ML20140E851
| ML20140E851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140E822 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-97-09, 50-482-97-9, NUDOCS 9706120221 | |
| Download: ML20140E851 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1997009
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-482
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License No.:
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Report No.:
50-482/97-09
Licensee:
Wolf Creek Nuc' ear Operating Corporation
Facility:
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:
1550 Oxen Lane, NE
Burlington, Kansas
Dates:
April 6 through May 17,1997
Inspectors:
J. F. Ringwald, Senior Resident inspector
J. L. Dixon-Herrity, Resident inspector
F. L. Brush, Resident inspector, Callaway
Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch B
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ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information
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9706120221 970606
ADOCK 05000482
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Wolf Creek Generating Station
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NRC Inspection Report 50-482/97-09
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Operations
The inspector identified a violation of Technical Specifications after noting a
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significant amount of debris in containment that the licensee failed to identify or
remove following Thermolag replacement in September 1996. The inspector
identified another violation of Technical Specifications after noting that the shift
supervisor failed to comply with the procedure for evaluating Technical Specification
operability (Section 04.1).
Licensee corrective actions in response to a failure of a containment isolation valve
were inadequate, resulting in a cited, licensee-identified violation (Section 08.3).
The inspector noted that the licensee's reliance on individual operator actions to
prevent operator distractions resulted in instances where operators did not
continuously monitor the control boards (Section 01.1).
Maintenance
The inspector identified deficient work planning and scheduling associated with a
preventive maintenance air filter replacement (Section M1.3).
The licensee identified and reported a noncited violation in Licensee Event
Report (LER) 50-482/96-003, resulting from the failure to maintain containment
closure during fuel movement (Section M8.3).
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The inspector identified a violation when operations personnel misunderstood
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engineering guidance and issued a general operating procedure with incorrect
guidance for cold overpressure mitigation for the normal charging pump
(Section E8.5).
Plant Support
A violation occurred when more than five visitors were escorted into vital areas by
only one security escort on multiple occasions without the permission of senior
licensee management. The generic f ailure of the escorts, security officers, and
control room personnel to be knowledgeable of and to enforce the escort ratio
requirements was a weakness.
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While a high integrity container rigging evolution was properly controlled and
posted, the inspector identified a weakness in the pre-evolution brief because the
brief failed to include contingencies for communication failures. This is significant
since radio communication to the crane control operator was, subsequently, lost
(Section S4.1).
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status
The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
1. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 Operator Distractions
a.
Inspection Scope (7170Z1
The aspector reviewed operator practices regarding distractions in the control
room.
b.
Observations and Findinos
As part of a review of industry events involving operator distractions, the inspector
questioned several operators regarding their individual and crew practices for
dealing with distractions, particularly while engaging in critical tasks where an
operator distraction could have significant consequences, e.g., adding positive
reactivity, filling a contaminated tank, partially draining an operating system, etc.
The inspector questioned operators on four of the six operating crews. Operator
responses to these questions were quite varied. None of the answers suggested
that there was a standard practice offered, as part of management expectations or
from training, regarding how operators were to deal with distractions. While some
operators suggested that they had thought of some techniques to ensure that
distractions would not affect their operations, the majority of responses simply
indicated that operators would attempt to limit the impact of distractions on their
individual activities.
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From a crew perspective, the answers were just as varied. Crews did not describe
expectations or practices that would enable the crew to protect an individual
operator from distractions during critical tasks. Some operators and crews
discussed the possible use of followup buttons and some operators suggested that
they might attempt to help other operators respond to telephone calls, etc. while
they were involved in critical tasks. However, the crews did not demonstrate a
consistently effective method of dealing with distractions that would ensure that
they would not impact operations.
On May 8,1997, the inspector observed control room activities continually from
8:09 a.m. until 9:39 a.m. During this period, the inspector noted that operators
generally maintained effective control board awareness. On one occasion, an
operator escorting a tour group called and asked the supervising operator if a
proposed control room tour would distract operators. However, on two occasions,
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external demands for operator attention caused the supervising operator and both
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reactor operators to be distracted at the same time. On one occasion, this period
extended for 4 minutes. During this 4-minute period, one of the external
distractions involved an off-shift senior reactor operator engaging the secondary
operator in a lengthy conversation.
c.
