IR 05000482/1987004
| ML20207R732 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | Hackney C, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207R724 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-87-04, 50-482-87-4, NUDOCS 8703180076 | |
| Download: ML20207R732 (10) | |
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s APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-482/87-04 License:
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l Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P. O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted:
January 26-30, 1987
~(luh )m Inspector:
of zwu c S7 C. A.' Hackney,' Eme ency Prepa'redn Analyst Dhte '
l-Other Accompanying Personnel:
N. Terc, NRC Region IV T. Essig, Battelle M. Good, Cemex Approved:
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L. A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Date/
and Safeguards Programs Section
' Inspection Summary i
I Inspection Conducted January 26-30, 1987 (Report 50-482/87-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance r
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and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Five deficiencies were identified (primary offsite dose calculation was a manual method with high potential for error which only addressed simple, straight-line gaussian dispersion conditions, paragraph 5; inability to measure radiciodine concentrations in the plant vent under accident conditions, paragraph 5; access telephone codes for placing calls not available to communicators, paragraph 5; delay in making protective action recommendations, paragraph 6; and lack of training in the use of the backup radio, paragraph 6).
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted e
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Principal Licensee Personnel
- B. Withers, President and Chief Executive Officer
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- G. Koester, Vice President, Nuclear
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- R. Hagan, Manager, Nuclear Services
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- F. Rhodes,,Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. Bailey,JVicePresident,-EngineeringandTechnical:Suppor$
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- K. Moles, Manager, Emergency Planning
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- 0. Maynard, Manager, Licensing
- R. Andrews, Emergency Planning Administrator
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- M. Nichols, Superintendent, Plant Support
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- J. Zell, Training Manager
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- S. Devena, Emergency Planning Administrator S. Hatch, Quality Assurance Lead Auditor R. Guyer, Simulator Supervisor D. Neufield, Shift Supervisor R. Miller, Supervising Operator i-R. Gibson, Shift Clerk J. Pappen, Nuclear Station Operator C. Young, Balance of Plant Reactor Operator R. Ferguson, Reactor Operator
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NRC
- J. E. Cummins, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. L. Bartlett, Resident Inspector Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
J. Overstreet, Director, Region VII R. Leonard, Program Manager F. Begley, Division Chief R. Bissell, Technolog' cal Hazards Specialist The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training, and emergency response organization.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Deficiency (482/8540-02):
The NRC inspectors noted during the exercise that communicators and dose assessors were able to correct erroneous information incoming from offsite radiological monitoring team . . : , I P' '
In ~ addition,' procedure EPP 01-8.2, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring," paragraph 4.3.2.3 had been changed to include data verification steps to alert the user.
, (Closed) Deficiency (482/8540-03): The NRC inspectors noted that the licensee'had dispatched four offsite radiological monitoring teams during the exercise.
(Closed) Deficiency (482/8540-04): The NRC inspectors noted that the licensee had implemented procedure EPP 01-2.4, " Core Damage Assessment Methodology," for determining the extent of core damage, and that the above procedure was used during the exercise by the Chemistry Coordinator . located in the Technical Support Center (TSC).
In addition, the NRC inspectors determined that a more sophisticated method for establishing core damage.was available for use during recovery mode.
3.
Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario was reviewed to insure that it would test as much of the licensee, state, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable-without mandatory public participation.
The review included an evaluation of both the operational and radiological aspects of the scenario.
Scenario sequences were reviewed to ensure that scenario objectives for each agency could be met. Operational and radiological data was reviewed for' correctness and consistency and that information provided to players by controllers would allow scenario sequences to be'~ executed. 1Results of this review were as follows: ' , The scenario contained a logical failure sequence which would- ' reasonably allow all major scenario objectives to be met.
, ' Information provided to the players was adequate, provided a simulator failure did not occur.
Information to control the scenario if the-simulator failed was brief.
This resulted in additional information, being prepared by the licensee to be used in the event the simulator failed during the exercise.
The scenario provided for a sequence of events that would result in classifications starting at Notification of an Unusual Event and proceed through all classifications to a General Emergency.
The scenario provided for adequate participation by the emergency response organization.
