IR 05000482/1987033

Insp Rept 50-482/87-33 on 871119-880103.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Startup from Refueling, Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Maint Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation & Cathodic Protection Sys

ML20147C971
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	02/23/1988
From:	Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20147C930	List: IR 05000482/1987033 ML20147C925 ML20147C953 ML20147C971
References
50-482-87-33, NUDOCS 8803030205
Preceding documents:	ML20154M804 (24 May 1988)
Download: ML20147C971 (12)

Text

, . .

APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/87-33 License: NPF-42 Docket: 50-482 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)

P. O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted: November 19, 1987 to January 3, 1988 I

Inspectors: i fA JJLO hm b 13 E. Cumdi % 8qn,iop Resident Inspecto D(te [

er bs AMf} A / //

B. L. Bartlett, Resident' Reactor Inspector, /Datfe Operations Approved: sJ _ an 211, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Section A D' ate 8803030205 880301 PDR ADOCK 05000482 g PDR

. .

Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted November 19, 1987, through January 3, 1988

.(Report 50-482/87-33)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant ste tup from refueling, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, onsite event followup, physical security verification, radiological protection, cold weather preparation, and cathodic protection syste Results: Within the nine areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to report as required by 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph 7).

e _

~

d' }

• f L 9_* B

,[ <

s .

._.' DETAILS l'. Persons Contacted-Principal Licensee Personnel

• B. D. Withers, President and CEO

. * M. Grant, Vice President, Quality

• J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Engineering & Technical Services

• F. T. Rhodes, Vice Presiden_t, Operations

• G. D. Boyer,. Plant Manager

• 0; L. Maynard, Manager, Licensing C. M. Estes, Superir.tendent of Operations M. D. Rich, Superintendent of Maintenance

• G. Williams, Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative Services

- W.'J.'Rudolph,-QA Manager-WCGS A. A. Freitag, Manager,. Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE), WCGS M; Nichols, Plant Support. Superintendent K. Peterson, Licensing

• G. Pendergrass, Licensing

• W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor, Quality Systems

• C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist

• C. E. Parry, Superintendent of Quality Engineering

.

• J. M. Pippin, Manager, NPE The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issue *Donotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on-January-8, 198 . Plant Startup From Refueling The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the plant startup, following the first refueling outag Portions-of the activities discussed below were observe o Mode changes performed in accordance with Technical' Specification requirements and the procedures listed below:

. GEN 00-001, Revision 7, "Mode 5, Fill and Vent of the RCS"

. GEN 00-002, Revision 12, "Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby" o Portions of three core physics tests listed below were witnessed to verify that they were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures and requirements of Technical Specifications: Determination of reactor shutdown margin

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _

.

.. .

Moderator temperature coefficient determination I Control rod worth measurements-

>

For a list of the procedures reviewed see paragraph 6, Monthly Surveillance Observatio o The NRC inspectors performed post maintenance walkdowns of the safety injection system (EM) and main feedwater (AE).

The NRC inspectors review of core power physics test data will bc documented in a' future inspection repor No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification The NRC inspectors verified that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation of licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing facility record The NRC inspectors, by observation of randomly selected activities and interview of personnel, verified that physical security, radiation protection, and fire protection activities were controlle By observing accessible components for correct valve position and electrical. breaker position, and by observing control room indication, the NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of_ selected portions of safety related systems. The NRC inspectors also visually inspected safety components for leakage, physical damage, and other impairments that could prevent them from performing their designed function No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation The NRC inspector observed maintenance activities performed on safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications (TS), and applicable industry codes and standard The following elements were considered by the NRC inspector during the observation and/or review of the maintenance activities:

o Limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met and, where applicable, redundant components were operabl o Activities complied with adequate administrative controls, o Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were use _ ___ __ _ _ _ _ -

_

, .

