IR 05000445/2024001
| ML24115A116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/2024 |
| From: | Greg Werner NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBB |
| To: | Peters K Vistra Operations Company |
| References | |
| IR 2024001 | |
| Download: ML24115A116 (30) | |
Text
April 26, 2024
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2024001 AND 05000446/2024001
Dear Ken Peters:
On March 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. On April 11, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Steven Sewell, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both findings involved violations of NRC requirements. One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Gregory E. Werner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000445, 05000446 License Nos. NPF-87, NPF-89
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000445 and 05000446
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000445/2024001 and 05000446/2024001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-001-0011
Licensee:
Vistra Operations Company LLC
Facility:
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2024, to March 31, 2024
Inspectors:
C. Alldredge, Health Physicist
D. Antonangeli, Resident Inspector
C. Dorman, Project Engineer
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
S. Hedger, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Melfi, Project Engineer
D. Proulx, Senior Project Engineer
H. Strittmatter, Resident Inspector
C. Young, Senior Reactor Analyst
Approved By:
Gregory E. Werner, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Control Ignition Source Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024001-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.05 The inspectors identified a finding and associated Green non-cited violation of the fire protection program for the licensee's failure to control ignition sources in the emergency diesel generator rooms. Specifically, the licensee placed and subsequently energized 480-volt heaters in the emergency diesel generator rooms 1-02 and 2-01 without issuing a fire permit and establishment of a fire watch.
Failure to Manage Risk Associated with Uninterruptable Power Supply Ventilation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024001-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.13 A self-revealed finding and associated Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a (4)occurred on March 5, 2024, when the uninterruptable power supply air conditioning unit X-02 tripped. Specifically, the licensee did not assess the risk of the uninterruptable power supply heating, ventilation, and air conditioning lineup and did not take the required risk management actions. This issue created a single point vulnerability to a loss of safety function by not changing the uninterruptable power supply air conditioning unit X-01 component cooling water line-up to available alternatives while performing maintenance. A subsequent trip of the uninterruptable power supply air conditioning unit X-02 heating, ventilation, and air conditioning caused a loss of safety function and resulted in entry to condition C of Limiting Condition of Operation 3.7.20.
Failure to Notify the NRC Within Eight Hours of a Condition That Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000445,05000446/2024001-03 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for not reporting an event or condition to the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> that, at the time of the discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000445/2023-001-01 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level 71153 Closed LER 05000445/2023-001-00 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 remained at or near 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.
On February 2, Unit 2 reduced power to 60 percent to repair the 2A main feedwater pump. On February 3, 2024, the licensee completed repairs and ascended in power to 100 percent. On March 12, Unit 2 tripped because of a feedwater transient. On March 14, 2024, the licensee restarted Unit 2 and reached 100 percent power on March 17, 2024. On March 17, 2024, the licensee tripped Unit 2 following loss of the 2A main feedwater pump. On March 20, 2024, the licensee restarted Unit 2 and reached 100 percent on March 22, 2024. Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe cold weather on January 16, 2024
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1, train A charging system on January 12, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator on February 5, 2024
- (3) Unit 1, train A safety chiller on February 27, 2024
- (4) Unit 1, component cooling water (CCW) train B on March 4, 2024
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1, safety chillers on January 16, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator 1-01 and fuel oil day tank room on January 26, 2024
- (3) Unit 1, emergency diesel generator 1-02 and fuel oil day tank room on January 26, 2024
- (4) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator 2-01 and fuel oil day tank room on January 26, 2024
- (5) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator 2-02 and fuel oil day tank room on January 26, 2024
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) CCW 1-01 heat exchanger
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 main feedwater pump A troubleshooting on January 24, 2024
- (2) The inspectors observed securing and restoration of the Unit 2 main feedwater pump A on February 2 and 3, 2024
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification simulator training session for control room evacuation on February 28, 2024
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)building and structures - refueling building
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1, train B charging pump emergent work on January 11, 2024
