ML20196H371
| ML20196H371 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196H364 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-98-19, NUDOCS 9812090056 | |
| Download: ML20196H371 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1998019
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9
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-482
License No.: NPF-42
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Report No.: 50-482/98-19
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location: 1550 Oxen Lane, NE
Burlington, Kansas
Dates: October 2 through November 14,1998
Inspectors: B. A. Smalldridge, Acting Senior inspector
F. L Brush, Resident inspector, Callaway
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector, Callaway
Approved By: David N. Graves, Acting Chief
ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information
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9812090056 981203
PDR ADOCK 05000482
G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Wolf Creek Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-482/98-19
Operations
. The clearance order established for the inspection and lubrication of the fuel building
emergency exhaust absorber unit toinado damper was inadequate and was a violation
of Technical Specification 6.8.1. The clearance order did not provide isolation from all
sources of high volumetric air flow and did not include special conditions or precautions
on the clearance order summary sheet, as was required if positive boundaries were not
established. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being
treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
. In violation of 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix B, Criterion XI, the procedure for testing the
spent fuel bridge crane was inadequate from September 1986 until October 1997 in that
it failed to account for the weight of the scale during checks of the overload cutout
setpoint as required. As a result, the licensee failed to demonstrate operability of the
spent fuel bridge crane. The licensee revised and successfujiy performed the
procedure. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being
treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy (Section M8.1).
Enoineerina
. Substantial effort by the engeeering organization resulted in sustained improved i
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performance of the turbine-druen auxiliary feedwater pump. At the end of September
1998, the accumulated rolling 18-month unavailability for the turbine-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump was approximately 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, substantially less than the goal of
200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> (Section E2.1). l
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. The licensee's corrective actions were appropriate to assure that the diesel-driven fire
pump starting circuit relays were placed in the preventive maintenance program for the !
diesel-driven fire pump (Section E8.1).
Plant Suocort
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- Overall, the licensee's response to road closures due to flooding was excellent. The
licensee maintained contact with offsite agencies and provided timely updates to 1
necessary personnel. The licensee ensured that all emergency response organization
requirements would be met if needed and provided updated road closure information to
emergency response managers. The road closure information was also posted in the
technical information center and the emergency offsite facility (Section P4.1).
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Report Details
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Summarv of Plant Status ,
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The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout the inspection period, i
1. Operations j
04 ~ Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Inadecuate Clearance Order i
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a. IrLspection Scope (71707) :
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The inspector reviewed the clearance order used to provide isolation for the inspection !
and lubrication of the fuel building emergency exhaust absorber unit tornado damper. j
b. Observations and Findinas l
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On October 15,1998, the inspector observed maintenance technicians attempt to !
inspect Tornado Damper GGD-0035, using Work Order 97-126469-001. Clearance !
Order 98-0994-GG established the isolation for the work. The ventilation duct and i
damper were located in the overhead on the 2047 foot level of the auxiliary building
inside the radiological controlled area. ;
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The maintenance technicians encountered a very high air flow when they initially opened i
the access cover in the ventilation duct in order to inspect the damper. The technicians, {
who were briefed to expect essentially zero flow, immediately closed the access. After
checking a second time to ensure that the isolation indicated on the clearance order was ;
in place, the maintenance technicians held discussions with the job coverage health ;
physics technician and with their supervisor. The decision was made to open the ,
access cover a second time to see if the high air flow would decrease. !
The technicians opened the access cover again and waited momentarily. The high air ,
flow did not decrease and the technicians closed the access cover because the air flow :
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was transporting lint and dust particulates out of the ventilation duct at such a high rate
that it was hazardous to be on the scaffolding. Additionally, the health physics ;
technician noted that the high air flow had blown a considerable amount of dust onto the
floor and onto the personnelin the area. Since this area had previously been a
contaminated area, there was a concern that the air flow could have redistributed
unidentified surface contamination from the overhead to the floor area. The inspector
noted that no surface contamination was detected and all persons in the area
successfully passed through a portal monitor. Due to the hazard presented to personnel
and the increased risk of spreading contamination, maintenance and health physics
supervision placed the job on hold until the flow of air could be stopped.
.The inspector returned to the work control center with the maintenance technicians to
determine why a high flow rate was encountered when almost zero flow was expected
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by the technicians. The inspector noted that work control center personnel had no
immediate explanation for the unexpected flow in the work area. Additionally, the
inspector observed that personnel in the work control center did not appear to recognize ,
or express concern that the isolation established by the clearance order for the work l
was inadequate. The inspector discussed this with the shift supervisor. This issue was
documented in Performance improvement Request 98-3106.