Conclusions
The inspector concluded that operators relied solely on their individual ability to
prevent distractions from affecting them during critical tasks. While management
generally expected operators to maintain control board awareness, operators had no
specific operating practices that would assist them in ensuring that distractions
would not affect critical tasks. On one occasion, the inspector observed all
operators in the control room become involved in distracting activities for a period
of 4 minutes.
04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Containment Cleanliness
a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
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The inspector accompanied licensee personnel during an at-power containment
entry. The inspector reviewed the material and housekeeping condition of the
containment.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On April 30,1997, the inspector noted a significant amount of trash and debris on
the 2026 foot elevation of the containment. The trash and debris consisted of small
wire, pieces of Thermolag and Darmat insulation material, duct tape, a small tube of
silicone lubricant, and similar items. The items had the potential, during a design
basis accident, to be transported to the containment sump and affect the
emergency core cooling system pump suctions. The licensee completed a detailed
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inspection of containment and removed debris that had the potential to cover
approximately 180 sq. in. of the inner screen of the containment sump. The
engineer evaluating the event determined that the debris could increase inner screen
blockage up to 1.9 percent. Design basis allows for up to 50 percent blockage of
both screens without effect on the net positive suction head of the pumps. The
licensee determined that this increase would not have caused any restriction of the
pump suctions during loss of coolant accident conditions.
The licensee concluded that most of the trash and debris was generated during the
Thermolag replacement effort during September 1996. The licensee had completed
a containment closecut inspection after the work was complete as required by
Procedure STS EJ-001, " Containment inspection," Revision 9. Step 8.1.1 of this
procedure required that the licensee verify by visual inspection that no loose debris
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was present in containment. The licensee subsequently performed a number of
routine containment entries and completed the required containment closecut
inspection. During these containment closecut inspections, the licensee failed to
identify and remove the debris. The failure of the licensee to remove the debris
from the containment is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a
(50-482/9709-01).
The inspector noted that the licensee had installed covers on the fire hose stations
in containment. The licensee stated that the covers were installed during Refueling
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Outage Vil during the Autumn of 1994. Licensee personnel immediately performed
a detailed walkdown of containment and removed covers from 13 fire hose stations.
Each cover had approximately 12 square feet of material.
During a loss-of-coolant condition, the covers potentially could be transported to the
containment recirculation sumps. The licensee initiated Performance improvement
Request (PIR) 97-1278 and Reportability Evaluation Request 97-032 to evaluate the
past operability issues. The inspector will review this evaluation when it is
complete and Unresolved item 50-482/9709-02 will track this issue.
After identifying the debris, the inspector informed operators of the concern
regarding the debris in containmern. The shift supervisor logged the concern at
12:20 p.m. on April 30,1997. However, the shift supervisor did not document any
consideration of the impact of the debris on the operability of the sumps until
2:30 p.m. Neither of these log entries provided a basis for an operability decision,
and the shift supervisor did not complete Form APF 26C-004-001, " Technical
Specification Operability Screening Checklist," required by Step 6.1.2 of
Procedure AP 26C-004, " Technical Specification Operability," Revision O. The
failure of the shift supervisor to log the justification of the operability determination
ani complete Form APF 26C-004-001 is a violation of Technical
Srecification 6.8.1.a (50-482/9709-03).
The licensee's response to Violation 50-482/9621-05 stated, "The operations
manager expects that log entries will be detailed and able to support any
conclusions reached. To correct this problem, Administrative
Procedure AP 26C-004, ' Technical Specification Operability,' was revised to clearly
reflect that a detailed log entry will be made by the shift supervisor whenever the
shift supervisor records a decision concerning operability. This detailed log entry
willinclude the basis for the operability decision." The failure of the shift supervisor
to implement these corrective actions resulting from Violation 50-482/9621-05
suggests that the corrective actions for this problem were not fully effective.
c.
Conclusion
The inspector identified a violation associated with the failure of the licensee to
identify and remove debris from the containment. The inspector identified a second
violation associated with the shift supervisor not complying with the procedure for
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evaluating the Technical Specification operability associated with the debris and
other matenal found in containment. Immediate licensee corrective actions to
rerlove the debris and other material from containment were appropriate. An
uniesolved item will track the review of the impact of all material removed from
cor tainment on the past operability of the containment sumps.