Scenario review comments were discussed with utility staff prior to the exercise.
Some changes were made to the exercise scenario based on the results of the scenario review.
No violations or deviations were identifie [. .. .
4.
Control Room Control Room players were given exercise initial conditions at 5:15 a.m.
on January 28, 1987.
Initial conditions that would affect scenario play and sequence of events were the following: ~ There were 100 full power days on the second core cycle.
Unusually high load conditions existed due to the loss of LaCygne II Generating Station and unavailability of replacement power.
The resfJual heat removal (RHR) system "B" train pump and heat exchanger were removed from service due to a tube leak.
The estimated time of repair was 20 to 32 hours.
The concrete hatch on the 2026 ft. elevation of the Auxiliary Building was removed for the RHR repair.
, Auxiliary Building ventilation was being provided by thei
Fuel / Auxiliary Building normal exhaust system.
_ . , The exercise was initiated at 5:30 a.m. and at about 5:40 'a.m.,' a fire alarm in switchgear room No. 1 was activated.
A loss of 4160 volt-vital bus N-B01, failure of the diesel to synchronize, and a halon activation ^ established conditions requiring declaration of Notification of. Unusual Event (NOUE).
The fire brigade was dispatched to investigate and reported' sparking rather than a fire which delayed the declaration of an NOUE until it was prompted at 5:59 a.m.
, A Lost; of Coolant Accident (LOCA) at 8:00 a.m. resulted in a prompt declaration of an Alert at 8:03 ..n.
Offsite agencies and the NRC were notified in a timely manner.
Station recall and facility activation initiated by the Alert declaration resulted in the TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) being activated within allotted time periods.
The sudden degradation of the LOCA at 9:00 a.m. resulted in core inventory problems due to the inability of makeup to maintain inventory.
Containment temperature and pressure started increasing.
At 9:40 a.m., core cooling was on a Red Path and conditions existed for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
At 9:51 a.m., a Site Area Emergency was declared.
Containment radiation levels were increasing rapidly indicating a potential fuel problem.
At 11:28 a.m., a hydrogen burn in containment increased containment pressure to 47 psig.
A General Emergency was declared at 11:42._.. . . -. .
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.NRC inspectors observed that state and local agenc'y notifications were timely and coricct.
The Supervising Operator was very professional and made good use of procedures and plant indicators to mitigate tho emergency.
The simulator, until the point of failure near the end of the exercise, supported the scenario sequence of events.
The following observations were brought to the licensee's attention.
-These observations are neither violations nor unresolved' items.
These items were provided for licensee consideration for improvement, but have no specific regulatory requirement.
" Gaitronics announcements were not made promptly following each classification.
Eleven minutes elapsed between the Alert classification and the time when the site alarm was sounded and the announcement was made to onsite personnel.
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Habitability monitoring was not conducted in the Control Room (simulator) throughout the exercise.
~ The declaration of NOUE was prompted by a controller.' Timely classification of the emergency was a Control-Room objective 'to be' demonstrated.
~ - . , _, i - Following activation of the TSC and E0F,*the Control Room did not assist the TSC and EOF in emergency classification.
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. The Control Room communicator did not use a formal log'to ' record ~ state and local agency notification times, i'e., attachment 3.0 to EPP 01-3.1 as required.
, A Nuclear Station Operator stated, "I have an hour to call Bethesda, there is no reason to jump into it."
Communicators were not trained in the NRC notification requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(a)3 and-(c)1.
- The plant Gaitronics announcements for emergency classifications and
. classification updates were not performed from the facility that had the lead respor.sibility.
Declaration of the General Emergency was not recommended by the control room prior to the hydrogen burn as hydrogen approached the explosive limits and containment high range radiation monitors indicated approximately 1000 R/hr.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Technical Support Center The TSC was activated 34 minutes after the declaration of an Alert, well within the licensee's one hour goal.
TSC personnel were observed using checklists contained in Procedure EPP 01-4.1, " Technical Support Center Activation" during this time.
The TSC had lead responsibility for offsite
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-notifications from its activation at 8:45 a.m. until it turned =over responsibility for this activity at 9:36 a.m. to the E0F.
