ML20236T146
| ML20236T146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236T142 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-98-14, NUDOCS 9807270463 | |
| Download: ML20236T146 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1998014
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ENCLOSURE 2
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-482
License No.: NPF-42
l Report No.: 50-482/98-14
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Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station
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Location: 1550 Oxen Lane, NE
j Burlington, Kansas
May 31 through July 11,1998
Dates:
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Inspectors: J. F. Ringwald, Senior Resident inspector
B. A. Smalldridge, Resident inspector
R. V. Azua, Project Engineer, Project Branch B
Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B
ATTACHMENT: SupplementalInformation l
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9907270463 980723 1
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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Wolf Creek Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-482/98-14
Ooerations
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Operators made reasonable preparations for anticipated severe weather, but discovered
during the storm that other actions, such as closure of the turbine building roll-up doors,
would have provided improved protection of plant structures and equipment. Despite the
known moisture intrusion into the unit auxiliary transformer and the lack of sufficient
!, personnel to evaluate the potential for the moisture intrusion to render the transformer
inoperable, the shift supervisor did not direct an evaluation of this potential and did not
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inform management of the moisture intrusion or ask for assistance in evaluating the
l potential consequences (Section 01.1).
. The Nuclear Safety Review Committee conducted a meeting corisistent with Technical
Specification requirements and the committee charter, focusing on nuclear safety issues.
The presentations from management were detailed and the committee members'
questions were probing. The committee demonstrated that they understood the issues
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thoroughly (Section O7.1).
Maintenance
. Maintenance technicians, with the permission of the shift supervisor, stored a heavy,
unrestrained door and frame in the control room near the Train A protection system logic
cabinets contrary to Procedure AP 21J-001. This issue was cited as a violation of
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Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for not following the procedure governing such activities
l (Section M2.1).
. An electrical maintenance technician and quality control technician lacked sufficient
knowledge regarding diode bias orientation, resulting in incorrect installation and quality
l control verification of diodes which led to a failed postmaintenance test. The licensee
! promptly identified the error and took aggressive corrective actions; therefore, the issue
was treated as a noncited violation as allowed by Section Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement
Policy (Section M4.1).
Enaineerina
- Corrective actions from a 1997 component cooling water surge tank level indication
l transient were not adequate to prevent recurrence. Engineering's response to collect
- . additional data appeared to be useful in developing additional corrective actions that may
successfully prevent further recurrence (Section E2.1).
Plant Sucoort
. The inspector concluded that security personnel made generally appropriate
preparations for anticipated severe weather, but some preparation weaknesses resulted
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in security personnel providing required security contingencies while facing adverse
weather conditions. Security management provided a good review of their activities,-
identified appropriate weaknesses, and initiated effective corrective actions
(Section S1,1).
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8,ecort Details
Summary of Plant Status
The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
l. Operations
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 Ooerations Resoonse to Severe Weather
a. Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspector reviewed the operations response to several severe thunderstorms,
severe wind, heavy rain, and tornadoes near the plant,
b. Observations and Findinas j
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On June 29,1998, operations personne! began preparations for anticipated severe
werther. They reviewed the applicable severe weather procedures, ensured that
security personnel were aware and would be making preparations for expected
necessary contingencies, and directed field personnel to conduct visual inspections of
areas outside plant buildings for loose material that could become a missile hazard.
When the first storm reached the plant site, winds in excess of 87 miles per hour caused
damage to insect mitigation screens that were stillin place at the turbine building roll-up
doors. Licensee personnel removed the screens and shut the roll-up doors. Before the
doors could be shut, the winds also blew compressed gas cylinders over, but installed
valve covers prevented damage to the cylinders that would have created a missile
hazard from the escaping gas. The winds also damaged the meteorology tower wind
speed instruments. Operators entered Updated Safety Analysis Report Action
Statement 16.3.1.3 for the inoperable instrumentation and initiated a work request to
begin repairs.
