IR 05000482/1989021
| ML20245H299 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1989 |
| From: | Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245H296 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-89-21, NUDOCS 8908160409 | |
| Download: ML20245H299 (10) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/89-21 Operating License:
NPF-42 Docket:' 50-482 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)
P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)
Inspection At:
. CGS, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas W
Inspection Conducted: July 1-31, 1989 Inspectors:
B. L. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects M. E. Skow, Resident Inspector Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects D. V. Pickett, Project Manager Project Directorate IV, Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V, and Special Projects, NRR
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7 Approved:
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E. d.t Holler, Chief, Project Section D Date Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted July 1-30/31, 1989 (Report 50-482/89-21)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, onsite followup of events at operating power
. reactors and in-office review of periodic and special reports.
Results: The licensee was observed to promptly initiate a power reduction to repair a valve which represented a potential personnel hazard if it had been repaired at power (paragraphs 2 and 6). The inspector identified a concern with the adequacy of work request (WR) retest instructions (paragraph 4). The licensee has determined that the ultimate heat sink (UHS) is silting up at a faster rate than expected (paragraph 5). A review of selected 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations identified some weaknesses with i
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-individual evaluations,' but showed the evaluations in general were adequate Specifications:(paragraph 7)pdated Safety l Analysis Report and Technical:
and properly addressed the U
... No violations or deviations were
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identified,
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i DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted j
Principal Licensee Personnel
- B. Withers, President and CEO j
- F. T. Rhodes, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services j
- R. M. Grant, Vice President, Quality Assurance (QA)
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I J. A. Bailey, Vice President, Operations G. D. Boyer, Plant Manager R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications
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- 0. L. Maynard, Manager, Regulatory Services j
B. McKinney, Manager, Operations
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- M. G. Williams, Manager, Plant Support
- K. Peterson, Supervisor, Licensing
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W. B. Norton, Manager, Technical Support j
- C. W. Fowler, Manager, Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
- R. B. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering
- R. S. Benedict, Manager, Quality Control
- W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor, QA J. Pippin, Manager, NPE
- S. Wideman, Licensing Specialist III
- R. P. Evenson, Supervising Operator
- C Sprout, Section Manager, NPE, WC
- N. Hoadley, Manager, NPE Systems
- G. Rathbun, Manager, NPE, Wichita
- B. Goshorn, Wolf, Creek Coordinator, KEPC0 The inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.
- Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on August 1, 1989.
2.
Plant Status I
I During the inspection period, the licensee operated at 100 percent reactor
power except for the time discussed below:
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o On July 10, 1989, the licensee reduced reactor power to perform
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repairs of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve AE FCV-510. On July 11,
1989, the plant returned to full power. This repair effort is discussed in more detail in paragraph 6. "0nsite Followup of Events."
There were no reactor trips or unplanned turbine trips.
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3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The purpose of this inspection was to ensure that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with license and regulatory requirements.
It also was to ensure that the licensee's management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation. The methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, corrective actions, and review of facility records.
Areas reviewed during this inspection included, but were not limited to, control room activities, routine surveillance, engineered safety feature operability, radiatilon protection controls, fire protection, security, plant cleanliness, instrumentation and alarms, deficiency reports, and corrective actions.
Routine surveillance and operating activities witnessed and/or reviewed by the inspectors are listed below:
o On July 7, 1989, chemistry personnel informed the shift supervisor that routine sampling of two fuel oil systems had shown results that were out of specification. The systems were the technical support center (TSC) backup diesel generator and the emergency operations facility.(E0F) backup diesel generator. The E0F fuel oil was out of specification due to water and sediment. The TSC fuel oil was out of specification because of water only. The licensee removed the out-of-specification fuel oil and replaced it with new fuel oil. As this is not the first time that the EOF fuel oil has been found out of specification due to water, the licensee is evaluating the fuel i
oil tanks to identify the source of water and initiate a permanent fix.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The purpose of inspections in this area was to ascertain that maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and Technical Specifications. Methods used in this inspection included direct observation, personnel interview, and records review.
Items verified in this inspection included:
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Activities did not violate limiting conditions for operation and redundant components were operable.
Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained before o
initiating work.