- (2) Unit 2, train B CCW pump oil change on January 22, 2024 (3)emergency diesel generator 1-01 work on February 6, 2024 (4)emergency pressurization failure and fire pump outage the week of February 26, 2024
- (5) Unit 1, train A CCW heat exchanger outage on March 5, 2024 (6)loss of uninterruptable power supply (UPS) ventilation system to both units on March 5, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2, remote shutdown panel following trip of safety chiller on restoration
- (2) Unit 1, safety chiller 1-05 with Freon equipment stored adjacent to the safety chiller
- (3) Unit 1, feedwater isolation room door found with three door latches not fully engaged
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)modification to add an amplifier to main feedwater pump control system, T3000, to increase current to 240 milliamps
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a Unit 2 forced outage caused by a main feedwater pump trip at 100 percent power. The forced outage started on March 17, 2024, and ended on March 21, 2024
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, train B charging pump repair on January 11, 2024
- (2) Unit 2, troubleshooting/replacement of fuses for an under-voltage relay 480-volt switchgear bus 2EB3 on January 23, 2024
- (3) Unit 1, maintenance on the 1-01 emergency diesel generator on February 7, 2024
- (4) Unit 2, MFP A and B following cleaning of servo on March 21, 2024
- (5) Unit 2, main feedwater pump control, T3000, amplifier addition and rerouting of the ground on March 27, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, smoke detector testing within the volume control tank on January 24, 2024 (2)calibration of motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1-02 local indication suction and discharge pressure gauges on February 29, 2024
- (3) Unit 2, boric acid inspection of the containment on March 20, 2024
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed a site wide drill involving a steam generator tube rupture on February 14,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) Ludlum M177s stored in radiologically controlled area release room, at the Unit 2 containment hatch step off pad, and outside a chemistry sample room
- (2) Telepole stored in the radiologically controlled area instrument issue room
- (3) Radeye G stored in the radiologically controlled area instrument issue room (4)model 3000 stored in the radiologically controlled area instrument issue room
- (5) RO2AA stored in the radiologically controlled area instrument issue room (6)continuous air monitors stored in the radiologically controlled area in the spent fuel pool and a chemistry sample room
- (7) Canberra GEM-5 gamma exit monitor stationed in Warehouse C
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (14 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) AMP-100, serial number (SN) 1698
- (2) Telepole, SN 1905
- (3) Radeye GX, SN 2322
- (4) Thermo RO-20AA, SN 4159 (5)frisker with GM Tube, SN 1644 (6)low volume air sampler, SN 5001
- (7) Ludlum TEM, SN 0062
- (8) ARGOS-5AB, SN 0065
- (9) AMS-4, SN 2143
- (10) AMS-4, SN 2153
- (11) Unit 1, containment elevation 905 high range radiation detector, 1RE-6290A
- (12) Apex FSCAN whole body counter
- (13) Apex ASCAN whole body counter
- (14) Canberra GEM-5 gamma exit monitor, SN 0079 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
(1)north vent stack discharge gas radiation detector, X-RE-5567B (2)liquid waste processing discharge radiation detector, XE-RE-5253
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing the following radioactive material (RAM):
(1)radioactive sealed sources stored in the warehouse C locker and in the calibration lab (2)vaults stored in the interim low level radioactive waste storage facility located in the owner-controlled area (3)containers and a vault of RAM stored in the radiologically controlled area yard
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
- (1) Units 1 and 2, spent resin transfer system
- (2) Units 1 and 2, liquid waste processing system
- (3) Units 1 and 2, gaseous waste processing system
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:
(1)
- 2023-04, Unit 1 reactor coolant system filter, dated January 8, 2023 (2)
- 2022-06, 2022-2024 dry active waste, dated June 14, 2022 (3)
- 2021-05, spent resin storage tank, dated August 12, 2021 Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04)
The inspectors had no opportunity to observe the preparation of a radioactive shipment while onsite.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted RAM shipments through a record review:
(1)shipment 2022-0037: UN3321, RAM, low specific activity (LSA)-II, 7, fissile-excepted; dry active waste, dated June 1, 2022 (2)shipment 2022-0040: UN3321, RAM, LSA-II, 7; dry active waste, dated July 20, 2022 (3)shipment 2022-0042: UN2916, RAM, type B(U) package, 7, RQ-radionuclides; resin, dated July 28, 2022 (4)shipment 2023-0047: UN2916, RAM, type B(U) package, 7, RQ-radionuclides; resin, dated December 8, 2023 (5)shipment 2023-0052: UN3321, RAM, LSA-II, 7; dry active waste, dated September 14,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 2023, through December 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 2023, through December 2023)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 2023, through December 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 2023, through December 2023)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 2023, through December 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 2023, through December 2023)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)
- emergency diesel generator automatic voltage regulator failure from 2021 On May 13, 2021, emergency diesel generator failed its monthly surveillance test.
The licensee determined that automatic voltage regulator master drive unit had failed.