Operators received Annunciator 133D, Unit Auxiliary Transformer Trouble Alarm, which
was caused by the local alarm for source voltage failure. Operators confirmed that
source voltage had not failed, and the shift electrician and nuclear station operator noted
that moisture intrusion into the transformer control cabinet had caused relays for this
local alarm to get wet, causing the annunciation. Approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> later, the
inspector asked the shift supervisor if anyone had evaluated the moisture intrusion j
beyond the wetting of the alarm relay to determine if the moisture intrusion could cause /
i inoperability of the unit auxiliary transformer. The shift supervisor said that they had not
had either the time or enough people to perform that evaluation and that, since the shift
electrician and nuclear station operator placed plastic shields inside the unit auxiliary
transformer control cabinet to attempt to redirect the water away from the relays, the shift
supervisor did not consider such contingency actions necessary. The shift supervisor
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did not inform anyone in management of the moisture intrusion and did not ask for
assistance or support from anyone else regarding this issue. Given the prior instance of
snow intrusion into the switchyard control box for Air Break Switch 345-163 that opened
the supply to the startup transformer causing a partial loss of offsite power as described
in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/95-24, Section 2.2, the known intrusion of moisture into
any power cabinet represented a potential for adverse consequences that warranted
further evaluation.
c. Conclusions
Operators made reasonable preparations for anticipated severe weather, but discovered
during the storm that other actions, such as closure of the turbine building roll-up doors,
would have provided improved protection of plant structures and equipment. Despite the
known moisture intrusion into the unit auxiliary transformer and the lack of sufficient
personnel to evaluate the potential for the moisture intrusion to render the transformer
inoperable, the shift supervisor did not direct an evaluation of this potential and did not
inform management of the moisture intrusion or ask for assistance in evaluating the
potential consequences.
07 Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Nuclear Safety Review Committee Meetina
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a. Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspector observed a portion of the regularly scheduled Nuclear Safety Review
Committee meeting.
b. Observations and Findinas
On June 24,1998, the Nuclear Safety Review Committee held a regularly scheduled
meeting to review recent plant issues and events. A poster listing Nuclear Safety Review
Committee challenges hung on the wall in the meeting room, which provided committee
members with a constant visual reminder. The committee received presentations from
various managers consistent with Technical Specifications and the committee charter.
The presentations were thorough and the questions asked by the committee in response
were probing. These presentations by managers provided the committee members with
i first-hand information on the issues reviewed and provided the managers with direct
, feedback from the committee members.
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c. Conclusions
The Nuclear Safety Review Committee conducted a meeting consistent with Technical
Specification requirements and the committee charter, focusing on nuclear safety issues.
The presentations from management were detailed and the committee members'
questions were probing. The committee demonstrated that they understood the issues
thoroughly.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
O8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9709-04: Failure to maintain motor-operated containment
valve. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response
letter, dated April 23,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were
identified.
08.2 LClgsed) Violation 50-482/9714-01: Technical Specification amendment implementation.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter,
dated October 31,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were
identified.
08.3 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9719-01: Uncontrolled operator aid. The inspector verified the
corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated December 23, ioC ,
to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
08.4 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9719-02: Review of corrective action documents. The
inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
December 23,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were
identified.
08.5 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9804-03: Failure to perform technical surveillance
requirements on staggered test basis. The inspector verified the corrective actions
described in the licensee's response letter, dated April 281998, to be reasonable and
complete. No similar problems were identified.
08.6 LClosed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-482/96010-01: Failure of motor-operated
valve; potential violation of containment isolation. This item was reviewed in
Section 08.3 of NRC Inspection Report 50-482/97-09, and the review applied to both the
original and Supplement 01 of this LER.
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II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments on Maintenance Activities
a. Insoection Scone (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:
WP 127870-007 Task 2 Monitor governor (EGA)
signals for system engineer
during Diesel B run
WP 128154 Task 1 Essential service water
Pump A motor meggar and
polarization index test
WP 98-200677-001 Task 1 Corrective maintenance-N2
supply containment
atmosphere isolation valve
WP98-126438-001 Task 1 Central alarm station door
repair
b. Observation and Findinas
Except as noted in Sections M4.1 and M4.2, the inspectors found no concerns with the
maintenance observed.
c. Conclusions ,
Except as noted in Sections M4.1 and M4.2, the inspectors concluded that the '
maintenance activities were being performed as required.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities
a. Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
[ STS EG-1008, Revision 13, Component Cooling water Pumps B/D inservice repair tests
STS KJ-005B, Revision 30, Manual / auto start, synchronization and loading of
Emergency Diesel Generator NE02 l
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b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found no concerns with the surveillance observed.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the surveillance activities were being performed as
required.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours
a. Insoection Scoce (61726)
During the inspection period, routine plant tours were conducted to evaluate plant
material condition.
b. Observations and Findinas
In general, where equipment deficiencies existed, the deficiencies had been identified by
the licensee for corrective action.
The inspectors noted that, in response to concerns with the diesel driven fire pump,
discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/97-23, the licensee repaired the circuitry,
demonstrated acceptable pump performance, and also performed significant cleaning,
painting, lighting improvements, and preservation.