The inspector then reviewed licensee Procedure AP 21E-001," Clearance Orders,"
Revision 7, to determine if the clearance order established for the damper inspection
met the clearance order program requirements. The inspector noted that
paragraph 4.6.1 of Procedure AP 21E-001, requires that " Danger-Do Not
Operate (DNO) tags should be installed on the control points and all boundary points to ,
isolate equipment from all sources of energy for the protection of personnel and i
equipment." Additionally, paragraph 6.1.2.1 states that a " qualified preparer will identify
energy sources and determine isolation points. When positive boundaries are not l
practical, the clearance order shall not be issued without adding special )
conditions / precautions on the attache d clearance order summary sheet." i
Paragraph 6.1.2.3 adds additional guidance by stating that "when it is necessary to I
communicate information of a technical nature or safety concern to ensure safe and
proper implementation of the clearance order, then the clearance order summary sheet,
Form AP 21E-001-11, shall be utilized and attached."
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The inspector observed that Clearance Order 98-0994-GG did not provide isolation from
all sources of high volumetric air flow to the ventilation duct at the fuel building
. emergency exhaust absorber unit tornado Damper GGD-0035. Further, the clearance
order did not include special conditions or precautions in the summary sheet section as
was required by paragraph 6.1.2.3.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 required, in part, that procedures shall be implemented
covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. l
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A,1.c, references procedures for equipment control
(e.g., locking and tagging). Failure to properly implement Procedure AP 21E-001 was a
violation.
A previous occurrence of clearance orders that did not provide adequate isolation was
identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/98-10, and resulted in a notice of violation
(50-482/9813-01) for clearance orders that did not provide complete isolation of the
component from all energy sources. In the previous instance, a clearance order for
electncal work was incomplete, which resulted in an arc flash and minor injury to a
maintenance technician. The licensee's response to the notice of violation, in a letter
dated July 7,1998, identified corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Those corrective
actions included a revision to Procedure AP 21E-001 to require that:
- A qualified preparer prepare the clearance order.
. A qualified preparer identify energy sources and determine isolation paints.
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. When positive boundaries are not practical, the clearance not be issued without
adding special conditions / precautions to the attached clearance order summary
sheet.
In addition, the licensee held a meeting on May 22,1998, with the clearance order group
to discuss the changes to Procedure AP 21E-001 and communicated the expectation
that clearance order preparers were to provide special conditions or precautions on the
clearance order summary sheet when complete isolation by the clearance order was not
practical. The inspector determined that these corrective actions were reasonable and
complete. If the preparer of Clearance Order 98-0994-GG had complied with the
requirements in the clearance order procedure, the clearance order would have been
properly prepared and provided maintenance technicians with the information necessary
to ensure safe and proper implementation of the work order.
The licensee commenced a thorough evaluation of the failure to comply with the
clearance order procedure. The individual responsible for the generation of the
clearance uder was counseled, and improvements in communication between the
clearance order group and the planning group were evaluated. The results of this
evaluation were subject to the review by the licensee's corrective action review board.
This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a
noncited violation, consistent Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
(50-482/9819-01).
c. Conclusions
The clearance order established for the inspection and lubrication of the fuel building
emergency exhaust absorber unit tcrnado damper was inadequate and was a violation
of Technical Specification 6.8.1. The clearance order did not provide isolation from all i
sources of high volumetric air flow and did not include special conditions or precautions l
on the clearance order summary sheet, as was required if positive boundaries were not
established. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being
treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
08.1 [Cosed) Violation 50-482/9813-01: Inadequate clearance orders. This violation and
licensee corrective actions were reviewed, and found to be acceptable, in conjunction
with the review of the event discussed in Section 04.1.b of thi,s report.
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M1 Conduct of Maintenance
j M1.1 General Comments on Maintenance Activities
a. Inspection Scope (62707)
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j The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities.
WO 98-200200-000 Replace SGK05 B relief valve
WO 98-129416-001 SGK05 B heat exchanger 18-month inspection and eddy
current examination as required by Guideline 89-13
l WO 98-204521-002 Inspect, adjust, repair valve seat on Valve EF HV-049
WO 97-126469-001 Inspection and lubrication of fuel building emergency exhaust
absorber unit tornado Damper GGD-0035
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j b. Observation and Findinas
The inspectors found no concerns with the maintenance observed.