During this interval, two messages (TSC-001 and -002) were issued to state / local.
government; however, some d_ifficulty was noted in placing the calls due to an access code number not being available.
- The TSC appeared to function in accordance with the licensee's Emergency - Plan and Implementing Procedures.
The Duty Emergency Director (DED), however, provided staff briefings which only relayed information relative to emergency _ classification and facility activation status.
The TSC staff failed to meet their objective to " demonstrate ability to recognize and classify an emergency condition in a timely manner." This was.a scenario problem (the Control Room classified the Alert before the TSC was activated and the classification responsibility had been transferred from the TSC to the EOF prior to declaration of a Site Area Emergency). -Dose assessment personnel maintained good control of onsite and offsite monitoring teams.
Dose assessment personnel employed a manual dose calculation method during the exercise, which, by its very nature, presented increased opportunities for error and had other limitations as discussed in two deficiencies described below.
Status boards were well maintained during the exercise.
Good TSC personnel accuuntability and radiological control was demonstrated.
Habitability surveys were conducted at regular intervals in the TSC; however, the collection of radiological air samples was simulated.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items.
These items were provided for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
Although habitability surveys were conducted regularly in the TSC, + the portion of the survey entailing air sample collection was simulated.
A TSC Controller's decision to permit this simulation-appeared logical in that it reflected the player's previously demonstrated ability to conduct this task; however, the~ simulation did not produce the background noise interference in.the TSC which an operating sample pump would have caused.
The licensee did not ensure that the individual filling the position of Duty Emergency Director used his position to integrate information and data flowing into the TSC to give the " big picture" of the emergency during briefings of the TSC staff.
The licensee did not ensure that the exercise objective related to recognition and classification of the emergency by the TSC staff was met.
Based on the above observations by the NRC inspectors, the following items are considered to be emergency preparedness deficiencies: .
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' < , l The primary offsite dose calculation method used by the licensee was essentially a manual method, involving data entry into a matrix and . operating in it with a hand-held calculator. Although the method was i reasonably timely, it had a high potential for error (due'to numerous arithmetic operations) and only addressed simple, straight-line . gaussian dispersion conditions (50-482/8704-01).
The licensee did not appear to have the capability to directly measure, either in-line or via laboratory analysis, radioiodine concentrations in the plant vent under accident conditions.
Consequently, during the exercise, the licensee could only infer what the plant vent radioiodine releases were by using: (1) precalculated radioiodine values corresponding to analyzed accidents; (2) measured in plant radioiodine concentrations which did not reflect removal via filtration; and (3) sem' quantitative measurements of air samples Ith a frisker by field teams (50-482/8704-02).
- The access code number for placing telephone calls to state and local acencies were not initially available to the TSC Communicator, thus causing ' confusion and a slight delay in making the required initial notification from_the TSC (50-482/8704-03).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Operations Facility The E0F was activated in a timely manner.
At 9:20 a.m. the Duty Emergency Manager (DEM) accepted command and control of all emergency coordination and direction functions including protective action recommendations from the OED at the TSC.
Responsibility for dose assessment was assumed later at 9:40 a.m.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention. These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items were provided for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
Managers at the E0F reporting to the DEM did not make an effort to characterize raw data, and to portray its consequences in a way that would be useful to the OEM.
Flow diagrams available in the EOF to facilitate decisionmaking processes pertaining to protective action recommendations were not used by the DEM and his staff during their meetings.
The dual telephone system between the logkeeper and the DEM could be improved by adding a voice activated tape recorder.
This would prevent subjective characterizations of events / communications by the 1ogkeeper's summary.
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. Based on the above observations by the NRC inspectors, the following items ' are considered to be emergency preparedness deficiencies: , ' + The DEM delayed making protective action recommendations after plant / , conditions (e.g., clad failure and core uncovering at 9:59 a.'m. ; ' - 3.5 percent concentration of hydrogen in the containment at 10:30 a.m.j. continuous pressure buildup in the containment building; large LOCA , and loss of coolant inventory) warranted it.