On June 29,1998, the shift engineer initiated Performance Improvement
Request 98-1919 to address the design adequacy of the meteorological tower
instrumentation. Emergency Action Level EP 01-2.1-1 required an Alert declaration if
continuous winds of greater than or equal to 95 miles per hour occurred, yet, during the
storm, the meteorological tower wind speed indicator failed with indicated wind speeds at
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Updated Safety Analysis Report described the meteorological tower wind speed
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i instrumentation as having a range up to 100 miles per hour and that there have been
prior instances where the wind speed instruments failed in winds less than the maximum
rated wind speed. The inspector also noted numerous instances where the
meteorological tower was inoperable and that many of these occurrences coincided with
severe weather at the plant site. During discussions with the engineer assigned to
review Performance improvement Request 98-1919, the engineer said that the review
would include an historical review of the meteorological tower's instrumentation
performance compared with the Updated Safety Analysis Report description, leading to
an evaluation of whether the meteorological tower design is adequate to fulfill the
Updated Safety Analysis Report description.
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c. Conclusions
The material condition of those plant systems and components evaluated during this
inspection period were good, with few equipment deficiencies.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
M4.1 Imorocer Storage of Temoorarv Eauioment in the Control Room Eauioment Cabinet
Room
a. Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspectors reviewed temporary equipment placed in the control room equipment
cabinet room pursuant to the requirements of Procedure AP 21J-001, " Control of
Temporary Equipment," Revision 2.
b. Observations and Findinas
On June 4,1998, the inspector observed the door and frame from the central alarm
station in the control room leaning against the wall in the control room equipment cabinet
room adjacent to the Train A protection system logic cabinets. The inspector asked the
shift supervisor if the storage location and configuration met the requirements for
temporary equipment in a safety-related area. The shift supervisor took immediate i
action to place the door and frame in a stable configuration and initiated Performance I
improvement Request 98-1616.
Maintenance technicians had removed Door 36091 from the central alarm station on
June 3,1998, per Work Order 126438-001. The technicians asked for and received
permission from the shift supervisor to store the door and frame temporarily in the control
room equipment cabinet room. The door was stored in an unrestrained manner
adjacent to the Train A protection system logic cabinets. The door and frame were in
this configuration for approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. The configuration and location of the door
and frame during this time did not meet the criteria for storage of unstable equipment as
required in paragraph 6.9 of Procedure AP 21J-001, Control of Temporary Equipment,
Revision 2. Procedure AP 26J-001 required that unstable equipment be restrained in a
suitable location to prevent toppling or be located no closer than 1 foot plus the height of
the unstable item from the nearest safety-related equipment. In this case, the distance
from the frame and door to the Train A protection system logic cabinets was less than
the height of the door and frame plus 1 foot. The technicians' failure to comply with the
requirements of paragraph 6.9 of Procedure AP 21J-001 for storage of unstable
equipment in the vicinity of safety-related equipment is a violation of Technical
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Specification 6.8.1.a (50-482/9814-01).
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On June 29,1998, the inspector observed that two portable Instrumentation and
Control 7300 Rack Testing Cabinets located along the northwest wall in the control room
equipment cabinet room also appeared noncompliant with the unstable equipment
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storage criteria contained in paragraph 6.9 of Procedure AP 21J-001. The testing
cabinets, which were 70 inches tall and mounted on casters, were located a distance of
approximately 3 feet from cabinets which contained control room annunciator circuitry.
While not directly safety related, the annunciator circuitry contained in the cabinets
provides indication to control room operators of trouble with safety-related equipment
and circuitry. The inspector informed the shift supervisor who took action to remove the
portable testing cabinets from the control room. The inspector also noted that the
procedure did not address how long an item classified as temporary equipment could be
stored outside of a designated storage area. The two instrumentation and control testing
carts had been stored in the control room at that location for several years. The shift
supervisor initiated Performance improvement Request 98-1896 to identify the
proceduralinadequacy.
c. Conclusions
Maintenance technicians, with the permission of the shift supervisor, stored a heavy,
unrestrained door and frame in the control room near the Train A protection system logic
cabinets, contrary to Procedure AP 21J-001. This issue was cited as a violation of
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for not following the procedure governing such activities.
