IR 05000456/1985057

Safety Insp Repts 50-456/85-57 & 50-457/85-53 on 851201- 860201.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings,Integrated Hot Functional Test Program,Plant Tours & Fire Protection

ML20205K245
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	02/21/1986
From:	Farber M, Gardner R, Kropp W, Tangue T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205K190	List: IR 05000456/1985057 ML20205K187
References
50-456-85-57, 50-457-85-53, NUDOCS 8602270217
Download: ML20205K245 (13)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/85057(DRP); 50-457/85053(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: December 1, 1985 through February 1, 1986 Inspector j g ue M. [ Fl wI.h[r Approved By:

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R. N. Gardner, Acting Chief 2/!80 Braidwood Project Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on December 1, 1985 through February 1, 1986 (Report N /85057(DRP); 50-457/85053(0RP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; action on regional requests; preoperational testing; preoperational test program improvement plan; integrated hot functional test program; safety injection pump runout protection orifices; plant tours and independent assessments; receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel; new fuel security program; radiation occurrence reports; pressurizer code safety valves; Unit 1 - reactor coolant system hydrostatic test; fire protection; and meetings, training and other activities. The inspection consisted of 224 inspector-hours oniite and 10 inspector hours offsite by three NRC inspectors including 62 inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results: No violations or deviations were identifie B6 DR ADOCK O py6

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. DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)

Corporate Personnel A. Miosi, Nuclear Licensing Administrator Braidwood Personnel

• J. Wallace, Project Manager

• C. W. Schroeder, Station Services Superintendent

• D. L. Shamblin, Project Construction Superintendent

• P. L. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor G. E. Groth, Assistant Construction Superintendent M. E. Lohmann, Assistant Construction Superintendent

• E. E. Fitzpatrick, Station Superintendent

• L. M. Kline, Regulatory Assurance Group Leader

• C. Tomashek, Project Startup Superintendent H. Zimmerman, Project Startup Testing Supervisor

• D. Paquette, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent

• D. O'Brien, Administrative and Support Services Assistant Superintendent

• R. Legner, Senior Operating Engineer G. Masters, Operating Engineer R. Ungren, Operating Engineer F. Willaford, Security Administrator M. Andrews, Station Chemist R. Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor G. Nelson, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor F. Krowzack, Radiation-Chemistry Supervisor T. Keith, Lead Health Physicist T. W. Simpkin, Technical Staff-Licensing R. Mertogul, Station Nuclear Engineer T. E. Quaka, Site Quality Assurance Superintendent R. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor T. Meyer, Station Fire Marshall State of Illinois Governor's Office K. Witter, Assistant to the Governor for Material Resources M. Carey, Associate to the Governor for Material Resources

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Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety l

B. Rodman, Assistant to the Director G. Wright, Manager, Office of Nuclear Facility Safety

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. NRC Personnel J. Stevens, NRR Licensing Project Manager The inspector also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, startup engineers, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical, and instrument personnel, contract security personnel, and construction personne * Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on December 5 and 19, 1985, January 9, 16, 24, and 30, 1986, and informally at various times throughout the inspection perio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings lhe inspector reviewed the licensee actions on the following items and the results are as stated:

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (456/85004-01(DRP); 457/85004-01(DRP)): Inspection of containment tendons to determine the presence of water and grease leakage. The licensee contractor completed the inspection of the bottom grease cans on all vertical tendons on Unit 1 and 2 containment The sample was expanded to include all vertical tendons because water was found in some of the cans in the statistical sample. The results of the examinations revealed from a trace up to one gallon of water in 13 tendons on Unit 1 and 28 on Unit 2. Sufficient water for sample analysis was found in seven tendons on Unit 1 and 14 on Unit 2. The water samples and grease from all tendons with water present were sent to Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories for analysis. One tendon on Unit 2 (V241), which contained water in July 1985, was found to contain about two quarts of water during the most recent examination. The licensee will have the 41 tendons, where water was found, reexamined in May 1986. The results of the recent inspection were forwarded to NRR for evaluation. This item will remain open pending the identification of the source of the water and the source of the grease leakag (0 pen) Unresolved Item (456/85009-11(DRP); 457/85009-11(DRP)): Auxiliary feed minimum flow lines have a potential for failure due to missiles generated from the diesel engine. The inspector reviewed a proposed resolution and determined that it did not adequately address the concer The minimum flow lines for both the motor and diesel-driven pumps are in the potential path of a missile which might be generated by a catastrophic failure of the diesel engin The resolution identified these lines as

