IR 05000445/1990001
| ML20006F588 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1990 |
| From: | Caldwell R, Earnest A, Powers D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006F587 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-90-01, 50-445-90-1, 50-446-90-01, 50-446-90-1, NUDOCS 9002280208 | |
| Download: ML20006F588 (13) | |
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APPENDIX
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U. S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-445/90-01 Construction Permits:
CPPR-126.
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50-446/90-01 CPPR-127 Dockets:
50-445
50-446
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Applicant: TV. Electric Company (TV)
400 North Olive, L.B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES)
Inspection At: CPSES, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: January 8-17, 1990
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Inspectors:
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R/. A. C'aldwell, PhysicaV/ Security Specialist-Date Security and Emergency Preparedness Section
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'A'. B. Earnest, Physical Security. Specialist Date Security and Emergency Preparedness Section
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Accompanied By:
R. B. Man 1111, Reactor Security Specialist Reactor Safeguards Branch, NRR-Approved:
PM 8-7-90
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Dr. D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and Date Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary:
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Inspection Conducted January 8-17, 1990 (Report 50-445/90-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the applicant's physical security program. The areas inspected within the physical security program included a followup on previously identified inspection findings; security plan and implementing procedures; management effectiveness; security program audits; records and reports; locks, keys, and combinations; security system power
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supply; compensatory measures; access control personnel; access control -
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. packages; access control - vehicles; alarm stations; communications; personnel training and qualifications; safeguards contingency plan implementation; material control and accounting; and Technical Instruction 2515/102 - land vehicle bomb contingency procedures.
Results: Within the program areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The inspectors identified problem areas that required further applicant action.
However, the applicant was able to complete the action before the inspection was completed. There are 34 outstanding open items
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closed within this report.
Seventeen of the outstanding open items closed can be classified as access-control concerns.
Most of the access-control concerns were caused by the extensive construction effort underway within the protected
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area (PA).
Fifteen of the outstanding open items closed.are classified either as vital area (VA) barrier, VA detection aid, or. communication hardware concerns.
Some of these concerns were the consequence of security hardware abuse caused by the extensive number of construction craftsmen required within
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the CPSES Unit I area. Also, closed during the inspection were all of the remaining preoperational physical security inspection modules.
As a result of this inspection, it appears that the applicant's physical security program is ready to undertake the security requirements imposed by an-operating license. During the inspection, the applicant demonstrated a responsive posture toward inspector concerns and thus enabled the-inspectors to efficiently close out previously identified deficiencies and open items.
It was apparent that the security force had high morale and was well trained.
a It was evident-to the inspectors that both corporate and plant management are supportive of the security program. 'The applicant has been imposing the physical security plan (PSP) requirements on.the plant and personnel for several months, and is now effectively implementing all aspects of access control.
Inspection Summary:
Inspection Conducted January 8-17,1990 (Report 50-446/90-01]
Areas Inspected:
No inspection of Unit 2 was conducted.
Results: Not applicable.
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DETAILS i
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Persons Contacted TV Electric
- W. Cahill, Executive Vice President
- H Bruner, Senior Vice President
- J. Beck, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering
- A. Scott, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operations i
- B. Lancaster, Manager, Plant Support
- A. Scogins,-Security Manager
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- T. Hope, TV Site Licensing
- B. Southam, Plant Security Manager
- J. Rumsey, Corporate Security
- G. Bell, Senior Licensing Engineer
- J. Ardizzoni, TV Security
- L. Fuller, TV Security
- M. Blevins, Nuclear Operations Support Manager
- D. McAfee, Quality Assurance Manager
- P. Mills, Quality Assurance Auditor
- G. Laughlin, Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Manager-
'*R. Rasmussen, Supervisor of I&C Production
- J.' Martin, I&C Supervisor
- J. Salsman, Emergency Planning Manager NRC
- R. Warnick, Assistant Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- J. Wiebe, Senior Project Inspector, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- W. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Powers, Chief, Security and Emergency Preparedness Section
- B. Spitsberg, Emergency Preparedness Analyst R. Man 1111, Reactor Security Specialist, Reactor Safeguards Branch, NRR Others
- W. Sparks, Burns Project Manager
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- D.. Hickey, Burns Security Chief
- D. Proffitt, Burns Assistant Security Chief l
- D. New, Burns Training Supervisor
- Denotes those that attended the exit interview on January 17, 1990.