M4.2 incorrect Diode Orientation Durina installation of Modification to Emeraency Diesel Relay
a. Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the completed work package for installation of a modification to
emergency diesel generator excitation system relays.
b. Observations and Findinas
On June 16,1998, technicians modified emergency diesel circuitry per Configuration
Change Package 07767, " Add Diodes to Emergency Diesel Generator Excitation System
Relays," Revision 0, using Work Order 98-200510-000, implement Change
Package 07767 on Diesel Generator A, NE01. Step 2.9 of the work order required that
diodes be orientated with the cathode to positive and the anode to negative. Step 2.9.1
of the work order specified a quality control verification of correct installation of the
diodes. The technician terminated the diodes with the cathode to negative and anode to
positive, and the quality control technician failed to identify that the diodes were
incorrectly installed during the verification inspection.
This condition was discovered during postmaintenance testing when two safety-related
fuses blew in the 125 volt de power supply circuit to the emergency start relays in the
voltage regulate circuitry. This resulted in extending the scheduled limiting-conditions-
for-operation work in order for the licensee to investigate and correct the problem. This
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was identified in significant Performance Improvement Request 98-1732.
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Although the incorrect diode installation was identified during postmaintenance testing
and corrected before placing Emergency Diesel Generator A back in service, the failure
to install the diodes as directed by procedure is significant. Both the electrical
maintenance technician who installed the diodes and the quality control technician who
verified that the diodes were installed as directed lacked sufficient knowledge at the time
the work was completed to ensure the diodes were installed per procedure.
In subsequent discussions with the electrical maintenance department and the electrical
quality control group supervisor, the inspector learned that the installing technician and
the quality control technician discussed diode bias orientation and jointly looked at prints
during the course of the work. This may have caused a loss of independence which
contributed to both technicians failing to ensure that the diodes were installed as
directed.
The technician's failure to follow the instructions of Step 2.9 5 Work Order
98-200510-000 for the installation and installation verification of diodes in the emergency
diesel excitation system is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. This
nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited
violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-482/9814-02).
c. Conclusions
An electrical maintenance technician and quality control technician lacked sufficient
knowledge regarding diode bias orientation, resulting in incorrect installation and quality
control verification of diodes which led to a failed postmaintenance test. The licensee
promptly identified the error and took aggressive corrective actions; therefore, the issue
was treated as a noncited violation as allowed by Section Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement
Policy.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9719-03: Inadvertent atmospheric relief valve actuation. The
inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
December 23,1997, to be reasonable but not complete in that the letter identified a
contributing cause, but described no corresponding corrective actions. One contributing
cause was that there were missed opportunities to provide more specific direction, to ,
confirm what was misunderstood, or to call " time-out." A quality evaluations individual
identified the error prior to the inadvertent atmospheric relief valve actuation, but raised
the question with the planner rather than questioning the worker or calling " time-out." ,
The inspector discussed this matter with the acting performance improvement and f
assessment manager who indicated that this issue has been discussed in detail with the j
quality evaluator. In addition, the expectation for any person in performance
improvement and assessment to call" time-out" when they identify an error or problem in
the field has been reinforced with everyone in the group. No similar problems were
identified.
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Comoonent Coolino Water Surge Tank Level Transient
a. Insoection Scoce (37551)
The inspector reviewed the circumstances and licensee response to an unexpected
component cooling water surge tank level transient.
b. Observations and Findinos
On July 1,1998, while operators attempted to transfer the component cooling water i
service loop from Train B to Train A, the level in the Train A surge tank hwered to the l
point that it initiated an automatic makeup from the demineralized water makeup storage !
and transfer system. This prompted operators to stop the evolution and transfer the l
service loop back to Train B. This event was similar to an event that occurred on l
March 31,1997, and was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/97-08,
Section 01.2. ,
Following the 1997 event, the licensee initiated Performance improvement
Request 97-0958, which concluded that clogging of the surge tank level transmitter l
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sensing line from the bottom of the tank caused an erroneously low indication from the
level transmitter and an unnecessary automatic makeup. The clogging was determined
to be the result of corrosion products, most likely from the carbon steel portions of the
system. While the chemical treatment of the component cooling water system was ;
intended to provide for carbon steel corrosion passivation, this process required 1
dissolved oxygen in the component cooling water fluid. In the lower sample leg, the very
firnited mixing created a stagnant area which lowered the dissolved oxygen
concentration, limiting the passivating effect of the chemical treatment. Corrective
actions from this event included replacing the transmitter, collecting and performing an
analysis of the sample line contents, and the creation of a 36-month preventive
maintenance task to drain and refill the sample lines.
The licensee concluded that the July 1 occurrence was due to a buildup of corrosion
. products in the level transmitter sensing line. Performance Improvement Requests
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98-1943 and -1944 were initiated to provide further evaluation of the occurrence and to
review previous corrective actions for adequacy. Additional corrective actions were
proposed but not yet implemented and included reducing the interval for the newly
created preventive maintenance task.