..

o Craftsmen were cualified to accomplish the designated task and technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations)

was.made available when appropriat o Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certifie o Required radiological controls were implemente o Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriat o Required alignments and surveillances to verify postmaintenance operability were performe o Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work activitie Selected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work requests (WR) listed below were observed and related documentation reviewed by the NRC inspector:

& Activity WR 05117-87 Core Subcooling T/C-inspect / repair Ray-Chem splice WR 04851-87 EBB 01A and B Steam generator possible feedring erosion caused by J-Tubes WR 05551-87 KKJ01B Diesel generator-replace item 15 on attached drawing WR 05685-87 TKJ04A "A" diesel generator lube oil tank, add oil No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed surveillance test procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedure The NRC inspectors considered the following elemerits while inspecting surveillance activities:

o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved procedur o The surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirement o Required test instrumentation was calibrate _ _

. .

o TS LC0 were satisfie o Test data was accurate and complet Where appropriate, the NRC inspectors performed independent calculations of selected test data to verify their accurac o The performance of the surveillance procedure conformed to applicable administrative procedure o The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the test results met the required limit Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed below:

STS IC-502A, Revision 2, "Calibration of Pressurizer Pressure Transmitters," performed on November 28, 1987 STS RE-004, Revision 7, "Shutdown Margin Determination." performed December 22 and 31, 1987 STS KJ-001B, Revision 5, "Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation Test-Train B," performed on December 22, 1987 STS BB-004, Revision 5, "RCS Water Inventory Balance," performed on December 23, 1987 STS CR-002, Revision 7, "Shift Logs For Modes 4, S, and 6," performed on December 22, 1987 STS EG-201, Revision 6, "Component Cooling Water System Inservice Valve Test," performed on December 18, 1987 STS RE-002, Revision 5, "Determination of Estimated Critical Position," performed on December 31, 1987 RXE 01-002, Revision 0, "Reload Low Power Physics Testing," performed December 31, 1987, and January 1-4, 1988 No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Event Followup The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that occurred during this report perio The NRC inspectors reviewed control room logs and discussed these events with cognizant personnel. The NRC inspectors verified the licensee had responded to the events in accordance with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required in a timely fashion. The NRC inspectors will review the LERs for these events and will report any findings in a subsequent NRC inspection repor _ _ _ ___ _ __ -

,

. . I

,.

Selected NRC inspector observations are. discussed below: Lost Test Source On December 18, 1987, the licensee notified the NRC that a radioactive test source could not be located. The licensee determined that the source was missing on December 15, 1987, during a TS required inventory of radioactiva sources. The 400 microcurie ,

Strontium 90 and Yttrium 90 pure beta emitter source was cylindrically shaped and was 1/2- by 1/4-inch. The source was used for performing calibration checks of radiation monitoring instruments. Licensee records show that the source was last accounted for on August 1,198 In The source October was 1987, onemounted of the testinassemblies a test assembly (made of plexiglass.HPH-182) was the reactor building when a corner of the plexiglass housing was broken off. Test Assembly HPH-182 was taken-to the calibration laboratory to be exchanged with an identical test assembly, HPH-18 At that time the technician observed that the test source was missing from assembly HPH-184. The technician then removed the test source from the HPH-182 assembly and installed it in the HPH-184 assembl The technician failed to. notify anyone that the test source was missin The licensee made a search of the areas the source could have been used in, stored in, or transported through. The licensee's investigation of this matter is continuing, Diesel Generator Governor Settings On December 9,1987, at 8:20 a.m. (CST), the licensee declared the

"A" emergency diesel generator (D/G) inoperable. This was because an operator had discovered that the mechanical governor settings were different from where they had been left. A D/G vendor representative onsite informed the licensee of the possibility of tampering. At this time the reactor was in cold shutdown with "A" train residual heat removal (RHR) in operation and "B" train RHR out-of-service for maintenance. The licensee notified NRC, state and county officials,

-and the FBI. The licensee initiated their own investigatio The D/G was declared operable at 12:22 p.m. (CST) on December 9,1987, af ter the governor was reset. On December 11, 1987, during a test run the "A" D/G mechanical governor controls were observed to mov Investigation by the licensee, in consultation with the governor vendor, revealed a previously undetected failure in the governo After consulting the governor vendor, the licensee suspended the tampering investigatio The licensee informed NRC that the governor settings were changed due to the failure of the governor and not due to tampering,

.,-.