08
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901,92700)
08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9618-03: Violation of Technical Specification 3.9.4
(containment penetration open during core alterations). The corrective actions
taken in response to this event as described in LER 96-005 were not adequate
because the licensee failed to identify two additional procedures that would allow a
similar event to occur. The licensee verified that no additional procedures could
allow the event to occur and revised the two procedures identified. The errors
associated with the initial root cause evaluation were discussed with the operations
support staff. In addition to these corrective actions, the licensee recognized a
trend in the failure to completely address the root cause and identify effective
actions in response to LERs96-004 and 96-005. PIR 96-2592 was issued to
address this trend. The corrective actions in response to this included forming a
formal corrective action review board chaired by the Chief Operating Officer. This
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board will review the root cause determination and corrective action plan for all
significant PIRs. Organization changes were implemented to provide operations
personnel to support the corrective action process. Additional training was provided
for managers and personnel implementing the corrective action program. The
inspectors concluded that the licensee's subsequent corrective actions were
appropriate.
08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9618-04 and LER 50-482/96007-01 Surveillance
required to be performed while shutdown performed 3t power. The inspector
verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
February 14,1996, to be reasonable and complete with the excedon that the
response stated that this event was self-discovered. While the inadequate
postmodification testing was self-discovered, the fact that the surveillance testing
was performed at power and was required to be performed while shutdown was
identified by the inspector. Supplement 1 to LER 50-482/96007-01 addressed the
aspect of performing the additional testing at power when Technical Specifications
required them to be performed while shutdown. The root cause and corrective
actions reported were consistent with the response to this violation, and no
additional issues were identified. The licensee subsequently identified additional
examples as reported in LER 50-482/97-001. The inspector concluded that the
additional examples would not have reasonably been expected to have been
prevented by lessons learned from this violation. The root cause and corrective
actions for these additional examples will be reviewed during the review of the
LER 50-482/97-001.
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08.3 (Closed) LER 50-482/96-010: Failure of motor-operated Valve EF HV0034, "ESW 8
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to Containment Air Coolers." This report documents the failure of the valve to
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close during routine valve testing. The licensee determined that the root cause was
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inadequate pretensioning of the torque switch contact finger. The valve actuator
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had been replaced in response to a different concern during March 1996. The
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licensee determined that the Valve Operation Test and Evaluation System (VOTES)
test results after the replacement reflected the inadequate pretensioning and that
they had a previous opportunity to identify the problem after a similar failure that
occurred on July 28,1996. The licensee attributed the failure to three individual
failures: (1) lack of proper torque switch contact finger tension; (2) the failure to
identify or correct the problem during tne July 28,1996, event; and (3) the failure
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to identify the problem during VOTES testing on March 10,1996. Past similar
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f ailures causing confusion, a lack of a questioning attitude, inadequate maintenance
procedures, and a backlog of work for the motor-operated valve engineer were cited
as contributing factors.
The corrective actions taken by the licensee included: correctly pretensioning the
torque switch contact finger on the valve actuator, verifying that the VOTES test
data for all similar valves did not contain similar indications, revising the three
affected procedures, and developing a plan to eliminate the backlog of motor-
operated valve related work.
The inspector noted that the initial submittal of the LER identified that the hcensee
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was not in compliance with Technical Specification 3.7.4. The inspector identified
the licensee's failure to enter Technical Specification 3.6.3 in NRC Inspection
Report 50-482/96-18. This concern was discussed with the licensee at the exit
meeting on October 18,1996. The inspector discussed the failure to address the
f ailure to meet Technical Specification 3.6.3 in the LER with the licensee. As a
result, the licensee revised the LER to identify Technical Specification 3.6.3. The
licensee documented this failure in the response to Violation 50-482/9704-01,
dated April 23,1997. The root cause identified for this failure was an incomplete
investigation of PIR 97-2528 due to inadequate interface among organizations. The
operations department was not given an opportunity to provide input to the
evaluation. The corrective action review board discussed in Section 08.2 was not
in existence when the PIR was evaluated. Procedure AP 28A-001, " Performance
improvement Request," Revision 7, was to be revised to provide guidance for when
a multidiscipline team approach should be used to perform evaluations of significant
PIRs.
The inspector reviewed the LER and found that it did not adequately address the
f ailure of personnel to initiate a PIR, as documented in NRC Inspection
Report 50-482/96-18. The LER identified a lack of a questioning attitude, but did
not address the failure to initiate a PIR. PIR 96-2528, which was initiated to
perform a root cause analysis, indicated that a PlR was not initiated because
PIR 95-2502, which documented a similar issue, had not been closed.
