IR 05000445/1999002
| ML20203D634 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203D616 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-99-02, 50-445-99-2, 50-446-99-02, 50-446-99-2, NUDOCS 9902160272 | |
| Download: ML20203D634 (16) | |
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ENCLOSURE i
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
REGION IV
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Docket Nos.: 50-445 ,
50-446 l
License Nos.: NPF-87 - l NPF-89 !
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Report No.: 50-445/99-02 50-446/99-02' !
Licensee: TU Electric !
Facility: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM-56 Glen Rose, Texas Dates: January 19-22,1999 l Inspector (s): Gail M. Good, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst l James S. Dodson, Radiation Specialist Approved By: Arthur T. Howell 111, Director, Division of Reactor Safety l
Attachment: Supplemental Infarmation
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9902160272 990110 PDR ADOCK 05000445 ;
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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-445/99-02; 50-446/99-02 A routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the licensee's emergency preparedness program was conducted. The inspection included the following areas: events, emergency facilities and equipment, emergency pir.n and implementing procedures, training, organization and management control, audits, effectiveness of licenseo controls, and followup on open items. Emphasis was placed on changes that had occurred since the last routine emergency preparedness inspectio Plant Support
Overall, the emergency preparedness program was generally well implemente Emergency response capabilities were strengthened in the following areas: the emergency operations facility was significantly remodeled to improve information flow, replacement iodine monitors were requisitioned for the emergency response facilities, and provisions for emergency response facility relocation were improved. Several improvements to the emergency preparedness training program were identified including increased drill frequency, management evaluation of drill performance and training frequency, and development of task evaluation forms for initial training .
walkthroughs and requalification drills (Sections P2 and PS). !
Emergency response facilities were operationally maintained, and appropriate equipment and supplies were readily available. A self-identified, recurring issue involving the emergency operations facility ventilation system was being pursued more aggressively and at higher levels to ensure final closure (Section P2).
The protective action recommendation procedure was promptly corrected after inspectors identified that there were no provisions for protective actions beyond 10 miles. A concern was identified regarding the link between the emergency plan and the procedures in that some procedures. iid not fully describe actions to implement the emergency plan. Instead, the actions were described in position assistance documents (Section P3).
Performance during the simulator walkthroughs was significantly improved. Both crews l correctly classified all events, made timely offsite agency notifications, correctly '
formulated and communicated protective action recommendations, and quickly initiated onsite protective actions. One crew displayed exceptional communication abilities and team work. As a result, the crew implemented the emergency plan more efficientl Appropriate actions were taken to resolve errors involving isotopic mixtures used in dose ;
assessment calculations and release duration time determination and documentatio I Thorough and self-critical critiques were conducted (Section P4).
The training program was properly implemented. The emergency preparedness training program was not clearly described in the procedure referenced in the emergency plan (Section PS).
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The emergency preparedness department was properly staffed, and the emergency response organization was effectively controlled (Section P6).
- Program audits were improved by using technical area experts. A recent audit provided an indepth evaluation of the effectiveness of emergency preparedness corrective actions (Section P7.1).
- The current action item tracking system made it difficult to trend problems and track recurrence; however, a new electronic database was scheduled for sitewide
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implementation in the near future to improve capabilities. A comprehensive self-assessment program was developed and implemented (Section P7.2).
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4-4-Report Details IV. Plant Support
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P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities Insoection ScoDe (93702)
There were no declared emergency events or related event reports since the last routine I emergency preparedness inspection.
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P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources
, Inspection Scope (82701-02.02)
The inspectors reviewed the status of emergency response facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies to ensure that they were maintained in a state of
! operational readiness. The inspectors assessed the following locations:
l Control room (CR)
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- Operations support center (OSC)
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- Emergency operations facility (EOF)
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Offsite field team vehicles and emergency kits
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! Observations and Findinas
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Inspectors found that the emergency response facilities were orderly and capable of operation. Appropriate equipment, procedures, forms, and supplies were available and easily accessible. Radiological monitoring instruments in emergency kits were calibrated, and various sized self-contained breathing apparatus face pieces were
- available, inspectors ensured that special respirator glasses were available for licensed operators who needed prescription lenses. Since the last emergency preparedness operational status inspection, the telephone in the remote shutdown panel was added to an operations quarterly review to ensure operatio The EOF was remodeled late in 1997. The changes included new furniture (custom management table), new room separators (walls / windows), and sound deadening material in the public information area, in addition, electronic display screens were scheduled for installation (after July 1999). The changes to the EOF were considered ,
improvements because they would enhance information flow and communication The licensee informed the inspectors that a problem with the EOF ventilation system
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had been identified. The problem involved the ability to maintain a positive pressure to
! the remainder of the building (Nuclear Operations Support Facility) during calm weather conditions. This issue was identified on two previous occasions (Technical Evaluation TE92-1677 and Technical Evaluation 97-784). The problem resurfaced lately and was
! currently being evaluated and tracked by the licensee as a one form (98-1261, dated
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l September 4,1998). The one form was scheduled to be completed in April 1999. As !