The licensee replaced the failed component and restored the emergency diesel generator to an operable status within the allowed outage time. The licensee provided the failed master drive unit to a contracted vendor for analysis. The vendor could not identify a cause for the failure but did note that some components were aged and should be replaced periodically. The inspectors noted that although the failure occurred in 2021, the failure analysis did not complete until 2024. Although there were some challenges, many of the delays in analysis were preventable by the licensee. The inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency associated with the failure in 2021. The inspectors concluded the delay in completing the failure analysis was a minor performance deficiency.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000445/2023-001-01 and LER 05000445/2023-001-00, Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level, (Accession No. ML23285A094). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER were documented in inspection report 05000445,05000446/2023004 as FIN 05000445/2023004-03. This LER and updates are closed.
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a Unit 2 plant trip following the loss of the main feedwater pump A and licensees performance on March 12, 2024
- (2) The inspectors evaluated a Unit 2 plant trip following the loss of the main feedwater pump B on March 17, 2024
Reporting (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following event:
- (1) The inspectors reviewed reportability of the loss of the UPS HVAC system safety function on March 5,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Control Ignition Source Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024001-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.05 The inspectors identified a finding and associated Green non-cited violation of the fire protection program for the licensee's failure to control ignition sources in the emergency diesel generator rooms. Specifically, the licensee placed and subsequently energized 480-volt heaters in the emergency diesel generator rooms 1-02 and 2-01 without issuing a fire permit and establishment of a fire watch.
Description:
On January 18, 2024, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the emergency diesel generator rooms. During the walkdown, the inspectors identified 480-volt heaters staged in emergency diesel generator rooms 1-02 and 2-01. The inspectors could not locate a fire permit for the heaters. They informed the shift manager and confirmed that there was no permit for the heaters. The licensee stated that the heaters had been placed in the rooms for use during extreme cold conditions on January 14, 2024, to supplement smaller heaters placed in the rooms as part of their cold weather preparation plan. The licensee took this action because cold temperatures created a risk for the emergency diesel generator jacket water freezing. The licensee determined that the 480-volt heaters had been energized several times between January 14 and 18, 2024.
The licensee evaluated the as found condition and determined that additional controls were needed to ensure the heaters did not create a fire hazard. The additional controls were verifying that no gasoline was in the room and providing a qualified ignition watch, either in person or by a camera. After identification, the licensee initiated a fire permit and briefed site staff on the requirements to energize the heaters.
The inspectors noted that procedure STA -729, Control of Transient Combustibles, Ignition Sources, and Fire Watches, revision 16, section 6.3.1.1 required issuance of a fire permit for use of ignition sources in fire areas. In addition, section 6.4.1.1.A of the procedure required a fire watch be established when an ignition source is used. Procedure STA-729 defined an ignition source as "Any equipment, hot work and/or process which may radiate heat, produce spark or energy which could ignite combustible or flammable material (e.g. welding, burning, grinding, preheating devices, open flame, space heaters, etc.). Based on this, the inspectors concluded that the heaters were an ignition source, and therefore, required an ignition source fire permit and fire watch in the emergency diesel generator rooms; and thus, this condition constituted a failure to implement a fire protection procedure.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program, evaluated the condition and implemented a fire permit per STA-729.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-0466
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to establish required controls for a transient ignition source in the emergency diesel generator rooms 1-02 and 2-01.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency increased the likelihood of a fire by adversely impacting the cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. Using Appendix F, the inspectors categorized the finding under Fire Protection and Administrative Controls. In step 1.4.1, the inspectors answered yes to 1.4.1-A in that the finding increased the likelihood of a fire. The inspectors also answered Yes to 1.4.1-B in that the area has adequate automatic fire suppression and detection. Therefore, the finding screened as Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. The inspectors determined operations, maintenance and fire protection failed to communicate and coordinate activities when they did not initiate a fire permit when adding an ignition source.
Enforcement:
Violation: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant facility Operating License NPF-87 (Unit 1)and NPF-89 (Unit 2) section 2.G requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report through Amendment 78 (Unit 1) or Amendment 87 (Unit 2).
The Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 78 (Unit 1) and Amendment 87 (Unit 2),section 13.3B.4, requires, in part, that administrative procedures and controls will be established to ensure the reliable performance of fire protection personnel, systems and equipment, and that effective measures will be established to control the use and storage of combustibles and ignition sources.
