IR 05000482/1987025

Insp Rept 50-482/87-25 on 870921-25.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Insp Findings in Insp Repts 50-482/86-14 & 50-482/86-18

ML20236M418
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/26/1987
From:	Ireland R, Norman D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236M412	List: IR 05000482/1987025 ML20236M410
References
50-482-87-25, NUDOCS 8711130124
Download: ML20236M418 (6)

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l APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/87-25' License: NPF-42 I

Docket: 50-482 i Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)

P. O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

Inspection At: Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted: September 21-25, 1987 Inspector: [Wpww /6/2d*/77 D. E. Norman, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Date '

Section, Reactor Safety Branch Approved:

R. E. Ireland, Chief, Engineering Section, Reactor

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Date Safety Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted September 21-25, 1987 (Report 50-482/87-25)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection consisting of a followup of inspection findings identified in NRC Inspection Reports 50-482/86-14 and j 50-482/86-1 j

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Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations wera identifie l l

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M2230124e721o9 G ADOLK 05000182 PEK,

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DETAILS

' Persons Contacted ]

WCNOC ,

W. J. Rudolph, Manager, Quality Assurance

0. L. Maynard, Manager,- _ Licensing  !

D. R. Prichard, Engineer, NPC 1 J. Goode, Licensing Engineer 'j

K. Petersen, Supervisor, Licensing i a

NRC 4

B. L. Bartlett, Resident Inspector

R. P. Mullikin, Project Inspector

Denotes those present during exit interview on September 25', 198 . Background During May 1986, the NRC conducted an inspection at WCGS to determine the status of licensee actions relative to IE Information Notice (IN) 86-03 and to determire the internal wiring' types installed in Limitorque valve'

operators by performing a sample inspection of the operators used in plant safety-related application There are.156 <,afety-related Limitorque valve operators at WCGS,108 of which are located in a harsh environment. 'During 1984, prior to plant q operation, the licensee performed an inspectio'n of 59 of.the 108 operators and replaced parts necessary to ensure operator qualification. . Four. of -]"

the remaining operators were encapsulated and could not be readily

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inspected. The other 45 (HE-4 Specification) had been provided by'the NSSS vendor, and the licensee relied on the vendor qualification program 'I rather than inspecting the NSSS provided operator ']

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The NRC inspection consisted of a documentation review and an inspection-of 10 operators. Of the 10 operators, 7 had previously been inspected by-the licensee and 3 were HE-4 Specification operators which had-not been: ~ .

previously inspected. Wires in several operators were. unmarked; however, ' t i identification was made by comparison to wires which had manufacturer l markings. The wires in operator EJHV-8809A (HE-4. Specification) weref marked "Techbestos" for which no qualification documentation was , ,

j available; therefore,'the operator was considered to be unqualifie l e

Af ter the questionable wiring was identified,'the licensee performed walkdown inspections of another sample and four operators from that sample 1 were found to have unqualified wires. Based-on this. finding, the licensee shut the plant down from Mode 1 to. Mode 3 and replaced all internal wiring i

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.3 in 152 of-the safety-related operators. The 4 encapsulated containment recirculation sump isolation valve operators were not inspected, and a justification for. continued operation was written to provide justification to operate.with the 4 operators 'until an outage, which was scheduled for October 198 The licensee evaluated the removed wires and determined that a total of 27 operators (including the 1 identified by the.NRC .

inspector and the 4 previously. identified by:the licensee) contained '

indeterminate wiring; therefore, the condition of the operators was suc that operation was not ensured ir a post-accident environment. The 4-encapsulated operators were subsequently inspected during the outage'and no unqualified wires were foun l

. Inspection' Summary A followup of the following items . identified during th'e previous NRC inspections was made durfng this inspection, (Closed) Potential Violation 482/8614-01 - Unidentified wires wer found in Operator KAHV-0030 by the licensee during' the 1984 walkdown ,

inspection of Limitorque operators. No documentation was'available' j during the NRC inspection to show that the wires had been changed o were determined to be qualifie An analysis of the wires removed from the-operatot during the June 1986 rework showed that the wires were ideritifiable and were- i qualified. The wiras had apparently been-replaced after the 1984 inspection, but the replacement was not reflected'in maintenance documentation. This is considered a documentation error, and no- '

corrective action is required since the wires were. replaced again~in i June 1986, with Rockbestos wiring as shown on Work Request (WR) .02565-8 This item is close . -j l (Closed) Potential Violation 482/8614-02 - Unidentified terminal 1 blocks were found in several Limitorque operators by the licensee 1 during the 1984 walkdown inspection. There was no documentation'to show that the terminal blocks had been replaced or were determined to be qualifie The licensee reviewed field verification forms, which the NRC 1 inspector had reviewed, and verified.that in some instances data conflicted in the terminal block identification /and in other ,

instances showed that terminal blocks were unidentifiable'or  !

unqualified. Several terminal blocks were later identified and-determined to be qualified, while others could notLbe identified or-were identified but unqualifie This-process ha'd occurred in late- 1 1984 and early 1985 and was verified by the NRC inspector by ,

reviewing WRs showing replacement of the terminal blocks. .This data was'not available during the earlier NRC Inspection which. led to the findin ,

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This item is closed, (Closed) Open item 482/8614-03 - Field verification forms-from the 1984 walkdown inspection identified unqualified limit switche The NRC inspector did not review corrective action for this-item during the previous inspection because data could'not be retrieved prior to the end of the inspectio !