indicated above, problems with the EOF ventilation system were originally identified in 1992, but implemented corrective actions did not fully resolve the problem. The licensee e recently installed a pressure gauge which has allowed more sophisticated system ,
testing. Since resurfacing, the licerisee has pursued the problem more aggressively and ;
with higher levels of plant personnel attention to ensure final closur >
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Two other notable improvements were identified during the inspection. First, due to '
existing problems with the portable continuous iodine monitors, four replacement iodine ;
monitors were ordered for the emergency response facilities (expedited requisition).
The new monitors were expected by May 1999. Second, position assistance documents for emergency response facility relocation were revised and funher enhancements (in .
l the form of specific guidance) were expected as a result of recent EOF relocation '
walkthrough drill I Conclusions i
Emergency response facilities were operationally maintained, and appropriate i equipment and supplies were readily available. A self-identified, recurring issue involving the EOF ventilation system was being pursued more aggressively and at
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higher levels to ensure final closure. Emergency response capabilities were strengthened in the following areas: the EOF was significantly remodeled to improve information flow, replacement iodine monitors were requisitioned for the emergency response facilities, and provisions for emergency response facility relocation were improve l P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation i Insoection Scoce (82701-02.01)
The inspectors evaluated the following areas to determine if the emergency plan and procedures were being maintained:
- Continuity of the emergency plan, procedures, and position assistance documents l
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- Emergency action level reviews by offsite agencies
- Emergency plan changes !
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- Observations and Findinas i
inspectors identified two notable issues during the review of the emergency plan,
- procedures, and position assistance documents. The first issue involved a lack of guidance for recommending protective actions beyond 10 miles. The licensee agreed
- with the inspectors' comments and immediately initiated a change to Emergency Plan
- Procedure EPP-304," Protective Action Recommendations." Second, inspectors !
, identified a concern involving the link between the emergency plan, emergency plan !
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procedures, and position assistance documents. In some cases, the procedures did not fully describe how the plan was implemented. Instead, the details were contained in the position assistance documents. The procedures were submitted to NRC to meet i
'10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph V, requirements (emergency plan implementing procedures). The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments and stated that the matter would be evaluated. This response was acceptabl i inspectors confirmed that emergency action levels were reviewed annually with state and local officials in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph I However, documentation to support the review was not readily available. To document the state's review of the emergency action levels, meeting notes had to be obtained i
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from quality assurance personnel who attended an offsite meetin Conclusions
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The protective action recommendation procedure was promptly corrected after inspectors identified that there were no provisions for protective actions beyond 10 miles. A concern was identified regarding the link between the emergency plan and the procedures in that some procedures did not fully describe actions to implement the 4 emergency plan. Instead, the actions were described in position assistance document P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness Inspection Scope (82701-02.04)
The inspectors conducted walkthroughs with two operating crews using a dynamic simulation on the plant specific CR simulator. During the walkthroughs, the licensee was evaluated on the ability to:
- Evaluate plant conditions
- Classify emergency events
- Recommend appropriate protective actions (onsite and offsite) l
- Make timely notifications to offsite agencies '
- Perform and evaluate dose calculations
- Conduct a self-critique The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring escalation of emergency classifications, culminating in a general emergency. The scenario started with an increase in reactor coolant activity, followed by a tube leak on Steam Generator 2. The i failed fuel indication and steam generator tube leak met emergency action level criteria i for an alert and prompted a rapid plant shutdown. The steam generator tube leak increased to 400 gallons per minute and required a reactor trip and safety injectio These conditions prompted the declaration of a site area emergency. Following the '
reactor trip, a safety valve on Main Steam Line 2 failed open and could not be isolate A general emergency condition existed with failed fue: indications, an unisolable fault outside containment, and a greater than 50 gallons per minute tube rupture on the associated steam generator. Each walkthrough lasted about 90 minutes, followed by a critiqu .- _ - _ - .-. _ ._ .
