IR 05000456/1985037

Safety Insp Repts 50-456/85-37 & 50-457/85-36 on 851105-08. No Violations,Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise,Involving Observations of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise

ML20137K800
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	11/27/1985
From:	Kers L, Patterson J, Phillips M, Ploski T, Rohrer D, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137K775	List: IR 05000456/1985037 ML20137K770
References
50-456-85-37, 50-457-85-36, NUDOCS 8512030287
Download: ML20137K800 (20)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/85037(DRSS); 50-457/85036(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Station, Braidwood, IL Inspection Conducted: November 5-8, 1985

/ ?$ J fj)27/gf Inspectors: T. Ploski /

. Team Leader Date fa&n) ///17d5 Patters /

Date ohrer //fDhV Date

,_ AJ J L. Kers ///,77/ff Y . $n /

7/87 Date Approved By: . P. Phil ips, Chief '/ N)

Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on November 5-8, 1985 (Reports No. 50-456/85037(DRSS; No. 50-457/85036(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of the Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station's emergency preparedness exercise, involving observations by thirteen NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 226 inspector-hours onsite by eight NRC inspectors and four consultant Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identifie However, exercise weaknesses were identified as summarized in the Appendi PDR ADOCK 05000406 G PDrt

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC)

J. Patterson, Corporate Command Center (CCC)

M. Phillips, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

N. Williamsen, TSC L. Kers, E0F D. Rohrer, TSC, EOF F. McManus, Control Room F. Carlson, Operational Support Center (OSC), Fire Brigade, Inplant Teams G. Stoetzel, OSC, Inplant Teams E. King, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Teams R. Lickus, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) and E0F J. Strasma, JPIC Commonwealth Edison Personnel D. Galle, Assistant Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear Stations E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager D. O'Brien, Assistant Superintendent, Administrative Services L. Butterfield, Manager, Nuclear Services, Technical J. Golden, Supervisor of Emergency Planning T. Blackmon, Lead Controller, E0F L. Literski, GSEP Coordinator S. Stapp, Quality Assurance Department L. Bush, Controller, Control Room D. Vestal, Controller, TSC W. McNeill, Controller, TSC M. Whitemore, Controller, OSC J. Barr, Controller, CCC H. Finch, Controller, Control Room T. Markwalter, Controller, OSC T. Greene, Controller, Environs Team W. Brenner, Lead Emergency Planner The above licensee personnel attended the November 7, 1985 exit intervie . General An exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) and the Braidwood Annex was conducted at the Braidwood Station on November 6, 1985, testing the integrated response of licensee, State, and local organizations to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major

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release of radioactive material. The exercise was integrated with a test of the Illinois State, Will County, Kankakee County, and Grundy County emergency plans. This was a full participation exercise for the State of Illinois and all counties. Attachment 1 describes the licensee's scope of participation for the exercise. Attachment 2 describes the exercise objectives. Attachment 3 is a narrative summary of the scenari . General Observations , Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Braidwood Annex, and the emergency plan implementing procedures used by the Station, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F), and Corporate Command Center (CCC). Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If the events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet Observers Licensee observers observed and critiqued this exercise along with NRC observers and several Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

observers. FEMA observations on the responses of the State and local governments will be provided in a separate repor Critique The licensee held critiques immediately following the exercise on November 6, 198 The NRC critique was held at the Mazon E0F on November 7, 198 In addition, a public critique was held on November 8, 1985 to present both the onsite and offsite preliminary findings of the NRC and FEMA representatives, respectivel . Specific Observations Control Room The Shift Engineer (SE) activated the Station's Fire Brigade after receiving a report of heavy smoke in an inplant area. An Unusual Event was correctly declared when the fire location was not identi-fied within ten minutes of the smoke report. Initial notifications to the State of Illinois and the NRC Operations Center were completed in a correct and timely manner; however, the SE became overly involved in making the calls himself rather than delegating more calls to a