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The inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during the inspection.
Those employees included members of the applicant's technical L
and management staff and members of the security organization.
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Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Open Item (445/8956-01):
Communications - The inspectors determined there were areas within the auxiliary building where radio communications were not possible.
The licensee installed new radio base stations and repaired coaxial radio antennas inside the power block. The inspectors confirmed-that the upgrade of the system eliminated the areas where radio communications were not possible.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8956-02):
Communications - The applicant was
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unable to demonstrate an effective duress alarm in the secondary alarm station (SAS).
The applicant has now removed the discretionary option that enables central alarm station (CAS) or SAS operators to turn the duress switch on and off. The licensee has corrected the duress alarm system.
The inspectors confirmed that the duress alarm can only be taken
off line by a security supervisor.
If a CAS/SAS operator attempts to
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place the device off line, there is an alarm in the other alarm station.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8962-01):
Security Program Audits - The applicant had not yet exercised the audit procedure. The inspectors confirmed that t'e'TV Electric quality assurance (QA) organization had performed Audit QAA - 89-35A from October 20 through November 27, 1989.
(Refer to paragraph 5 of this report).
(Closed) Open Item (445/8962-02):
Access Control-Personnel - The inspectors-determined that the applicant required extensive use of temporary badges'to accommodate major construction effort and cleanup work within the PA. The applicant did not demonstrate the ability to implement-
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personnel escort requirements by using temporary badges. The' inspectors confirmed that the applicant had reduced the use of temporary badging from a quantity of approximately 2000 badges to 221 badges at the time of this-inspection. The reduction in temporary badges enabled the applicant to'
successfully demonstrate adequate access control of personnel entering the plant protected area.
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(Closed) Open Item (445/8962-03):
Access Control-Personnel - The inspectors determined that a test weapon was not always detected by the portal metal detectors. The-inspectors confirmed through observation and testing that. modifications to the metal detectors now prevent test-weapons from being successfully passed through the portal metal detectors.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8962-04): Access Control-Personnel - The inspectors determined there was a potential for guard incapacitation due to high temperatures as a consequence of losing power to the PA portal access badge cubicles. The PA portal access badge cubicles are now
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L provided backup power to operate the air-conditioning system. The l
inspectors reviewed an applicant design change (DM 89-402) to provide alternate power for the air conditioning of the PA portal access badge Cubicles.
l-(Closed) Open Item (445/8962-05): Access Control-Packages - The inspectors observed that the applicant was unable to demonstrate r
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authorization procedures, off-loading of packages from vehicles, control of materials entering containment, and control of materials on site. The inspectors confirmed through observations and testing that the applicant now controls package access to the plant in an adequate manner.
(Closed)OpenItem(445/8962-06): Access Control-Vehicles - The inspectors determined that the applicant was unable to demonstrate proper key control for designated vehicles. The inspectors observed
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applicant-designated vehicle control and determined that applicant vehicle operators or security officers now have vehicular key control.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8962-09): Security System Power Supply - The inspectors determined that the as-built emergency power supply does not conform to the PSP diagrams. The applicant, by correspondence dated January 17, 1990, committed to submitting a 10 CFR 50.54(p) change in Revision 7 to the PSP after the issuance of the operating license for CPSES Unit 1 to correct the diagrams.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8968-01):
Personnel Training and Qualification -
The inspectors determined that some members of the security force had inadequate on-the-job training (0JT) and other security officers had not received critical task testing. The inspectors confirmed through a records review and interviews that critical task testing has been performed for all members of the security force. Additional OJT has also been accomplished by the applicant.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8968-02): Access Control-Packages - The inspectors determined that the applicant was unable to demonstrate adequate search techniques.
Simulated explosive devices passing through the x-ray detection devices were not recognized by the access control security officers. The inspectors observed applicant tests of the x-ray detection sy m m and determined that the access control x-ray operators could now ac n rately identify and prevent simulated test weapons and incendiary devices from entering the plant.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8968-03): Access Control-Vehicles - The inspectors determined that the applicant was unable to demonstrate adequate search techniques for vehicles entering the PA.
The inspectors confirmed through observations and testing that the applicant now controls vehicular access to the plant in an adequate manner.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8968-04):
Access Control-Personnel - The inspectors determined that the applicant was unable to demonstrate I
adequate control of personnel in the primary access point (PAP) and the auxiliary access portal (AAP) at shift change times. The consequences of this inadequate control resulted in inadequate searches of packages and materials. The inspectors observed that now security supervisors have been assigned to the PAP and AAP and that the x-ray operators have no other duties so they can concentrate on package searches.
