IR 05000482/1998020

Insp Rept 50-482/98-20 on 981115-1226.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20199H481
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	01/15/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199H472	List: IR 05000482/1998020 ML20199H467
References
50-482-98-20, NUDOCS 9901250217
Download: ML20199H481 (18)

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[- ENCLOSURE

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION IV

f' Docket No.: 50-482 l License No.: NPF-42 l

- Report No.: 50-482/98-20 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation ;

Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station l Location: 1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas Dates: November 15 to December 26,1998 Inspectors: F. L. Brush, Senior Resident !nspector

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B. A. Smalldridge, Resident inspector !

L. E. Ellershaw, Reactor inspector ;

Approved By: D. N. Graves, Acting Dranch Chief

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ATTACHMENT: Supplemental information

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9901250217 990115

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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY h

Wolf Creek Generating Station NRC Inspection Report 50-482/98-20

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Operations

. Licensee management was aggressive in responding to several work performance problems. The problems, although not safety significant, indicated a lack of attention to l

detail by plant personnel. A site-wide work standdown and management briefing

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reinforced the importance of public, plant, and personnel safety to licensee personnel (Section O1.2).

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. The licensee responded properly to a failure of the rod control system. The control room staff entered and performed the appropriate off-normal procedure. The supervising operator exhibited good oversight during the response to the event. The i operators minimized distractions in the control room during the rod control system maintenance and testing and maintained a good awareness of plant conditions (Section O4.1).

Maintenance

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. In violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, licensee personnel performed maintenance on a steam generator atmospheric relief valve using an inadequate i

l maintenance procedure. Licensee maintenance personnel failed to reinstall a control air isolation valve for a steam generator atmospheric relief valve. The maintenance

department relied on skill of the craft to control the work on safety-related equipment, l instead of providing adequate procedural controls. This was a noncited violation (Section M1.3).

. The licensee's execution of the procedure to identify and correct the cause of a rod control system malfunction was excellent. The prejob brief clearly identified potential causes, procedural steps, communication expectations, and contingency plan Maintenance technicians used excellent step-by-step control, peer checks, communication techniques, and system response verification throughout the process (Section M4.1).

Enoineering

. The licensee made significant progress in implementing its check valve condition monitoring program, and the revised procedures met the requirements of the OM Code l

and incorporated the limitations included in the November 26,1997, Safety Evaluation (Section E8.1).

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-2-Plant Sucoort

. A health physics department briefing provided to radiation workers was timely and effective. The information presented during the briefing reflected current radiation worker issues inside the radiologically controlled area and recent program changes that directly impacted radiation workers. The dialogue between the presenter and the audience indicated that the audience understood the information that was presented (Section R5.1).

$ The ALARA review committee provided a rigorous, probing, and in-depth review of the refueling outage work packages that were evaluated. The committee closely examined the work processes to ensure that all available means of reducing radiation exposure were considered and appropriately utilized (Section R7.1).

. The licensee did not ensure that the technical support center would be habitable if the technical support centor diesel combustion air inlet damper became inoperable. The licensee's planned corrective actions were appropriate (Section P2.1).

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Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status

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The plant began the report period on November 15,1998, at 100 percent power. On l December 10, the licensee reduced power to 91 percent to facilitate repairs on a reactor i protection system inverter. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power on l December 11. On December 17, the licensee reduced power to 95 percent power to facilitate ,

I protection system *;esting. The licensee returned the plant to 100 percent power on December 18 and operated at 100 percent power for the remainder of the report perio i

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l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations l

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01.1 General Comments (71707) j The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Plant status, operating  !

problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room  ;

coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed several shift tumovers j and had no concern ;

O1.2 Work Standdown

' Inspection Scoce (71707)

I The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to several licensee identified work i performance problem I Observations and Findinas

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On the evening of December 16,1998, the plant manager ordered a site-wide work standdown. Within the previous 5 days, the licensee had experienced a number of work l performance problems. None of the individual problems were safety significant; l

however, in the aggregate, they indicated a lack of attention to detail by licensee personnel. The problems included- '

. An emergency diesel generator planned maintenance outage was extended approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />;

• A concrete lined radioactive waste storage drum, which was empty, was dropped in the radwaste building;

. A reactor coolant system sample panel was overpressurized which broke several gauge faces; and