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knowledgeable communicator. Meanwhile, another member of the Control Room crew was stopped by an exercise controller while calling the Braidwood Fire Department to request its assistance. Other onshift personnel continued to closely monitor radio communications from the Fire Brigade, which had split into two groups as more than one fire location was suspecte As a result of the SEC becoming overly involved in personally making certain calls and the late controller action in stopping an exercise participant from contacting the local fire department, there was about twenty minutes of confusion among all onshift personnel as to whether the local fire department was responding to the Station. Before the confusion was resolved, the Corporate Command Center (CCC) and the Operations Duty Supervisor (ODS), who later reported to the Technical Support Center (TSC), had been informed that the fire department was expected onsite. Several other work groups were also alerted to meet the fire trucks at the gatehouse. All facilities and work groups were later informed that offsite firefighting support had only been simulate The SE and ODS were well aware of the potential to upgrade the emergency classification depending on what plant equipment degrada-tion had occurred. A proper, conservative decision was made to activate certain TSC personnel and the Operational Support Center (OSC) due to the then unknown number of fires and associated damag Once the SE learned that there had been only one fire and that it had not affected safety related equipment, it was decided to continue OSC and TSC activation for damage assessment and corrective actions management purpose With one exception, personnel demonstrated adequate knowledge and efficient use of relevant emergency procedures. Personnel neglected to fill out a Fire / Injury checklist form found in Administrative Procedure 1110-16. .However, onshift personnel did take all proper actions in response to the fire. Due to the status of Control Room construction and licensed operator training, operators were, on several occasions, uncertain whether certain panel switches had yet been installed. One operator also expressed unfamiliarity with the meaning of scenario information that the incore thermocouple readout was "9999 and flashing." Later, there was some uncertainty regarding whether containment purge line valve IVQ005A was located inside or outside the containment building. It was determined that this valve was in containment and, therefore, inaccessible to any team sent to attempt its closur ' Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• Control Room personnel should demonstrate the capability to properly complete all forms and checklists relevant to an exercise scenari .

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• Knowledgeable communicators should be utilized whenever appropriate to relieve the SE of becoming overburdened with telephone communication b. Technical Support Center (TSC)

The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated following the Unusual Event declaration. The decision to activate this facility, due to one or more inplant fires of unknown origin and significance, was conser-vative and appropriate. Activation was rapid and orderly; however, it included all clerical support staff and the Administrative and Stores Directors, who would typically not be activated until an Alert had been declared. This over response may have been due to the knowledge that an exercise was occurring. In the future, the TSC activation should be limited to the Station Group Directors and other personnel who would really respond to the TSC for this particular Unusual Event declaratio The Station Director (SD) assumed command and control of onsite emergency response activities from the SE (acting SD) in a timely manner, only after having been adequately briefed on the situation and ensuring that TSC staff were ready. Periodic briefings were utilized throughout the exercise to keep TSC staff well informed of scenario events and major decisions, with the only significant exception being what protective actions were being implemented offsite. TSC staff demonstrated their capabilities to perform their assigned responsibilities. Relevant plant drawings were effectively utilized in problem analyses. Trending of relevant plant parameters was well don There were numerous examples of good teamwor The directors maintained adequately detailed records of their action In general, the use of internal message forms was very good; however, a message containing the analysis results of a post accident sample was misplaced for a few minutes at a time when this information was being sought as input to emergency reclassification decisionmakin One Director soon realized that this information had been reported, and the misplaced message form was found and given to the SD. The various TSC logs and message forms were transcribed on a personal computer, enabling administrative staff to generate a duplicate of an individual log or a comprehensive, chronological record of all key staffs' log entries. Thus, the applicant would have no trouble regarding reconstruction of actions and decisions involving TSC personne The SD's decisions to reclassify conditions as an Alert and later as a Site Area Emergency were correct and timel The associated initial notifications to the State of Illinois, using the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), were very prompt. Although the simulated notification of the NRC Operations Center was performed immediately after the State was told of the Site Area Emergency declaration, no Control Room or TSC communicator simulated a call

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to th; ARC concerning the Alert declaration. Had scenario events been real, it is possible that the Control Room or TSC would have maintained open line communications with the NRC Operations Center at any time following the Unusual Event declaration. It is also possible, however, that a real emergency would not have escalated beyond that classifiable as an Alert, especially since the reasons for the Unusual Event and Alert declarations were unrelated (fire and loss of coolant accident, respectively). The fact that a call to the NRC Operations Center was not simulated for the Alert declaration is an Exercise Weakness (456/85037-01 and 457/85036-01).