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(Closed) Open Item (445/8968-05):
Compensatory Measures - The inspectors determined that the applicant could not demonstrate an adequate compensatory measures program. The inspectors observed that the applicant can now compensate for all degraded security systems adequately.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8968-07):
Communications - The inspectors determined that the applicant's security-base radio transmitters failed frequently. The number of radio transmissions required was too great for effective radio communications. The applicant installed new radio-base stations and repaired coaxial radio antennas inside the power block. The inspectors confirmed that the upgrade of the system eliminated the requirement to frequently repeat transmissions for effective communications.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8968-08): Alarm Stations - The inspectors determined that there were a large number of VA alarms created because of continuing construction activity within the VAs. This indicated a need for additional manpower to respond to these VA alarms. The applicant has reduced the number of alarms through a personnel training program and a reduction of construction personnel in the VAs.
Additionally, the applicant has employed 50 more security officers.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8970-01): Access Control Packages - The inspectors determined that the applicant could not demonstrate proper search techniques at PA portal access lanes. The searches were cursory so as to not reduce the throughput rate of many construction personnel requiring entry to the PA. The searches produced delays affecting constrtetion activity. The inspectors observed that security supervisors have now been assigned to the PAP and AAP, and that the x-ray operators have no other duties and can now concentrate on package searches. The applicant has also reduced the number of hand searches through a personnel training program and a reduction of construction' personnel requiring entry to the PA.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8970-02): Access Control-Personnel - The inspectors determined the effect of large metal objects passing through the x-ray machine increased the number of false alaram on the metal detectors. The inspectors determineo that the proximity of the metal detectors to the x-ray machines was the root cause of this problem. The inspectors confirmed through observation and testing that modifications to the metal detectors and x-ray machines have reduced the false alarm rate on the metal detectors to an acceptable level.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8970-03): Access Control-Personnel - The applicant was allowing persons requiring hand search to mingle with previously searched personnel.. This practice provided a potential pathway for contraband to enter the PA undetected if it was passed from unsearched personnel to the searched personnel. The inspectors observed the hand-search processes and observed that personnel requiring hand searching are now removed to an area that does not allow mingling with previously searched personnel.
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(Closed) Open Item (445/8970-04):
Physical Security Plan and Implementing Procedures - The inspectors determined that the PSP requires full implementation of the PSP to be in effect 60 days before fuel load. The continued need to have extensive temporary construction personnel who have not received full access authorization in the PA prevented the applicant from meeting the requirements of the PSP. The NRC staff, Comanche' Peak Project Division, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, by correspondence dated September 15, 1989, determined that allowing such personnel without full access authorization processing as temporary workers would be acceptable until the issuance of the operating license.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8970-05): Physical Security Plan and Implementing Procedures - The inspectors determined that there were approximately 1500 personnel on site who have not received training on security requirements. The inspectors determined from a review of the records that all of the temporary workers on site have now received general education instruction on security requirements.
Moreover, all personnel with unescorted access on site have now completed general education training or general education instruction.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-01):
Physical Barriers-Vital Area - The inspectors determined that an intruder could have sufficient time to gain surreptitious entry into the tornado vents at the top of Stairwells S1 and S2 if the intruder could reach the roof. The inspectors observed that the applicant has added additional barriers to prevent such access.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-02):
Physical Barriers-Vital Area - The inspectors were unable to inspect VA Doors 18 and 19 because of a broken lock and hoses passing through the doors. The inspectors subsequently confirmed that VA Doors 18 and 19 are adequate VA doors.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-03):
Physical Barriers-Vital Area - The inspectors determined that Doors 17, 429, 430, 431, 433, 447 and 448 required enhanced penetration resistance until CPSES Unit 2 becomes operational. Additionally, the inspectors determined that Door 447 had the hinge pins on the PA side of the boundary and that the hinge pins were not tamper protected.