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! . One to two gallons of biocide was spilled at the circulating water pump hous j The licensee initiated performance improvement requests for each of the work performance problem l On December 17,1998, the inspectors attended briefings the plant manager and other !

licensee management conducted with all site personnel. The briefing topics included: 7

. Public, plant, and personnel safety; ,

. The work performance problems that occurred in the previous 5 days; and j

. The distractions produced by the holiday season and world event :

Following the briefings, the plant manager lifted the work standdow Conclusions i i

The inspectors concluded that licensee management was aggressive in responding to !

several work performance problems. The problems, although not safety significant, ,

indicated a lack of attention to detail by plant personnel. A site-wide work standdown l

and management briefing reinforced the importance of public, plant, and personnel safety to licensee personne O2 _ Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment i

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O Review of Eauioment Taaout (71707)

I The inspectors walked down the following tagout

• Clearance Order 98-1171-KJ - Emergency Diesel Generator A The tagout was properly prepared and authorized. All tags were on the correct devices l and the devices were in the position prescribed by the tags.

O2.2 Encineered Safetv Feature System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following engineered safety features and vital systems:

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. Auxiliary Feedwater System l

• Emergency Diesel Generators A and B Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptabl l l

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3-04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 0 Rod Control System Failure Insoection Scope (71707)

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The inspectors reviewed the control room operators' response to an inoperable rod control syste Observations and Findinas

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The licensee planned to reduce reactor power to facilitate maintenance on an inverter in the reactor protection system. . Following the initial boron injection, the control room operators attempted to manually insert control rods. The control rods did not mov The rod speed indication display indicated 48 steps per minute and the green direction light lit as expected. However, the stepping light, digital rod position indication, and demand counters did not respond. The control room operators immediately stopped the power reduction and entered Off-normal Procedure OFN SF-011," Realignment of Dropped, Misaligned Rods and Control Rod Malfunctions," Revision 5. The licensee determined that, although the control rod drive system was inoperable, the control rods would have tripped if require The shift supervisor made the appropriate notifications and coordinated the troubleshooting and repair effort (Section M4.1). The shift supervisor also discussed previously planned plant work with onsite and offsite personnel and postponed any that could affect plant operations. The control room staff properly implemented Procedure OFN SF-011. The inspectors also observed that the operators were very attentive to plant parameters while the rod control system was out of service. The shift supervisor exhibited good supervisory oversight of the even The inspectors discussed the response to the event with the control room staff and monitored the control room operators during the performance of the rod control system postmaintenance test. The operators performed Procedure SYS SF-001," Control Rod Shutdown Rod Operability Verification," Revision 15, to verify that control rods were operable following the repairs. The control room operators held a prejob brief before conducting the procedure. The brief was thorough, explaining what part of the circuit had been worked and the expected response at each applicable step of the procedur The supervising operator was clear in communicating the expectations for controlling reactivity changes, procedural adherence, directed and formal three-way communications, peer checking, and contingency plan The inspectors observed that control room operators demonstrated very good procedural control and sensitivity for reactivity management while performing Procedure SYS SF-001. At one point, the reactor operator displayed a questioning ,

attitude and did not continue with the procedure until the " parked" location for a specific

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-4-control rod v,as verified. i he operators consistently verified rod control system responses from more than one indicator, and effectively utilized three-way communications and peer checkin The inspectors also observed that the operators took action to remove other distractions from the control room while rod operability testing was in progress. This included restricting access to the control room and delaying other noncritical evolutions that were in process. The operators returned the rod control system to operable following successful completion of the rod control system operability verification procedur The troubleshooting and repair effort is documented in Section M4.1 of this repor Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee responded properly to a failure of the rod control system. The control room staff entered and performed the appropriate off-normal procedure. The supervising operator exhibited good oversight during the response to the event. The operators minimized distractions in the control room during the rod control system maintenance and testing and maintained a good awareness of plant condition . Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments on Maintenance Activities Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:

. Work Order 97-125386-004, install new conduit and connector assembly on Emergency Diesel Generator A Cylinders 5 and 8 work order

. Work Order 97-126507-001. Replace O-ring on Emergency Diesel Generator A intake manifold between Cylinders 8 and 9

. Work Order 98-128419-001, Remove and reinstall piping spool piece to i Emergency Diesel Generator A intercooler

