IR 05000445/1988062

Insp Repts 50-445/88-62 & 50-446/88-58 on 880909-1004.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Retesting Program,Plant Tours,Monthly Maint Observation, SER Followup & Comparison of as-built Plant to FSAR

ML20205G393
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	10/24/1988
From:	Bitter S, Burris S, Joel Wiebe NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20205G390	List: IR 05000445/1988062 ML20205G385
References
50-445-88-62, 50-446-88-58, NUDOCS 8810280255
Download: ML20205G393 (12)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:'

.
'. -

l

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!O!ISSION

      !

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-62 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/88-58 CPPR-127 l Dockats: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 Construction Permit < Expiration Date: Unit 1: Extension request , submitte l Unit 2: Extension request submitte Applicant: TU Electric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name: Comancho Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: September 9 through October 4, 1988 Inspector:kn(k$.k) O , /A /0))V)[[

 /js. D. Bitter, Redident Inspector,   'Date V Operations Inspector: of [. NA5 D'  , a  id/d Y[8/
 { Burris, Schfor Resident Inspector, Operations
      'Ddte l Reviewed by: :AtkN_k  O  /o/Jy!M
  . S. Wiebe, Lead Project Inspector  'Date 8810280255 831024 PDR ADOCK 05000445 o  PDC
  - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _

    .-. .
,

t .

.

1 Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted: September 9 through October 4, 1988 (Report 1 50-445/88-62: 50-446/88-58) Areas Inspected: Unannounced resident safety inspection of the preoperational rotesting program, plant tours, monthly maintenance ! observation, safety evaluation report follow-up, comparison of l as-built plant to FSAR description, and follow-up on j 10 CFR 50.55(o) reports.

I Results: Within the arcas inspected, no significant strengths or : I weaknesses were identified. During the inspection, no significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identifie Two open items were identified. One involves the control room l operators' inability to retrievo a design change authorization l (paragraph 3.a); the other involves a broken fastener on the Unit 1, Train B, diesel generator (paragraph 4.b). One unresolved item resulted from the loss of, and subsequent recovery of f a Safeguards document (paragraph 3.c).

l

     !

l l l

l l . . _

    .. _- . - _-

*
..
.
.
.
,

DETAILS Persons Contacted

 *R. W. Ackley, Jr., Project Manager, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)
 *R. P. Baker, Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric '
 *J. L. Barker, Manager, Engineering Assurance, TU Electric
 *J. W. Beck, Vice President, Nuclear Engi'.secting, TU Electric
 *G. L. Bell, Nuclear Licensing, Dallas, TU Electric -
 *H. D. Bruner, Senior Vice President, TU Electric
 *W. J. Cahill, Consultant, TU Electric
 *J. T. Conly, APE-Licensing, SWEC
 *W. G. Counsil, Executive Vice President, TU Electric
 *J. C. Crnich, Project General Manager, Ebasco
     '
 *D. L. Davis, Nuclear Operations, Results Engineer Manager, TU Electric
 *G. G. Davis, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item :

Coordinator, TU Electric

 *D. E. Deviney, Deputy Director, Quality Assurance (QA),

TU Electric

 *S. H. Freid, Chief Mechanical / Nuclear Engineer, Bechtel
 *B. P. Garde, Attorney, CASE   l l  *W. G. Guldemond, Executive Assistant, TU Electric l  *P. E. Halstead, Manager, Quality Control (QC), TU Electric :
 *T. L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer,  l TU Electric    ,
 *C. B. Hog, Engineering Manager, Bechtel  ,
 *R. T. Jenkins, Manager, Mechanical Engineering, TU Electric .
 *J. J. Kelley, Manager, Plant Operations, TU Electric
 *0. W. Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric l  *F. W. Madden, Mechanical Engineering Manager, TU Electric ,
 *D. M. McAfee, Manager, QA, TU Electric
 *J. W. Muffett, Manager of Civil Engineering, TU Electric l

,

 *L. D. Nace, Vice President, Fngineering & Construqtion, ;

! TU Electric '

 *E. F. Ottney, Representative, CASE  l
 *S. S. Palmer, Project Manager, TU Electric  !
 *J. D. Redding, Executive Assistant, TU Electric  ;
 *D. M. Reynorson, Director of Construction, TU Electric
 *M. J. Riggs, Plant Evaluation Manager, Operations, TU Electric
 *A. B. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric
 *C. E. Scott, Manager, Start-up, TU Electric
 *J. C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric
 *S. L. Stamm, Project Engineering Manager, SWEC
 *M. R. Steelman, CPRT, TU Electric
 *P. B. Stevens, Manager, Electrical Engineering, TU Electric
 *C. L. Terry, Unit 1 Project Manager, TU Electric  !
 "T. G. Tyler, Director of Projects, TU Electric  !
 *R. D. Walker, Manager of Nuclear Licensing, TU Electric j
 *K. C. Warapius, Project Director, Impell  I
 *J. R. We.t?rs, Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electric

   ^  ~
,
,,
.
-
,

     '

The NRC inspector also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection perio * Denotes personnel present at the October 4, 1988, exit intervie . preoperational Retesting Program (70300, 70301, 70312) During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the procedure for the acceptance test of the condensate system and , witnessed portions of the test. The inspectors reviewed the - Procedure, 1CP-AT-19-01, RT1, Revision 0, to verify that: ) . Acceptance critoria were identified and clearly define . The procedure was clear and concis . The procedure provided for individual step verificatio . Areas containing data collection points provided were

,  clearly defined with additional signoff points provided
>

as required.

4 . Test equipment used for data collection was required to be properly calibrated and signed for by test personne ! l' The results of the procedural review did not identify any discrepancies, i Prior to starting the test, the inspectors reviewed all test

,  procedure changes (TPCs) to ensure that, if any of the TPCs i  altered the intent of the procedure, the appropriate 1  administrative approvals were obtaine In all cases the

inspector determined that the TPCs were accomplished in accordance with the appropriate applicant administrative i control ' On several occasions, the inspectors attended protest briefings for this test to determine whether the system test engineer clearly identified to the test personnel any factors

     ,

j l

'
. that could impact the test results. Furthermore, the I inspectors verified that any special precautions or prerequisites were met prior to commencing the test. The
,
"

inspectors then witnessed portions of test sections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3. During the performance of test section 7.1, the test engineer noted that the circuit breaker for condensate pump 1-1 failed to close when required by step 7.1.12. A second attempt to close the breaker also failed. The test engineer and Operations personnel then decided to stop the test to determine the cause of the breaker failur Currently, the applicant is still investigating the cause of

]  the breaker proble ,

I

.
..
*
 .
.
,

The inspectors verified that the previously described testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and that the test records reficct the as-found and as-tested conditions. The verification determined that:

 . Overall crew performance met the minimum required training requirement . Test interruptions were adequately documented with deficiencies noted, if require Required support equipment was in service to provide the necessary system operatio . The system engineer was fully aware of system status during the conduct of the tes The inspectors did not note any condition or circumstance that was adverse to safe and reliable testing method No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.

1 Plant Tours (71302) The NRC inspectors conducted numerous plant tours during this inspection period. These tours provided coverage during normal, off-normal, and backshift working hour During the tours, inspection activities included reviewing. work documentation, witnessing ongoing work activities, observing and interviewing shift operations personnel, reviewing the status of control room construction work, reviewing the status , of system and component completion, observing the status of

'

Units 1 and 2 equipment lay up, observing housekeeping activities, and inspecting for general safety complianc To support these activities, NRC inspectors attended , i plan-of-the-day meetings, discussed plant status with i Operations personnel, and discuased access and security i requirements for the protected area with security force members.

' During the course of the tours and inspections, the NRC

inspectors noted the following:

 (1) On numerous occasions, an NRC inspector interviewed

< on-duty security personnel concerning the badging

;  and security requirements associated with gaining i

access to the protected area. In all cases the '

' security officers demonstrated a clear and accurate { understanding of these requirement ^ i t

_ _-.

.
.
*
.

(2) Discussions with several control room personnel indicate that the current design change authorization (DCA) control system is cumbersome and impractical. This was demonstrated when an NRC inspector, while performing a walkdown of the auxiliary feedwater system, determined the.t the installed system piping did not match the design reficcted on the latest drawing revision on file in the control room. When control room personnel attempted to locate the DCA that accounted for the apparent discrepancy, they were unable to obtain i Furthermore, they were unable to generate a current listing of DCAs applicable to the drawing in question. This item is identified as an open items (445/8862-0-01, "Inability of Control Room Personnel to Retrieve DCAs").

b. The applicant informed the inspectors that during the semiannual nuclear material surveillance on September 22, 1988, a lockable cover for one of the spent fuel pool racks, Y-25, was found not adequately secure This condition could have allowed access to fuel assembly B3 Subsequently, the cover was removed and an inspection of the fuel top nozzle area and burnable poison rod assembly I was conducted to verify that there were no missing j components or damage. Upon completing this verification, i the container was correctly relocked. Results Engineering personnel performed a review of all available data and records and determined that apparently the cover , had not been securely relocked after a quality assurance i audit (to verify fuel storage locations) conducted on May 12, 1988, by the QA/Results Engineering group. All personnel involved in the incident have received I additional training to preclude a recurrence of this i even In accordance with 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C, l section V, subsection G, the NRC is not issuing a Notice i of Violation. This decision is based on the following reasons:

. The incident was promptly and appropriately reported to the shift supervisor,

l l . This item would have been classified aa a severity I Level IV or V violation.

l . The ittu was correctly reported to the appropriate l authoritie . The incident was immediately corrected; furthermore, I , ' measures to prevent recurrence have been implemente . l

,

__ _ , ' *

.     :
.

  ,

i

 . The applicant has no history of a prior, similar
     '

incident; therefore, this incident could not have been prevented by previous corrective action Therefore, this item is considered close The applicant informed the inspectors that in July 1988, while Document Control Center (DCC) personnel were

performing an audit of Safeguards information held by the Results Engineering group, a particular DCA (21343,

Revision 4) could not be located. Because the missing DCA addresses safeguards information, the audito informed her supervisor at the time she identified the los Apparently however, because of DCC personnel ,

changes, the incident was not immediately reported to either senior management or Securit It is still not clear exactly how much time elapsed before the missing documents were reported to the Security Department on i

     '

September 8, 198 Two subsequent scarches, conducted on September 12 and 14, 1988, also failed to locate the

missing documen i The applicant initiated a Security Incident Report ,

j (496-88) on September 8, 1988, which requested that a l comprehensive site audit of Safeguards information bc ; performed. Subsequently, the missing DCA was located in . - an unsecured area. The applicant is currently determining the significance of the temporary loss of the q identified DC j

, The inspectors are currently reviewing the applicant's ! corrective actions and have requested that the results of l TU Electric's investigations be made available for NRC ! revie Pending final NRC review of the incident, this

item is identified as an unresolved item

l

 (445/8862-U-01, "Unaccounted for safeguards  i Information").

j Monthly Maintenance observation (62703) The NRC inspectors observed portions of troubleshooting

     , ,

i to determine the cause of a shaft rub in the Unit 1, ! ! No. 2 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The NRC l inspectors examined the work order (C880005132) and the

work request (00005531), and observed the removal of the l impeller The NRC inspectors determined that the work was conducted in accordance with Mechanical Maintenance Manual Proceduro MMP-311.

}' No items of concern were note ; i

.
*
'.'
 .
.
,

l l Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) Diesel Generator Problem During this inspection period, the inspectors were notified of a plant incident report which identified a problem found during work on Unit 1 and 2 TDI diesel generator engines.

l , While preparing to work inside the #4 (left) bank l camshaft cover of the Train B, Unit 1 diesel en;'ae; maintenance personnel noticed a broken 5/16-inch machine screw head fall from the internal area of the engine when the camshaft cover was removed. Maintenance personnel immediately stopped work and initiated actions to determine the source of the broken screw hea Subsequent investigation found that the screw head had broken off a cover support bracke (Cover support brackets are used to provide lateral support when securing the cam cover in place.) The broken screw head i came from one of the four screws used to hold the support i l bracket in its recessed slot on the engine casing. The l applicant is currently investigating the root cause of i the screw failure and is discussing the issue with TDI to , determino generic implications, t l Pending the applicant's determination of the root cause for the bolt failure, this item is identified as an open item (445/8862-0-02, "Broken Bolt Head on Unit 1, Train B Diesel Generator Engine Cover Support Bracket"). l No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte . Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Review and Follow-up (92719)

     ;

( ' Comanche Peak SER (NUREG 0797) includes various commitments and requirements that the applicant must meet prior to the NRC's decision on issuance of an operating license. The l following items were reviewed by the inspector ' section 3.5. The applicant stated that a rollaway missile . shield will be provided to stop postulated missiles generated ! by a control rod drive mechanism failure. The NRC inspector i has verified that following a refueling, step 4.6.36 of l refueling Procedure RFO-102A, "Refueling Operation," ' specifically calls for replacing the missile shield in I l accordance with Mechanical Maintenance Instruction MMI-906.

l Therefore, the inspector is satisfied that the missile shield l will be maintained in its proper place during plant operation.

! . I Section 6.2.4: The applicant commits to using redundant Westinghouse electric thernal hydrogen recombiners to limit I the hydrogen that would accumulate in the containment l l

.
..
. . .
 .

1 .

,

following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The NRC l inspector has verified that the applicant's Emergency Responso Guidelines call for placing these recombiners in service ' l subject to meeting certain hydrogen concentrations in ' containment. Therefore, the applicant meets the implied l commitment to use the hydrogen recombiners following a LOC r Section 15.2.3.1. This section addresses boron dilution events. Specifically, this section of the SER states that

 "uncontrolled boron dilution cannot occur during the refueling mode because all sources of unborated water are isolated in this mode." The NRC inspector has verified that procedure RFO-102A, "Refueling Operations," specifically states that certain listed valves must be closed and locked prior to initiating refueling operation. The inspector has !

concluded that closing and locking these valves will effectively ensure that all sources of unborated water are isolated while refuelin : I Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description (37301) During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors initiated a walkdown of the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. This walkdown, now approximately thirty percent complete, has three basic purposes: ' To determine that the physical installation is in agreement with the piping and instrumentation diagrams contained in the current FSAR descriptio ' To ensure that the draft technical specification , surveillance test procedures can be accomplished with the as-built plant, To determine that the control and logic instrumentation conform to the description of instrumentation and controls contained in the FSA Specifically, the inspectors have verified that  ! System valves are installed correctly and exhibit no damag Major system components are properly labeled, l The as-built condition of the system corresponds with the latest drawing revision when outstanding design change ' authorizations (DCAs) are considere Major work is in progress on the system: i i 4

    .
,
..
. . .
 -
.
,

 (1) To remove and relocate the low-pressure suction taps for the AFW pump (2) To double the accumulator capacity for the flow control valves by adding an accumulator (from Unit 2) to each existing accumulator, Housekeeping is adequate; no flammable materials are

, being stored in the vicinity of the syste It should be noted that an NRC inspector was delayed in performing the walkdown due to the inability of control room personnel to retrieve a list of outstanding DCAs. While the delay itself was of minor consequence, it does illustrate problems with tracking and retrieving DCAs. This concern, now ;

     '

listed as an open item (445/886.-0-01), is addressed in more detail in paragraph 3 of this repor . Follow-up on 10CFR 50.55(e) Reports (9,2700) f (Closed) SDAR CP-86-15, "Diesel Generator Field Flashing Circuit." This deficiency identified a potential problem with the minimum acceptable operating voltage for the

)

field flashing and K1 relays not being in accordance with project specification requirement The applicant requested that Transamerica De Laval review e the problem and provide a response supporting their .

'

finding In its reponse, the vendor stated that the minimum operating voltage for the field flashing and K1 relays should be 100 vde instead of 90 vde as required by specificatio However, the vendor also stated that with

the existing design and a minimum battery voltage of 105 vde the voltage at the diesel generator control panel bus will be greater than 100 vdc. Therefore, this item is , close i (Closed) SDAR CP-86-76 and SDAR CP-86-46, "Gould Battery l Racks". The applicant used separate tracking numbers to identify similar problems associated with the Gould Battery Racks. The problems involve structural

deficiencies with the vendor suoplied battery racks, in that the configuration and dimensions were not in i

.

accordance with vendor dusign drawings. The applicant l found that cell spacing was incorrect, bolts were

'

missing, and other similar structural problems existe The applicant issued nonconformance reports for all of the deficiencies and subsequently generated work orders ; to impicment DCAs to correct these problems. The : inspectors reviewed the applicant's documents which ' removed the batteries, repaired the affected battery racks in accordance with the approved DCA, reinstalled i l

,
.
, .* -
 -
.
.

the batteries and performed post-work testing as required. The inspectors have inspected the battery racks and did not identify any outstanding deficiencie This item is considered close . open Items , open items are matters which have been discussed with the ! applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, I and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or l applicant or bot Two open items disclosed during tho l inspection are discussed in paragraphs 3.a ar.d 4.b.

[ Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, volations, or deviations. One unrosolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph . Exit Meeting (30703) An exit meeting was conducted on October 4, 1988, with the applicant's representativos identified in paragraph 1 of this report. No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspectors during this reporting period. The applicant ; did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio During this mooting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspectio ,

     .

J

     !

l

     :

, t

-_ _ _ _ . . . _ . . -

,
   .
   -.
.
  . . _ . - _ _ _ _ . .
-
: . ..
     !

s

     !
     !

50-445/99-6R; 50-446/89-50  !

     ,
     !

DISTRIBUTION:

' Docket 1 Files ' 8 50-445/444.)

NRC PDR , LPDR CPPD-LA I CPPD Reading (HQ)  : OSP Reading

* Site Reading File    ,

R. Warnick [

*J. Wiebe
     .
     >
     :
*H. Livermore
* MIS System, RIV    l
*RSTS Operator, RIV    e DRP, RIV    '

RIV Docket File

*L. Shea, ARM /LFMB J. Taylor     i
     !

J. Partlow C. Grimes i P. McKee  ! J. Lyons J. Wilson l M. Malloy J. Moore, OGC-WF  ! J. Gilliland, RIV { D. Crutchfield E. Jordan B. Grimes B. Hayes  ! r aw/766 I

     {

f j l f i t I s

     !

l

     ;
     :

I l

     !

i _ . . _ _ _ . }}