"two class D return lines to the condensate storage tanks" but did not address the potential for diverting flow from the steam generators in the event of damage to those lines. The inspector discussed this aspect of the matter with a member of the licensee's engineering staff who agreed to further evaluate the matte (0 pen) Open Item (456/85027-02(DRP); 457/85027-01(DRP)): Deficiencies in Procedure PM-04, Revision 0, "10 CFR 50.55(e) Determination and Reporting."

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. status of correcting the identified deficiencie The inspector was informed that the delay in correcting PM-04 was due to corporate evaluation and placing of higher priority on hearing-related issue Approximately six months have elapsed since the deficiencies were identified and this issue will now be the subject of increased NRC attention. This item remains ope (Closed) Open Item (456/85045-05(DRP); 457/85044-05(DRP)): Issuing of Procedure PM-05, "Nonconformance Reporting." The inspector met with licensee management to discuss this item and was informed that they did not intend to issue this procedure but would continue to use Quality Procedure Q.P. 15-1 " Reporting Quality Nonconformances During Construction and Test." The inspector reviewed Q.P. 15-1 and determined that it was sufficiently detailed to adequately administer and control the generation, review, and dispositioning of Nonconformance Reports onsite. This matter is considered close . Regional Request Generic Letters Region III requested the senior resident inspector review the licensee's program for assurance that a mechanism existed to meet the requirements of Generic Letters. The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed Technical Staff Procedure, BwVP-300-8, " Operating Experience Feedback," which establishes the station process for correspondence including NRC originated matters such as: Bulletins, Circulars, Information Notices and correspondence (Generic Letters). The procedure defines the individual responsibilities of and necessary steps in disposition of these items as far as distribution to operators or other cognizant personnel. In addition, the licensee uses a list from Byron entitled " Guidance for Coordinating Review of NRC Correspondence from NLA." That document is used as a guide to coordinating station activities when the matter requires responses to the NR It was also found that the licensee uses an unofficial computer tracking system at the station that can be used to track the status of all NRC related activities. On a random review of several generic letters, it appeared that the licensee's system was sufficient to assure that responses were met in a timely manner and with technically adequate responses. Presently, the licensee at Braidwood is undergoing the transition from a construction to a preoperational/ operational facilit During the transition, some procedures and responsibilities may change: BwVP-300-8 is being converted to an administrative (BwAP) procedure. To assure continuity, the licensee program for response to NRC initiatives, ie. Generic Letters, will be periodically reviewed under the routine inspection program Three Mile Island Modifications In response to a regional request, the senior resident inspector contacted the appropriate licensee personnel in an attempt to determine the status of all Three Mile Island modifications. The

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, licensee is developing a list to show the status of all items similar to that provided to the resident inspectors prior to operation at the Byron Statio No violations or deviations were identifie . Preope' rational Testing-During the inspection period, the inspector observed portions of preoperational tests. The observation included verification that properly approved procedures were available and being followed, that data was properly recorded and within the allowable band specified in the procedure, that out-of-service tags were properly applied as necessary, procedure entries and exits were properly executed, instruments were properly calibrated, deficiencies identified were properly resolved and/or recorded for resolution, and that applicable regulatory requirements were me The inspector also reviewed applicable portions of the FSAR and draft Technical Specifications for compariso During the inspection, the inspector observed portions of the following tests:

• BwPT AF-10, Auxiliary Feedwater System

• BwPT CV-10, Chemical Volume Control System

• BwPT CC-10, Component Cooling In addition to the foregoing, the inspector observed the following activities on the Auxiliary Feedwater Tests: control circuit logic tests, automatic auxiliary feedwater regulating valve responses to induced control signals, and test runs of the diesel-driven and electric-driven auxiliary feerfwater pump No violations or deviations were identifie . Preoperational Test Program Improvement Plan On March 15, 1985, the licensee met with members of Region III management to discuss elements of an action plan to improve performance in the areas of Quality Assurance, mechanical contractor activities, and testin This meeting was summarized in a D. H. Smith letter to J. G. Keppler dated April 25, 1985. The inspector conducted a review of the licensee's administrative controls for testing to determine the status of implementa-tion of action plan elements and evaluate their effectivenes The following specific elements of the plan were reviewed:

• Braidwood Lessons Learned Program

• Parallel Byron /Braidwood Startup Manual

• Example procedures with joint Byron /Braidwood Test Review Board (TRB) approval c

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• TRB pre-test and post-test review checklists

• Independent verification of jumpers and lifted leads

• Minor Test Change Request Forms

• ANSI 18.7 Compliance Verification The inspector verified that all of the elements listed were in place with the exception of the parallel startup manual and the separate ANSI 1 compliance verificatio The Lessons Learned program was well established and specific personnel were dedicated to its operatio The inspector examined the files, which were well organized, and noted that the program uses inputs from many sources. Procedures were in place which required the documentation of review of the lessons learned program during test procedure development, review, and approval. The inspector reviewed a B. R. Shelton letter to M. J. Wallace dated September 17, 1985, which listed the example procedures to be used in the development and review of forthcoming preoperational test procedures. The list appeared to be comprehensive and those Byron /Braidwood procedures which were subject to this program were listed. The inspector reviewed STUP TI-19 which contained the TRB pre-test and post-test checklists and instructions for their us The checklists specified review of approximately a dozen significant areas and appeared to adequately cover previous problem areas. The inspector reviewed a number of completed Minor Test Change Request forms from a ventilation system preoperational test and noted no deficiencies. The inspector also noted that lifted leads and jumpers were documented as being independently verifie At tha close of this inspection period the parallel startup manual had not yet been issued and the contingent ANSI 18.7 compliance verification had not been conducte The inspector discussed with licensee management the length of time (ten months) which has passed without the implementation of this element of the action plan and characterized it as excessiv The inspector also expressed concern that implementation of the new startup manual in the same time frame as the commencement of integrated hot functional testing could result in administrative problems during the conduct of the test progra The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concerns and stated that actual procedure differences were minimal, the manual's issue was imminent, and that implementation and training would be conducted in such a way as to minimize administrative problem No violations or deviations were identifie . Integrated Hot Functional Test Program Review The inspector commenced a review of BwPT-RC-10, Revision 0, " Integrated Hot Functionals" during this inspection perio The review is still in progress and as comments are developed they will be forwarded to the licensee for resolutio No violations or deviations were identifie .

7. Safety Injection Pump Runout Protection Orifices While reviewing Safety Injection system P& ids the inspector noted that l

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temporary carbon steel " runout protection crifices" were installed in the branch lines leading to the RCS loops and that preoperational testing was necessary to determine the correct size for the orifices. Following the completion of the preoperational testing stainless steel orifices of the correct size were to be installed. BwPT-SI-12, Revision 0, " Safety Injection Flow Balance" was reviewed to determine if testing was conducted to address this aspect of system design. The inspector could not locate, within BwPT-SI-12, a test method which determined proper orifice siz During discussions with licensee startup personnel the inspector was informed that the sizing of the orifices had been done using a Westinghouse computer code and that the test verified the design of the orifice Using the same input data, pressure drop, flow, pipe diameter, and temperature, as used in the computer calculations, the inspector performed orifice sizing calculations to check the accuracy of the computed results.

i As expected, the inspector's results did not exactly match the computer's but the margin of error was very small. A walkdown of all twelve orifices confirmed that permanent stainless steel orifices of the calculated size had been installe In a subsequent re-review of BwPT-SI-12 the inspector could not determine that the test method actually verified the ability of the orifices by themselves to prevent pump runou The test method ran the pumps with

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the throttle valves in their throttled position such that flow was limited, not by the orifices themselves, but in combination with the throttle valves. Since this does not appear to verify the design of the orifices, the adequacy of the test method and acceptance criteria in BwPT-SI-12 is an unresolved item (456/85057-01(ORP)) pending further information from the license . Plant Tours and Independent Assessments

! The inspector conducted routine plant tours during the inspection period to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions, security, fire protection, general personnel safety, housekeeping, and adherence to applicable regulatory requirement During the tours, the inspector reviewed various logs and daily orders, interviewed personnel, attended shift briefings, and independently determined equipment status. During the shift changes, the inspector observed operator and shift engineer turnovers and panel walkdowns.

l The inspector noted improvements since the previous inspection in l communications through better presentations by all involved at shift meetings, including presentations by 0AD, who had not been reporting in the past. The inspector noted that the licensee is continuing to improve l housekeeping by embarking on a program of preparing for operation by

cleaning, painting, and isolating areas of the plant as they are l available. The licensee has selected three non safety related areas of i the plant (makeup demineralizer area, the auxiliary boiler area, and the waste water treatment area) as models which will be set up as an example

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of how the entire plant should eventually loo The inspectors will continue to follow these activitie .