In general, communications between the TSC, CCC, and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) were adequate. As the exercise progressed, TSC dose assessment staff continued to generate offsite dose pro-jections and to monitor transmissions from offsite survey teams under EOF control, thus enabling the SD to have the information he needed to meaningfully participate with his EOF and CCC counterparts in offsite protective action decisionmaking. In contrast, there was some confusion between the TSC and E0F regarding the number and status (closed or open) of three valves in the release path for this scenario. For this reason, and due to some dubious scenario infor- '

mation regarding an alarming radiation monitor downstream of the valves in the release path, personnel in both facilities incorrectly concluded that the release had initiated shortly after 1030. After many communications involving the TSC, E0F, and inplant and offsite survey teams, it was verified that the release had not begun at that tim However, TSC staff should have been more aggressive in attempting to have an inplant team attempt closure of one or both accessible valves in the potential release path, which was a containment building purge line having three valves - one within and two outside containment. Volunteers should have been sought and emergency worker exposure limits authorized for this task. Instead, work on this task was inhibited when an inpiant team encountered a higher radiation field than they were allowed to work within. By not providing emergency worker exposure limits such that teams had to abandon this task, the opportunity to prevent a release from occurring through this flow path was los Promptly after the Site Area Emergency declaration, the SD ordered the simulated assembly and accountability of all onsite personne Once informed that this task had been completed, the Station, Rad Chem, Environs, and Security Directors showed good judgement and concern for nonessential personnel by simulating their evacuation from the Station along a radiologically safe route. Allowing for reasonable times for the assembly, accountability, and site evacuation processes to be accomplished, the latter would have been completed prior to the radioactive releas .

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Later in the exercise when the release began through the containment purge line, TSC staff had-no difficulty.in confirming the release and the release path. Several inplant survey teams were dispatched to confirm that-there were no additional unmonitored release path TSC staff then demonstrated good knowledge of plant systems in the identification of several possible methods to close at least one of the two accessible valves in the release path. Actions were well underway to close one of these two valves.when a scenario message indicated the closure of a third, inaccessible valve in the release pat Nevertheless, TSC staff and an inplant teali continued their efforts and demonstrated that they could also close one of the two accessible valves, providing further assurance that the release had been stoppe Following a scenario time jump, TSC staff successfully demonstrated their ability to identify and prioritize short-term recovery task Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• Emergency worker exposure limit should be promptly provided to teams that perform tasks which could mitigate or prevent a release of significant amounts of radioactivity from the plan c. Fire Brigade, Operational Support Center. (OSC) and Inplant Teams The strategy of splitting the fire brigade to expedite identifying the fire location (s) was appropriate. Considering the potential for having multiple fires, the brigade captain's request for offsite support was proper. The brigade identified the only fire location within an acceptable twenty minutes and correctly reported the fire's location to the Control Room. Both portions of the brigade were adequately equipped, and demonstrated their abilities to keep each other and the Control Room well informed of their activitie The OSC was fully operational with adequate staff within an acceptable thirty minutes of the decision to activate this facilit The OSC Director effectively managed the facilit Communications between the OSC, TSC, and Control Room were good. An adequately detailed OSC log was maintained. Personnel were issued high range dosimetry upon their first arrival at the OSC. Portable radios and a status board were effectively utilized to track inplant team Dose extensions were requested from the TSC for members of the teams

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who could receive over 100 millirem exposure while performing assigned tasks. Personal exposure records were adequately maintaine No teams were observed to leave the OSC without Radiation Chemistry l

Technician (RCT) support. RCTs routinely checked their survey instruments for proper operation and current calibration before i leaving the OSC.