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-7-b. Observations and Findinas Both crews made correct emergency classifications using the emergency action level The first crew was very prompt in its recognition of emergency conditions. The first shift manager effectively used the shift technical advisor to verify emergency classification i This verification was performed quickly and systematically. The second crew did not determine the steam generator leak rate as quickly as the first and classified the initial event as a notification of unusual event (based only on the failed fuel indication).
Although this classification was correct, based on the information communicated /
available at the time of the declaration, the subsequent alert classification may have ,
been slightly delayed by the quality of the crew's communications. This matter was appropriately discussed by operations personnel during the critiqu Similarly, both crews made timely offsite agency notifications; however, at times, the second crew challenged the time limits. Although both shift managers effectively used the shift technical advisors to peer-check the notification forms, the first crew displayed l a higher level of team work. As a result, emergency plan actions were implemented more efficientl Correct protective action recommendations were quickly formulated and communicated to offsite agencies (simulated). However, two areas for improvement involving dose assessment were identified during the second walkthrough, as discussed below:
- Due to a lack of guidance, the shift technical advisor used an incorrect isotopic mix (100 percent clad melt versus 1 percent clad failure) to compute dose ;
projections. Scenario conditions indicated about 4 percent clad failure. Since oefault protective action recommendations were used during the walkthrough (dose calcul&tions were not available when the general emergency was declared), the calculations were performed after scenario termination to test the shift technical advisor's knowledge. Using 100 percent clad melt led to an unnecessary public evacuation recommendation. The licensee acknowledged that there was a lack of guidance for dose assessors when conditions were between 1 and 100 percent clad failure and appropriately added this issue to the emergency preparedness action tracking system for resolutio * There was a discrepancy between the release duration time that the shift manager entered on the notification form and the one used by the shift technical advisor for dose projections (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> versus 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />). The time used by the shift technical advisor (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) was correct. During an actual emergency, this error would have caused confusion, since the state uses the release duration time from the notification form to compute its own dose projection Onsite protective actions were promptly determined and communicated during the walkthroughs. Both crews informed personnel of areas to avoid and changing radiological conditions (simulated). At the site area emergency, both shift managers correctly ordered a site evacuation.. Instructions for the evacuation were promptly made as part of the classification upgrade announcement. Site evacuation implementation problems were observed in previous simulator walkthroughs, as discussed in Section P8.2 belo . .- ~ . - .- .- - - - . - - .
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Critiques were conducted after both simulator walkthroughs. The critiques were conducted in a facilitative manner by the crew's shift manager. Issues not discussed by l the crew were provided by emergency preparedness personnel who observed the ,
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walkthroughs. The critiques were thorough and self critical.
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i Performance during the simulator walkthroughs was significantly improved. Both crews ;
correctly classified all events, made timely offsite agency notifications, correctly l formulated and communicated protective action recommendations, and quickly initiated onsite protective actions. One crew displayed exceptional communication abilities and team work. As a result, the crew implemented the emergency plan more efficientl Appropriate actions were taken to resolve errors involving isotopic mixtures used in dose 1-assessment calculations and release duration time determination and documentatio Thorough and self-critical critiques were conducte ,
P5_ Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness Insoection Scope (82701-02.04)
The inspectors reviewed the training program, training records for selected individuals, and documents associated with drills / exercise ,
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I Observations and Findinas
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I Inspectors found that the training program was not well described. Section 13 of the l
emergency plan stated that the emergency preparedness training program was
" outlined"in Procedure TRA-105," Emergency Preparedness Training," Revisions 1 i
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TRA-105 provided only limited information concerning the training program. For ( example, the procedure implied that a position versus training matrix existed; however, l the matrix was not included in the procedure. When a copy of the matrix was produced, the recommended reading section included a deleted emergency plan procedure, l indicating that the matrix was not regularly reviewed for accuracy / content. The licensee
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acknowledged the inspectors' comments and initiated a revision to TRA-105 to
- incorporate the training matrix. A revision to the matrix was in progress at the time of
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the inspection. The licensee's actions were appropriat Training records indicated that the training program was being properly implemented.