The DEM postpon_ed making . protective action recommendations for the public at risk, even after the NRC Emergency Response Team informed him that in their opinion
, general emergency conditions were present (10:23,a.m.). The decision for sheltering personnel within the center zone was not~ recommended by ~ the DEM until 11:10 a.m.
At that time, the county decided for , evacuation of human populations at the center zone (50-432/8704-04)., - " During the exercise the EOF experienced a temporary loss of the, telephone system.
Communicators in the EOF had not received hands on - training in the use of the radio.
That lack of hands on radio training prevented the communicators from using the backup radio communications for making offsite notifications to the State.
The telephone service was restored in a matter of minutes and the offsite notifications were made within the 15 minute requirement.
If the event had been a lasting telephone system failure, notifications could have been substantially delayed (50-482/8704-05).
The principal dose assessment system used by the licensee was shown to be unreliable, and cumbersome.
As a consequence, dose projections were based on hand held calculators and a simple straight-line gaussian model.
These are similar concerns to those pertaining to dose assessment and measurement of iodine in the TSC as discussed in paragraph 5 (50-482/8704-01).
The licensee did not appear to have the capability to directly measure, either in-line or via laboratory analysis, radiciodine concentrations in the plant vent under accident conditions.
Consequently, during the exercise, the licensee could only infer what the plant vent radioiodine releases were by using: (1) precalculated radioiodine values corresponding to analyzed accidents; (2) measured in plant radioiodine concentrations which did not reflect removal via filtration; and (3) semi quantitative measurements of air samples with a frisker by field teams.
These are similar concerns to those identified in the TSC as discussed in paragraph 5.(50-482/8704-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Operational Support Center (OSC) The OSC was observed to function adequately and to interface effectively with the TSC.
Emergency Team Briefing Sheet forms were used effectively to brief teams dispatched from the OSC.
Both task briefings and radiation protection briefings were given.
During the dispatching of a team whose
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members had been requested to wear full-face, air purifying respiratory protective equipment, it was noted that voice amplification devices were not available.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved items.
These items were provided for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
The licensee did not have voice amplification devices for use with respiratory protective equipment, thus potentially hindering oral communications between team members.
- The licensee did not demonstrate the capability to perform repair / recovery activities and communicate with the OSC while wearing self-contained breathing apparatus.
Self contained breathing apparatus spare bottles did not have protector caps during storage to keep out dust and foreign material.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Accountability
' The NRC inspectors observed the accountability function performed at the personnel control access point.
The protected area personnel ' accountability process was accomplished in approximately.27 minutes.
The licensee did not evnuate nonessential personnel.from'the protected area.
A list of selected individuals was given to security personnel for verification.
Er.ch onsite emergency facility maintained accountability following the initial accountability.
The following is an observation the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's attention.
This observation is neither a violation nor an unresolved item.
This item was provided for licensee consideration for improvement, but it has no specific regulatory requirement.
The licensee did not demonstrate the ability to evacuate all nonessential personnel from the protected area, exclusion area, and perform initial and continuous accountability.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exercise Critique
The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee staff on January 29, 1987, to evaluate the licensee's identification of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F.5.
The licensee staff identified the deficiencies listed below: __ ___ _ ______- ____
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- Emergency procedures need review for human factors.
Develop generic names for plant locations for security, operations, and health physics to use during emergencies.
Review HPN and ENS telephones to determine cause of poor quality.
Make available access codes for all facility communicators.
Retrain all emergency facility communicators on proper operation of radios and timely completion of nrtifications.
- Modify primary dose assessment system to expedite obtaining dose assessment results.
Correct media center recopier problem.
Corrective action for identified deficiencies and weaknesses'will be examined during a future NRC inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with licensee representgtives (denoted in , paragraph 1) prior to and at the conclusion of the inspection on January 30, 1987.
The NRC inspectors summarized the purpose and the. scope of the inspection and the findings.
The NRC team leader reviewed the five deficiencies with Mr. B. D. Withers and staff.
The NRC inspectors stated ~ that the findings discussed during the exit interview will_.be reviewed by NRC Region IV management.
If there are any substantive changes to our findings, the NRC team leader will contact appropriate licensee representatives.
, The licensee's actions during the exercise were found to be acceptable to protect the health and safety of the public.
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