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The quality of briefings given to OSC personnel was adequate, with the exceptions that assembled persons were not told that a General Emergency had been declared for about ninety minutes, and later that the release had ended around 1345. The quality of briefings given to specific teams generally improved during the exercise. Although the briefings addressed radiological hazards, they did not routinely incorporate current Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) data available from the Control Room. Several teams stopped in the Control Room to obtain such data before proceeding on their missions. In addition, inplant radiation survey information posted on plant layout maps in the OSC did not always include the valid times of the dat A contamination control point was established and utilized at the OSC's entrance while background radiation levels were low. OSC habitability surveys were periodically done. Several air samples were also taken in the OSC, beginning before the radioactive releas The initial air sample was taken over a twenty-five minute period, although it was reported as a thirty minute sample. The technician had difficulty in finding procedural guidance for collecting and counting the sample. The sample cartridge was then improperly left on a table for several hours. A RCT who collected another sample was observed to be handling the particulate filter without glove Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• All persons in the OSC should be kept well informed of all major events during an emergency, including any emergency reclassification * Briefings given to inplant teams should incorporate relevant ARM data in addition to available survey information. Valid times of these types of data should be available in the OS * RCTs assigned to collect air samples should receive additional training on sample collection, counting, and handling technique Corporate Command Center (CCC)

The CCC was activated in a timely manner. Actual transfer of command and control of emergency response activities from the TSC to the CCC was appropriately delayed for a short time, as persons in the TSC were very involved in finalizing an emergency reclassification decision and in completing the associated initial offsite notifica-tions. Subsequent transfers of command and control from the TSC to the CCC, and later from the CCC to the E0F were smooth and done only after the managers of both involved facilities had been adequately briefed. Optional transfer of control of the Station's offsite

< monitoring teams from the TSC to the CCC was not accomplished, per the agreement of the staffs of both facilities. The CCC Director kept in close communication with his TSC and EOF counterparts, and

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ensured that his staff did likewise. Key staff maintained adequately detailed records of their activities. In general, status boards were kept up to date; however, offsite monitoring team data could have been posted in a more timely manne I e. Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

The E0F became fully operational within one hour of the decision to activate this facility. Access control was adequate, although over-zealous regarding NRC personnel who displayed proper identification and had already been granted unescorted access to all areas of the EOF building. Staff briefings were adequately detailed, but could have been more frequent later in the exercise. Recordkeeping was sufficient to provide adequate reconstruction of E0F activities and majordecisions. Status boards were adequately maintained with a few, relatively minor informational discrepancies. Trending of critical plant parameters was adequat All offsite notifications for the General Emergency and subsequent major events, such as the beginning and end of the simulated release and what protective actions were being recommended, were completed in a timely and accurate manner. Based on the radioactive release rate and containment radiation level data available from the scenario, E0F staff developed the appropriate offsite protective action i recommendation Although EOF staff issued appropriate protective action recommenda-tions, the Recovery Manager (RM) did not maintain a sufficient awareness of what recommendations had been implemented offsite or what was the progress of their implementation. Such information was not, therefore, relayed to the TSC, CCC, or to the offsite monitoring team Although TSC and EOF staff followed procedures and acquired a meteorological forecast, a forecast shift in wind direction was not incorporated into the protective action decisionmaking process. The forecast wind direction shift did not occur prior to release termina-tion. Nevertheless, the failure to adequately consider forecast changes in meteorological conditions during the protective action decisionmaking process is an Exercise Weakness (456/85037-02 and 457/85036-02).

Environs staff compiled and analyzed data received from the Station's offsite survey teams; however, it was not evident that attempts were made to acquire and utilize survey results from the State's teams which were kept further from the Statio In addition to the exercise weakness, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• Movements of NRC personnel displaying proper identification should not be inhibited within the E0F once facility access has been grante .