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Receipt, Inspection and Storage of New Fuel During the inspection period, the licensee received a number of shipments of new fuel from Westinghouse Nuclear Fuel Services in Columbia, South Carolina. Upon arrival at the site, the shipment was monitored for radiation and contamination, inspected for damage and stored in the new fuel storage vault and/or the station spent fuel poo On a sample basis, the inspectors verified that procedures were approved, available and followed, the vehicle and containers were properly labeled and placarded, container seals and shock detectors were undisturbed, instruments were properly calibrated, prior to opening containers displayed an internal vacuum, and container numbers, fuel assembly numbers and insert numbers agreed with shipping document In addition, the inspectors observed cleanliness and health physics practices, and performed confirmatory radiation surveys of the vehicle, containers, fuel assemblies, and storage facilities and found them to be in agreement with the licensee survey During the receipt inspections of the new fuel, the licensee discovered one fuel assembly with a small unaccountable piece of metal present and a fuel pin with a small dent. Another peripheral assembly was found with the burnable poison rodlets misoriented by 90 with respect to the central vertical axis of the assembly. The licensee developed appropriate deficiency reports and has committed to submit a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report on the misoriented burnable rodlets. Both defects were confirmed by the fuel supplier representative and both affected assemblies were returned to Westinghouse for correction. These findings represent examples of excellent observations by the fuel inspectors. A general survey is being conducted by Region III for similar problems at other plants and will be submitted to the Vendor Inspection Branch in NRC Headquarters for possible review of the quality control of the fuel supplie No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiation Occurrence Report During the receipt and inspection of new fuel, the licensee experienced the first event that resulted in a Radiation Occurrence Report (R0R).

The event appeared at first to be a potentially contaminated individual who failed to execute the proper followup procedure when exiting the fuel storage and inspection area. However, the licensee's investigation revealed that the individual was not contaminated, but that the individual misinterpreted the increased radiation levels from the fuel stored in the vault beneath the floor. The licensee promptly followed up with the investigation and report. In addition, the report on the findings was circulated throughout the station and presented at tailgate meetings and safety meetings as a learning experience. The licensee action is commendable on this situation as it should create a greater awareness of the seriousness associated with individual responsibilities toward radiation protectio _ _ _ -

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, The licensee has also commenced a radiation awareness program during the report perio No violations or deviations were identifie . New Fuel Security Program The inspector reviewed new fuel security program activities in conjunction with the preparations for and receipt of new fue These activities were reviewed to determine compliance with:

• NRC Materials License SNM-1938

• Approved Physical Security Plan for Storage of New Fuel

• Licensee approved procedures for new fuel security (BwAP 2000 series)

The inspector verified that controlled access areas and guard force assignments were in accordance with the approved physical security plan and provided adequate protection against theft or sabotag The inspector verified that licensee had developed a material control and accounting program consisting of reviewed and approved station procedures which basically endorsed existing Commonwealth Edison Nuclear Procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Pressurizer Code Safety Valves The inspectors witnessed the testing of two of three pressurizer code safety valves for Unit 1. The tests were conducted jointly by the Mechanical Maintenance Department and the Technical Staff. The testing consisted of verifying that the code safety valves lifted at the required pressure and to determine if the valves had any seat leakage. The inspectors witnessed a portion of the testing. The testing procedures required that each valve be lift tested three times to ensure its operability. The inspectors reviewed the following documents which were utilized in the testing of these valves:

• BwMP 3100-037, Revision 0, " Bench Testing / Setting of Safety / Relief Valves"

• BwVS 4.2.2-1, Revision 0, " Bench Testing of Reactor Coolant System Safety Valves", including Temporary Change No. 044, dated December 5, 1985