The licensee established procedure STA-729 Control of Transient Combustibles, Ignition Sources, and Fire Watches revision 16 to control the use and storage of combustibles and ignition sources, and defined an ignition source as Any equipment, hot work and/or process which may radiate heat, produce spark or energy which could ignite combustible or flammable material (e.g. welding, burning, grinding, preheating devices, open flame, space heaters, etc.). Procedure STA-729, step 6.4.1.1.A, required, in part, that an ignition source fire watch be established when an ignition source is used.
Contrary to the above, from January 14-18, 2024, the licensee failed to establish an ignition source fire watch when an ignition source was used. Specifically, after installing and energizing 480-volt heaters, an ignition source, in emergency diesel generator rooms 1-02 and 2-01, the licensee failed to establish a fire watch.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Manage Risk Associated with Uninterruptable Power Supply Ventilation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024001-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.13 A self-revealed finding and associated Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(4)occurred on March 5, 2024, when the uninterruptable power supply air conditioning unit X-02 tripped. Specifically, the licensee did not assess the risk of the uninterruptable power supply heating, ventilation, and air conditioning lineup and did not take the required risk management actions. This issue created a single point vulnerability to a loss of safety function by not changing the uninterruptable power supply air conditioning unit X-01 component cooling water line-up to available alternatives while performing maintenance. A subsequent trip of the uninterruptable power supply air conditioning unit X-02 caused a loss of safety function and resulted in entry to condition C of Limiting Condition of Operation 3.7.20.
Description:
The site has a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system for its four 118 VAC safety bus UPS and distribution rooms. The UPS HVAC system is composed of four emergency fan coil units (EFCU), one in each room, and two air conditioning (A/C) units in a different space. Each EFCU can independently control the temperature in its own room and each A/C unit (X-01 and X-02) can independently control the temperature in all four rooms. The EFCU are considered inoperable when secured because they do not have an automatic start feature.
On March 5, 2024, the licensee secured the EFCUs, and therefore rendered them inoperable, so that maintenance personnel could more easily hear each other while working in the UPS and distribution rooms. Although scheduled on the plan of the day, the risk analysis did not include taking the EFCUs out of service. The UPS A/C unit X-01 was also secured and had previously been declared inoperable due to ongoing maintenance which affected its normally aligned cooling water supply. Temperature control of the UPS and distribution rooms was being provided solely by the UPS A/C unit X-02. At 07:20 a.m., the UPS A/C unit X-02 tripped due to the failure of its blower motor. This caused the loss of temperature control for the UPS and distribution rooms, which is the safety function of the UPS HVAC system. In reviewing the condition, the inspectors noted that the UPS A/C unit X-01 could be supplied from an operable unit 2 CCW train; however, the licensee did not change the alignment until after the loss of UPS A/C unit X-02. Prior to the trip of UPS A/C unit X-02, the UPS HVAC configuration placed both units in LCO 3.7.20 condition A with a 30-day completion time since only the UPS A/C unit X-02 was operable. After the trip of UPS A/C unit X-02, the licensee entered LCO 3.7.20 condition C, which required restoration of one of the two A/C units within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. This condition represents a loss of safety function since no UPS HVAC trains remained operable. The licensee started the EFCUs in about 9 minutes, then realigned the UPS A/C unit X-01 cooling supply to unit 2 CCW system and started UPS A/C unit X-01 to restore cooling to all four UPS and distribution rooms within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and exited LCO 3.7.20, condition C.
In reviewing the event, the inspectors noted that the licensee did not recognize that the plant alignment placed the site in a condition with a single point vulnerability to loss of a safety function on both units. Nor had the licensee recognized that securing the EFCU required a 10 CFR 50.65 risk assessment. The licensee stated that realigning UPS A/C unit X-01 cooling water supply to unit 2 CCW would have been performed as a risk management action had the risk been assessed.
Corrective Actions: The licensee completed actions within 9 minutes to restore all four EFCUs and within an hour to restore the UPS A/C unit X-01 to an operable condition.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-1448
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to assess and manage risk associated with alignment of the UPS HVAC system.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency was associated with alignment of the UPS HVAC system to provide redundancy of HVAC. In addition, the inspectors compared the performance deficiency to example 8.e of inspection manual chapter 0612, appendix E issued October 26, 2023. In this example, a failure to perform a risk assessment would be more than minor if additional risk management actions would be required. For this issue, additional risk management actions, e.g. aligning the UPS A/C unit X-01 to Unit 2 CCW, would be required.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process dated October 16, 2020. Using the licensees evaluation of risk deficit (incremental core damage probability, since the licensee did not conduct a risk assessment)of 5.78x10-8 for a bounding duration of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the finding screened as Green. The inspectors also independently assessed risk and consulted with the regional SRA and determined that no material differences existed between NRC and licensee evaluations.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe to proceed, rather than unsafe to stop. The inspectors noted that while reducing UPS HVAC to one train is allowable, more prudent options existed to re-align the UPS A/C unit X-01 CCW, which would have maintained redundancy in the UPS HVAC system.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65 (a)4 requires, in part, that "before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities.