Procedure AP 28A-001, " Performance improvement Request," requires that a PIR
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be written for problems or potential problems (equipment operation that does not
occur as required). The inspector discussed the event with an engineer in the plant
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trending and evaluation group. The engineer explained that, because PIR 95-2502
had already been evaluated and the corrective action taken, a similar event could
not be added and that a new PIR had to be written. The inspector discussed the
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failure to write a PIR with the manager of support engineering. The manager agreed
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that PIR 96-2528 did not address the failure to write a PIR and verified that no
corrective action had been taken to address this concern.
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The inspector concluded that the licensee failed to completely understand the event
and that the root cause and corrective actions taken failed to address the failure of
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licensee personnel to follow procedures for problem identification. The failure to
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maintain motor-operated containment isolation Valve EF HV0034 operable is a
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violation of Technical Specification 3.6.3 (50-482/9709-04).
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11. Maintenance
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Conduct of Maintenance
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M1.1' General Comments on Maintenance Activities
a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities.
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Task 33
install motor alignment jack bolt lugs
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on Safety injection Pump A
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115516
Task 2
Repair Centrifugal Charging Pump A
oil reservoir top gasket leak
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119029
Task 1
Replace air filter on
Damper GK HZO184E
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119886
Task 1
Megger test of Centrifugal Charging
Pump A
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119894
Task 1
Lubricate breaker for Residual Heat
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Removal Pump A
119894
Task 2.
Instrumentation and control
postmaintenance testing for Residual
Heat Removal Pump A breaker
119895
Task 1
Lubricate breaker for Centrifugal
Charging Pump A
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b.
Observations and Findinns
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Except as noted in Section M1.3, the inspectors found no concerns with the
maintenance observed.
c.
Conclusions
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Except as noted in Section M1.3, the inspectors concluded that the maintenance
activities were being performed as required,
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M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities.
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
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STS EF-001, Revision 7
Essential service water valve check
STS EJ-100A, Revision 19
Residual heat removal system inservice
Pump A test
STS EN-100A, Revision 11
Containment Spray Pump A inservice pump
test
STS IC-209B, Revision 6
4 kV degraded voltage trip actually device
operational Test NB02 bus separation
Group 4
Power range adjustment to calorimetric
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors found no concerns with the surveillances observed.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the surveillance activities were being performed as
required.
M1.3 Ventilation Damoer Preventive Maintenance
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inspection Scoce (62707. 37551)
The inspector observed the initial approvals and performance of the preventive
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maintenance task to replace the air filter supplying control building isolation damper
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Actuator GK HZ-184E.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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On April 22,1997, the inspector observed instrument and controls technicians sign
onto Work Package 119029, Task 1, to replace the air filter supplying
Actuator GK HZ-184E. The technicians asked the superintendent, central work
authority, if a risk assessment had been completed for this work. The
superintendent responded by saying that, since the work was on the schedule, it
had been evaluated during the risk assessment for all scheduled work. The
technicians then questioned why the fan was still running and asked how the fan
was to remain inoperable during their work to prevent equipment damage. The
superintendent recognized that a clearance order was needed to protect the damper
and told the technicians that a clearance order would be prepared to support this
work. The inspector reviewed the work package and noted that the planner had not
identified that a clearance order would be needed in order for the technicians to
perform this work.
While personnel prepared the clearance order, the technicians walked down the
work area and noted that the scaffolding had a "Do Not Use" tag on it. They
questioned maintenance support personnel who replied that the use of this scaffold
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was awaiting an inspection by engineering personnel, and this had not been
acamplit.hed yet due to scheduling problems.
After resolving the clearance order and scaffolding issues, the technicians
completed the work without further planning or scheduling problems.
c.
Conclusions
The inspector concluded that the planning for this task was deficient in that the
planner and package rev; ewers failed to recognize the need for a clearance order.
The scheduling of this work was also deficient in that the work was scheduled to be
performed prior to the completion of the scaffold preparation.