. Work Order 98-129056-001, Refueling battery charger cleaning and maintenance

. Work Order 98-129056-002, Refueling battery undervoltage relay testing i

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. Work Order 98-203278-003, Remove / reinstall actuator accessories and perform l actuator setup on Train A atmospheric relief Valve AB PV-003

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. Work Order 98-205621-000, Troubleshoot a malfunction of the rod control l system

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b.' Observation and Findinas

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The inspectors identified no substantive concerns. All work observed was performed i with the work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed l'

supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when require )

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M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities Inspection Scope (61726)

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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities: l

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. Test Procedure STS IC-608A, Revision 13, Slave Relay Test K608 Train A safety injection,  ;

. Test Procedure STS AB-201D, Revision 5, Atmospheric relief valve inservice i valve test; j

. Test Procedure STS SF-001, Revision 15, Control rod shutdown rod operability verification; and

. Test Procedure STS AL-103, Revision 31, Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump inservice pump tes ;

i Observations and Findinas 1 l

The surveillance testing was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's )

approved programs and the Technical Specification l M1.3 Inadeauate Maintenance Procedure j Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances that led to the failure to reinstall a control air isolation valve and fitting during reinstallation of the actuator on a steam generator atmospheric relief valv Observations and Findinos  !

On November 24,1998, maintenance technicians reinstalled the actuator for Valve AB PV-004, Steam Generator D atmospheric relief valve,'using Work l

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l Order 98-202606-000. A control air isolation va,se located near the relief valve actuator j in a section of copper tubing had been removed using Step 1.7 of the work orde Step 1.14 of the work order specified the reinstallation of the accessories that were removed when the valve actuator was disassembled, which included the control air i isolation valve. The atmospheric relief valve was reassembled and placed back in service. The following day, a nuclear station operator identified that the control air isolation valve for Valve AB PV-004 was not installed. The missing control air valve was then located and reinstalled. The licensee classified the error as significant and initiated Performance improvement Request 98-360 During the initial reinstallation of the relief valve accessories on November 24, the control air isolation valve and an associated fitting were not reinstalled. The work order did not specifically identify which accessories were to be removed or reinstalled on the relief valve actuator. The work order also did not include procedural guidance to identify which accessory components were removed in order to ensure they were reinstalle Instead, the maintenance department relied on skill of the craft to control the work on the steam generator atmospheric relief valve, a safety-related componen Additionally, a procedural quality control step to monitor the tightening of the instrument air fittings during reinstallation had been deleted. Although this quality control step deletion was allowed by the quality assurance program, it could have identified the omission of the control air isolation valve. The inspectors identified that this was the second occurrence over several months in which maintenance technicians using skill of the craft experienced difficulty with configuration control involving control air isolation valves on air-operated valves. The first occurred on August 21,1998, and was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/98-17, Section O The licensee's corrective actions included implementing the use of a form similar to a

" lifted lead" form typically used for electrical work. The new form will be used by the entire maintenance department when detailed drawings are not provided with a procedure that removes and reinstalls equipment comoonents. The corrective actions associated with this issue were included for review by the licensee's corrective action review boar ,

The inspectors determined that the failure to reinstall the control air isolation valve did not affect the operability of the atmospheric relief valve. However, the removal and reinstallation of accessory components on Valve AB PV-004 was not performed in accordance with written procedures in a manner which assured the quality of a l l safety-related component. This was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-482/9820-01).

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l In violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, licensee personnel performed maintenance on a steam generator atmospheric relief valve using an inadequate maintenance procedure. Licensee maintenance personnel failed to reinstall a control air

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isolation valve for a steam generator atmospheric relief valve. The maintenance I

department relied on skill of the craft to control the work on safety-related equipment, l

instead of providing adequate procedural controls. . This was a noncited violatio M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment >

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M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant material conditio l

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in general, where equipment deficiencies existed, the deficiencies had been identified by l the licensee for corrective action. The inspectors observed the following plant material ,

condition issues during the inspection period:

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. The inspectors identified that piping and tank foundation fasteners in the i refueling water storage tank pipe enclosure room at the base of the tank were l heavily coated with white crystals. The inspectors informed the licensee and *

questioned what effect the substance would have on the fasteners. The licensee subsequently determined that the crystalline material built up on the refueling ,

water tank foundation and piping consisted of approximately 10 percent boron, 1

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0.2 percent silica, and other noncorrosive material. The licensee also