Contrary to the above, on March 5, 2024, the licensee neither assessed nor managed the risk associated with the UPS HVAC system. This failure to manage risk led to loss of safety function of the UPS HVAC system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Violation 71152A Failure to Identify a Condition Adverse to Quality Minor Violation: The licensee failed to promptly identify those components associated with the emergency diesel generator automatic voltage regulator master drive unit suffered age-related degradation. Part 10 CFR 50 appendix B, criterion XVI requires, in part, that "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected." Contrary to this requirement, following failure of the Unit 2 train A emergency diesel generator automatic voltage regulator master drive unit in 2021, the licensee did not promptly identify that age degraded components in the master drive unit required periodic replacement and establishment of a preventive maintenance schedule, until 2024.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors concluded that the performance deficiency was minor because it is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, example 4.f, in that the failure to promptly identify had no adverse impact on the emergency diesel generator (i.e., no additional failures).
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 appendix B criterion XVI constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Notify the NRC Within 8 Hours of a Condition That Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000445,05000446/2024001-03 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for not reporting an event or condition to the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> that, at the time of the discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
Description:
The site has a HVAC system for its four 118 VAC safety bus UPS and distribution rooms. The system, referred to as UPS HVAC system, is composed of four EFCUs, one in each room, and two A/C units in a different space. Each EFCU can independently control the temperature in its own room and each A/C unit (X-01 and X-02) can independently control the temperature in all four rooms. The EFCUs are considered inoperable when secured because they do not have an automatic start feature.
On March 5, 2024, the licensee had the EFCUs secured, and therefore inoperable, so that maintenance personnel would more easily hear each other while working in the UPS and distribution rooms. Unit X-01 UPS A/C was also secured and had previously been declared inoperable due to ongoing maintenance which affected its normally aligned cooling water supply. Temperature control of the UPS and distribution rooms was being provided solely by UPS A/C unit X-02. At 07:20 a.m. CST, the UPS A/C unit X-02 tripped due to the failure of its blower motor. This caused the loss of temperature control for the UPS and distribution rooms, which is the safety function of the UPS HVAC system. This met the requirements for an 8-hour report to the NRC of the occurrence of an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
The licensee then took immediate actions to restore the UPS HVAC system and started all four of the EFCU at 07:29 a.m., CST, thus regaining temperature control of the UPS and distribution rooms within 9 minutes. The site also took actions to realign the cooling supply of the functioning UPS A/C unit X-01 to its alternate supply and started it successfully.
The report required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was due at 03:20 p.m., CST. The licensee had initially determined that a 10 CFR 50.72 report was not required but, after questions from the inspectors, the licensee determined that an 8-hour report was required.
Corrective Actions: At 06:14 p.m., CST, on March 5, 2024, the licensee made a report to the NRC concerning the events of that morning (Event Number 57020). This restored reporting compliance.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-001497
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement.