-

... .

,

c

-

On December 9, 1987, at'3:32 p.m. (CST), the licensee made a report to NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi). Review of this event by NRC has determined'that this event should have been reported as required by 10-CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) required the reporting of "Any event, found while the reactor.is shut down, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including-its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded . . . ."

As stated above D/G "A" was declared inoperable at 8:20 a.m. (CST),

thus the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) should have been completed no later than 12:20 p.m. (CST).

This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) is an apparent violation (482/8733-01).

c. Spent Fuel Pool Pumpdown On December 22, 1987, the licensee accidentally reduced the water level in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Listed below is a sequence of events:

o On December 17, 1987, the SFP cleanup system was secured from cleaning the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The valve lineup was left in the RWST cleanup mode, o After the performance of STS KJ-001B on December 22, 1987, the SFP cleanup suction valves (BN HCV-8800 A and B) were left close o At 11:40 a.m. (CST) on December 22, 1987, SFP cleanup was

, established per Procedure SYS EC-120, "Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup." This procedure, however, does not verify the position of the '/alves to the RWS o At 12:29 p.m. (CST) on December 22, 1987, SFP cooling pump "A" tripped, o At 12:34 p.m., SFP cooling pump "A" was restarted, o At 12:37 p.m., SFP cooling pump "A" tripped agai o At 12:54 p.m., SFP cooling pump "B" was started and an operator was sent to investigate why "A" trippe o At 1:10 p.m. , the operator informed the control room of low SFP level and went to close Valve V-00 o At 1:31 p.m. , SFP cooling pump "B" was secure m

.-.: .

o At 2:17 p.m., commenced filling SFP from RWS o .At 3:21 p.m., secured filling SF The'cause of the pump down was that Valve BN V-002 was left ope BN V-002 is the manual isolation valve from the SFP cleanup system to the RWST. Major contributors to the pumpdown was that the SFP level indicators and low-level a'nnunciator located in the control room have been inoperable since December 31, 198 When SFP cooling pump "A" tripped, it was caused by its low water level protective circuitr However, with their level indication inoperative, the control room operators had no immediate means to determine this. The licensee's investigation has shown that the SFP level was below the TS limit of at least 23 feet above the fuel for approximately 90 minutes. The action statement states the level should be returned within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ~

'The lowest SFP level was approximately one foot below the 23-foot minimu Passive design features would have prevented the pumpdown of the SFP below 22 feet above the' fuel even if the operators had not secured SFP cooling pump "B" and if it had failed to automatically trip on low-leve After the level was returned to normal, the pumps low-level trip setpoint was verified to be accurat The investigation irito why SFP cooling pump "A" tripped early is still ongoin The licensee's procedure for startup of the SFP is being changed to verify the positions of appropriate valves prior to starting SFP cooling pump Reactor Vessel 0-Ring Leakage On December 30, 1987, at 2:00 a.m. (CST), during a routine phone call to the shift supervisor, the NRC resident inspector was informed of a leaking o-ring. At 8:12 p.m. (CST), on December 26, 1987, the temperature indicator in the vessel o-ring indicated high. The valve to the inner o-ring was closed isolating the leakage. The valve to the outer o-ring was then opened placing its leakoff line inservic The licensee has committed to the NRC that if the outer o-ring develops a leak that WCNOC will immediately initiate an orderly shutdown and cooldown to prepare for replacing both seai ,ing This commitment was documented in Licensee Letter ET 88-0006, dated January 6,1988, from John Bailey to NR No violations or deviations were identifie . Physical Security Verification The NRC inspectors verified that the facility physical security plan (PSP)

is being complied with by direct observation of licensee facilities and security personne .3

^

.