' determined that the crystalline material did not have a deleterious effect on the tank or piping. The licensee cleaned up the materia <

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. During troubleshooting activities in rod control logic Cabinet SF1108, the shift supervisor identified, and informed the inspectors, that a wood frame covered by steel mesh was found at the bottom of the cabinet. The wood frame was located underneath permanently installed equipment in the cabinet and appeared to have been in place since initial plant startup. The licensee documented this condition in Performance improvement Request 98-3742. The licensee evaluated the wood frame and determined that it did not affect operation of any safety-related components in the cabinet and could not be removed without removing some of the cabinet internals. The licensee planned to remove the frame from the cabinet during the next refueling outag . The licensee completed a major material condition improvement to the Class 1E switchgear room cooler unit rooms. The improvements included cleaning and painting the piping, valves, and other equipment in the rooms and sealing and painting the concrete walls and floors with high quality coatings. Piping and valves which previously exhibited signs of corrosion were treated and painte The inspectors observed that these improvements significantly improved the material condition of the rooms.

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Conclusions ,

I The material condition of those plant systems and components evaluated during this l inspection period was good with few equipment deficiencie l

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M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance l M4.1 Troubleshootina of Rod Control System Inspection Scope (62707/92902) '

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The inspectors monitored troubleshooting efforts by the maintenance department on the l

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rod control system. . Observations and Findinas i

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On December 9,1998, control rods did not move as expected when reactor operators  ;

attempted to manually move rods to control axial offset during a planned reactor - i downpower. A description of the operations department's response to the rod control ;

system malfunction is documented in Section O4.1 of this report. The engineering and ,

maintenance departments quickly developed and implemented a troubleshooting procedure to identify and correct the cause of the rod control system failur !

The inspector attended a prejob briefing for the rod control system troubleshooting !

procedure. The inspectors found that the briefing, which was thorough, covered the -

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. A description of the problem; j

- The initial troubleshooting efforts;

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. The procedural steps to further determine the cause;

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. Contingency plans;

. Expected operator actions if the rod control system degraded further; and

. Human error prevention techniques.

l Maintenance technicians used the procedure in Work Order 98-205621-000 to

! determine and correct the cause of the rod control system failure. The cause was l determined to be a faulty pulse-shaper card which was replaced. The inspectors b ' observed that the procedure was clearly written and provided the technicians with the results expected for each step. The technicians used excellent step-by-step control and peer checks and verified results before moving to the next step. The technicians communicated system response and related information on a continuous basis with both the control room operators and the system engineer at the rod control system cabinets ,

throughout the troubleshooting process. Overall, the inspectors found that the maintenance department's troubleshooting of the rod control system was excellent.

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-9- Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's execution of the procedure to identify and correct the cause of a rod control system malfunction was excellent. The prejob brief clearly identified potential causes, procedural steps, communication expectations, and contingency plans. Maintenance technicians used excellent step-by-step control, peer checks, communication techniques, and system response verification throughout the proces Ill. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E8.1 Check Valve Condition Monitorina inspection Inspection Scope (73756)

An inspection of the Wolf Creek check valve condition monitoring program was conducted on November 16-20,1998. The NRC, in a Safety Evaluation dated November 26,1997, authorized an alternative to the ASME Code check valve testing requirements for the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, the first plant to be so authorize Observations and Findinas The licensee's alternative testing consisted of adopting the requirements specified in ASME OMa Code-1996, Subsection ISTC 4.5, including the use of Mandatory Appendix 11, Check Valve Condition Monitoring Program. The NRC authorization incorporated the licensee's commitment to seven specific limitations to Appendix 11, ;

including a requirement that the licensee submit any risk-informed criteria to the NRC l for review and approval prior to their use in the check valve condition monitoring progra The inspector found the implementation of the Wolf Creek check valve condition monitoring program to be in its early stages. Of the 189 check valves in the licensee's inservice testing program, four valves (residual heat removal pump to accumulator injection line Check Valves EP8818A, -B, -C, and -D) were included in the condition ,

monitoring program. While there is no minimum number, type, or class of check valves i that must be included in the program, the current scope of the program was considered to be a reflection of the licensee's initial effort to establish a new program. Licensee personnel informed the inspector that their intention was to eventually include all reactor !