The inspectors observed that these deficiencies have been adequately corrected.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-04):
Physical Barriers-Vital Area - The inspectors observed that Door 16 to the control building roof opens up additional pathways to other roofs where surreptitious entry to VAs is possible. The inspectors observed that the applicant has now appropriately secured Door 16.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-05):
Physical Barriers-Vital Area - The inspectors were previously unable to inspect the auxiliary elevator equipment room for VA penetration pathways. The inspectors subsequently inspected the area and determined that a hatch over the elevator shaft is properly secured to prevent entry to the elevator shaf c
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(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-06): Detection Aids-Vital Area - The inspectors noted that a change to the PSP is required to reflect that the emergency escape from containment is not locked as required by 10 CFR 73.55(d)(8). The applicant by correspondence dated January 17, 1990, committed to submitting a 10 CFR 50.54(p) change in Revision 7 to the PSP after the issuance of the operating license for CPSES Unit I to better define the protective mechanisms in place.
(Closed)OpenItem(445/8981-07): Detection Aids-Vital Area - The inspectors observed that the intrusion detection system line supervisory circuit did not remain active when the door intrusion device was placed off line. The inspectors determined that the applicant has changed the coding on the computer programming to permit only security supervisors to take intrusion devices off line, which is an adequate arrangement.
(Closed) Open item (445/8981-08): Detection Aids-Vital Area - The inspectors observed that the tamper switch on the junction box at Door 221 did not function. The inspectors reinspected the tamper switch for the junction box at Door 221 and observed it working properly.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-09): Detection Aids-Vital Area - The inspectors observed that the tamper switch for the magnetic switch on Door 1 did not function. The inspectors reinspected the tamper switch for the magnetic switch at Door 1 and observed it working properly.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-10): Detection Aids-Vital Area - The inspectors were unable to inspect the magnetic switches at Doors 13 and 19. The inspectors inspected the magnetic switches at Doors 13 and 19 and observed them working properly.
(Closed)OpenItem(445/8981-11): Detection Aids-Vital Area - The inspectors were unable to inspect the magnetic switch at Door ISO because of a large volume of personnel passing through the door.
The inspectors inspected the magnetic switch at Door 150 and observed it working properly.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-12): Access Control-Personnel - The inspectors noted that the badge card readers were not actively engaged to limit users' access. The inspectors determined that the badge card
readers are now engaged to discriminate between users' access levels.
(Refer to paragraph 10 of this report)
(Closed) Open Item (445/8981-13): Access Control-Personnel - The inspectors determined that vital equipment located in Rooms 200, 201, 206, 207, and 208 required additional protection as separate VAs. The applicant, by correspondence dated January 17, 1990, committed to submitting a 10 CFR 50.54(p) change in Revision 7 to the PSP after the issuance of the operating license for CPSES Unit I to make these rooms separate VA.
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3.
Physical Security Plan and Implementing Procedures (81018)
The PSP and implementing procedures were inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 73.55(b)(3). The areas inspected included review of the plan changes, management of security procedure development, and an evaluation of the procedures, and the procedure changes and the administration of the procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Management Effectiveness - Security Program (81020)
The effectiveness and adequacy of the applicant's management as it relates to the administration of the security program was evaluated.
The areas inspected included establishment of policy, delegation of responsibilities to qualified subordinates, accountability of performance, and the decision-making process.
The applicant's organization appears to efficiently integrate the security organization into the total organizational environment. The inspectors noted that interorganizational communications appear to be effective and open.
Senior management support for the security organization is apparent and appropriately forceful. Subordinate security. managers appear well qualified and trained to perform the required tasks. Overall administration of the security program appears sound, effective, and adequate to meet the perforiaance required by the NRC regulations.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Security program Audits (81034)
Security program audits and the surveillance program were inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.S4(p) and 73.55(g)(4) and the PSP. The areas inspected included audit personnel, audit frequency, quality and comprehensiveness of audits, audit findings, and applicant response to audit recommendations.
- The inspectors noted that the applicant performed one QA audit (QAA-89-35A) of the security program during this preoperational period.
The inspectors observed that the audit failed to provide a comprehensive, in-depth performance-based assessment of the security program. The QAA-89-35A audit, which was intended to be programmatic in nature, was shallow, did not cover all security programs (i.e., records and reports; locks, keys, and combinations) and lacked in security technical expertise in determining the significance of findings.