M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902,92700)
M 8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followup Item 50-482/9612-01: Protection set test jacks. This
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item involved problems with secure connections between test leads and protection
set test jacks during the performance of surveillance testing. As a result of the
inspector's observations, the licensee inspected the test leads, replaced any suspect
test leads, and initiated Work Request 113992 to inspect the test jacks on every
card in the protection sets. During the performance of Work Request 113992,
technicians identified every worn test jack. With this data, the licensee initiated
Work Requests 117657,117662,117664, and 117666 to replace every identified
worn test jack during Refueling Outage IX. In addition, this issue was discussed
with allinstrumentation and controls technicians during shop discussions and
reinforced the management expectation that technicians be particularly sensitive to
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test jack continuity during surveillances performed prior to Refueling Outage IX.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's response to this issue was appropriate.
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M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9614-03: Safety-related ::witchgear breaker cubicle door.
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The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response
letter, dated November 5,1996, to be reasonable and complete. No similar
problems were identified.
M8.3 (Closed) LER 50-482/96-003: Failure to maintain containment closure. This item
involved the licensee's discovery that workers failed to secure a blind flange which
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replaced a main steam safety valve during refueling and, therefore, failed to
maintain containment closure required by Technical Specification 3.9.4. The
licensee identified the root cause as insufficient work package guidance and a
contributing cause as work planners not having standard procedural guidance for
what constituted effective containment closure. While the work package planner
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was aware that the flanges were for containment closure, the work package only
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stated that these flanges were for foreign material exclusion. Corrective actions
included establishing effective containment closure, revising the affected work
package and all related work packages to clearly identify that the flanges are to be
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for containment closure with specific guidance on how to install them, training of
the maintenance planners on containment closure requirements, and the
incorporation of clear guidance into licensee procedures to provide a clear standard
for what will constitute effective containment closure in the future. The failure of
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the licensee to maintain containment closure during refueling is a violation of
Technical Specification 3.9.4. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is
being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NRC
Enforcement Policy (50-482/9709-05).
M8.4 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9614-01: Simultaneous maintenance on motor-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump Trains A and B. The inspector verified the corrective
actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated November 5,1996, to be
reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
M8.5 (Closed) Violation 50-482/9614-02: Clearance order hung on a molded case
breaker without a secured lock hasp. The inspector verified the corrective actions
described in the licensee's response letter, dated November 5,1996, to be
reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
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E8
Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8,1
(Closed) Inspection Followuo item 50-482/9603-13: Auxiliary boiler reliability. This
item was left open because a fuel oil transfer pump removed from service for
corrective maintenance on October 31,1996, was still out of service on
January 11,1997. The pump bearings and mecMnical seal were replaced and the
pump was returned to service on February 25,1997. The remaining activities to
improve the reliability of the auxiliary boiler are still planned as described in NRC
Inspection Report 50-482/96-24.
E8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followun item 50-482/9612-03: Turbine-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump dropping resistor f ailure. This item was opened to review the root
cause analysis and corrective actions taken in response to repeat resistor failures.
The inspector reviewed the root cause analysis and the corrective actions taken.
The resistor failed because the heat sink body for the resistor was not properly
drilled during the manufacturing process. This prevented adequate heat transfer in
the resistor. The licensee noted that this problem could not have been identified
during receipt inspection. The corrective actions included upgrading the resistor to
a 250 watt resistor in lieu of 72 watts to provide excess heat dissipation and
increasing the receipt acceptance criteria to include load testing at twice the
expected normal load.
E8.3 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 50-482/9618-06: Fuel building concrete
degradation. The licensee identified that a small piece of concrete had broken off of
one of the corbels that support the fuel building crane. The licensee identified that
it occurred due to spalling. The licensee determined that, during plant construction.,
the form used for the concrete pour had separated. Following the pour, the excess
concrete was removed by grinding. The licensee stated that the grinding likely
initiated a weakness in the corner. Also, fuel building crane operation imparted
some vibrations into the concrete. The comoination of the two weakened the piece
and caused the spalling. The licensee stated that the spalling did not affect the
structural integrity of the corbel. Additionally, since the corbel was not in the
vicinity of the spent fuel pool, there was no concern with concrete falling into the
pool. During walkdowns, neither the inspector nor licensee personnel identified this
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condition in locations where the concrete could fallinto the spent fuel pool.
E8.4 { Closed) Violation 50-482/9618-07: Inadequate postmodification test. The
inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter,
dated February 14,1996, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems
were identified.