., #

r

Th'e NRC inspectors observed randomly selected activities.to verify that

, search equipment _is operable, that the protected area barriers and vital area barriers are well maintained,'that access control procedures are followed and that appropriate compensatory measures are followed if require No violations or deviations'were identified.

y'

9 .' Radiological Protection By performing the following activities, the NRC inspectors verified that radiologically related activities were controlled in accordance with the licensee's procedures and regulatory requirements: ,

o Reviewed documents.such as active radiation work permits and the health physics shift turnover lo o Observed personnel activities in the ' radiologically controlled area (RCA) such as:

. Use of the required dosimetry equipment

. "Frisking out" of the RCA

. Wearing of appropriate anti-contamination clothing where required o Inspected postings of radiation and contaminated area o Discussed activities with radiation workers and health physics supervisors.-

No violations or deviations were identifie . Cold Weather Preparation The NRC inspectors verified by discussions with licensee personnel and i review of licensee Procedure STN GP-001, Revision 2, "Plant Winterization" (performed on November 9-10, 1987) that the licensee had taken action to protect vital areas and equipment that could be subjected to freezing conditions. The procedure documented that heating systems and heat tracing were available and energized where appropriate to the areas and equipment. The NRC inspector walked down the areas adjacent to the refueling water storage tank, condensate tank, the reactor make-up water storage tanks, and verified that heating and instrument lines were insulated where they could be subjected to freezing conditions. Where appropriate heat was being supplied to the are No violations or deviations were identifie .. .

11. Cathodic Protection System The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee activities related to problems with the cathodic protection system. From discussions with licensee personnel, review of documents and observation of components in the field; the NRC inspectors determined that there had been a problem with maintaining certain areas of the cathodic protection system in a fully operational status. This resulted in galvanic corrosion to a number of underground pipes. The following are two examples where the cathodic protection system not being fully operational could have been a contributing factor to failure of the pipes:

o In September 1986, a 1!s-inch auxiliary boiler fuel oil line developed thru wall leaks apparently due to galvanic corrosion. Plant Modification Request 02141 documented repair of this lin o In June 1987, an 8-inch fire protection line developed a thru wall leak, apparently due to galvanic corrosion. Repair / replacement of this line was documented on Work Request (WR) 1164-8 In September 1986, Nuclear Plant Engineering and the Maintenance Department initiated actions to correct problems with the existing cathodic protection system. These actions included the following:

o Selected areas were excavated so that pipes could be inspecte o Repairs were made to cathodic protection power supplies, header cables, and anode beds, o Damaged pipes were repaired / replaced, o A program to help insure the cathodic protection voltage levels were maintained at the level (0.85 volts) recommended to prevent galvanic corrosion was implemente On October 8, 1987, Nuclear Plant Engineering issued engineering study

"Engineering Piping at Wolf Creek Generating Station," Revision 0. This study determined, based on pipe corrosion data obtained from six excavations, that carbon steel when imbedded adjacent to piping of a different metal (i.e., ductile iron) appeared to be most susceptible to an accelerated galvanic corrosion rate. This problem apparently was also intensified when the cathodic protection system for the area in which the pipe was located had not been maintained at the recommended leve The study also delineated further excavations to bS performed during the fall 1987 refueling outage. The purpose of these additional excavations was to inspect pipes in areas where conditions for accelerated corrosion rates existed. Another purpose was to confirm that conclusions, based on previous excavations, were accurate. The study concluded that further degradation of the piping system could be mitigated by an adequate cathodic protection system. The NRC inspectors will continue to monitor licensee activities in this are . , ___ _ - - -.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

. .. .

,

No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Meeting The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection on January 8, 1988.