l New emergency response organization members received appropriate training prior to being placed on the call-out roster, and individuals were removed from the roster when training lapsed. Additional reviews of training status were implemented after the 1997
' annual emergency preparedness audit identified one individual who had not been ,
removed from the roster when this person's training qualifications expired. Since l
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requalification consisted of drill participation, the licensee developed task evaluation forms to do. 4 ment / measure individual performance. Similar forms with broader evaluation cnteria were developed for initial training walkthroughs. The task evaluation
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[ -9-As a result of past problems during the simulator walkthroughs, the licensee increased l the frequency of drills and initiated periodic emergency preparedness review boards to I
evaluate drill performance and establish drill frequencies (see Sections P8.1 and 2 below). These efforts demonstrated increased management attentio In reviewing the drill program, the inspectors confirmed that annual radiological drills were properly conducted and documented. Action items were appropriately identified and tracked, inspectors did note a minor discrepancy on the 6-year drill objectives matrix; there were no provisions to demonstrate capabilities to relocate the OSC and news center. In response to the inspectors' comments, the licensee added the locations to the matrix. The EOF was added after the 1997 emergency preparedness operational status inspection (NRC Report 50-445;-446/97-04).
c. Conclusions '
The emergency preparedness training program was not clearly described in the procedure referenced in the emergency plan. The training program was properly implemented, and required drills were properly conducted and documented. Several ;
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improvements to the emergency preparedness training program were identified including increased drill frequency, management evaluation of drill performance and training frequency, and development of task evaluation forms for initial training walkthroughs and requalification drill P6 Emergency Preparedness Organization and Administration a. Lnspection Scooe (82701-02.03)
The inspectors reviewed emergency preparedness department management and staffing, emergency response organization staffing, and offsite support organization agreement b. Observations and Findinas l No issues were identified in this area. Emergency preparedness staffing had decreased by one individual (a planned reduction discussed in NRC Report 50-445;-446/97-04).
The emergency preparedness department was well staffed by individuals with expertise in operations, health physics, and emergency preparedness. The emergency response i organization was properly maintained, and offsite agreements were reviewed in ,
accordance with emergency plan requirement !
c. Conclusions The emergency preparedness department was properly staffed, and the emergency response organization was effectively controlled.
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-10-P7 Quality Assurance in Emergency Preparedness Activities P Independent and Internal Reviews and Audits (82701-02.05) Inspection Scooe The inspectors examined the latest emergency preparedness program audit report (Nuclear Overview Department Evaluation Report NOE-EVAL-98-000010, dated March 3,1998) and discussed the results of a recent audit (draft report) with the lead auditor to determine compliance with NRC requirements and licensee commitment Observations and Findinas No issues were identified in this area. Program audits met requirements for scope and frequency. Inspectors noted an improvement in the audits conducted since the last emergency preparedness operational status inspection in that technical experts were used on the audit teams. A recent audit identified important issues involving the effectivehess of corrective actions. The audit identified the need to expand the scope of short-term corrective actions and improve long-term corrective actions. The inspectors'
review of the emergency preparedness action item system resulted in a similar conclusion (see Section P7.2 below). Conclusions Program audits were improved by using technical area experts. A recent audit provided an indepth evaluation of the effectiveness of emergency preparedness corrective action P7.2 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls (82701-02.06) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the emergency preparedness action item tracking system and self-assessment Observations and Findinos The inspectors determined that corrective actions for emergency preparedness issues did not always prevent the issue from recurring. Moreover, the system inhibited the licensee's ability to trend problems and track recurrence. Inspectors identified many issues involving the quality of position assistance documents, the need for clarification in procedures, and the need to add details. The inspectors also identified many issues that were opened, closed, and then later reopened. The licensee (emergency planning and quality assurance personnel) acknowledged the inspectors' comments and explained that a new electronic database tracking system, "Smartform," was scheduled for implementation in February 1999 and that, for the past year, the staff had been reviewing team drills for generic issues. The "Smartform" system was expected to i improve capabilities in the following areas: trending problems by electronic sorting, .
