IR 05000445/1988004

Insp Repts 50-445/88-04 & 50-446/88-03 on 880106-0202.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Applicant Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Corrective Action Program & General Plant Areas

ML20149L588
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	02/19/1988
From:	Livermore H, Wagner P NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20149L573	List: IR 05000445/1988004 ML20149L571
References
50-445-88-04, 50-445-88-4, 50-446-88-03, 50-446-88-3, NUDOCS 8802240302
Download: ML20149L588 (15)

Text

,

.

i

.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/88-04 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/88-03 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 .

Construction Permit Expiration Dates:

Unit 1: August 1, 1988 Unit 2: Extension request ,

submitte !

!

'

Applicant: TU Electric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street  :

Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 .

i Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), ;

Units 1 & 2 l

,

Inspection At: Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas :

Inspection Conducted: January 6 through February 2, 1988

.

Inspecto : #AJ40Z V C.~ Wagner, Reactor Inspector

.2//9/ErP pg fate'

Reviewed by: M -

H. H. Livermore, Lead Senior O//7[bV

'Dats '

Inspector

,

8802240302 880219 ,

PDR ADOCK 05000445 0 DCD

_ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

.

Inspection Summary:

Inspection conducted: January 6 through February 2, 1988 (Report 50-445/88-04; 50-446/88-03), ,

Areas Inspected: Unannounced, resident, safety inspection of applicant actions on previous inspection findings, the Corrective Action Program, and general plant areas (tours).

Results: Within the areas inspected, the inspector did not observe any significant strengths or weaknesses in the licensee's progra During the inspection, no violations or deviations were identifie Meetings were held on safety significance evaluation and corrective action program reports to clarify information that had been provid-e I

!

i

.

.

.

DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. C. Aldridge, Engineering Assurance (EA), Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)

• R. P. Baker, EA Regulatory Compliance Manager, TU Electric

• J. L. Barker, Manager, EA, TU Electric

• D. P. Barry, Manager, ESG, SWEC

• D. N. Bize, EA Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, TU Electric

• M. R. Blevins, Manager, Technical Support, TU Electric

• J. T. Conly, Lead Ticensing Engineer, SWEC

• J. C. Finneran, CIE-PSE, TU Electric

• K. M. Fitz9;*ald, HVAC Program Manager, Ebasco

• P. E. Halstead, Manager, Quality Control (QC), TU Electric

• T. L. Heatherly, EA Regulatory Compliance Engineer, TU Electric

• C. R. Hooten, CPE-Civil Engineering Unit Manager, TU Electric

• J. J. Kelley, Manager, Plant Operations, TU Electric

• 0. W. Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric

• F. W. Madden, Mechanical Engineering Manager, TU Electric

• D. M. McAfee, Manager, QA, TU Electric

• D. E. Noss, QA Issue Interf ace Coordinator, TU Elec' ric

• E. Odar, Project Engineer Manager, Ebasco

• M. D. Palmer, Plant Evaluation, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric

• B. L. Ramsey, Project Manager Civil / Structural, TU Electric

• D. M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric

• M. J. Riggs, Plant Evaluation Manager, Operations, TU Electric

• A. B. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric

• C. E. Scott, Manager, Startup, TU Electric

• J. C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric

• M. R. Steciman, CPRT, TU Electric

• P. B. Stevens, Manager, Electrical Engineering, TU Electric

• J. F. Streeter, Director, QA, TU Electric

• C. L. Terry, Unit 1 Project Manager, TU Electric

• R. D. Walker, Manager of Nuclear Licensing, TU Electric The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection perio * Denotes personnel present at the February 2, 1987, exit intervie . Applicant Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Open Item (445/8511-0-24): Lack of required i slack in electrical cable at the transition between a I cable tray and a conduit. The ERC inspector identified l that cable E0106091 lacked the required 2 inches of slack i

in free air as it exited a cable tray and entered a conduit during a third-party inspection witnessed by the NR Subsequently, Nonconformance Report (NCR)

l i

i

. l

-

1

.

CE87-244SX was written (transferred from old NCR i E85-101211SX) to document this problem and was dispositioned "use-as-is" since Design Change Authoriza-tion (DCA) 44970 revised the cable slack requirement The NRC inspector reviewed DCA 44970 and verified that the 2 inch slack requirement was revised to define that

"adequate" slack (at transitions) exists when the follow-ing conditions are met:

(1) The cable bend radius for training is not violated; (2) Unsupported cable length does not exceed 3'6";

(3) Unacceptable cable indentations, as defined in specification 2323-ES-100, do not exist at points of cable transition; e.g., cable tray rails and rungs or at bushed conduit end The NRC inspector verified that these conditions were met for the cable transition in question and 11 other transi-tions during a plant tour of Room 79 in the Unit 1 Safeguards building on January 14, 198 The resolution of the slack cable problem was reported to the NRC by letter dated January 11, 1988, SDAR CP-BS-3 b. (Closed) Open Items (445/8511-0-26 and 27): Insufficient cable slack at transition from cable tray to condui During a NRC witnessed, third-party inspection of Cable E0121890, an ERC inspector identified two instances where the required 2 inches of slack at transition points was

'

not available. The ERC inspector determined that only 1/2 inch of slack existed at the transitions from T130CCQ22 to C13011615 and T130CCQ45 to C1300331 Since ,

the observed slack fulfills the present requirements (see '

parkgraph 2.2 above) for cables, these conditions are no longer considered nonconforming. The NRC inspector verified that the above two transitions, and approximate-ly 25 additional transitions in the Unit 1 cable spread-ing room, met the revised criteria on January 15, 198 I c. (closed) Open Item (445/8513-0-27): Insufficient cable slack at transition from cable tray to conduit. During another NRC witnessed, third-party inspection of Conduit C13G05532, an ERC inspector identified an out-of-scope .

condition where the then required 2 inches of free air I slack did not exist. An out-of-scope observation was l processed and the applicant wrote NCR CE87-2447X for this j condition. On January 15, 1988, the NRC inspector '

verified that the transition from cable tray T13GACD27 to conduit C13G05532 met the revised criteria discussed in i paragraph a, above. Therefore, this condition is no i longer considered to be nonconforming.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

.

.

d. (Closed) Open Item (446/8626-O-02): Lack of required documentatio During an inspection-of the remote shutdown panel, the NRC inspector was unable to locate documentation to verify that all of the internal, nonme-tallic components were self-extinguishing in accordance with the specification. The applicant provided the inspector a copy of United Control, Inc. letter dated November 12, 1987, which certified that the nonmetallic materials used in the panels complied with the specifica-tion and purchase order requirements, e. (Closed) Open Item (445/8702-0-01, 446/8702-0-01):

Review of work process memoranda (WPM). The NRC inspec-tors, in evaluating the acceptability of the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) Issue-Specific Action plan (ISAP) VII.c implementation, performed an inspection of the establishment of the populations for third-party inspections. The populations were the items of safety-related hardware which were categorized into the groups to be inspected. In order for the population to provide a true random sample, the population was required to be homogeneous i- amposition. During the inspection of the six populatiom which were selected from the ISAp VII.c populations in the areas of mechanical, civil / structural, and electrical, the NRC inspectors noted that the WPM which were required by the CPRT program had not, as yet, been issued. Subsequently, all the WPM for all ISAp VII.c populations have been issued, reviewed by the applicable NRC inspectors, and found to be acceptable. The questions related to the homogeneity *

of the HVAC population, as documented in Unresolved Item 445/8713-U-03, will be handled as a separate issu (closed) Unresolved Item (445/8733-U-01): Adequacy of equipment qualification (EQ) walkdown data for Limitorque valve actuators. Following the NRC inspector questioning the auditability of the walkdown data sheets, the appli-cant wrote Deficiency Report (DR) C87-4787 to evaluate  ;

the problem of auditable data sheets. The DR was dispositioned on January 13, 1948, to reexamine the

,

actuator in question, review all actuator data sheets and

'

recommend rewalkdown of any additiceal actuators which i had data sheets which could be misinterpreted or mislead-in These actions have bean completed and Impell memorandum IMT-3596 has been sent to the TU Electric maintenance department requesting the walkdown of 14 ad-ditional actuators. The NRC inspector found these actions to be responsive to the problem and acceptable to resolve the concern of data sheet adequac l l

- . . _ - ,_ . . _ . .

- - . . .

.

l

'

.

3. Corrective Action Program (CAP)

i Equipment Qualification (EO) CAP (25576)

The NRC inspector reviewed the Project Status Report (PSR) for the EQ CAP which was submitted by YU Electric letter dated. January 8, 1988. The PSR discussed the scope and methodology used in the CAP, and' procedures which are being implemented in the Post Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP). (The PCHVP is the hardware validation portion of the CAP.) The following

.'

field verification methods (FVMs) were listed as those procedures being implemented in the EQ PCHVP:

. FVM-047 Field Verification Method TE-FVM-EQ-047 was devel-oped to control the collection of data for class lE Limitorque valve actuator . FVM-053

'

Field Verification Method TE-FVM-EQ-053 was devel-3 oped to control the collection of as-built data for safety-related equipment conduit entry configura-

tions.

j i . FVM-057 Field Verification Method CPE-IM-FVM-EQ-057 was

'

developed to control the collection of as-built data for equipment requiring environmental and/or seismic qualification.

, . FVM-103 I Field Verification Method CPE-IM-FVM-EQ-103 was i developed to control the collection of as-built data

for anchorages for rotating and reciprocating equipmen The NRC inspection of FVM-047 was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/87-33, 50-446/87-25. The i adequacy of the collected data documentation (the walkdown data sheets) was the subject of Unresolved Item 445/8733-U-02. NRC review of the data collected by the other procedures will be included as part of the ongoing NRC EQ inspection progra The NRC inspector also reviewed the two appendices to the

, PSR: Appendix A addressed resolution of CPRT identified j issues, Appendix B addressed resolution of CAP identified l

issue Of the 14 issues discussed (7 in Appendix A and 7 in Appendix B), the inspector noted the following three issues which had been discussed in previous NRC inspec-tion reports: i l

!

.

. .- .. .- . =_ _ -

.. . ._- - .- ~. -.- .- -. -

.

t

'

. ,

7  !

,

e

. A7 - Flexible Conduit and Cable Slack {

The issues of adequate flexible conduit installation !

and the lack of two inches of cable slack at transi- i tions were resolved by reevaluation of and revision to the site acceptance criteri (See para- ,

graph 2.a, above, and IR 50-445/85-11.)  ;

. B2 - Limitorque Actuators .

i The issues of unqualified terminal blocks and crimp l splices'in Limitorque operators was resolved by *

recommendation to replace the unqualified components with qualified replacements. This design change is ,

in process and will be followed as part of the NRC I EQ inspection effor (See IR 50-445/87-33, J 50-446/87-25.)  !

$ . B7 - Weidmuller Terminal Blocks (tbs)  !

!- The issue of unqualified tbs was resolved by a i

'

a

'

recommendation to remove the tbs and replace them with qualified cable spices. This design change is  ;

being implemented and will be followed as part of 1

. the ongoing NRC site inspection effor (See i

!

IR 50-445/87-33, 50-446/87-25; 50-445/87-23, l

50-446/87-17.) l The NRC inspector will continue to follow the status of

the EQ issues as part of the onsite inspection effort add a future NRC EQ audit. No violations or deviations were identifie Electrical CAP

(1) Electrical PSR Review (51051)

In order to evaluate the breadth of the physical

, reinspection efforts which will be conducted by the i

'

applicant as part of the PCNVP in the electrical area, the NRC inspector reviewed the Electrical PSR.

This volume was submitted to the NRC by TU Electric

, letter dated January 15, 1988. The inspector noted that Table 5-3 listed the final acceptance at-tributes for each of the 18 construction work-l categories and provided the attribute validation l method for each of the 147 attributes. The inspec-tor observed that 88 of these attributes were to be ,

evaluated by Engineering and Construction Engineer- 1 ing Procedure ECE 9.04-05, "PCHVP Engineering

Evaluations," to determine if physical walkdowns or

reinspections are required; 26 of the attributes

! will be reinspected in accordance with

!

CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE-090, "PCNVP Quality Control Rein-

, spections"; and 14 of the attributes will be veri-l fled in accordance with CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE-089, "PCNVP

,

b

.. -. . . . _ _ - - - - .. . . ... - . - .- -

..

.

'

;

,

8 -

?

.

,

Engineering Walkdowns." The remaining attributes will be evaluated in accordance with other FVM- ,

4 procedure '

- The NRC inspector also reviewed the appendices to

the PSR to evaluate the disposition of CPRT

and CAP identified issues, Appendix A and B respectivel i The inspector noted that there were 14 issues in-  !

Appendix A and 11 in Appendix B. Of these, 7 issues o

- in Appendix A (1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14) and >

6 issues in Appendix B (2, 3,.6, 7, 8, and 9) l

involve technical evaluation of revisions to design  ;

'

criteria or design calculations, and, as such, NRC  :

technical staff review should be conducted. The i i inspector also noted some confusion in the  !

I discussion of the resolution for some of.the issue i

'

In order to resolve the confusion, the inspector l requested a meeting with invc1' red applicant j 2 personne A meeting was held on January 29, 1988, to discuss {

] the inspector's concerns and obtain clarification on  !

'

i three of the CPRT identified issues. The issues,_as j listed in Appendix A were: l i

]

j . Al - Electrical Separation l In clarification of the resolution of the issue by incorporating the-guidance of Regulatory i

Guide 1.75, IEEE 384 and IEEE 420 into the . J l design criteria, applicant personnel stated l that the allowance in Regulatory Guide 1.75 for .

,

submitting analysis or test dr.ta was considered ,

1 incorporating the guidanc t i

i . A4 - Preinsulated Environmental Sealed (PIES)  !

] Butt Sp'. ices l 1 In response to the inspector's concern over the i

resolution statements that splice ~1ocations had !

been documented, applicant personnel stated  !

1 that not all splice locations were documented, l but if new splices were located,_they would be l l.

documented. The inspector's concern over the 6 j er.vironmental qualification of the splices )

without being heat shrink sealed was clarified j

!l by applicant personnel stating that all new splices will have heat shrinkable sleeves

]

l

!

! installed as part of the splice kit and that I i FVM-090 will address existing PIES splice l

j . A5 - Agreement Between Drawings and Field l Terminations l

In response to the inspector's concern that the l

CPRT inspections did not demonstrate that all

i

,

.

.

terminations were in accordance with design drawings, applicant personnel stated that the design drawings will be checked for consistency (i.e., schematic and connection drawings) after the completion of the CAP portion being checked by FVM-08 The NRC inspector will continue to follow these and the other issues along with any revisions to the PS (2) Implementing Procedure Review The NRC inspector reviewed the following PCHVP implementing procedures to ensure that program commitments were being me (a) Heat Shrinkable Insulation Sleeves (HSIS)

(51063)

NRC inspection of the HSIS portion of the Electrical CAP was initiated as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/87-30,

,

'

50-446/87-22. The inspector's disagreement with the implementation of recommendations for HSIS led to the issuance of Deficiency Report C87-4741, which was dispositioned on January 8, 1988, to require changes to Revision 1 of the FVM (CPE-SWEC-TVM-EE-064). The NRC inspector reviewed Interim Change Notice (ICN)-04 to the FVM, which was approved on January 12, 1988, to ,

verify that the proposed changes had been incorporated. The inspector noted that the cable spreading room cables excluded from the scope of the FVM were clarified to be the ends

'

of those cables in the spreading room, not the

' entire cable. The note on Section 2 of the FVM data sheets, which had directed the QC inspec-tor to consider the lack of an inspection report to be grounds to "NA" the remainder of the requirements, had been deleted. The ICN

also stated that "backfit is required of all data sheets completed with irs dated prior to June 18, 1985." The inspector found these changes to acceptably resolve the concerns i raised in the above report.

"

The NRC inspector will follow the implementa-tion of the FVM as part of the ongoing CAP inspection effort when these activities are i reinitiate No violations or deviations were ;

identifie '

.

.

.

(b) Electrical Cable Tray and Conduit (51053)

The NRC inspector reviewed the two TU Electric procedures which were written to provide the inspection instructions for the PCHVP related to the cable tray and conduit portions of the Electrical CAP. The procedures both provide seven QC inspection reports (irs), one for each of the seven attributes to be reinspected. The procedures and their associated attributes were:

(1) NOI - 3.09-E-001, "PCHVP Reinspection of Electrical Cable Tray," Revision 1

-

Cable Spacing and Cable Tie Down

- Separation and Separation Barriers

-

Cable Tray Cover Location

-

Cable Tray Fill Above Side Rails

-

Cable Damage (general and indenta-tion) and Cable Slack

-

Separation and Separation Barriers at Air Drops  :

-

Identification and Color Code - '

Thermolag ,

(2) NQI-3,09-E-002, "20HVP Reinspection of Electrical Conduit," Revision 0 I

-

Separation (general, NIS and service '

level) and Barrier Type

-

Conduit Identification l'

-

Bend radius and Pull Points (NIS

'

conduit only)

l -

Cable Damage and Cable Slack

-

Pulling Aids Removed - Conduit

-

Pulling Aids Removed - Wall Sleeves

-

Cable Air Drop Separation and Separa-tion Barrier Type Because neither procedure was clear as to how the cable tray / conduit components to be inspected were selected, the inspector requested applicant person-nel to explain how the work packages were to be developed and how the number of cable trays and conduita to be reinspected would be determine (e.g., will all trays and conduits be inspected, or, if not, how will the sample population be deter-mined?)

The inspector was informed that the procedures and the large number of irs, were generated because the requirements for inspection were developed from the FVMs which formulate the PCHVP. These FVMs (086, 088, and 090) all relate to the reverification

.

- - _ _ _ _ - - - - . _ _ . _ - _ _ . - _ _ _ .

.

11 6

'

.

programs and result in the compilation of component

-

lists of items requiring reinspection. The compo-nent lists are then provided to the paper flow group (PFG) which assembles work packages that contain the appropriate IR forms for '.he components on the lis Since not-all attributes are required to be-inspect-

'

ed on each component, separate irs _were developed for the PFG to insert into the package.

'

The NRC inspector will follow the implementation of these procedures as part of the ongoing CAP inspec-tion effort. No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Tours

,

At various times during this report period, the NRC inspector

conducted inspections of the Unit 1 and 2 reactor, safeguards emergency diesel generator, auxiliary, and electrical / control buildings. These inspections were conducted to observe work in progress, equipment protection and storage, and general ,

housekeeping activitie Specific observations are discussed belo ; Previous Observation Follow-up (51063)

(1) On January 13, 1988, the NRC inspector observed that the temporary power cables (two green jacketed and one orange jacketed, field color coded with red bands) had been removed from cable tray T22KSBS4 These cables had been installed jn the Unit 2 safeguards building to provide ttmporary power while '

,

the Train B, 6.9kv switchgear was being reworke See NRC Inspection Report 50-445/87-02, 50-446/87-0 (2) On January 20, 19P8, the inspector observed that one of the cables from conduit C14G21432 to cable tray T14GRDE52 for connection to the pigtails from

'

electrical penetration assembly (EPA) lE-14 had been replaced with a new, longer cable. The inspector ,

then verified that the remaining two cables would be long enough to splice to the EPA pigtails in the tra The replacement of the short cable l (EG14868422) resolved the inspector's concern expressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/87-16, l 50-446/87-1 ! Electrical Cable Pulling (51063) l l

On January 13, 1988, the NRC inspector witnessed the

'

repulling of two triaxial (nuclear instrumentation)

cables from junction box (JB) JBic 585R to JB1C 589R

,

l

,

-, , ,, ,, ----------.-.~m4y-

.. _ . _ _._ _ _ . -

'.-

e

inside the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The two cables which

. were witnessed (ER1405112 and ER1405082) and the other

! four cables being repulled, had been pulled back as part of the EPA replacement for EPA lE-46. ~The JB at the EPA had been relocated so that the EPA pigtails extended'

,

=

through a short conduit nipple into the J (The "R" i identifier of the cables and JBs designate Reactor i Protective Channel-I services.the cables for the other three channels were similarly pulled back and their

,

associated JBs relocated.)

'

The cables were repulled individually, by hand,:with great care, to ensure. compliance with tensionfand bend radius requirements. The repulling was accomplished by seven craft personnel and witnessed by three QC inspec- tors. Because six cables were being-pulled tnrough the

conduit, the NRC inspector questioned why a tag rope was not being used to retain capability-for pulling back and

fort The QC inspector stated that the recent changes

. to the cable pulling procedures for NIS cable did not l allow the use of a tag rope and, therefore, required the i craft to push a fish tape through the conduit, connect a the pull rope and pull the fish tape and rope back to the origi After the fish tape was removed, a swabbing rag coated with lubricant and the NIS cable were attached to the rope which was pulled back to the destination. This process, while acceptable, was more involved than attach-ing a tag line to the pull rope at the origin which could be used to return the pull rope after the cable was pulle The inspector discussed this issue with quality engineering personnel who agreed to consider a procedural chang The NRC inspector-also reviewed the documentation packag-es for the two cables he witnessed. Each package con-tained a copy of DCA 67158, Revision 0, which deleted the requirement to test the cable prior to repulling but required engineering representation when the installed cable was tested. While the NRC inspector agreed with the instructions on the DCA, he noted that the DCA had not been reviewed and approved as evidenced by the lack of signatures in the spaces provided on the form. The ;

inspector reviewed Engineering Procedure ECE 5.01-I3, ;

"Design Change Authorization," Revision 0, as. revised through Engineering Document Change Notice (EDCN)-0 ,

The EDCN was approved on October 30, 1987. The procedure ;

allowed work to proceed on an economic risk basis, prior l to final confirmation by engineering, provided certain 1 conditions were met. The NRC inspector verified that the l procedural restrictions and requirements had been ful- l filled and that work proceeding at risk was an accepted-practice at other facilitie ,

__

O o

.

No violations or deviations were identifie c. Electrical Cable Installations (51063)

During a tour of the 852' elevation of the Unit 1 Safe-guards building on January 20, 1988, the NRC inspector observed two Train A cable installations which did not appear to conform to facility requirements. The instal-lations were visuclly accessible because the thermolag coatings on the cable trays and cables had been removed for PCHVP evaluation (1) The cables from cable trays T120ABA50, T120ABB55 and T130ACP53 to Motor control Center (MCC) XEB3-2 appeared to exceed the maximum allowable 3' 6" free air drop length specified in Section 3.2.2.30 of the electrical erection specification (ES-100). A review of Drawing 2323 S-0910, sheet CSD-126, Revision 5, showed that installed cable lengths had been identified as exceeding the maximums in a number of cases for this MC A review of DCA 6393 which was referenced on the drawing disclosed an allowable configuration of 10' vertical drop and 3' 6" horizontal difference; however, note 2 on the DCA contained a requirement that: "Engineering approval is required for specific applications where the length of exposed cable is more than 3' 6" measured along the cable," (i.e., the original requirement). The inspector, therefore, requested t

how engineering approval, including the basis, had been provided and was informed that the engineering approval of the drawing provided the required approva Since this method for approving exceeding the 3'6" maximum free air drop length did not appear to the inspector to be an acceptable practice, he requested a meeting with involved applicant person-ne This meeting will be held and documented in a subsequent inspection perio (2) The NRC inspector observed two cables behind the rungs of ladder type cable tray T130ACP55. The tray section was mounted vertically down an internal wall and the cables were between the wall and the tra When applicant personnel investigated the inspec-tor's finding, they determined that two cables were out of the tray for approximately five rungs and that an additional cable was outside one rung near the top of the vertical section. Based on these

'

observations, the applicant wrote NCR 88-01446 on January 22, 1988. This is an open item pending resolution of this issue (445/8804-0-01).

.

'

t

. Broken Pipe Support Bo'_1t (50090)

The NRC inspector observed a broken bolt on a removable pipe support located in Room 51 of the Unit 1 Safeguards buildin Following discussions with the inspoctor,'the applicant wrote NCR 88-01556. This condition should have been documented on an NCR when the bolt was broken during torquing and is another example of Violation 445/8718-V-08. Applicant personnel told the NRC inspec-tor that a misunderstanding by one person led to the failure to write the NCR in accordance with procedures and commitment for corrective action. The NRC will report on the resolution of this problem in the close out of the above violatio . Significant Meetings (30702)

Messrs. R. Warnick, H. Livermore, and P. Wagner met with !

'

Messrs. R. Miller, M. Gaden, M. Steelman, and other applicant and third-party personnel on January 7, 1988, to discuss the applicant's December 18, 1987, response to NRC Inspection Report 50-445/87-04, 50-446/87-04. That report documented the onsite review efforts related to the Safety Significance Evaluation (SSE) Progra Each of the findings made during the third-party inspections as part of the Comanche Peak Review Team (CPRT) efforts were evaluated for their safety significance. NRC review of a sample of the SSEs disclosed a

'

number of findings which were designated as open items for NRC tracking purposes. The applicant complied with the NRC request for a written response to those open items in the December 18, 1987, letter which provided responses for 24 of the 26 open items. The letter also explained that responses to the other two items would be submitted at a later dat Of the 26 open items in the above report, 5 were generic in

, nature in that the concern affected more than a single occur-rence; the remaining 21 items were for specific observation r The meeting was requested by the NRC inspectors to obtain clarification on ten of the specific observation items; of these, six were clarified to resolve the inspectors' concerns while some questions continued on the other four. Following discussions among the NRC participants, additional informaticn was requested on these remaining four items. Another meeting was held on January 20, 1988, among the same participants, which provided the requested clarifications and an agreement

to augment the December 18, 1987, response for these item The inspectors will respond to the supplemental response in separate correspondenc _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ .

.

.-

s

.

6. Open Items open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant or both. One open item was identified during this inspection and is discussed in paragraph . Exit Interview (30703)

An exit interview was conducted February 2, 1987, with the applicants representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this repor During this interview, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The applicant acknowledged the finding No written material was provided to the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection.

,

i

I I

l i

i i