from service for minor maintenance while Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) "B" was inoperable. The continuation of core alterations without an operable boron injection flowpath and an operable power source for the operable CCP was in violation of the T The licensee attributed the root cause of this event to inadequate oversight by licensed operations personnel. The operations personnel failed to ensure operability of the emergency power source for the operable CCP and the injection flowpath while performing core

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In an effort to prevent recurrer.ce of this event, "Special Plant Configuration Checklists," Revision 0, which specified a list of major equipment being relied upon to maintain an operable CCP and boron injection flowpath (for example: systems, pumps, and their intended functions) was developed. This check list is used as an aid in verifying compliance with the requirements of TS 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3. These TS sections address plant Operational Modes 4, 5, and WGCS Standing Order 13. " Discussion of General Operating Philosophy Regarding Plant Evolutions," Revision 1, dated January 6,1989, to operations aersonnel was issued. This order emphasized the overall concept that the control room operators must be cognizant of operations and work activities. The order stated that control room operators should question all activities and concur with the activities prior to permitting work to star' ,

An interoffice correspondence memorandum dated January 6, 1989,

" Guidelines for Entry Into Tech Spec Action Statements," further clarified that it is not permissible to purposely enter into a TS l

action statement, which would require a restoration "immediate action" for performance of corrective maintenance. The memorandum f

< stated the steps necessary to be performe.d should a situation arise in which there appears to be a need to enter such an action statement for corrective maintenance. This LER is close * (Closed) LER 88-O'29: Accidental Bumping of Local Power Switch to Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor Causes Engineered Safety Features Eouipment Actuations - A containment purge isolation signal (CPIS) and a control room ventilation signal (CRVIS) were received from Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor GT RE-3 The licensee determined that the root cause of this event was an accidental bumping of the local main power switch to GT RE-32. The licensee held discussions with the foreman, superintendent, and work crew involved. The discussions reemphasized the importance of exercising caution while working near plant equipment and of contacting the control room operators promptly in the event that

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plant equipment islor may have been bumped or jarred. The importance of unlicensed personnel not resetting plant equipment: following bumping or jarring of the equipment was stressed during these discussions. This LER is close (Closed) LER 89-005: Late Performance of Unit Vent Sample as Required by Technical Specifications Caused by Personnel Error in Determining Sampling Requirements - The NRC inspector verified that the' licensee provided training to chemistry personnel- regarding' TS requirements for unit vent samples. .This LER is closed.

j Exit Meeting (30703)

The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) on June 2 and'6, 1989. The NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify, as proprietary, any of

'the information provided to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspector .

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