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increasing visibility and management oversight of identified issues, and allowing for cross-functional area action assignment. The emergency planning staff planned to have the existing action item tracking system transferred to the new system by the end of 199 The emergency planning staff recently develope 6 a self-assessment program (June 1998). The program was described in Staff Guicoline 18," Emergency Planning Self-Assessment Program," Revision O. The goals of the self-assessment program were to identify improvement opportunities, identify problem precursors, identify problems before plant events occur, and generate plant management suppor Self-assessments were conducted in the following areas: emergency plans, emergency action levels, and agreement letters; however, no issues were identified. The self-assessment program was considered an effective too Conclusions The current action item tracking system made it difficult to trend problems and track )
recurrence; however, a new electronic database was scheduled for sitewide '
implementation in the near future to improve capabilities. A comprehensive self assessment program was developed and implemente l P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness issues ;
l P (Closed) IFl 50-445:-446/97004-02: exercise weakness for failure to make a timely protective action recommendation. During the simulator walkthroughs conducted during the last emergency preparedness operational status inspection, one shift j manager / emergency coordinator did not demonstrate confidence or full familiarity with established processes and procedures for determining protective action recommendations. As a result, a notification and protective action recommendation were untimely. Corrective actions taken to resolve the weakness, as described in the licensee's April 14,1997, response, included additional training for all persons qualified as emergency coordinators. The frequency of training for shift managers was increased in 1997 and was evaluated by management to determine the proper frequency for future training. As discussed in Section P4 above, both shift managers / emergency coordinators made correct and timely notifications and protective action recommendations during this inspectio P8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-445:-446/97004-03: violation for failure to correct a previously identified exercise weakness (implementation of site evacuation procedures). During the simulator walkthroughs conducted during the last emergency preparedness operational status inspection, a site evacuation was not ordered in a timely manner because the shift manager / emergency coordinator did not follow the site evacuation procedures. The observed results indicated that corrective actions for a previously identified weakness were ineffective. Corrective actions taken to resolve the violation, as described in the licensee's April 14,1997, response, included revisions to Emergency Plan Procedure EPP-314," Evacuation and Accountability," and applicable position assistance documents, and additional training for all persons qualified as emergency I
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-12-coordinators. As discussed in Section P4 above, both shift managers promptly and correctly implemented site evacuation procedures during this inspectio P8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-445:-446/97019-01: violation for decreasing the effectiveness of the emergency plan (reduction in shift augmentation capabilities). This violation stemmed from a review of Revision 25 to the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, a subsequent reactive inspection conducted in September 1997, and an ;
October 31,1997, predecisional enforcement conference (EA 97-468, dated January 16,1998). Shift augmentation capabilities were reduced in the following areas:
notifications, dose assessment / engineering, offsite monitoring, and radiation protection ;
(e.g., station surveys, team coverage, onsite surveys, access control, personnel l monitoring, and dosimetry). Corrective actions taken to resolve the violation, as )
described in the licensee's February 16,1998, response, included revisions to the emergency plan. Revision 25 was immediately revised to return to previous staffing I level commitments, and Revision 26 was issued October 22,1997, to address the other !
issues cited / discussed during the reactive inspection. Moreover, additional guidance ;
was developed for conducting 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews; however, the wording in l Emergency Plan Procedure EPP-100," Maintaining Emergency Preparedness," !
Revision 2, was unclear. The corrective actions were verified as complete during this j inspectio l l
l P8.4 (Closed) VIO 50-445:-446/97019-02: violation for decreasing the effectiveness of the emergency plan (description of emergency response organization, training program, and offsite decisionmakers). This violation stemmed from a review of Revision 25 to the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, a subsequent reactive inspection conducted in September 1997, and an October 31,1997, predecisional enforcement conference (EA 97-468, dated January 16,1998). There were three examples cited in the violation: (1) emergency response organizstion position descriptions were deleted from the emergency plan but remained on the organization chart and call-out roster, (2) references to fire brigade and security training were deleted, and (3) identification of offsite protective action decisionmakers for the ;
ingestion pathway zone was deleted. Corrective actions taken to resolve the violation, l as described in the licensee's February 16,1998, response, included issuance of j Revision 26 to the Emergency Plan on October 22,1997. As previously mentioned, j additional guidance was developed for conducting 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews. The l corrective actions were verified as complete during this inspectio V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 22,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identifie . . - -
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A ATTACHMENT ,
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee ,
J. Ayres, Manager, Plant Support Overview i D. Barham, Emergency Planner G. Bell, Emergency Planner ;
M. Blevins, Vice President, Nuclear Operations ;
D. Davis, Manager, Nuclear Overview I E. Dyas, Senior Nuclear Specialist J. Ellard, Emergency Planner i K. Faver, Nuclear Support Assistant q D. Goodwin, Manager, Operations Support j W. Guldemond, Manager, Shift Operations
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N. Hood, Manager, Emergency Planning T. Hope, Manager, Regulatory Compliance J. Kelley, Vice President, Engineering R. Kidwell, Emergency Planner <
W. Nix, Emergency Planner l T. Robison, Emergency Planner i M. Sunseri, Manager Nuclear Training C. Terry, Senior Vice President C. Wilkerson, Senior Licensing Engineer i
NRC ,
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A. Gody, Senior Resident inspector LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED f 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program 92904 Followup - Plant Support LIST OF ITEMS CLOSED 97004-02 IFl Exercise weakness for failure to make a timely protective action recommendation (Section P8.1)
l 97004-03 VIO Failure to correct a previously identified exercise weakness :
l (implementation of site evacuation procedures) (Section P8.2)
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97019-01 VIO Decrease in emergency plan effectiveness (reduction in shift aagmentation capabilities) (Section P8.3)
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97019-02 VIO ' Decrease in emergency plan effectiveness (description of emergency response organization, training program, and offsite decisionmakers) :
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UST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Emeroency Plan Procedures
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l EPP-100, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness. Revision 2 l
- EPP-109, Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator / Recovery Manager,- j
' Revision 12 i
~ EPP-112, Duties of Control Room Personnel During Emergencies, Revision 8
.i EPP-116, Emergency Repair & Damage Control and immediate Entries, Revision 6 EPP-121, Reentry, Recovery and Closeout, Revision 7 .