• Vendor Manual, dated August 1976, " Installation, Operating and Maintenance Instruction No. I-1105-2 for Crosby HB and HB-BP Self-Activated Nozzle Type Safety Relief Valves"

• Bw!P 2400-026, Revision 0, " Certification of a Pressure / Vacuum Gauge"

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The testing was authorized by Nuclear Work Requests (NWR) A03542 (valve 1RY8010A) and A03544 (valve IRY8010C). The NWR packages included a

" Maintenance / Modification Procedure" (MMP) which delineated the procedures to be utilized in the testing activitie The MMP was reviewed and approved by the appropriate personnel and required the testing to be in accordance with Maintenance Department procedure, BwMP 3100-037 and Technical Staff procedure BwVS 4.2.2- The procedures required the valves to lif t at 2485 psig + or - 1% (2460 - 2510 psig).

The results of the tests witnessed by the inspector were:

Valve Lift No. 1 Lift No. 2 Lift No. 3 Seat Leakage IRY8010A 2490 psig NW NW NW 1RY8010C 2475 psig 2505 psig 2505 psig zero NW = Not Witnessed The test equipment utilized included a pressure gauge (QA No. 033924BR)

and a temperature instrument (QA No. 153921BR). The inspectors witnessed the calibration of the pressure gauge after the first lift test of valve IRY8010A. This calibration was performed in accordance with BwlP-2400-026,

" Certification of a Pressure / Vacuum Gauge." A deadweight tester (BR018)

was used to calibrate the gauge. The inspector reviewed the calibration records for the deadweight tester and substantiated that the deadweight tester was calibrated with standards traceable to the National Bureau of Standards. During this review it was noted that a Deficiency Report (DR)85-039 was issued during the last calibration (January 1985)

identifying a "out of tolerance" conditio The deadweight tester was repaired and returned to the station "in tolerance." The disposition of DR 85-039 required not only the repair of the deadweight tester, but also required an evaluation to determine the validity of previous tests performed since the previous calibration. This evaluation was documented and attached to DR 85-039. It appears that this OR was properly dispositioned and close The testing commenced December 4, 1985, with some confusion as to the applicable test method. As required by procedure BwMP-3100-037, the Maintenance Department notified the Technical Staff prior to commencing the test. The test method described in procedure BwMP-3100-037 required the test medium to be nitrogen, however, the Technical Staff procedure, BwVS-4.2.2-1, required the valves to be tested with water pressurized with nitrogen. Since there was a conflict between the test procedures in regards to the test medium, the Technical Staff would not sanction the test. However, the Maintenance Department proceeded in testing valve 1RY8010A without first resolving this conflict. The test was conducted in accordance with maintenance procedure BwMP-3100-037, a generic bench test of the station's safety / relief valve The Technical Staff's procedure BwVS 4.2.2-1 was written and issued to specifically address the surveillance requirements identified in the technical specifications for the pressurizer code safety valves. The conflict with the test medium was resolved by a temporary change (No. 044) to procedure Bwv5-4.2.2-1, allowing the valves to be tested with nitroge Valve IRY8010A was cubsequently retested to the requirements of BwVS-4.2.2-1 as well as

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those requirements identified in BwMP-3100-03 The NWR packages clearly established that the testing of the code safety valves would be in accordance with BwMP-3100-037 and BwvS-4.2.2-1. This lack of l coordination between the Maintenance Department and the Technical Staff demonstrated during the initial testing of the code safety valves was discussed with the licensee's managemen The management was concerned that this situation occurred and assured the resident inspectors that any l future testing / surveillance activities would be planned sufficiently to preclude any testing which is not conducted in accordance with requirements identified in a NWR package. This matter is considered an open item (456/85057-02(DRP); 457/85053-01(DRP)) pending further evaluation by the resident inspector . Unit 1 - Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test The inspector reviewed a copy of the "as-run" test package which included the following items:

• BwSD-RC-24, Revision 0, Fill, Vent, and Heatup for Reactor Coolant System Hydro

• Reperformance Procedure for Unit No. 1 Reactor Coolant System Hydro e Sequence of Events Log l * Authorized-for-Test Drawings The inspector had the following comment with respect to these documents:

• There were inconsistencies in the revisions of the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) and the Control and Instrumentation Diagrams (C& ids) listed in the procedures and included in the drawing package. In a number of cases revisions listed in the hydro l procedure appeared to have been superseded by revisions listed in

! the Fill and Vent procedur While revisions to P& ids at the stage of a project are usually minor in t nature, the potential for impact on the test must not be ignored. The ,

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! inspector requested that the licensee review the changes made to each

! drawing used in the test and evaluate them for impact on test results.

l This is an open item (457/85057-03(ORP)) pending inspector review of the ,

l licensee's finding The inspector witnessed performance of the RCS hydro on January 23, 1986.

l This report addresses the events in the control room and makes no attempt i to evaluate the adequacy of piping and weld examinations. That subject I is covered in report 456/85058; 457/85054. Test engineers and operators involved with the test appeared to be knowledgeable about the test procedure, required conditions, and plant status. Several questions on plant status asked by the inspector were answered clearly and without hesitattun. The inspector noted that a separate crew of additional operators for the test was used by the licensee to avoid impacting

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routine evolutions. The inspector reviewed data sheets which recorded RCS temperature, pressure, and chemistry and did not identify any apparent discrepancies. The inspector also reviewed the calibration status of the test instrumentation and did not identify any discrepancie Valve lineups in the procedure were reviewed against the P& ids in the authorized-for-test package and appeared to be correc During the walkdown inspection conducted at step 9.2.9 of the hydro test procedure the licensee identified two valves, IM0VSI8801A and 1M0VSI88018, as being closed when they were required to be ope This resulted in a portion of the Safety Injection system not being exposed to test pressur The licensee condJCted an evaluation of the incident and subsequently reperformed the entire test on January 25, 1986. In

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reviewing the documentation for the test the inspector noted that the valves were listed as being in the open position on the valve lineup sheet and had been initialed and dated. No independent verification of the lineup was performed. The licensee is conducting an investigation into the circumstances involved in the incident, however, their findings will not be available for review until after the close of this inspection. The inspectors recognized that it was a construction test, the number of allowable hydrostatic pressure transients was not exceeded, and there is no evidence that the fission product boundary was compromised. However, if a similar event had occurred to the plant while in an operational mode, it could result in NRC escalated enforcement action. This matter is considered to be an unresolved item

• (456/85057-04(DRP)) pending review of the licensee's findings and a determination made as to whether or not a violation of NRC requirements

, exist . Fire Protection

On January 31, 1986, the station Fire Marshall, a Regulatory Assurance Group Leader, and the Services Superintendent informed the Senior Resident Inspector of their identification of a potential hose failure on a number of fire extinguishers throughout the plan The Fire Marshall became aware of this situation through an announcement published by Ansul Corporation in the January 1986 " Fire Journal." Through follow-up, he found that approximately 1% of the Ansul dry chemical fire extinguishers with EX-607 hose were subject to rupture while in use or separated from the hose fitting on the canister. The licensee has about 600 of these units on site and based on telecons with Ansul, has ordered replacement hoses under their quality assurance system and will replace the hoses as soon as practical. The licensee has informed their corporate 10 CFR 21 coordinator for review of the reportability of this matter to the NRC, however, a review by the station and the SRI shows that it is probably not required in that those extinguishers are not required for protection of the plant in the FSA A Region III fire protection specialist was consulted by the SRI and the consensus was that the licensee actions were acceptable. A copy of the published notification was provided to the fire protection specialist for review and consideration of any further NRC actio .

, No violations or deviations were identifie . Meetings, Training and Other Activities On December 30, 1985, two persons from the Governor of Illinois Office and two members of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety were on site for an information tour. The senior resident inspector accompanied the tou On January 31, 1986, the senior resident inspector gave a presentation at the licensee's routine safety meetings. The presentation was an opportunity for the people to get to know the SRI and consisted of a brief description of the history and function of the NRC resident inspector program, a discussion on the importance of plant housekeeping and control room (job) demeanor, a reaffirmation of their rights under 10 CFR 19 to discuss plant safety concerns at any time with the inspectors, and discussion on their individual actions on the job related to public health and safet . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 12 and 1 . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 7 and 1 . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 during and at the conclusion of the inspection on January 30, 1986. The inspector sumrnarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection repor The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur