IR 05000456/1985040
| ML20137X258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1985 |
| From: | Danielson D, Jeffrey Jacobson, Muffett J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137X254 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-85-40, 50-457-85-39, NUDOCS 8512100462 | |
| Download: ML20137X258 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-456/85040(DRS); 50-457/85039(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, IL Inspection Conducted: August 19, 22, September 17-19, and October 3-4, 16-18, 24, 1985 Mw
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1/ 2 2//4~
Inspectors-
. Jacobson Date d Wb
'I /2 2./6,6 J. Muffett Date NY W
Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief
///L1//.F Materials and Processes Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 19, 22, September 17-19, and October 3-4, 16-18, 24, 1985 (Reports No. 50-456/85040(DRS); 50-457/85039(DRS))
Areas Inspected: Announced safety inspection of licensee actions concerning previous inspection findings and one 50.55(e) item. The inspection involved a total of 122 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No violations or deviations were found.
8512100462 851122 PDR ADOCK 05000456 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison (CECO)
M. Wallace, Project Manager
- C.-Sch oeder, Project Licensing and Compliance Superintendent
- D. Shainblin, Project Construction Superintendent P. Barnes, Project Licensing W. Vahle, Project Field Engineering Manager J. Dierbeck, Project Field Engineer
- E. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Manager of Quality Assurance The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.
- Denotes those attending the final exit interview at the Braidwood Station on October 24, 1985.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Open Item (456/84-36-04):
Improperly qualified welding procedure for L. K. Constock (electrical contractor) welding of galvanized material. To preclude the possibility of any questionable work arising from a failure to remove the galvanize coating before welding, the licensee instructed L. K. Comstock to qualify a procedure for welding with the galvanized coating in place.
The NRC inspector reviewed the Procedure Qualification Test Records No. LKCE-PQR-084, 085, 086, and 087. These tests were conducted in the flat, horizontal, vertical and overhead positions with the galvanize coating in place. Performance of these qualification tests are considered a technically acceptable method of closing this item.
b.
(Closed) Open Item (456/84021-04; 457/84020-04): Questionable certification of a L. K. Comstock (electrical contractor) welder.
A review of the qualification tests performed by Welder No. 11 was conducted with results as follows:
Welder No.11 originally qualified for carbon steel welding on July 28, 1978.
Welder No.11 left the jobsite and returned on April 16, 1981.
At this time he was retested and again qualified for carbon steel welding.
Welder No. 11 was tested for stainless steel welding on May 18, and May 20, 1981, failing both tests.
Welder No. 11 was given additional training and retested
successfully for stainless steel on May 21, 1981.
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' Welder No. 11 again left the jobsite and returned on May 23, 1983. He was retested on this date and failed to requalify.
Based on the above review, Welder No. 11 was properly qualified during the periods in which he performed safety related welding for L. K. Comstock c.
(Closed) Violation (456/84021-01; 457/84020-01):
Safety-related structural steel fillet welds were visually examined for acceptance in the painted condition. A 100% review of the Napolean (structural contractor) Visual Weld Reports was conducted by Pittsburg Testing Laboratory (PTL). Visual Weld Report Nos. 709, 711, 713, 716, and 717 encompassing 122 welds were identified as being performed through l
paint. These inspections were performed by a single inspector during a nine day period in 1980. These inspections were performed through paint at the direction of CECO Site Quality Assurance and are deemed to be an isolated occurrence. All paint was removed and the welds were reinspected to correct this deficiency. To prevent recurrence, PTL was directed to perform first line weld inspection only in the unpainted condition. The NRC inspector reviewed PTL Nonconformance Report No.191, Revision 1 documenting the resolution of this item and found it acceptable, d.
(Closed) Violation (456/83009-10(c); 457/83009-10(c)):
Pullman Sheet Metal (PSM) Procedure B10.2.F, " Visual Weld Inspection", did not require a documented inspection of base metal surfaces and edges prior to welding.
Section 3 of the AWS DI.1-77 Code, entitled
" Workmanship," states in part that surfaces and edges to be welded shall be smooth, uniform, and free from discontinuities which would adversely affect weld quality.