Severity: The violation was determined to be Severity Level IV using example 6.9d.9. of the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated January 12, 2024, because it was a failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) requires, in part, that the licensee shall notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of any event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Contrary to the above, on March 5, 2024, the licensee failed to notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the loss of the UPS HVAC system safety function which is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On March 20, 2024, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Steven Sewell, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 11, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Steven Sewell, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed Institute on Nuclear Power Operations reports that were issued during the fourth quarter of 2023.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
ABN-912
Extreme Cold Weather/ Heat Tracing and Freeze Protection
System Malfunction
Procedures
OWI-912
Cold Weather
Drawings
BRP-CS-1-AB-
001
Chemical and Volume Control
Drawings
M1-0215 sheet D
Starting Air Piping CP1-MEDGEE-01
Drawings
M1-0255
Flow Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System
Charging and Positive Displacement Pump Trains
Miscellaneous
0036-B
Clearance for 1-02 CCP Drain for Maintenance
01/12/2024
Procedures
OPT-214A
Diesel Generator Operability Test
Procedures
SOP-103A
Chemical and Volume Control System
Procedures
SOP-501A-SW-
V02
Train B Station Service Water Valve Lineup
Procedures
SOP-502A
Component Cooling Water System
Procedures
SOP-502A-CC-
C01
Control Switch Lineup
Procedures
SOP-502A-CC-
V02
Valve Lineup Train B
Procedures
SOP-609A
Diesel Generator System
Procedures
SOP-815A-CHS-
V02
Unit 1 Train A Safety Chiller Valve Lineup
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-YYYY-NNNN
2004-000621
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
EV-CR-2024-
0466
Procedures
FIR-308
Fire Brigade Equipment
Procedures
FIR-308
Fire Brigade Equipment
Procedures
FIR-308
Fire Brigade Equipment
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Fire Protection
Report
Procedures
FPI-104A
U-1 Train 'A' Diesel Generator and Equipment Elev. 810'
and Fuel Oil Day Tank Room Elev. 844'
Procedures
FPI-104B
U-2, Train 'A' Diesel Generator & Equipment Elev. 810' and
Fuel Oil Day Tank Room Elev. 844'
Procedures
FPI-105A
U-1, Train 'B' Diesel Generator & Equipment Elev. 810' and
Fuel Oil Day Tank Room Elev. 844'
Procedures
FPI-105B
U-2 Train 'B' Diesel Generator and Equipment Elev. 810'
and Fuel Oil Day Tank Room Elev. 844'
Procedures
FPI-510
Electrical and Control Building Chiller Pump Rooms,
Elevation 778'=0"
Calculations
ME-CA-0229-
29
CCW Parameters for Fouling Monitoring
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
20-00917
Corrective Action
Documents
IR-YYYY-NNNN
23-006509
Corrective Action
Documents
TR-YYYY-NNNN
21-002308
Miscellaneous
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Fouling Data
Trend Sheets
Miscellaneous
Eddy Current Test Results for CCW/SSW Heat Exchangers
Procedures
MSM-C0-5877
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance
Miscellaneous
LO44.ABN.915
ABN-915 Simulator Exercise Guide
Miscellaneous
LOB8.B24.SUP
Unit 2 Startup - Post MFW Pump Trip Induced Reactor Trip
03/13/2024
Procedures
ABN-302
Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction
Procedures
ABN-915
Security Events
Procedures
ODA-102
Conduct of Operations
Miscellaneous
Maintenance Rule Database for Buildings and Structures
Miscellaneous
Guarded Equipment Management Sign Posting Log DG 1-
Miscellaneous
Guarded Equipment Management Sign Posting Log-1-01
03/04/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
24-09-12B U1
FINAL Schedule
Evaluation
(2/25/2024 -
3/2/2024)
Risk profile for the week of February 25, 2024
Miscellaneous
24-09-12B U2
FINAL
Pressurization
OOS Schedule
Evaluation
(2/25/2024 -
3/2/2024)
Risk Profile for the week of February 25, 2024
Procedures
ODA-308-3.7.20-
S01
Supplemental Information for ELCO Standard LCOAR
Procedures
OPT-214A
Diesel Generator Operability Test
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-000025, 2024-0481,2024-0901
Procedures
ABN-602
Response to a 6900/480V System Malfunction
Engineering
Changes
FDA-2024-014-
2-00
Update T3000 software and hardware to convert +/- 30 mA
to +/-240 mA Signal to control Servo Valves.