A review of specification M-237 operators showed that there was a question concerning the limit switch gasket material. The vendor was-contacted and it was found that the limit switches had been qualified without gaskets, therefore, the gaskets do not perform a safety )

function. The gaskets'instalied on the switches were acceptable and no corrective action was necessar This item is close (Closed) Deviation 482/8614-04 - Certain wiring and terminal blocks installed in Limitorque operators, but not included in the Limitorque operator qualification tests, were not discussed nor referenced in the equipment evaluation worksheet (EEW). Therefore, no trail l

existed for making a determination of the gaalification status of the I items. This was a deviation from the commitment in " Environmental I Description of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" submitted by letter to the NRC dated January 17, 1986.

l The NRC inspector reviewed the qualification documentation for HE-4 operators and found a statement in the EEQ Evaluation Check Sheet Supplement, dated September 1986, which states that wiring in the operators is Rockbestos Firewall III, Raychem Flamtrol or GE Vulkene l Supreme. Test reports were available for the Rockbestos and Raychem l wirin The report for the GE wiring is proprietary and is available l

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for review at GE. The corrective action is satisfactor This items is close (Closed) Potential Violation 482/8614-05 - There was no qualification test report available to support qualification of GE Vulkene Supreme wiring which had been installed in some Limitorque operators. The basis of qualification was a GE Prodt.ct. Data Pamphlet which was not y an acceptable qualification documen The wiring test report is proprietary and is not in the possession of the licensee. On July 25, 1986, the licensee reviewed the wiring

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test report during an audit at G The result of the audit, which l concluded that qualification of GE Vulkene Supreme wiring was supported by Report 515-710-Qual-308, dated February.1986, is documented in EEQ Evaluation Check Sheet Supplement, dated September 198 This item is close _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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f. (Closed) Potential Violation 482/8614-06 - There was-no' documentation'

to support qualification of."Techbestos" wiring which was: identified 1 in, one Limitorque. operator during the NRC walkdown inspectio The ')

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operator was,'therefore, considered to be unqualifie Wiring in. operators EJHV-8809A, identified by .the NRC inspector, .and EJHV-8309B, .later identified by the licensee, was rep. laced with qualified Rockbestos wiring on.May 16, 1986, immediately following ,

the NRC inspections This was verified by reviewing'WR 02222-86'and WR 02223-8 ]~

The identification of-the unqualified wiring 'resulted 'in .thE-reinspection'and rework program of all safety-related operators,.as j described. in paragraph. 2 of this. report. The actions.taken?by WCNOC' . ,

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indicate that the licensee did take timely and appropriate actio.nLto  ;

identify and correct the Limitorque? wiring problem, based on'the knowledge of t'ne problem at the tim This item is close g. (Closed) Potential Violation 482/8714-07 f Kukula terminal blocks..had; been identified by the licensee during the 1984 walkdown inspection- j and no documentation to support.their qualification was' presented-

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during the NRC inspectio The licensee had identified '15 Limitorque operators with unqualified Kukula series K622 terminal blocks. The terminal blocks had been replaced in January 1985; however, the WRs for their replacement were i not available during the NRC inspection. . The1r. replacement was

i verified during this inspection by reviewing the'WR '

This item is close h. (Closed) Unresolved Item 482/8618-03 - As stated'~previously in thi ,

report, following the. NRC inspection which identified unqualified "

wiring in 'Limitorque operators, the licensee initiated'a' reinspection program for all Limitorque operators. The reinspection and-subsequent analysis of the findings were performed under the 1 direction of Corrective Action Request (CAR) 23, which was! reviewed 'l by the NRC inspector during.this inspectio I

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Wiring removed from the operators wa: segregated by? operator number ,

and later analyzed to determine _ operability' status. - The'following: 1 conditions previously identified in NRC. Inspection Report.50-482/86-18 were analyzed-for Category A operators (required to function post-accident) and Category B operators = (.not' required to function post-accident;-however, must not=adverselyJfail-. a post-accident):

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'i-(1) 27 coerators (137 total wires) had unidentifiable wiring and could not be verified to be qualified for'a post-accident

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environmen (2) Approximately 25 lugs had been crimped with a single crimp . ,

instead of a double crimp, customarily used at WCG '

Connections were mechanically sound and had good electrical contact, therefore, were determined to be acceptable, o

(3) Approxim&tely 152 lugs had been crimped backwards (placed -

backward in crimping tool). Connectior,s were mechanically sound

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and had good electrical contact,. t^.erefore, were determinedEto ', ;

be acceptabl '

(4) Approximately 179 internal wires were 16 AWGLinstead of

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specified 14 AWG. This would not have affected operator operabilit (5) Approximately 40 ring-type lugs had been modified to a spade configuration. Engineering judgement was that the lugs would i have functioned properly during a seismic event assuming good '

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installation practices'had been use As a result of the reinspection and analysis performed by the j licensee, it was determined that.only the unidentifiable wiring could have caused valve operators to become inoperable. This has been

> ddressed in paragraph 3.f of this repor i This item is close j Exit Meeting An exit meeting was conducted on September 25 1987, at which time results of this inspection were discussed with members of the WCNOC staf l l

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