PSM procedures require inspection of shop fabricated items at the time of shipping and inspection of materials for field fabricated items at the time of receipt at the Braidwood site. Jobsite fabricated items are saw cut, which virtually eliminates the likelihood of irregular edges.
In addition, the PSM welding procedures require inspection of the welding surface by the welder before welding is commenced.
To further demonstrate weld quality, the licensee performed a weld sample test program.
The sample program consisted of tensile tests on 82 welded joint samples removed from the HVAC as-welded construction at the Braidwood Station. The results of this test program demonstrated that test failure loads were larger than the design allowable loads by at least 50%.
Based on a review of the above information and an inspection of in excess of 300 HVAC welds performed by the NRC inspector, it was concluded that the lack of a documented inspection of base metal surfaces and edges prior to welding had no design significant effect on weld quality.
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(Closed) Violation (456 4043-01;457/84039-01): During an inspection e.
related.to allegations concerning Byron /Braidwood design activities,
it was determined that Sargent and Lundy did not' have retrievable design basis records for the "9" factor methodology employed in the
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design of auxiliary steel for pipe supports. This was a violation of
e, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII.
(SeeNRCInspectionReport r
No. 50-454/84-71 fordetails).
In response to this violation the
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r d6 sign basis for the."p" factor methodolpgy was recreated. All.
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supports-designed using the "9" factor methodology were reviewed for compliance with -the' new "9" factor parameters or specific detailed 9esign calculations were performed to veriff the acceptability of the c
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supports.
In addition, the Structural Design Standard for Mechanical
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Component Support Steel Framing (SDS-E37) was revi~ sed. Also, a i
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review of other. technical support documentation wss performed to
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assure that the design bases were retrievable. An inspection was
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'g7 performed concerning these actions and all were found acceptable.
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(C16 sed) Violation (456/84043-02; '467/84039-02)l. During an
l inspection related to allegat" ions.concerning Byron /Braidwood design
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activities, it was determined that the AISC (American Institute of t
Steel Construction);11mit for 41e'nderness ratio (KL/R) had not been incorporated into the Structural Design Standard,' Chapter E 36.0,
" Safety-Related HVAC Duct Supports," for ceiling mounted duct sup$ orts.. This was'a violation _of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion ~III.
(SeeNnC'InspectionReportNo.-50-454/84-71for t
detalls.)
In response, SDS, E 36.0 was revised to incorporate the
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limit on slenderness ratio (KL/R).and existing designs were reviewed
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c for* compliance with the limit on_ slenderness ratio. An inspection
of the revisions to SDE/ E 36.0 and the review of existing designs i
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was perfyrmad and found; acceptable.
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(Closed) Violation (456/83009-02(B); 457/83009):02(B)): NRC i
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Inspection Report No.,50-456/83-09; 50-457/83-09'found that the I* 'Ticensee was not in compliance with the Quality Assurance Manual,
. Revision 77, Q.P. No. 7-1 which _is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix i
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B, Criterion V.
This violation concerne& the lack of receipt
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inspection _of wall thicknessNr.d diameter of,pipirig. As a corrective
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j action, the inspection requirement was, incorporated into QCP-B4, Revision 4, which was approved for usefon January 23, 1984.
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Subsequent to the violation, the licensee inspected piping received
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prior to July 26,1983, for, wall thickness violations. To provide an addition assurance that piping currently in storage had received s
the dimensional inspection, the NRC inspectors performed independent
' dimensional inspections of piping in storage using a D'igital
,e Thickness Measurement device. The results of this in' dependent
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j inspection are as follows:
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No.
Min.
Size Heat No..
Type Lengths Measurements'
Acceptance 2" Sch 80 U71443 SA-106
.221,.221,.222,
.191
.224,.228,.228,
.226,.220,.223,
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.220,.218,.221,
.232,.228
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11" Sch 80 187312 SA-106
.235,.226,.222,
.175
.224,.209,.206,
.210,.218,.206,.
.199,.200,.186,
.184,.187
li" Sch 80 204272 SA-106
.224,.230,.206,
.175
.206,.208,.198,
.200,.206,.207,
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.218 3/4" Sch 80 169031 SA-106
.156,.156, 155,
.135
.151,.148,.152,
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.167,.160,.159
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'2" Sch 160 74001 SA-106
.350,.350,.348,-
.300
.335,.335,.337,
.349,.348,.348
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4 k No.