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• The Recovery Manager and appropriate aides should maintain adequate knowledge of the protective actions being implemented offsite, including their completion status. Such information should be relayed to the CCC, TSC, and to offsite survey team * Offsite survey results from State field teams should be routinely acquired and utilized by EOF environs staf Radiological Environmental Monitoring Teams Two teams were activated for this exercis Both were adequately briefed prior to being dispatched. They checked their field survey kits for completeness, equipment operability, and equipment calibra-tion before leaving the Station. Radios were also performance checked; however, one team's only radio failed during the exercise, resulting in a temporary loss of communications with this tea The teams were well utilized by the TSC Environs staff to help verify that no release had begun shortly after 1030. Both teams remained relatively close to the Station throughout the exercise, while the State's teams remained further away. -The teams were provided with adequately detailed, legible maps and exhibited no difficulties in finding the locations to which they were directed by TSC or E0F staffs. The team which was accompanied during the exercise demonstrated proper techniques in collecting, handling, and storing air, soil, and vegetation samples and in taking direct radiation readings. Samples were adequately labeled for later iden-tificatio Proper care was taken to avoid spreading contamination

'in the vehicle and among the sampling equipment. The team spent much of its time in sampling at only one or two locations and then waiting outside the plume for further instructions. At no time was either team utilized to determine the approximate borders of the plume in order to ascertain whether its location in the environment corresponded closely to predictions made by the Environs staff. On one occasion, a team was told to replace environmental dosimeter However, no replacement dosimeters were available in their van, although it was understood that the van contained such equipmen Radio communications between the teams and their TSC or EOF controllers were not always easily understood, especially when a team member attempted to communicate while wearing a face mask and a throat microphone. However, those involved in the communications persisted until the messages were understood. The teams were kept sufficiently appraised of major scenario events, with two notable exceptions. They were not promptly told when a Site Area Emergency had been declared, and they were never informed of what protective actions were being implemented offsit ..

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Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• All environmental monitoring teams should be equipped with multiple radio * Teams should be occasionally directed to ascertain the approximate boundaries of the plum * The teams should be provided with environmental dosimeters, if they are expected to replace those currently deployed in the fiel * Teams should be promptly kept informed of all emergency reclassifications and all protective actions oeing implemented offsit g. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was located in a storage /

workshop area at the eastern end of the E0F building. This location has been utilized as the licensee's JPIC for all exercises of the Dresden and LaSalle County Stations' emergency plans subsequent to June 198 The staff's concerns regarding the JPIC's marginal accept-ability, in terms of its size; inadequate soundproofing evident when the building's heating, ventilation, air conditioning, or water pumping equipment are operating; and its inadequate number of electrical outlets for the expected amount of media equipment have already been documented in Inspection Reports No. 373/84018(DRSS)

and No. 374/84024(DRSS). The s W 7 understands that the licensee has budgeted funds for improving t4s md its other JPIC facilities, although no schedule has M9 esp <lished for planned improvement The licensee issued six press reieases during the exercise. All but the first release, which was issued by the CCC, were approved by the R None of the press releases contained false information; however, the use of the word " stable" in Press Release No. 4 when describing the core's condition was confusing. While this press release correctly stated that no release had yet occurred, there was already sufficient evidence of significant core degradation. Emergency class definitions were included where appropriate in the press release However, the General Emergency definition was incompletely stated in Press Release No. 3. None of the press releases adequately addressed the licensee's prognoses on scenario events, the serious-ness of the events, or what activities were being taken to mitigate the consequences of the acciden Several problems were evident regarding the performance of the licensee's technical spokesperson. First, several of the licensee's press briefings were not well coordinated with those of the govern-mental spokesperson. At the first briefing, the licensee spokesperson read an outdated press release issued by the CCC which

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dealt with the Alert phase of the emergency. While the spokesperson ;

said that an updated release was being prepared, his presentation l was then followed by that of a State spokesperson who was prepared to discuss the current Site Area Emergency situation. The licensee later held a briefing regarding the General Emergency very soon after it had been declared; however, the State spokesperson was not yet ready to follow with his presentation in response to this significant change of scenario events. The second major problem with the performance of the technical-spokesperson was that he failed to anticipate some basic questions relative to the emergency conditions and thus was not readily able to answer the audience's questions. Such basic questions addressed when had the Loss of Coolant Accident begun, and was the reactor core currently covere The spokesperson did, however, provide adequate answers to such obvious questions at a later tim Such problems involving the performance of the licensee's technical spokespersons had been identified during several exercises at the licensee's other nuclear generating facilities. By letter dated September 5, 1985, the licensee has committed to complete several specific corrective actions to upgrade the capabilities of its technical spokespersons. This will consist of revising the selection criteria for technical spokespersons and providing expanded trainin The current scheduled completion date for these corrective actions is December 1986. As the inadequate performance of the licensee's technical spokespersons has previously been identified as an exercise weakness and a schedule for corrective actions has already been established, the performance of the technical spokesperson at the 1985 Braidwood Exercise is not a new exercise weakness. However, the licensee's progress toward completing its commitments to improve the capabilities of its technical spokespersons will be closely tracked as will adherence to scheduled corrective action completion date Other problems evident in this exercise were that the spokesperson too often left the JPIC between press briefings, leaving no licensee person obviously available to address media concerns in between press br5efings. Also, the building's ventilation and water' pump equipment was occasionally shut off to reduce background noise levels during press briefings. The water pump equipment was restarted between briefings when the building's water pressure was los Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• Additional attention should be paid to the contents of press releases so that all information is clearly stated and complet * Press releases should include, where appropriate, additional details to give some indications of the prognoses of the current situation, and activities to mitigate the consequences of the even . - -

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• A knowledgeable licensee representatives should be clearly designated and readily available within the JPIC at all times when the technical spokesperson is absent from the JPI . Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on November 7, 1985 with those licensee personnel identified in Paragraph 1. The inspectors discussed the scope and preliminary findings of the inspection. The licensee agreed to consider the items discussed. The inspectors determined from the licensee that none of the information discussed was proprietary in natur Attachments:

1. Exercise Scope of Participation Exercise Objectives Exercise Narrative Summary

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. s BRAIDWOOD 1985 GSEP EXERCISE SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION Commonwealth Edison will participate in the Braidwood Station exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization and the of f-site emergency response organization as appropriate, subject-to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe efficient operation of Braidwood Station and other CECO nuclear generating station Activation of the TSC and other on-site participants will be conducted on a real time basis during the day time hours. The exercise shift will receive the initial scenario information and respond accordingl The Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the Recovery Group will be prepositioned close to Byron to permit use of Recovery Group personnel from distant location The Corporate Command Center will be activate . Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actualJy incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergenc3 response except as prearranged specifically for the exercis Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the exercis Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the compan On-site assembly and accountability along with High Range Sampling System (HRSS) procedures will be simulated during the exercise. Assembly and accountability will be demonstrated at a date and time ' selected to minimize disruption of construction work in progress. -HRSS will be demonstrated upon the completion of the system at.the Braidwood Statio K

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BRAIDWOOD 1985 GSEP EXERCISE OBJECTIVES Primary Objective:

Demonstrate the capability to implement the Commonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan in cooperation with the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents to protect the public ir, the event of a major accident at the Braidwood Statio This capability will be demonstrated during the hours to qualify as a day-time exercise in accordance with NRC guidanc Supporting Objectives:

1) Incident Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSE (EOF, CCC, TSC, CR)

2) Notification and Communication Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations within 15 minutes of declaring an accident classificatio (EOF, CCC, TSC, CR) Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC within one hour of the initial inciden (CR) Demonstrate the capability to contact organizations that would normally assist in an emergency, but are not participating in this exercise (e.g. INPO, Murray & Trettel, Westinghouse, etc.)