Engineering
Evaluations
2-00
50.59 Screen of T3000 Software and Hardware to Convert
+/- 30 mA to +/- 240 mA Signal to Control FW Servo Valves
Procedures
IPO-002B
Plant Startup From Hot Standby
Procedures
NUC-111
Inverse Count Rate Ratio Monitoring
Procedures
SOP-302B
Feedwater System
Corrective Action
Documents
TR-YYYY-NNNN
23-006498
Miscellaneous
1-PI-2468
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-02 Discharge
Pressure Indicator Maintenance Datasheet
Miscellaneous
Datasheet: 1-PI-
2487
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-02 Suction
Pressure Indicator Maintenance Datasheet
Procedures
ETP-302B
FWP Overspeed Trip/Stop Valve/Oil Pump Test
Procedures
INC-2040
Calibration of Pressure Gauges
Procedures
OPT-214A
Diesel Generator Operability Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
23-70724, 2024-40464, 5389502, 5451947
Miscellaneous
Emergency Response Exercise for Blue Team
2/14/2024
Calibration
Records
RPI-508-1
Coversheet for WBC System Calibration Data Package;
WBC System Number ASCAN
09/20/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-508-1
Coversheet for WBC System Calibration Data Package;
WBC System Number FSCAN
05/01/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-805-1
Calibration of the Ludlum Upgraded TEM Data Sheet;
Equipment TAG Number 0062
08/15/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-862-1
ARGOS/SIRIUS Calibration Date Sheet; Equipment Tag
Number 0065
2/13/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-862-2
GEM-5 Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment Tag Number
0079
04/03/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-881-11
AMP-100 Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment Tag Number
1698
10/23/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-881-13
Telepole Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment Tag Number
1905
09/26/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-881-17
Radeye GX Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment Tag Number
22
09/19/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-881-19
Thermo RO-20AA Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment Tag
Number: 4159
09/25/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-882-1
Frisker with GM Tube Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment
Tag Number: 1644
10/22/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-888-1
Low Volume Air Sampler Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment
Tag Number 5001
2/13/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-889-1
AMS-4 Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment Tag Number
2143
06/29/2023
Calibration
Records
RPI-889-1
AMS-4 Calibration Data Sheet; Equipment Tag Number
2153
10/23/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR/TR-YYYY-
NNNNNN
22-04297, 2022-005467, 2022-007934, 2022-007949,
22-008079, 2022-008225, 2023-000886, 2023-000961,
23-001317, 2023-002076, 2023-003739, 2023-004632,
23-004906, 2023-005534, 2023-005645, 2023-008715,
23-008814, 2024-000203, 2024-000919
Corrective Action
IR-2024-
001328
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NNNNNN
Miscellaneous
Environmental Laboratory Quarterly Quality Assurance
Report for Environmental Analysis (April - June 2022)
08/22/2022
Miscellaneous
Environmental Laboratory Quarterly Quality Assurance
Report for Environmental Analysis (July - September 2022)
2/02/2022
Miscellaneous
Environmental Laboratory Quarterly Quality Assurance
Report for Environmental Analysis (October - December
22)
2/28/2023
Miscellaneous
Environmental Laboratory Quarterly Quality Assurance
Report for Environmental Analysis (January - March 2023)
06/23/2023
Miscellaneous
Environmental Laboratory Quarterly Quality Assurance
Report for Environmental Analysis (April - June 2023)
07/18/2023
Miscellaneous
Environmental Laboratory Quarterly Quality Assurance
Report for Environmental Analysis (July - September 2023)
10/02/2023
Miscellaneous
Environmental Laboratory Quarterly Quality Assurance
Report for Environmental Analysis (January - March 2022)
06/17/2022
Procedures
ICI-4930
Channel Calibration Low Range Area Monitor
Procedures
INC-7079
Channel Calibration Containment High Range Radiation
Monitor Channels
Procedures
RPI-301
Portable Survey Instruments
Procedures
RPI-503
Operation of the Stand-Up Whole-Body Counter
Procedures
RPI-508
Calibration of the Stand-up Whole-Body Counter
Procedures
RPI-534
Calibration of Electronic Personal Dosimeters and Pocket
Ion Chambers (PICs)
Procedures
RPI-800
Control of Radiation Protection program
Procedures
RPI-801
Operation of Portable Survey Instruments
Procedures
RPI-802
Performance of Source Checks
Procedures
RPI-805
Calibration and Operation of the Ludlum Upgraded TEM
Procedures
RPI-809
Operation of the Calibration Well Source
Procedures
RPI-862
Calibration of the ARGOS/SIRIUS Personnel Contamination
Monitor and GEM-5 Gamma Exit Monitor
Procedures
RPI-881