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c. Conclusions
- The inspectors concluded that the maintenance activities were being performed as
required.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities
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a. inspection Scope (61726) !
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities.
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STS EM-1008, Revision 14, Safety injection Pump B Inservice Pump Test
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STS AB-201 A, Revision 3, Main Steam isolation and Bypass Valve Test l
STS IC-260, Revision 13, Analog Channel Operational Test Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
Suction Pressure Low Transfer to Essential Service Water i
STS KJ-005B, Revision 31, Manual / auto Start, Synchronization and Loading of
Emergency Diesel Generator NE02
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found no concerns with the surveillances observed.
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c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the surveillance activities were being performed as
required.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours
a. Inspection Scoce (61726)
During this inspection period, routine plant tours were conducted to evaluate plant )
material condition.
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b. Observations and Findinos
in general, where equipment deficiencies existed, the deficiencies had been identified by ,
the licensee for corrective action. The inspector noted several material condition issues '
during this inspection period.
On October 22,1998, during surveillance testing, Train A containment cooler outlet
containment isolation Valve EF HV-049 failed to fully close. Valve EF HV-049, a 10-inch
butterfly valve with a Teflon seat ring, is physically located outside of containment. The 1
licensee declared the valve inoperable and closed the manual isolation valve inside l
containment, which resulted in entry into a limiting conditions for operation action i
statement which required that the Train A containment cooler be restored to operable '
status within 7 days. The licensee then developed a plan to remove, repair, and reinstall l
the valve within the required time constraints. The plan included contingencies for
unexpected valve component conditions. Once the valve was removed, the licensee
discovered that the Teflon seat ring was damaged and required replacement.
Additionally, the base metal at one location in the vicinity of the seat ring was damaged
and required weld buildup, which was one of the preplanned contingencies. The j
licensee completed the repair and reinstallation of the valve and the postmaintenance I
test was successful. Va!ve EF HV-049 was restored to operable status on October 23, l
1998. Subsequently, the licensee successfully completed testing of Train B
containment cooler outlet containment isolation Valve EF HV-050. j
On September 29,1998, during monthly surveillance testing of Emergency Diesel
Generator B (NEO2), a fuel oil leak was identified which originated from Cylinder 13.
The leak rate was determined to be approximately 2 drops per second while the diesel
was in operation and decreased to approximately 1 drop every 5 seconds when the
diesel was secured. Drip pans with oil absorbing pads were provided to catch the
leaking fuel oil and residual fuel oil was routinely wiped up. The licensee's fire
protection engineer evaluated the fire hazard associated with the leak and determined
that the fire hazard associated with the leak was within the limits of the design basis fire
load evaluation for the emergency diesel generator room. The inspector agreed with the
fire protection engineer's assessmerit. During a meeting to plan the repairs, the
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licensee decided to repair the leak during the Emergency Diesel Generator B outage
scheduled for the fourth week of October 1998. However, the licensee determined that
one of the parts needed to complete the repairs was not in stock onsite. When the
licensee approached the vendor to obtain the part, the vendor responded tnat the part
would not be available until early in 1999. The Emergency Diesel Generator B outage !
scheduled for February 1999 includes the repair of the fuel oil leak.
During this inspection period, the inspector walked down portions of the plant, l
specifically checking temporary equipment for compliance with Procedure AP 21J-001, !
" Control of Temporary Equipment," Revision 2. The inspector identified several
examples of minor deficiencies with the labeling expectations for temporary equipment.
The licensee responded quickly to evaluate and correct the labeling deficiencies where )
warranted. Licensee Performance improvement Requests 98-2959,-3067, and -3120 l
addressed the identified deficiencies. l
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On October 12,1998, during a plant tour, the inspector found the cover p! ate for
Pressure Switch AB PSL-0017E, " Main Steam Isolation Valve Low Pressure Air Supply ,
Pressure Low," not installed. This was documented in Performance Improvement !