- (CR, CCC, EOF, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to provide accurato and timely information so that reports may be made to the emergency news center for press release (EOF, CCC, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information to the State in a timely manne (EOF)

3) Radiological Assessment Demonstrate the capability to calculate off-site dose projection (EOF, CCC, TSC)

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-2- Demonstrate the capability of environmental field teams to conduct field radiation surveys and collect air, liquid, vegetation and soil samples when neede (EOF, CCC, TSC, ENV) Demonstrate the capability to conduct in-plant radiation protection activitie (OSC, HP) Demonstrate the ability to perform calculations with radiological survey information, trend this in formation , and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective action (EOF, CCC, OSC, HP)

4) Emergency Facilities Demonstrate the capability to activate the emergency organization and staff the nuclear station emergency response facilities in accordance with procedures during a day time perio (EOF, TSC, HP, CCC, OSC) Demonstrate through discussion and staff planning, the ability to perform a shift change in the TSC, EOF and control roo (EOF, TSC, CCC)

5) Emergency Direction and Control Demonstrate the ability of the directors to manage the emergency organizations in the implementation of the GSE (EOF, CCC, OSC, TSC, CR) Demonstrate the capability of coordinating the direction of emergency response among CECO and Illinois offsite command centers by using Liasion personnel and communicator (EOF)

6) Recovery and Re-entry Demonstrate the capability of the emergency response personnel to identify requirements, programs, and policies governing damage assessments and implementing procedures for

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recovery and re-entr (EOF, CCC, TSC)

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V NOVEMBER 1985 EXERCISE

Narrative Summary INITIAL SITUATION 0700 - 0715 (15 minute duration)

• Plant Status Unit One: In operation at 100% power with a normal full power electrical lineup with the exception of the IB Diesel Generato Surveillance testing of the Reactor Protection System was completed on the previous shif No power changes are anticipated. RCS activity is steady at 18 uci/gm. A tube leak of 0.15 gallon per minute attzibuted to tubes in the IB Steam Generator and well below Tech Spec limits is being tracke I Unit Two: Shutdown in Mode 5 with major steam generator maintenance in progress. Shutdown occurred within previous 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> following greater than 180 full power days of operation. Secondary plant maintenance is in progress on the feedwater system and the turbine auxiliary system * Service Report Unit One: Diesel Generator IB has been out of service for 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> for j3 turbocharger bearing changeou It is, estimated that three hours remain to ( ,) restore it to servic B centrifugal charging pump was placed out of service at 0500 today for work on the coupling. A Mini Purge is in progress to balance containment pressur I Unit Two: Steam Generator's 2A and 2B have tube plugging in progress based upon previously scheduled repairs. Steam Generator 2C's secondary side

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is drained and repairs are in progress to a secondary side inspection manwa * Precursor Events Two coal powered stations on the grid have gone off the line for l emergency maintenance within the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the Load Dispatcher has l

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advised that maximum power should be maintained on Unit on )

In the following zones of the fire protection system, a number of i

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ionization detectors but less than one-half the total for each zone, have been reported as inoperable due to failure of their ionization detectors in the surveillance test administered 11/4/8 l Zone 8 - 401' elevation Zone 9 - 401' elevation Zone 10 - 383' elevation Zone 11 - 330' elevation Zone 13 - 383' elevation Zone 29 - 383' elevation () Zone 76 - 426' elevation

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Page 2 Generator fuel storage tank.At this time, investigatory work is being conducted in Z The condenser off gas radiation detector (IRT-PR027 B), failed high on the last shift and is in the process of being replace instruments, on the average, were indicating 0.4% high.A calo take No action has been

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UNUSUAL EVENT (0715 - 0800) (45 minute duration)

t = + 15 EAL 5A Fir minutes. Fire requires NRC notification if not identified within located in the Unit 1 ESV Pump room (330'Heavy elevation).Anelectricalf smoke is carried through the HVAC system and ultimately causes main board annunciation at p () IPM09J, Zone 25; Aux Building HVAC system energize Ten minutes later annunciation on 2PM09J, Zone 17, helping to localize the problem. Upon local determination, the fire is classified as not requiring offsite assistance .

The non-safety related equipment within the tray is rendered inoperable .