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E8.5 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-482/9704-05: Cold overpressure mitigation related to
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the normal charging pump installation. This item involved the failure of operations
support personnel to implement procedural guidance for cold overpressure
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mitigation for the normal charging pump in a manner that was consistent with the
assumptions and guidance provided by engineering. Specifically,
Procedure GEN 00-006, " Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown," Revision 36, permitted
operators to operate the normal charging pump with reactor coolant system
temperature as low as 325 F. Design Change Package 4590 indicated that the
normal charging pump was to be placed in pull-to-lock whenever operators operated
the plant in the low-temperature overpressure protection mode. Engineering and
operations personnel both knew that low-temperature overpressure protection mode
meant 368 F. Engineering used this terminology so that the guidance would be
accurate even when future coupon sample analyses result in future changes in the
temperature where cold overpressure mitigation is required. Without clarifying the
point with design engineering personnel, operations support personnel assumed the
allowance that permitted the positive displacement charging pump to be operated as
low as 325 F also applied to the normal charging pump. PIR 97-0439 addressed
this issue and documented that this concern was determined to have occurred due
to poor communications between operations and design engineering. However, the
only corrective actions identified in PIR 97-0439 were the revision of all affected
procedures and the inclusion of this closed PIR in required reading for operations
support personnel. When the inspector questioned why the PIR corrective actions
failed to address the identified concern, engineering personnel responded that this
was not required for nonsignificant PIRs. The inspector acknowledged that the
program did not require a detailed root cause determination and corrective actions
to address the root cause for nonsignificant PIRs, yet noted that corrective actions
that failed to address identified concerns were ineffective in resolving the issue.
The failure of operations personnel to establish Procedure GEN 00-006 in
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accordance with the guidance provided by engineering is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (50-482/9709-06).
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IV Plant Support
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R1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R 1.1
Hiah Intenrity Cpntainer Manioulation
a.
Insoection Scooe (71750)
The inspector observed the movement of a high integrity container filled with
approximately 90 cubic feet of low-speUfic activity spent resin.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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On April 22,1997, health physics technicians moved a high integrity container from
the solid radwaste disposal with segmented shield area to high level storage in the
radwaste building. The evolution was controlled and all workers involved with the
move knew which technician was leading the evolution. Radiation area postings
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were adequate to provide proper warning to other workers not involved in the
evolution, and appropriate public address announcements were made to caution
workers to avoid unnecessary entry into the area during the move. Two health
physics technicians were stationed in the radwaste building in areas where they
could monitor the changing dose level, and they monitored radiation levels in a
sufficient number of different locations to ensure that the adjacent areas remained
properly posted.
The crane operator and lead technician had a remote indication that displayed the
height of the grapple, but did not have the height of the high integrity container and
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sling immediately available. Therefore, the crane operator and lead technician could
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not use the remote indication to determine how much clearance there was between
the bottom of the high integrity container and other objects that it could contact
during the move. Since the cameras dit. not clearly display this clearance, the crane
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operator relied on communication with t;,e lead health physics technician controlling
the overall evolution in order to ensure that there was adequate clearance between
the bottom of the container and the wall, floor, or other objects.
The lead health physics technician directed the evolution from the field using a
wireless radio headset to communicate with the crane operator. The transceiver
and battery pack were clipped to the lead technician's safety harness. Because the
safety harness straps were larger than the belt clip, the lead technician had
difficulty keeping the transceiver clipped to the harness. At one point, another
technician informed the lead health physics technician that the transceiver was
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unclipped. A few minutes later, the inspector observed the transceiver become
unclipped and fall to the concrete floor.
The inspector asked the radwaste supervisor how the prejob briefing dealt with
potential communication difficulties between the cranc operator and the lead health
physics technician. The supervisor replied that all the technicians knew to stop the
job if communications failed, but that the pre-evolution briefing did not specifically
address contingency plans associated with a communications failure.
The inspector reviewed the certificate-of-compliance and operating instructions from
the vendor of the high integrity container and determined that the rigging evolution
complied with the requirements and limitations of the vendor documents.
c.
Conclusions
The rigging evolution was properly controlled, met vendor requirements, was
adequately posted, and was performed with good radiation exposure control. The
inspector noted one weakness in that health physics technicians did not specifically
discuss preplanned contingencies for a possible communications failure during the
pre-evolution briefing. The inspector also observed that the crane operator did not
have information readily available that permitted remote monitoring of the clearance
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between the bottom of the high integrity container and the floor, wall, or other
object that it could contact during the fift.
Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance
S4
S4.1 Excessive Vital Area Visitor-Escort Ratio
Lnj;pection Scopo (71750)
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a.
The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the identification that
security escorts exceeded the visitor-to escort ratio required by the security plan.
b.
O_bservatens and Findinas
On May 8,1997, one tour group consisting of an escort and six visitors toured the
control room. Despite the fact that the group was relatively large, the control room
The
operators were not sensitive to the site's 5:1 escort ratio requirement.
inspectors later observed one tour group leaving another vital area and asked the
escort what the escort-to-visitor limits were. The escort said that the limit was ten
The inspectors observed another tour group and asked the
visitors per escort.
second escort the same question. The escort said that the ratio limit was six
visitors per escort in vital areas, but was five visitors per escort in the control room
and this was the reason why the second tour group did not visit the control room.
The inspectors then asked two security guards the same question and were told
that the 5:1 ratio requirement only applied in the radiologically controlled area, an
incorrect understanding of the escort requirements. The inspector subsequently
informed the security superintendent of these findings. The security operations
supervisor later informed the inspector that security personnel had initiated
significant PIR 97-1358, Safeguards Event Log Entry 53, and incident
Report 5-8-1219.
Security Procedure SEC 01202, " Personnel Access to Protected Area,"
Revision 31, Step 6.5.2.6, required the visitor-to escort ratio to be no more than
10:1 in the protected area and 5:1 in vital areas, unless prior permission had been
The f ailure of more than one escort to
obtained from senior licensee management.
comply with the security procedure requirements is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c (50-482/9709-07).
c.
Conclusions
A violation occurred when more than five visitors were escorted into vital areas by
only one security escort on multiple occasions without the permission of senior
The generic f ailure of the escorts, security officers, and
licensee management.
control room personnel to be knowledgeable of and to enforce the escort ratio
requirements was a weakness,
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
,
conclusion of the inspection on May 20,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
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should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
C. W. Fowler, Manager, Integrated Planning and Scheduling
O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. T. McKinney, Plant Manager
R. Muench, Vice President Engineering
W. B. Norton, Manager, Performance Improvement and Assessment
R. L. Sims, Manager, System Engineering
C. C. Warren, Chief Operating Officer
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USEC_
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Onsite Engineering
,
Surveillance Observations
Maintenance Operations
Plant Operations
Plant Support Activities
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
Followup-Plant Operations
Followup - Maintenance
Followup - Engineering
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-482/9709-01
Failure to remove debris from containment
(Section 04.1)
50-482/9709-02
Fire hose station covers (Section 04.1)
50-482/9703-03
Operability evaluation for debris in containment
(Section 04.1)
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50-482/9709-04
Failure to maintain motor-operated containrnent valve
operable (Section 08.3)
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50-/482/9709-06
Cold overpressure mitigation related to the normal
charging pump installation (Section E8.5)
50-482/9709-07
Excessive vital area visitor escort ratio (Section S4.1)
Closed
50-482/96 003
LER
Failure to maintain containment closure (Section M8.3)
50-482 f 96-007-01
LER
Surveillance required to be performed while shutdown
performed at power (Section 08.2)
50-482/96-010
LER
Failure of motor-operated Valve EF HV0034
(Section 08.3)
50-482/9603-13
IFl
Auxiliary boiler reliability (Section E8.1)
50-482/9612-01
IFl
Protection set test jacks (Section M8.1)
50-482/9612-03
IFl
Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump dropping
resistor failure (Section E8.2)
50-482/9614-01
Simultaneous maintenance on motor-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump Trains A and B (Section M8.4)
50-482/9614-02
Clearance order hung on a molded case breaker without
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a secure lock hasp (Section M8,5)
50-482/9614-03
Safety-related switchgear breaker cubicle door
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(Section M8.2)
50-482/9618-03
Violation of Technical Specifications 3.9.4
(Section 08.1)
50-482/9618-04
Surveillance required to be performed while shutdown
performed at power (Section 08.2)
50-482/9618-06
IFl
Fuel building concrete degradation (Section E8.3)
50-482/96'i8-07
Inadequate postmodification test (Section E8.4)
50-482/9704-05
Cold overpressure mitigation related to the normal
charging pump installation (Section E8.5)
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Ooen and Closed
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50-482/'s709 05
Failure to maintain containment closure (Section M8.3)
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