Request 98-3058. The cover plate was immediately reinstalled and an environmental J
qualification evaluation was performed that concluded no environmental qualification
hazard existed. The licensee determined that the cover plate had been inadvertently left
uninstalled during a calibration procedure performed earlier the same day. Installation j
of the cover plate was considered a skill-of-the-craft task and was not included as a ;
specific procedure step. '
c. Conclusions
The material condition of those plant systems and components evaluated during this l
inspection period were good with few equipment deficiencies, including those discussed
in this section.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-482/97017-00: Spent fuel storage facility
crane surveillance not met. On September 30,1997, the licensee identified that, from
1986 to 1995, surveillance test Procedure STS KE-003, " Spent Fuel Bridge Crane
Surveillance Test," was inadequate to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance
Requirement 4.9.7. The procedure did not account for the weight of the scale in steps
to check the overload cutout setpoint. The scale weighed approximately 49 pounds.
Technical Specification 3.9.7 stated that loads in excess of 2250 pounds shall be
prohibited from traveling over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool storage facility.
Technical Specification 4.9.7 required that the crane interlocks and physical stops which
prevent loads in excess of 2250 pounds from traveling over fuel assemblies be
demonstrated operable within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days
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thereafter during crane operation, in late 1995, Amendment 89 transferred Technical l
Specification 3.9.7 and the associated surveillance requirements to Updated Safety
Analysis Report Section 16.9.3.
The licensee determined the cause to be an inadequate procedure revision. In i
September 1986, the licensee revised Procedure STS KE-003 to incorporate the use of
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the scale. The procedure revision did not take the weight of the scale into '
consideration.
The licensee declared the spent fuel bridge crane inoperable until ;
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Procedure STS KE-003 was revised and successfully performed. On October 1,1997,
the licensee satisfactorily revised the procedure to include weight of the scale. On l
October 2,1997, the procedure was successfully performed. The licensee reviewed
past calibrations of the load cell, which initiates the overload cutout. The licensee
determined that no loads in excess of 2250 pounds were moved over fuel assemblies.
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The inspectors determined that, although there were no past operability concerns, the
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licensee had an inadequate surveillance test procedure for testing the crane from
September 1986 until October 1997.
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The inspectors concluded that, in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI,
the procedure for testing the spent fuel bridge crane was inadequate from i
September 1986 until October 1997 in that it failed to account for the weight of the scale l
during checks of the overload cutout setpoint as required. As a result, the licensee !
failed to demonstrate operability of the spent fuel bridge crane. The licensee revised
and successfully performed the procedure. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and i
corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with
Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-482/98019-02).
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Ill. Enaineerina
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo Peformance Imorovement
a. Inspection Scope (37551)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's basis for moving the turbine-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump from maintenance rule Category (a)(1) to (a)(2).
b. Observation and Findinos
On September 30,1998, a licensee expert panel decided to move the turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump from maintenance rule Category (a)(1) to Category (a)(2).
The system had demonstrated that it met the established goals for a period of several
months before the licensee made the change. The maintenance rule performance
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goals for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump were unavailability of less than or
equal to 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> per rolling 18-month period and a functional failure rate of less than
or equal to one per rolling 18-month period. The unavailability goal was originally
exceeded, resulting in the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump initially being placed
in the (a)(1) category.
The unavailability goal for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was exceeded as
a result of the following:
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Failures of the limit switch on the turbine-trip throttle valve.
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Failures of the Resistor R1 in the power circuit for the turbine control circuitry.
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Water intrusion into the lube oil from steam leaks and gland seal alignment
problems.
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Inattention to maintenance rule performance goal requirements.
Since 1996, the performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump had
improved. This was a result of increased licensee focus on improving the system. The
system engineer involvement in the planning and scheduling of maintenance was
increased and the system out-of-service time was optimized to streamline maintenance
activities. Maintenance procedures were revised to improve guidance on setting limit
switches; the frequency of some preventive maintenance was adjusted to better meet
the needs of the components; and major system repairs and modifications were
accomplished. As a result of these efforts, the performance of the turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump improved such that the system unavailability was well within
the established performance goals.
At the end of September 1998, the accumulated rolling 18-month unavailability for the
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was approximately 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, substantially less
than the goal of 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />. Sustained improved performance over several months led
the expert panel to move the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump from maintenance
rule Category (a)(1) to Category (a)(2). The licensee performance criteria for the
system shall remain the same as the goals used in Category (a)(1).
c. Conclusions
Substantial effort by the engineering organization resulted in sustained improved
performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. At the end of September
1998, the accumulated rolling 18-month unavailability for the turbine-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump was approximately 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, substantially less than the goal of
200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903) i
E8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-482/9812-10: Review the corrective actions to :
assure that the diesel-driven fire pump starting circuit relays are placed in the preventive l
maintenance program. The licensee identified in Performance improvement
Request 98-0964 that the diesel-driven fire pump engine failed to start on demand
during postmaintenance testing on April 2,1998. The licensee determined that the i
cause of the failure was a failed relay in the engine start circuitry and that the preventive
maintenance program did not include the inspection or replacement of these relays. ,
This weakness was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/98-12. i
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation and the corrective actions specified in l
Performance Improvement Request 98-0964. The inspector also reviewed Performance i
improvement Requests 98-0943, -2482, -2569, and -2571. The inspector verified that
the inspection of the start circuit relays was added to the licensee's preventive j
maintenance program for the diesel-driven fire pump. Additionally, the inspector !
determined that the licensee performed a complete review of the maintenance history,
preventive maintenance program, and manufacturer's recommended maintenance
program for the diesel-driven fire pump. As a result of this review, the licensee !
incorporated additional improvements into the preventive maintenance program for the ;
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diesel-driven fire pump.
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The inspector concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate to ;
assure that the diesel-driven fire pump starting circuit relays were placed in the ,
preventive maintenance program for the diesel-driven fire pump. !
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E8.2 (Closed) LER 50-482/98002-00: Inadequate evaluation of a reactor coolant pump lube l
oilleak collection system nonconforming condition. This LER and the licensee's j
corrective actions were reviewed during an inspection documented in NRC Inspection
Report 50-482/98-12 in support of the closure of LER 50-482/97016-00. i
LER 50-482/98002-00 is being closed administratively in this inspection report. l
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IV. Plant Support
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness
P4.1 Road Closinos Due to Floodina Within the 10-Mile Emergency Zone
a. Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to road closings due to flooding within
the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The inspectors attended licensee meetings and
discussed contingency planning with various licensee personnel. The inspectors also
toured various areas within the emergency plc.nning zone.
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b. Observations and Findinos
The licensee maintained contact with federal, state, and local agencies during the
flooding. The licensee also attended the Coffey County emergency planning daily
briefings as conditions warranted. The licensee provided timely updates of offsite
conditions and licensee contingency plans to the inspectors, Region IV, and
headquarters personnel.
When the county closed roads due to flooding, the licensee ensured that alternate
evacuation routes were delineated. Since the flooding could also affect offsite
monitoring team routes, the licensee provided road closure information to the
emergency managers and posted the information in the technical information center and
the emergency offsite facility. The licensee provided the emergency response team
members with road closure information and ensured that all emergency plan staffing
requirements would be met if required.
c. Conclusions
Overall, the licensee's response to road closures due to flooding was excellent. The
licensee maintained contact with offsite agencies and provided timely updates to
necessary personnel. The licensee ensured that all emergency response organization
requirements would be met if needed and provided updated road closure information to
emergency response managers. The road closure information was also posted in the
technical information center and the emergency offsite facility.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on November 13,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTI AL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licenseo
M. J. Angus, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action
G. D. Boyer, Chief Administrative Officer
J. W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection
O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager
R. Muench, Vice President Engineering
W. B. Norton, Manager, Performance improvemont and Assessment
C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551 Onsite Engineering
IP 61726 Surveillance Observations
IP 62707 Maintenance Observations
IP 71707 Plant Operations
IP 71750 Plant Support Activities
IP 92902 Follow up - Maintenance
IP 92903 Follow up - Engineering
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened
50-482/9819-01 NCV Inadequate clearance order (Section 04.1)
50-482/9819-02 NCV Spent fuel storago facility crane surveillance not met
(Section M8.1)
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Closed
50-482/9813-01 VIO Inadequate clearance orders (Section 08.1)
50-482/97017-00 LER Spent fuel storage facility crane surveillance not met
(Section M8.1)
50-482/9819-01 NCV inadequate clearance order (Section 04.1)
50-482/9819-02 NCV Spent fuel storage facility crane surveillance not met
(Section M8.1)
50-482/9812-10 IFl Review the corrective actions to assure that the diesel-driven
fire pump starting circuit relays are placed in the preventive
maintenance program (Section E8.1)
50-482/98002-00 LER Inadequate evaluation of a reactor coolant pump lube oil leak
collect;on system nonconforming condition (Section E8.2)
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