coolant system pressure isolation valve l At the time of the inspection, the two procedures governing and documenting the check valve condition monitoring program were draft documents. Draft Procedure Al 298-002,

" Check Valve Condition Monitoring Program," was the governing procedure for

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implementing Appendix li of the OM Code and the limitations committed to by the licensee. The inspector performed a detailed comparison between this procedure and

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the requirements of Appendix 11. The inspector identified minor inconsistencies that were acknowledged by licensee personnel as areas requiring additional revie Draft Procedure STS CV-100, " inservice Testing Check Valve Condition Monitoring," l l

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implemented the check valve condition monitoring activities for the four residual heat removal pump to accumulator injection line check valves. All of the required condition

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monitoring activiti@ were included in Draft Procedure STS CV-100. Licensee personnel l stated that they~ intended to finalize the draft procedures by the end of December 199 ,

Procedure AP 298-004," Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves Document," l dated May 30,1997, detailed the methodology to be followed for making changes to the  ;

inservice testing program. Form AP 29B-004-01 was the procedure form used to  ;

document and justify specific changes. Change Notice 109 to Form AP 29B-004-01,  !

which was in draft form, documented the change to the inservice testing program with j respect to the four residual heat removal pump to accumulator injection line check valves, included was the residual heat removal check valve analysis data sheet which t documented all the check valve condition monitoring activities used to determine the final activities for testing and examination of these specific check valves. The inspector  ;

! noted that all four check valves were included in one group despite the fact that two of the valves in the early history of the plant were subject to abnormal wear at high residual heat removal system flow rates because of the placement of upstream orifices which are  :

still installed in the same location. Licensee personnel stated that a revision to the plant Technical Specifications reduced the residual heat removal flow rate requirement. The inspector noted that the activities determined by the licensee to meet the Code ,

requirements for each valve included: (1) leak rate testing every refueling outage; (2) {

verification of forward flow at normal shutdown cooling operations every refueling outage;(3) trending of number of residual heat removal system depressurizations once  ;

every 3 months; (4) visual examination of check valve exterior for bonnet leaks every refueling outage; and (5) tracking number of hours when the flow exceeds 3000 gallons ,

l per minute to trend wear of bearing bioch and hinge pin every refueling outag Considering that these activities were performed on every check valve at least once every refueling outage, the inclusion of all four check valves in a single group was ,

determined by the inspector to be appropriate.

L On December 15,1998, the licensee finalized and issued Revision 0 to  !

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Procedures Al 29B-002 and STS CV-100. In addition, Change Notice 109 to [

l Form AP 29B-004-01 was finalized and issued on December 30,1998, i

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! Conclusions The inspector determined that the licensee had made significant progress in implementing its check valve condition monitoring program and that the revised procedures met the requirements of the OM Code and incorporated the limitations included in the November 26,1997, Safety Evaluation.

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-11-E8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-482/9411-03: Review of steam generator fill water dissolved oxygen histor Since this 1994 inspection, the licensee has implemented the use of nitrogen sparging in the condensate storage tank to maintain dissolved oxygen at low levels and now complies with the Electric Power Research Institute guideline value of s100 ppb ,

dissolved oxygen for steam generator fill water. Based on licensee actions, no further r inspection is warrante ;

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IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls ,

R General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely *

touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically controlled areas exhibited good radiation protection work practice Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a !

sample of doors, required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection, and found i no problem R5 Staff Training and Qualification R Radiation Worker Update Briefino ' Inspection Scoce (71750)  !

The inspector monitored a health physics department briefing on recent radiation worker issues and program updates that was provided to radiation worker l 1 Observations and Findinas i

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On November 11,1998, the inspector monitored a briefing on recent radiation worker issues and program updates that was provided to support engineers. The briefing was prepared by the health physics department and was provided to all radiation workers onsite in order to provide timely information on recent radiation worker issues and program changes. The briefing, which was presented by a senior health physics technician, was informative, interactive, and thorough. It provided the radiation workers with information regarding:

. Requirements for accessing the overhead inside the radiologically controlled area

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New controls for the use of tools inside the radiologically controlled area