Calibration of Portable Dose Rate Instruments
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
RPI-882
Calibration of Portable Count Rate Instruments
Procedures
RPI-889
Calibration of the Eberline AMS-4
Procedures
STA-433
Equipment Important to Emergency Response
Procedures
STA-658
Radiation Protection Equipment Calibration Program
Procedures
STA-677
Preventive Maintenance Program
Procedures
STI-677.01
PM Change Processing
Work Orders
24-110141
X-RE-6274 FB El 860 U1 Spent Fuel Pool E. Wall Low
Range Area Monitor Radiation Detector
03/09/2024
Work Orders
24-45809
X-RE-6274 FB El 860 U1 Spent Fuel Pool E. Wall Low
Range Area Monitor Radiation Detector
03/08/2024
Work Orders
5371788
X-RE-5701; Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System
Radiation
08/19/2019
Work Orders
5858407
X-RE-5567B; North Ventilation Stack Discharge Noble Gas
Radiation Detector
10/23/2023
Work Orders
5962919
X-RE-6272 FB El 860 U2 Spent Fuel Pool E. Wall Low
Range Area Monitor Radiation Detector
09/19/2022
Work Orders
24386
X-RE-5253; Liquid Waste Processing Discharge Radiation
Detector
10/24/2022
Calculations
Interim Low Level Radwaste Storage Facility Inventory:
Aggregated Sum of Fractions Calculation for Vaults 3, 5, and
2/28/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR/TR-YYYY-
NNNNN
22-007897, 2022-007898, 2022-007899, 2022-008000,
22-008310, 2022-008665, 2023-000648
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
IR-2024-
NNNNNN
001302, 001331, 001333, 001338
Drawings
Radwaste Systems
04/06/2020
Miscellaneous
21-05
Waste Stream Analysis: Spent Resin Storage Tank (SRST)
08/12/2021
Miscellaneous
22-06
Waste Stream Analysis: 2022-2024 Dry Active Waste
06/14/2022
Miscellaneous
23-04
Waste Stream Analysis: Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System
Filter
01/08/2023
Miscellaneous
23-05
Waste Stream Analysis: Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System
Filter
01/09/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
2-586809
Sealed Source Leak Test Data Sheet
06/14/2023
Miscellaneous
23-251716
Sealed Source Leak Test Data Sheet
2/13/2023
Miscellaneous
CP-202200145
21 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
04/18/2022
Miscellaneous
CP-202300159
22 Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report
04/27/2023
Procedures
RPI-202
Receipt of Radioactive Material
Procedures
RPI-204
Radioactive Waste Handling
Procedures
RPI-205
Wet Waste Processing
Procedures
RPI-206
Liquid Process Filter Control
Procedures
RPI-212
Radioactive Source Control
Procedures
RPI-215
Waste Stream Sampling
Procedures
RPI-230
Radioactive Material Shipments
Procedures
RPI-239
Radioactive Material Shipment Documentation
Procedures
RPI-240
Radioactive Waste Shipments
Procedures
RPI-242
Radioactive Waste Characterization and Classification
Procedures
RPI-247
Radioactive Waste Shipment Documentation
Procedures
RPI-260
Radwaste and Radioactive Material Container Accountability
Procedures
RPI-263
RMC Activities
Procedures
RPI-271
Interim Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Procedures
RPI-272
Inventory Surveillance of Interim Low Level Radioactive
Waste and Storage Facilities
Procedures
RPI-274
CPSES Transportation Security Plan
Procedures
RPI-602
Radiological Surveillance
Procedures
SI-6.0
Security Instruction: Category 1 and Category 2 Radioactive
Materials
Procedures
STA-709
Radioactive Waste Management Program
Procedures
STA-713
Procedures
STA-919
CPNPP Safety-Security Interface Requirements
Radiation
Surveys
M-20231220-6
Survey after Vault 18 placed in RCA Yard
2/20/2023
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240103-6
Monthly Interim Low Level Rad Waste Storage Area
01/03/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240108-3
Warehouse C (WHSEC) Quarterly Survey
01/08/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240111-3
Vault Storage Area
01/11/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240122-8
C-Yard Bi-Weekly Survey
01/22/2024
Radiation
Surveys
M-20240229-4
810 Turbine Building Annex RP Calibration Lab
2/29/2024
Self-Assessments EVAL-2022-007
CPNPP Nuclear Oversight Audit Worksheet 6: Radworker
Practices
01/07/2023
Self-Assessments TR-2022-006037
22 CPNPP Mid-Cycle Assessment Report
07/29/2022
Shipping Records
22-0037
UN3321, Radioactive Material, LSA-II, 7, Fissile-Excepted
06/01/2022
Shipping Records
22-0040
UN3321, Radioactive Material, LSA-II, 7
07/20/2022
Shipping Records
22-0042
UN2916, Radioactive Material, Type B(U) package, 7, RQ-
Radionuclides
07/28/2022
Shipping Records
23-0047
UN2916, Radioactive Material, Type B(U) package, 7, RQ-
Radionuclides
2/08/2023
Shipping Records
23-0052
UN3321, Radioactive Material, LSA-II, 7
09/14/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
21-3228
Corrective Action
Documents
TR-YYYY-NNNN
22-3342
Miscellaneous
Post Trip Evaluation for a Unit 2 Trip on March 12, 2024
03/14/2024
Miscellaneous
Post Trip Evaluation for a Unit 2 Trip on March 17, 2024
03/18/2024