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EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification and Plan f
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Activation, Revision 10 t
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l - EPP-203, Notifications, Revision 13
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l EPP-204, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Revision 13
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EPP-205, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center (OSC), Revision 11 l l EPP-206, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Revision 13 EPP-207, Activation and Operation of the News Center, Revision 10 EPP-304, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 15
- EPP-305, Emergency Exposure' Guidelines and Personnel Dosimetry, Revision 11 EPP-309 Onsite / Inplant Radiological Surveys and Offsite Radiological Monitoring, ,
Revision 12 EPP-314. Evacustion and Accountability, Revision 7 i Other Procedures l - TRA-105, Emergency Preparedness Training, Revisions 14 and 15
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3-Other Documents Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revision 27 Emergency Planning Organization and Responsibilities, dated January 12,1998 September 1,1998, Off Hours Unannounced Drill Report, dated September 9,1998 Action item Tracking System Status, February 1,1997 to January 20,1999 Position Versus Training Matrix, Change 2, dated July 31,1997 Training records for selected individuals !
l Emergency Response Organization Walkdown Grading Sheet !
6-Year Objectives Tracking Plan, dated December 9,1997 Radiological Monitoring Drill Reports,1997 ar d 1998 Response to Task Interface Agreement (97TIA001) - Request for Evaluation of Comanche l Peak Emergency Plan Revision 25, dated September 24,1998 l Licensing Document Change Request, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revision 28, dated January 18,1999 Position Assistance Documents: Shift manager / emergency coordinator, shift technical l advisor / dose assessor, communicator, TSC, OSC, and EOF l
One Form,98-1261, dated September 4,1998 Technical Evaluations TE92-1677 and TE97-784 Offsite Survey Teams Quarterly Inventory and Functional Checks, dated December 2,1998 Nuclear Overview Department Evaluation Report NOE-EVAL-98-000010, dated March 3,1998 Emergency Planning Self Assessment Program, Staff Guideline 018, Revision 0, dated )
June 26,1998 l
Nuclear Production Policy Statement Self-Assessment Guiding Principles, Policy No.124, Revision 0, dated April 8,1996 Emergency Planning Self-Assessment Program Presentation Emergency Planning Self-Assessment Log,1998 Emergency Planning 1999 Self-Assessment Schedule
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Emergency Planning Self Assessment,98-005, EOF Relocation Walkthru j Emergency Planning Self Assessment,98-009, Emergency Response Organization Team . :
Performance During May 1998 Exercises
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Emergency Planning Self Assessment,98-010, Annual Review of the Emergency Plan - :
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Emergency Planning Self Assessment,98-012, Open items / Corrective Actions !
l Response to inspection Report 50-445;-446/97-04,' dated April 14,1997-Confirmation of Commitments to Corrective Action Related to Emergency Plan, Revision 25, ;
letter dated September 26,1997 ;
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' Response to inspection Report 50-445;-446/97-19, dated February 16,1998 !
Emergency Planning Program Review Board Meeting Minutes January 6,1998, office ;
memorandum dated February 27,1998 i
Emergency Planning Program Review Board Meeting Mbutes June 16,1998, office memorandum dated June 16,1998 -
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Emergency Planning Program Review Board Meeting Minutes December 1,1998, office ,
memorandum dated January 13,1999 i
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