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o Radiological controls were properly implemented.
o Fire prevention controls were implemented, o
Required alignments and surveillance to verify postmaintenance operability were performed.
o Replacement parts and materials used were properly certified.
o Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and additional technical expertise was made available when needed.
o Quality Control (QC) hold points and/or checklists were used and
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quality control personnel observed designated work activities.
o Procedures used were adequate, approved, and up to date.
Portions of selected maintenance activities regarding the WRs listed below were observed. The WRs and related documents were reviewed by the inspectors:
No.
Activity WR 01135-89 Emergency fuel oil day tank (TJE02A) looses level slowly, either Valve JEV033 or Checkvalve JEV085 is leaking.
WR 05259-88 Diesel Generator KKJ01A replace turbo-charger anode.
WR 51591-89 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump DPAL01A Circuit Breaker NB00105 perform 18-month preventive maintenance.
Selected inspector observations are discussed below:
o During the inspector's review of WR 51591-89, it was noted that Block 29, " Retest Instructions," stated "N/A, Tested Per Block 18."
Block 18, " Work Instruction," stated " Perform In Accordance with Procedure MPE-E009Q-02." The inspector's review of the worker's copy of MPE-E009Q-02, Revision 5, " Inspection and Testing of 13.8 KV and 4.16 KV Circuit Breakers," identified a concern with the adequacy of the retest instructions.
Administrative Procedure (ADM)01-057, Revision 14. " Work Request"
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governs the performance of all WRs. Step 3.5 states that Block 29 (
will contain "... The required testing to verify l
operability / functional acceptability of the affected item...."
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While MPE-E009Q-02 does require several operability checks of the
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l breaker, the procedure does not require a pump run to verify breaker reclosure after the breaker has been returned to its cubicle. The
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, licensee stated that because MPE-E009Q-02 only performed testing of the breaker and did not perform any adjustments, a pump start test was not required. However, during a sneeting with the inspector,
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licensee personnel reviewed MPE-E009Q-02 and realized that l
Step 7.8.12 did call for a check and adjustment of the plunger l
interlock. -
The licensee informed the inspector that, because this type of preventive maintenance (PM) WR was only scheduled with other PM WRs and immediately prior to a preplanned run of the pump, the retest i
The inspector informed the licensee that each WR should ensure that
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performed was adequate and did not need to be referenced on the WR.
I all testing required to verify operability was stated in Block 29 of l
the WR. The licensee committed to the inspector to modify future PM l
WRs on 4160 volt breakers to ensure that adequate retesting is referenced in Block 29, i
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain whether surveillance of safety-significant systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS. Methods used to perform this inspection included direct observation of licensee activities and review of records.
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Items inspected in this inspection included, but were not limited to, verification that:
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Testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure.
o The surveillance procedure was in conformance with TS requirements.
o The operating system and test instrumentation was within its current calibration cycle.
o Required administrative approvals and clearances were obtained prior to initiating the test.
o Limiting conditions for operation were met and the system was l
properly returned to service.
o The test data were accurate and complete and the test results met TS requireunts.
Surveillance witnessed and/or reviewed by the inspectors are listed below:
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o STS IC-2538 Revision 5. " Analog Channel Operational Test Fuel Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor GG RE-28," performed July 10, 1989.
o STS 1C-916, Revision 5,. " Channel Calibration Component Cooling Water System Non-Nuclear Safety Related Components," performed July 14, 1989.
o STS IC-275B,' ' Revision 6, '" Analog Channel Operational Test Containment Purge System Radiation Monitor GT RE-33," perfortaed July 25, 1989.
o WR 50847-89, Annual check of the UHS dam.
o WR 50844-89, Annual sedimentation check at the sounding stations in the.U.HS basin.
Selected inspector observations are discussed below:
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TS require that at least once per.12 months the licensee perform a surveillance on the height of the underwater dam to the VHS.
In conjunction with this surveillance, the licensee also performs a check of the amount of silt which has settled on the bottom of the UHS. These surveillance were performed in late June and, while both test results were found to be acceptable, the UHS was found to be silting up'at a higher rate than the licensee anticipated.