ALERT 0800 - 0900 (60 minute duration)

t = +60 EAL 16 Loss of Primary Coolan A > 50 gpm leakage _ increase in a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> period flow, oras VCT indicated by either leak rate calculation, charging pump level' change leak of approximately 55 gpm to developA suddenl stressed weld in charging flow increase, high VCT make-up.and a Pressurizer level decrease are the initial indications follo the humidity (slowly). Area radiation monitors in Containment trend up, as does initiate A power rampdown of approximately 12 Mw/ min is NOTE:

When this occurs, valve IVQOOSA will fail to shut.An automatic securing of M O

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~O SITE EMERGENCY 0900 - 1030 (90 minute duration)

t = +120 EAL 16 Loss of Primary Coolant. primary system leakage is beyond makeup capabilities of charging pump The two inch cold leg bypass pipe shears with an instant leak rate of approximately 1400 gpm. Safety Injection is initiated either manually or shortly thereafter automatically. High head SI flow is prevented from entering the RCS by manual valves ISI 8810 A, B, C, and D, which have been lined up in,the shut position instead of the open position. Initiation of high head SI breaks loose a cap on the test connection in the line to these

valves, which allows flow through the line and out the test tee. Five minutes after the initiation of the break, thermocouple and structural material broken loose by the high velocity break flow lodges in the broken pipe and reduces j

the break flow to 300 - 350 gpm. Shortly thereafter the primary pressure i

begins to cycle between 1300 and 1550 PSIG as limited SI pump input and high decay heat provide insufficient cooling for the cor NOTE: Any attempt to depressurize the primary via the Pressurizer PORV's during this time period will be met with failure. PORV 1 RY 455A is inoperable due to a leaking diagram. PORV 1 RY 456 is inoperable due to a

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bleed down of the nitrogen flask through a leaking check valve connection.

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t = +130 (At 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> an electrical fire reoccurs this time in the safety

system, tripping Bus 141 on overcurrent. Temperature spikes greater than 15000F noted by mainboard annunciation occur on thermocouple readout in

. certain areas. Core damage occurs in the form of rod burst t = +165

! "With the restoration of Bus 141 and the second Safety Injection pump,

' some cooling begins to take place in the core, which up until now had been voiding and flooding, voiding and flooding due to insufficient cooling and deeper and deeper core uncovery (greater mass loss than mass input and little i cooling effect from voided steam generator tubes). Increased cooling to the hotter core areas, causes stress damage to the marginal clad / fuel positions, resulting in more fission product release to the coolant and containment."

t = +180

Containment Radiation monitors indicates levels inside in excess of 4,000 R/h t = +195 Coolant grab sample results delivere [ Greater than 300 uCi/gm].

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GENERAL EMERGENCY 1030 - 1330 (210 minute duration)

t = +210 EAL 24 Loss of Fission Product Barrier > 2.0E 3 R/hr Primary Containment Radiation, AND Loss of two of the following three fission product barriers with an imminent loss of the third barrier: Cladding; grab sample results > 300 uCi/gm equivalent of

. 1-131, Reactor Coolant System; a) Containment pressure > 5 psig and, b) Containment temperature > 1500 F and, c) Containment humidity > 50%. Primary Containment; a) Containment pressure > 50 psig or, b) Containment temperature > 2800 F or, c) Loss of containment integrity when containment integrity

~') is require '

G One Containment Purge path valve (lVQ 005A) is already ope Indication of mid position is seen for valve IVQ005 t = +250 With the decrease in RCS pressures, the debris partially blocking the break flow shifts positions, and the leak increases to 1100-1200 gpm. Break flow and charging flow counterbalance each other as cooling continue t = +315 Release path open via remaining purge valve (1VQ 005C) failing --

neophrene/ rubber seal fails under heat and pressure. Containment begins venting to atmosphere through the path outlined above, an open exhaust damper, and out the plant vent stac At 1345 valve IVQ005A, purge valve, returns to it's shut position, thus i terminating the releas !

l RECOVERY / REENTRY (1430)

At 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />, a.24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time jump occurs. The plant condition is q deemed stable, with sufficient subcooling, containment conditions under (_) control (temperature, pressure, hydrogen levels, and sump recirculation in progress.) No further indications of fire in the electrical system are found, and radiation levels in containment have stabilize DSV/1mk/6342E/52

- ENk