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c. Conclusions
Corrective actions from a 1997 component cooling water surge tank level indication
transient were not adequate to prevent recurrence. Engineering's response to collect
l additional data appeared to be useful in developing additional corrective actions that may
successfully prevent further recurrence.
l IV. Plant Support
R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection and Chemistry issues (92904)
R8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9714-03: Spent resin liner kansfer. The inspector verified the
corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated October 31,1998, to
be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
R8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9804-07: Radiation work permit noncompliance. The
inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
April 28,1998, to be reasonable but not complete because the response did not address
all the corrective actions prompted by this event. Radiation protection supervision
initiated Performance improvement Request 98-0452 to address several radiation
protection programmatic issues that were raised by this issue. These issues included
the applicability of dose gradients to hot spots in lower dose areas, the lack of a
, procedural requirement for workers to inform radiation protection technicians prior to
beginning work in the radiologically controlled area, and the actual meaning of
intermittent radiation protection job coverage. Corrective actions included revising
procedures to clarify dose gradient dosimetry issues, procedurally requiring radworkers
to inform radiation protection technicians prior to entering the radiologically controlled
area, and creating a start of job reference card to help radworkers ensure that radiation
protection procedural requirements will be met prior to starting work. No similar
problems were identified.
R8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9810-11: Inadequate high radiation area posting. The
inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
June 5,1998, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 Security Preparations and Conduct Durina Severe Weather
a. Insoection Scope (71750)
- The inspector reviewed the security response to several severe thunderstorms, severe
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b. Observations and Findings
On June 29,1998, security properly anticipated the necessary compensatory measures
as a result of the approach of severe weather. These measures included posting
security guards to monitor the protected area perimeter. When the snift supervisor
decided to activate the onsite tornado alarm and direct plant personnel to go to j
designated shelters, the security shift lieutenant decided that it would be more of a
l hazard for the compensatory post officers to leave the compensatory post shacks, so
these officers were directed to remain at their posts. During the storm, winds in excess
of 80 miles per hour caused significant damage to one of the shacks, but the posted
officer was not injured. In response to this occurrence, the security superintendent
provided immediate, clear expectations to improve the safety of the security officers.
The security shift lieutenant completed a security incident report, and security personnel
initiated Performance improvement Request 98-2006.
c. Conclusions
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The inspector concluded that security personnel made generally appropriate
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preparations for anticipated severe weather, but some preparation weaknesses resulted
in security personnel providing required security contingencies while facing adverse
weather conditions. Security management provided a good review of their activities,
identifying appropriate weaknesses and initiating effective corrective actions.
V. Manaaement Meetings
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on July 10,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should
be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
G. D. Boyer, Chief Administrative Officer
K. W. Hall, Acting Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action
l J W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection
S. R. Koenig. Acting Manager, Performance improvement and Assessment
O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager
R. Muench, Vice President Engineering
C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551 Onsite Engineering
IP 61726 Surveillance Observations
- - IP 62707 Maintenance Observations
IP 71707 Plant Operations
IP 71750 Plant Support Activities
l IP 92901 Followup - Operations
j IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
Ooened
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! 50-482/9814-01 VIO Improper storage of temporary equipment in the control
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room equipment cabinet room (Section M4.1) j
50-482/9814-02 NCV incorrect diode orientation during installation of modification ;
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to emergency diesel relay (Section M4.2)
l
Closed
l ;
50-482/96010-01 LER Failure of motor-operated valve potential violation of l
containment isolation (Section 08.6)
50-482/9709-04 VIO Failure to maintain motor-operated containment valve
(Section 08.1)
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50-482/9714-01 VIO Technical Specification amendment implementation
(Section 08.2)
50-482/9714-03 VIO Spent resin liner transfer (Section R8.1)
o
t___________.____.______________._____________ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ , - _ _ _ _ _ _ .
a
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2-
50-482/9719-01 VIO Uncontrolled operator aid (Section 08.3)
50-482/9719-02 VIO Review of corrective action documents (Section 08.4)
50-482/9719-03 VIO ' inadvertent atmospheric relief valve actuation (Section M8.1)
. 50-482/9804-03 VIO Failure to perform technical surveillance requirements on
i staggered test basis (Section 08.5)
l.
50-482/9804-07 VIO Radiation work permit noncompliance (Section R8.2)-
l 50-482/9814-02 NCV Incorrect diode orientation during installation of modification of
emergency diesel relay (Section M4.2)
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