Licensee analysis has shown that up to 129 acre-feet of silt can be accommodated before the function of the VHS would be compromised. To date, the licensee estimates that a total of 60 acre-feet of silting has occurred. The licensee expected that, as the lake aged, plant growth along the shoreline would slow down the siltation.
Surveillance results have shown that the silt rate has remained relatively constant at approximately 20 acre-feet per year.
The licensee is evaluating the VHS silting and plans to take action prior to reaching.a total silt deposit of 105 acre-feet.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
The purpose of this inspection activity was to provide onsite inspection
- of events at operating power reactors. Specific inspection activities included:
o Observing plant status.
o Evaluating the significance of the events, performance of safety systems, and actions taken by the licensee.
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Nuclear Plant Engineering evaluated the pattern of the questionable studs and recommended the valve be isolated during the repair efforts. Accordingly, at 11:44 p.m., the licensee commenced a
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power reduction with the unit coming offline at 2:17 a.m. on l
July 11, 1989.
The reactor was maintained at low power levels during the repair efforts. During this time, steam generator water levels were allowed to drift high resulting in a feedwater isolation signal when a steam dump valve cycled open. All equipment operated as designed.
After the valve was repaired to a safe condition, the unit was brought back online, achieving 100 percent power at 5:20 p.m. on l
July 11, 1989.
The licensee has sent the questionable bolts to a vendor lab for analysis to determine root cause. Pending the inspector's review of the licensee's root cause analysis, this item will remain open for t
tracking purposes (482/8921-01).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports (90713)
Recently completed 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were selected for review to ascertain whether the information reported by the licensee is technically adequate and satisfies applicable reporting requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the license, and regulation.
In particular, the evaluations were reviewed to determine that they properly addressed l
and answered the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59.
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The evaluations selected for review included the following:
I Plant Modification Request 02814, " Floor Slab Penetration Closure,"
Revision 1 The modification seals the existing 11-inch diameter core drill-
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penetration in the 2047-foot elevation floor slab of the auxiliary l
building for an existing 3/4-inch diameter electrical conduit.
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Safety Evaluation 89-SE-012. " Temporary Procedure for Flow
Information on Essential Service Water System" This temporary procedure was written to support the installation of temporary gauges on the essential service water piping system to obtain post-LOCA flow information.
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l Safety Evaluation 89-SE-037, " Temporary Cooling to Class IE
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This temporary procedure describes the use of nonsafety-related equipment to cool the Class I 1E 125V DC (NK) rooms and the Class IE 4.16KV (NB)
switchgear rooms upon loss of both safety-related Air Conditioning Units SGK05A and SGK05B.
- Plant Modification Request 02879, " Sump Level Instrumentation" The modification changes the scales on the Class 1E sump level instrumentation such that actual sump level, measured from the bottom of the sump, can be read without any conversation.
In general, the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were determined to be adequate in addressing the criteria for an unreviewed safety question. The safety evaluations found in the evaluations properly addressed the appropriate sections of the USAR and/or the Technical Specifications.
It was also apparent that multiple discipline reviews ar.d concurrence took place with each of the evaluations.
There were, however, individual weaknesses identified in the evaluations which were discussed with the licensing staff. Neither of the safety evaluations dealing with temporary procedures appear to provide the effective dates of the procedures. Safety Evaluation 89-SE-012 involved a specific test of the service water system and Safety Evaluation 89-SE-037 involved temporary procedures that would only be effective during maintenance and repair to the switchgear room coolers. The reaaer of these evt'uations would not know when, or if, these temporary procedures were discontinued.
Safety Evaluation 89-SE-037 lacked references to supporting engineering calculations that were apparently made. Statements such as "We predict that the temperature in the rooms cooled by SGK05A and B would not rise enough to fail the equipment..." and "... it is estimated that the cooling can be initiated in well under the 30 minutes it could take for these roons to heat up to the point that the operability of some of the equipment would be in jeopardy" are weak in themselves and do not indicate that supporting analysis exists.
Finally, Safety Evaluation 89-SE-037 has a temporary procedure attached that does not appear to be the final version. The temporary procedure attached to this 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation is not numbered and it appears that it was not distributed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exit Meeting (3C703)
The inspectors met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) on August 1, 1989. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify, as proprietary, any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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