Min.
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Size Heat No.
Types Lengths Measurements Acceptance
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1" Sch 80 20k891
.SA-106 ;
.195,.190,.186,
.157
.209,.212,.209,
.208,.210,.214
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2" Sch 80-18497 SA-106
.244,.250,.242,
.191
.229,.240,.236
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11" Sch 80 B16497 SA-312TP304
.206,.201,.201,
_.175
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.2b3,.201,.200, e
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.2'09,.202,.200
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2" ch 80 462774 SA-312TP304
!212,.212,.210,.
.191
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.210,.211,.212, Y
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' i.210, 2212,.213
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'3/4" Sch 80.4470382 SA-312TP304
.115,.124
.99 p
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11" Sch 80' 462800 SA-312TP304,,.3
.147,.147,.146,<
.127
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.152,.142.,.149,
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.142,.144,.146
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.271,.268,.bY, 3 246
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11" Sch 160 463001 SA-312TP304
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.274,.273,.273, n
.270,.268,.264
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J No.
Min.
Size Heat No.
Type Lengths.
Measurements Acceptance 2" Sch 80
'24257
- SA-312TP304
.211,.211,.211,
.191
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.210,.210,.210, l
.220,.220,.220 2" S/160 462843 SA-312TP304-
.324,.325,.324,
.300
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.332,.331,.331,
.335,.340,.336
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The NRC. inspector reviewed QCP-84, Revision 4 and found it acceptable,
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.in addition, all measurements of wall thickness performed by the licensee and the NRC. inspectors were acceptable.
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(Closed).0 pen Item (456/85019-03;.457/85020-03):. During' an -
- inspection of BCAP documentation and engineering analysis the.
inspector _ discovered'a BCAP observation form which stated that a
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crack had been discovered in a cable tray supgort weld. Subsequent-to the initial observation, the original BCAP inspector changed'the
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observation to a " shrinkage line." :A decision was made that the NRC
would inspect this weld in a subsequent inspection..(See NRC Inspection Report No. 50-_456/85019; 50-457/85020 fordetails).
-During this inspection the weld was. inspected by the NRC inspectors.
The weld contained no cracks and was acceptable.
1. _
(Closed)Open_ Item (456/84034-02;457/84032-02): This item concerns
.a Pullman Sheet Metal inspection procedure permitting transverse cracks to remain in the weld.
Inspection Procedure PSM-WP-307, Addendum A, was prepared by Pullman Sheet Metal (PSM) and
. subsequently was accepted by S&L on March 3,~1981. This inspection
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procedure was used by PSM to reinspect a random sample of 200 ducts.
'These inspections were used to-disposition Ceco NCR L-246 which concerned inspection of' silicon bronze welds, with respect to overlap and~ weld profile. Production inspections were not performed using this procedure. Current PSM weld inspection' procedures do not permit
cracks of any orientation.
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AWS D1.1 " Structural Welding Code," allows the use of alternate acceptance. criteria, provided they are based on engineering
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evaluation. The acceptance of PSM-WP-307, Addendum A, was based
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on tensile testing of welds containing transverse cracks, as i
documented in a letter from PSM dated February 10, 1981. To i
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supplement the data provided in 1981, S&L reviewed the results of 80 tensile tests performed in 1983. This review has shown that this specific type of transverse cracks in silicon bronze welds, used for the HVAC applications in question, has no significant effect on the ability of the welds to perform their design function. The NRC
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inspector reviewed the basis for acceptance of this inspection procedure and its-limited application and found it acceptable.
3.
Licensee Action on 50.55(e) Items (Closed) 50.55(e) Item (456/83004-EE; 457/83004-EE)
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This item concerns the use of jam nuts in sliding structural connections. The inspector reviewed a sample of the design analyses
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of the sliding connections for the Byron and Braidwood containment buildings.
In addition, selected examples of sliding connections utilizing jam nuts were inspected.
Both the design analyses and the installations inspected were acceptable.
4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1),
on October 24, 1985, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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