IR 05000445/1988050
| ML20207E100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1988 |
| From: | Livermore H, Runyan M NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207E099 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-88-50, 50-446-88-46, NUDOCS 8808170002 | |
| Download: ML20207E100 (14) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS NRC Inspection Report:
50-445/88-50 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/88-46 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 Construction Permit Expiration Dates:
Unit 1: Extension request submitted.
Unit 2: Extension request submitted.
Applicant:
TU Electric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),
Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:
Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted:
July 7 through August 2, 1988
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Inspector f
L) tau stD
% - 12.- W ft M.
F. Runyan, Resident Inspector, Date Civil Structural
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Consultant: W. Richins, Parameter (paragraphs 2 and 5)
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Reviewed by:
2A444,vLu Q -11 -frV H. H.
Livermore, Lead Senior Inspector Date
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8808170002 880812 PDR ADOCK 05000445 Q
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection Conducted:
July 7 through August 2, 1988 (Report 50-445/88-50; 50-446/88-461 Areas Inspected: Unannounced, resident safety inspection of applicant actions on previous inspection findings, Technical Review Team technical concerns and allegations, 10 CFR Part 50.55(e)
deficiencies identified by the applicant, and general plant tours.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, no weaknesses, strengths, violations, or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted M. R.
Clem, CAP Structural Stone and Webster Engineer Corporation (SWEC)
- W.
G.
Counsil, Executivt Vice President, TU Electric N.
D. Hammett, Engineering Assurance, Brown & Root (B&R)
- T. L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electr.ic C.
R. Hooten, Civil Engineering Manager, TU Electric S. D. Karpyak, CPRT, TU Electric
- O.
W. Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric J.
C. Miller, TERA
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W.
Muffett, Manager of Civil Engineering, TU Electric
- D. M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric M.
R.
Steelman, CPRT, TU Electric E. O. Tomlinson, CAP Structural, SWEC K. W. VanDyne, Engineering Assurance, Southern Technical Services The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection period.
- Denotes personnel present at the August 2, 1988, exit meeting.
2.
Applicant Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (445/8836-U-02):
This item addressed the adequacy of the repair of abandoned Hilti
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bolt holes using dry-pack grout.
The NRC inspector l
(1) reviewed current and historical procedures, (2) observed dry-packing of abandoned Hilti bolt holes,
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(3) interviewed craft personnel and construction engineers, and (4) performed numerous plant tours I
regarding this issue.
The current Specification 2323-SS-30, Revision 3,
"Structural Embedments," allows unlimited patched abandoned holes in close proximity (no minimum spacing requirements are specified) to a Hilti bolt.
In addition, this specification requires 100 per cent QC verification that grouted holes within four bolt diameters of Hilti bolts are allowed to cure at least four days before the Hilti bolts are set and that abandoned holes are patched before base plates are installed that will cover the holes.
Specification 2323-SS-30 does not, however, require QC verification of the quality of the patching of these holes.
The NRC inspector met with the applicant to discuss methods used to clean and soak abandoned holes prior to repair of the holes using dry-pack grout.
Included in this unresolved item was the concern that these methods l
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may be inferior and result in low-strength repair.
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applicant defended the current practice of cleaning I
shallow holes (3"-4") with a rubber aspirator and stated f
that a portable vacuum is used to clean full-depth l
(8"-10") holes.
Subsequently, a craft person who specializes in hole repair, when questioned, informed the NRC inspector that he uses a rubber aspirator to clean shallow holes and a portable vacuum to clean deep holes.
Based on this information, the NRC inspector concurred that the methods used to clean holes are acceptable.
With respect to wetting holes prior to placement of dry-pack, the applicant cited references in ACI Ccde 301,
"Specifications for Structural Concrete for Buildings."
This code requires a thorough dampening of the hole to prevent water from being drawn away from the dry-pack grout and to assist the formation of a bond between the grout and the parent concrete.
The code does not specify that the water must soak into the parent concrete for a certain period of time before grout placement.
The applicant stated that the current practice of wetting and immediately filling the hole with dry-pack grout meets the intent of the ACI code and is sufficient to ensure a quality bond and well-consolidated repair.
The NRC inspector considered the applicant's response to adequately resolve this matter.
The NRC inspector observed that the vast majority of abando'4ed holes near Hilti bolts are drill holes ranging in dit. meter from 1/4 inch up to the diameter of the installed Hilti bolt with depths of 1 1/2 to 3 inches (the depth of the first or second rebar layer).
Very few holes extend to depths equal to the depth of the hole used for the Hilti bolt.
The abandoned holes are patched with dry-pack grout which has a compressive strength greater than that of the parent concrete.
The NRC inspector reviewed test results regarding this issue published in "Effect of Abandoned Holes on Capacity of Wedge Bolts" by E.13. Burdette, S. Sen, and E.
Ismen, ASCE, Vol. 108, No. ST4, April 1982.
This paper concluded that holes filled with dry-pack grout'do not affect the strength of the adjacent Hilti bolt anchor.
In addition, no reduction of strength was noted for abandoned (unfilled) holes spaced 3 bolt diameters from the used Hilti and a 20% to 45% reduction of strength for spacings of 1 1/2 bolt diameters.
The abandoned holes used in this test had depths equal to the depths of holes used for the Hilti' bolts.
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since (1) very few full depth holes exist within 3 bolt
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diameters of used Hilti bolts, (2) all abandoned holes within 4 bolt diameters are inspected by QC to ensure that the holes are patcheu, and (3) the dry-pack grout has a greater compressive strength than the parent i
concrete, the NRC inspector concluded that the repair of abandoned Hilti bolt holes is adequate.
This item is closed.
b.
(Open) Unresolved Item (445/8842-U-02):
This item addressed four Hilti bolt spacing discrepancies with current requirements and the identification of the corresponding historical requirements.
The discrepancies were:
(1)
A 1 1/4" super Hilti bolt used for support FW-1-097-034-C62R installed 5 3/4" from a 12" wall penetration.
The current required minimum spacing I
is 7 1/2".
(2)
A 3/4" Hilti bolt used for Support C23012547-03-installed 3 3/4" from a free concrete edge.
The current required minimum spacing is 10 1/2".
(3)
A 1" Hilti bolt used for Support H-SI-1-RB-032-002-2 installed 2 1/2" from an unused 1 1/2" Richmond insert.
The current required minimum spacing is 3".
(4)
A 1" Hilti bolt used for Support RC-1-115-023C66R installed 2 1/4" from an unused 1 1/2" Richmond insert.
The current required minimum spacing is 3".
The NRC inspector reviewed historical procedures in effect at the time the above Hilti bolts were installed, QC inspected, and/or modified.
The historical requirements corresponding to the above identified discrepancies were:
(1)
Specification SS-30,-Revision 0, and Construction procedure CEI-20, Revision 7-8, in effect during the construction and modification of Support FW-1-097-034-C62R, do not address spacing requirements between Hilti bolts and wall penetrations.
CEI-20 did specify a minimum spacing of 6 1/4" to a concrete edge which apparently was applied for this case.
(2)
This support is located in the Unit 2 Auxiliary building.
Since construction activities are
currently temporarily suspended for Unit 2, the original construction package and inspection reports for Support C23012547-03 were not readily available.
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Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) 87-8072-EC identifies that the inspection reports for this support were to be located.
This CDR has not been dispositioned.
The original construction date and procedures have not been identified but the probable minimum spacing at the time of construction was 3 3/4".
(3-4)CEI-20, Revision 7-8, states, in part, "Hilti bolts may be installnd as close as practical to unused Richmond Screw Anchors which have been plugged.
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The above supports violate current Hilti bolt spacing requirements but were installed correctly according to the requirements in effect at the time of construction and/or modification.
Field Verification Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-CS-075 (FVM-075)
was developed to identify concrete attachment spacing violations based on current requirements.
The applicant has not committed to a 100% review of Hilti bolt spacing using FVM-075 at this time.
The NRC inspector could not determine if FVM-075 will identify all spacing discrepancies where Hilti bolts no longer meet current spacing requirements due to changes in the specifications.
This item remains open (see also Unresolved Item 445/8842-U-01).
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(Closed) Open Item (445/8821-0-02; 446/8818-0-02):
l This item addressed attribute definition, attribute l
grouping, and the related statistical validity of
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this process for the fill and backfill construction i
work category discussed in the ISAP VII.c Results L
Report, Appendix 20, "Fill and Backfill. Placement."
l The NRC_ inspector identified initially that l
inspection check lists contained either 9 or l
13 safety-significant attributes (depending on the
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population being inspected) and that these attributes were grouped into a set of three
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l attributes (inspectors report notation, test i
results, and inspector certification) for discussion
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in the Results Report.. The attributes listed on the l
inspection check lists were n)t statistically nampled.
After discussions between CPRT, the applicant, and the NRC inspectors, CPRT issued Supplement A to the ISAP VII.c Results Report dated June 22, 1988, and Memo QA/QC-RT-10285 dated June 13, 1988.
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documents identify the work process attributes that were covered by the inspections and how each is
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covered by inspection report sample items.
The work l
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process attributes are: (1) location, (2) control of material, (3) placement of material, and (4) compaction of material.
These work process attributes are subdivisions of the inspectors report notation attribute discussed in the Results Report.
The NRC inspector reviewed these documents and verified that each work process attribute was adequately sampled and that the conclusions as stated in the Results Report are justified.
This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8821-0-01; 446/8818-0-01):
This item involved transfer of the issue of microbiological 1y-induced corrosion (MIC) from the CPRT Quality of Construction (QOC) to the Design Adequacy Program (DAP).
The issue involves two concerns: (1) the technical disposition of the MIC problem and (2) the administrative controls governing the issue referral process.
Regarding actions taken to concrol MIC in stainless steel tank liners, the applicant issued Corrective Action Request (CAR)87-009..All stainless steel tanks were inspected and MIC was not found in any place other than the Reactor Water Makeup Storage Tank (RWMST), the site of the original concern.
The applicant believes that MIC in the'RWMST was the result of water used during the hydrostatic test and that MIC probably would not occur during normal operations.
Nevert %1ess, the CAR commits to inspecting and sampling stainless steel-tanks periodically on an availability basis..The NRC inspector determined that the technical concerns regarding MIC have been adequately addressed.
Regarding administrative control specific to CPRT QOC referrals to DAP, the NRC inspector reviewed Procedure DAP-19, "Processing and Review of Information Between the Quality of Construction, QA/QC Adequacy Program and the Design Adequacy Program.". This procedure requires CPRT QOC referrals to be processed through an~ interface manager, who transmits DAP responses back~to CPRT QOC except in cases where the DAP response is "no comment."
The DAP did not have any comments-concerning MIC and no response was transmitted back to CPRT QOC.
This was in accordance with the procedure and no administrative breakdown was identified by the NRC inspector.
DAP's "no' comment" response can be interpreted to mean that DAP.
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considered MIC to be a cleanliness / operations issue s.
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without any design implications.
The NRC inspector determined that the subject referral was adequately handled and that no further generic concern exists.
This item is closed.
e.
(open) Unresolved Item (445/8842-U-01):
This item addressed the concern that FVM-075, as implemented, would not effectively identify concrete attachment spacing violations per Specification 2323-SS-30.
During a meeting conducted July 14, 1988, the applicant informed the NRC of enhancements designed to improve the effectiveness of FVM-075.
A computer program was developed to compute distances between attachments using grid dimensions provided on the walkdown sketches.
All locations where attachments are computed to be closer than 1/2 inch greater (to allow for measurement tolerances) than the specified minimum distance will be identified and flagged by the program.
For all flagged items, an inspector and/or ongineer will directly measure the distance between the attachments.
This direct measurement will then be used to calculate design allowables and determine the need for hardware modifications.
The NRC inspector had previously located an unused Richmond insert which was not included on the walkdown sketch.
To help prevent this from recurring, the applicant stated that the regular grid pattern of Richmond insert placements would be considered during the construction of the walkdown sketches, including instances where Richmond inserts are likely to be covered by base plates or otherwise unobservable.
If successfully implemented, these actions will resolve the concerns presented in the unresolved item.
This item will remain open pending review of i
the computer program, the selection and percentage of plant surfaces inspected,.and a sample of the completed results of this FVM.
The adequacy of (
FVM-075 will also be addressed in the closure of Unresolved Item 445/8842-U-02 regarding previously located Hilti bolt spacing violations.
3.
Assessment of Open Issues Associated With the Technical Review Team (TRT) Technical Concerns and Allegations (99014)
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The following open issues responded to in letter TXX-88294 dated March 25, 1988, from W. G. Counsil to the NRC regarding tl.e review of TRT technical concerns and allegations were inspected during this report period:
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a.
II.E.4 TU Electric should identify actions taken or needed to be taken to address the concern of poorly consolidated concrete.
The applicant stated that the TRT's concern of poorly consolidated concrete had been evaluated by SWEC and reported in Specific Technical Issue Report (STIR)-CPRT-S-002, Revision 0, "Concrete Voids / Inadequate Consolidation."
The NRC inspector reviewed STIR-CPRT-S-002 and determined that it adequately addressed the TRT's concern.
The study included an investigation of nonconformance reports (NCRs), a review of concrete specifications and procedures, visual observations of concrete, core bore evaluations, and interviews with craft personnel.
The information provided in this report supported the report conclusion that the concrete placed in CPSES structures is of good quality, with the required design compressive strength and will perform its intended function.
This open issue is closed.
b.
II.F.4 TU Electric should identify actions taken or needed to be taken to verify the integrity of the concrete behind the cavity liner plates in Unit 1.
The applicant stated that the TRT's concern of degraded l
concrete behind the Unit 1 cavity liner plates had been evaluated by SWEC and reported in STIR-CPRT-S-002, Revision 0, "Concrete Voids / Inadequate Consolidation."
The NRC inspector reviewed STIR-CPRT-S-002 and determined
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that it adequately addressed the TRT's concern.
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study included a visual inspection of the steam generator l
compartment walls between elevations 812 and 860 feet, a l
review of relevant NCRs and pour cards, and a search for voids behind the cavity liner by tapping the plates and
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evaluating the sound.
The report concluded that no major l
voids exist behind the cavity liner in Unit 1.
The NRC l
inspector concurred with the report conclusions.
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open issue is closed.
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4.
Action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Deficiencies Identified by the Applicant (92700)
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(Closed) SDAR-CP-85-45, "Rebar Damage":
By letter TXX-4761 dated April 11, 1986, the applicant informed the NRC that potential rebar damage resulting from boring cores to install shear lugs was not a reportable issue.
The applicant's review identified 24 pipe supports where the installation of shear lugs may have resulted in rebar damage.
QA records for only one of these pipe supports
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verified that no rebar had been cut.
In each of the remaining 23 cases, the applicant determined that the overall structure was adequate assuming that the maximum amount of rebar damage had occurred.
The NRC staff reviewed this analysis as part of the inspection of ISAP II.e (see NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-42; 50-446/88-38) and concurred with the applicant's analysis.
This SDAR is closed.
b.
(Closed) SDAR-CP-86-56, "Seismic Air Gap Design Adequacy":
By letter TXX-7047 dated December 23, 1987, the applicant informed the NRC that a deficiency t
involving a potential design inadequacy of the seismic air gap was not a reportable issue.
Gibbs & Hill (G&H)
calculation LIS-100C, Set 1, required a gap of approximately 2 1/8 inches between the containment building and the top elevation of the Auxiliary building whereas the design drawing required a minimum gap of 2 inches at this location.
The design calculations were based on very conservative temperature assumptions.
The discrepancy was resolved by revising the design calculation assuming more realistic temperature conditions.
The replacement calculations (G&H LIS-100C, Set 1, Revision 3, and LIS-100C, Set 22, Revision 0)
require gap dimensions less than that required on the design drawings.
An alternate calculation (SWEC 16345-CS[B)-044) was performed which also confirmed the I
validity of the design drawing requirements.
The NRC staff reviewed SWEC calculation 16345-CS(B)-044 as
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l documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-15; 50-446/88-11 and concurred with the result pending resolution of several SWEC internal confirmations l
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regarding assumptions and boundary conditions.
Final gap requirements were not affected by the resolution of the l
confirmations.
The NRC inspector concurred that this L
issue was not reportable.
This SDAR is closed.
c.
(Closed) SDAR-CP-86-57, "Reinforcing Steel in Unit 1 I
Reactor Cavity Wall":
By letter TXX-6028 dated l
October 15, 1986,- tha applicant informed the NRC that the l
specification and subsequent deletion of additional robar l
in the Unit 1 reactor cavity wall was not a reportable l
issue.
The concrete placement of the reactor cavity wall i
between elevations 812'-0" and 819'-0 1/2" was
constructed in accordance with Revision 2 of I
drawing 2323-S1-0572.
Revision 3 to the drawing required l
additional rebar to minimize the possibility of cracking,
.but was issued after the wall at this location was
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Revision 4 of the drawing restored the design configuration of Revision 2.
An additional calculation (G&H SRB-115C, Set 5) was generated to demonstrate that the omission of the additional rebar did not impair the i
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structural integrity of the reactor cavity wall.
The NRC staff concurred with the result of this calculation as part of its review of ISAP II.a (see NRC Inspection Report 50-445/85-11; 50-446/85-06).
This SDAR is closed.
d.
(Closed) SDAR-CP-86-58, "Drilling / Cutting of Reinforcing Steel in the Fuel Building":
By letter TXX-6029 dated October 15, 1986, the applicant informed the NRC that the potential unauthorized cutting of rebar in the fuel handling building was not a reportable issue.
Cutting activities were noted to extend possibly to the third layer of rebar at a location 9here only the first layer of rebar was authorized for cutting.
The applicable structural calculation, G&H SRB-102C, Set 1, was revised assuming that the third layer of rebar was cut and showed that structural adequacy sas maintained.
The NRC staff concurred with the result of this c alculation as part of its review of ISAP II.e (see NRC Inspection Report 50-445/85-11; 50-446/85-06).
This SDAR is-closed.
c.
(Closed) SDAR-CP-86-65, "Unconsolidated Concrete - Unit 2 RCB Exterior Wall":
By letter TXX-6330 dated March 13, 1987, the applicant informed the NRC that a deficiency involving unconsolidated concrete in the exterior wall off the Unit 2 Reactor Containment building was not a i
reportable issue.
The NRC inspector reviewed calculations which showed that the structural integrity of the exterior wall was not compromised by the 10" diameter by 7 3/4" deep void.
In as much as the void exposed three reinforcing steel bars, the NRC inspector questioned the lack of consideration in the calculation for a loss of these
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members due to long-term weathering effects (in the event the void had not been found).
The applicant stated that the exposed bars were diagonals which provide resistance to in-plane shear loads and that since..the margin in allowable in-plane shear exceeds 48 percent for both service load and factored load conditions, the loss of the exposed bars was acceptable by inspection (without
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l calculation).
The NRC inspector reviewed this explanation in the context of the existing calculation and concurred with the exp.1anation and overall result.
l This SDAR is closed.
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(Closed) SDAR-LP-87-24, "Containment Liner Nelson Stud l
Bending":
By letter dated December 8, 1987, the i
applicant informed the NRC that a deficiency involving l
the bending of Nelson studs attached to the containment l
liner was not a reportable issue.
Instances had been I
identified where engineering apr sva' had been provided to allow bending of Nelson stud
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containment liner in excess of TSAR requirements.
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calculations 16345-CS(B)-025, 16345-CS(B)-027, and 16345-CS(B)-028 were performed, demonstrating that the bending of the Nelson studs would not cause stresses in adjacent anchors or in the liner plate to exceed allowable stress limits.
The NRC inspector reviewed the above referenced calculations. The calculations were very comprehensive and appeared to justify the review conclusions.
This SDAR is closed.
g.
(Closed) SDAR-CP-87-69, "Design Basis Tornado (DBT)
Analysis for HVAC Ductwork and Components":
By letter TKX-t8208 dated February 12, 1988, the applicant informed the hRC that documentation deficiencies regarding the analysis of tornado loadings was not a reportable issue.
This item resulted from a concern that the pressure relieving capacity of tornado. venting devices may be insufficient to' prevent the failure of safety-related heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC)
ductwork and components during the design basis tornado (DBT).
The previous analysis did not include sufficient documentation showing that HVAC ductwork and components could withstand the negative pressure transient expected during the DBT.
The_ applicant performed an additional analysis which indicated that the HVAC system would be able to withstand a DBT.
The NRC inspector reviewed the following documents supporting this conclusion:
Calculation No. 3-A-6 #004, Revision 1, "Pressure Differential Across Duct Wall During Tornado."
Test Report #A-751-88, "Testing of Negative Pressure and Seismic Category II HVAC Ducts."
Calculation Book Vol. I Book 24, Revision 0,
"Tornado Effects on HVAC Duct Systems (Class I)."
Calculation No. 3-A-6 #005, Revision 1, "Pressure Differential Across Duct Wall During Tornado (S. G.
Bldg.)."
Using conservative assumptiens, the calculations yielded results showing structural adequacy with a safety factor greater than 2.
The NRC inspector concluded that the applicant's analysis provided reasonabic assurance that the HVAC system could successfully withstand a DBT.
This SDAR is closed.
h.
(Closed) SDAR-CP-87-73, "Unsound Concrete Mortar":
By letter TXX-7056 dated December 9, 1987, the applicant informed the NRC that a deficiency regarding unsound concrete mortar at construction joints was not a
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reportable issue.
Two areas of unsound concrete mortar were identified: (1) unconsolidated grout at the bottom of a pilaster in a Unit 2 system generator cubicle, and (2) voids, abandoned holes, anchors, and foreign material near the tip of a concrete column in the Unit 1 Auxiliary building.
The applicant surveyed 88 randonly-selected construction joints and found no further evidence of unsound concrete mortar.
The two subject cases were structurally analyzed and determined to be adequate in their as-found state (though both were subsequently repaired).
The NRC inspector reviewed calculations 16345-CS(S)-177, Revision 0, and 16345-CS-(S)-145, Revision O, verifying conservatism in the assumptions and consistency between the calculational results and final conclusions.
This SDAR is closed.
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(Closed) SDAR-CP-87-75, "Epoxy Grout Temperatures":
By letter TXX-7059 dated December 23, 1987, the applicant informed the NRC that the failure to include temperature limitations for epoxy grout placements in applicable procedures was not a reportable issue.
The applicant stated that manufacturer's temperature limits for epoxy grout were not incorporated in the earliest revisions of Specification 2323-SS-09, "Concrete," and Procedure QI-QP-11.0-12, "Inspection of Pressure Grouted Plates and Equipment Bases."
Despite the procedural inadequacy, inspection personnel usually documented temperature readings or referred to manufacturer's requirements and, therefore, demonstrated awareness of the temperature restrictions.
Procedure CEI-25, "Grouting, Pipe Support Wall and ceiling," which was utilized for nearly all epoxy grout placements, included the applicable temperature requirements.
The applicant's study of
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ambient temperatures revealed that very few, if any, ecoxy placements could have taken place outside the specified temperature bands.
The NRC inspector reviewed the file and concurred with the applicant's response.
This SDAR is closed.
5.
Plant Tours (92700),
The NRC inspector made frequent tours of Unit 1, Unit 2, and common areas of the facility to observe items such as housekeeping, equipment protection, and in-process work activities.
The tours included intermittent observations of QC validation and final close-out of the seismic gap between the Auxiliary building and Safeguards Unit 1.
This activity is being conducted under Traveler 02C-8904A-1914, Package 2,
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and is the first in two series of QC inspections which will complete the corrective actions for ISAP II.c (Maintenance of
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Air Gap Ectween Concrete Structures).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Meeting (307031 An exit meeting was conducted August 2, 1988, with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report.
No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspectors during this reporting period.
The applicant did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
During this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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