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Radiation work permit knowledge requirements The inspector found that the information contained in the briefing was directly related to recent radiation worker issues and changes to the program that would impact radiation workers. The inspector observed that the information was presented in a manner that elicited audience response. The dialogue between the presenter and the audience,

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. which followed questions from the audience, demonstrated listener comprehensio Conclusions The inspectors concluded that a health physics department briefin0 provided to radiation workers was timely and effective. The information presented during the briefing reflected current radiation worker issues inside the radiologically controlled area and recent program changes that directly impacted the workers. The dialogue between the presenter and the audience indicated that the audience understood the information that i was presente '

R7 Quality Assurance in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Activities R7.1 ALARA Review Committee Meetina Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspector monitored an ALARA review committee meetin Observations and Findinas I The inspectors monitored a meeting of the licensee's ALARA review committee, which met to evaluate refueling outage work packages planned inside containment. The goal of this committee was to reduce individual and collective radiation exposur Management representatives from each major department participated in the evaluatio The inspectors observed that the committee demonstrated good background knowledge about the jobs that were reviewed and used site history and the lessons learned at other sites during the review. The inspectors observed that the committee asked work

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planners probing and meaningful questions and demanded adequate responses, i Several times during inc meetino, the work package planners were unable to adequately address tbc concerns of the committee. Each time this occurred, a specific action item was identified and a specific due date assigned. These assigned action

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-13-items were then identified in the meeting minute The inspectors also observed that the committee was adamant that all work steps be sequenced and specifically tied to the official refueling outage schedule. This would maintain personnel exposures ALARA by ensuring that the work was accomplished per the plan, at the scheduled time, and with the required plant configuration. The inspectors found that the committee closely examined the work processes to determine if all available means of reducing radiation exposure were utilized and ensured that the following methods were considered:

. Alternative processes and contingency plans

. Temporary shielding

. Conservative placement of temporary equipment and personnel

. Mock up training

. Equipment qualification and staging

. Move personnel away from radiation fields when not required

. Procedures and instructions complete The inspectors found that, overall, the ALARA review committee provided a rigorous, probing, and in-depth review of the refueling outage work packages that were evaluate c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the ALARA review committee provided a rigorous, probing, and in-depth review of the refueling outage work packages that were evaluate The committee closely examined the work processes to ensure that all available means l of reducing radiation exposure were considered and appropriately utilize l l

P2 Status of Emergency Prepare 61ess Facilities, Equipment, and Resources l

P Technical Support Center habitability a. InsoectiortScope (71~51 .

l The inspectors toured the technical support center and evaluated the operability of the technical support center diesel and ventilation syste b. Observations and Findinas During a tour of the technical support center, the inspectors identified that a potential existed for large quantities of outside air to be introduced into the technical support center which would affect pressurization capability. Should the damper that allowed combustion air to the technical support center diesel become inoperable, the licensee would open the outside doors to the equipment room. This would allow potentially

contaminated air into the technical support center. The technical support center could l then become uninhabitable.

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The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 98-3720 to document the issue and associated corrective actions. The licensee's planned corrective actions included changing the technical support operations procedure to allow the damper to be ;

opened manually by disconnecting the darnper operator from the louvers. The licensee l'

would then block the louvers open. This would prevent potentially contaminated air from entering the technical support center pressure boundary. The inspectors reviewed the l licensee's planned corrective actions and had no further concern Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not ensure that the technical support center would be habitable if the technical support center diesel combustion air inlet damper became inoperable. The inspectors also concluded that the licensee's planned corrective actions were appropriat I i

V. Manaaement Meetinos

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X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 23,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente ;

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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie !

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. J. Angus, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action l G. D. Boyer, Chief Administrative Officer l J. W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer l

B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager R. Muench, Vice President Engineering S. R. Koenig, Manager, Performance Improvement and Assessment C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 Onsite Engineering IP 61726 Surveillance Observations IP 62707 Maintenance Observations IP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750_ Plant Support Activities IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance IP 92903 Followup - Engineering  ;

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

,O,_pened 50-482/9820-01 NCV Inadequate maintenance procedure (Section M1.3)

_ Closed 50-482/9411-03 IFl Review of steam generator fill water dissolved oxygen history (Section E8.2)

50-482/9820-01 NCV inadequate maintenance procedure (Section M1.3)

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