The audit was ineffective in uncovering weaknesses traditionally identified by NRC, and failed to provide constructive recommendations (especially in regard to
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-10-positive feedback). The inspectors noted that a QA audit is not required until after license issuance.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Records and Reports (81038)
Asamplingoftherecordsandreportswasinspectedtodeterminethe applicant s compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b) and (c);
10 CFR 73, Appendix B, Criteria A; and the PSP. The areas inspected included a review of reports of physical security events, security personnel qualification records, testing and maintenance program records, and routine activity reports.
During the initial stage of the inspection, the applicant's quarterly safeguards event logs were inspected and determined to be inadequate, especially in regard to the detail of discussion. Moreover, the logs were compared to security incident reports for the same time frame, and the inspectors determined that some safeguards events were not being logged as required by 10 CFR 73.71.
Prior to the end of the inspection, the applicant demonstrated an adequate understanding of the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 and a sample of the safeguards event logs for the period during the inspection indicated that all safeguards events were being properly logged.
No violati'ns or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Locks Keys, and Combinations (81046)
The locks, keys, and combinations program for protecting access to all vital areas, protected areas, and security-related equipment was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7), (8), and (9) and the PSP.
The areas inspected included the lock and key control system, penetration resistance of related hardware, protection of key controller, and protection of override features.
During the initial stage of the inspection, inspectors determined that inadequate inventories were conducted to ensure that positive control of security keys was maintained.
Furthermore, some security officers who were assigned to issue keys had not been trained for that responsibility.
Prior to the end of the inspection, the applicant demonstrated their ability to adequately inventory security keys. Also, all personnel who will be assigned to issue keys were trained and documentation was completed to demonstrate the necessary training.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Security System Power Supply (81058)
The security system power supply was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (e)(2),
and (f)(4) and the PSP. The areas inspected included the emergency power supply, uninterruptible power systems, independent power for nonportable communications equipment, and automatic switchover capabilities.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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Compensatory Measures (81064)
The compensatory measures program was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a)
and(g)(1). The areas inrpected included the deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measures.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
10. Access Control - Personnel (81070)
The access control program for personnel was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1), (6),
(7), and (8) and the PSP. The areas inspected included protected area access control (general), VA access control (general), the control of activities and conditions in protected and VAs, identification and authorization of personnel, badging practices, search equipment, escorting practices, and the access control facilities and equipment.
The inspectors observed that the applicant's VA access control program was able to partially discriminate between those with frequent requirements to enter specific VAs and those with infrequent requirements.
The applicant can use this capability to limit VA access to those personnel with the need for frequent entry, and to provide VA access expeditiously to any authorized employee with an infrequent requirement.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
11. Access Control - Packages (81072)
The access control program for packages was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)
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and (d)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) and the PSP. The areas inspected included the control of.the package and material access points, package and material searches, package authorization practices, off loading of the packages from vehicles, protection of admittance control, control
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No violations and deviations were identified in this program area.
12. Access Control - Vehicles (81074)
The access control program for vehicles was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1), (4),
and (9) and the PSP. The areas inspected included the control of vehicle access, searching of vehicles, practices for admittance control, and control of designated vehicles.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
13. Alarm Stations (81084)
The alarm stations were inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1), (2), and (3) and the PSP.
The areas inspected included the requirements and capabilities, redundancy and diversity of stations, protection of the alarm ttations, and systems security.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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14. Communications (81088)
Communications equipment and procedures were inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(f)(1), (2),
(3), and (4) and the PSP. The areas inspected included continuous communications capability, hard-wired communications systems, radio communication systems, and duress alarms.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
15.
Personnel Training and Qualifications (81501)
The program for personnel training and qualification (T&Q) was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix B; 50.54(p); 73.55(b)(4) and (h)(5); and the T&Q Plan. The areas inspected included general requirements, demonstration uf abilities, and the employment suitability and qualification criteria for security officers and watchpersons.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
16. Security and Contingency Plan Implementation Review (81601)
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The Security and Contingency Plan (SCP) implementation was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 50.90. The areas inspected included a review of SCP
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changes, availability of resources, procedures detailing actions and decisions, and drills of the SCP.
j The inspectors observed six drills conducted by the applicant to I
demonstrate their ability to implement the SCP.
The applicant's drills were well organized and challenged the security shif t on duty during the i
drills.
Representatives from the local law enforcement agency were participants in one of the drills and they expressed their appreciation for being included. The applicant's security force demonstrated an
excellent ability to handle the design basis threat during three of the i
drills. During the initial design basis threat drill, the operations
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shift personnel on duty were not knowledgeable about their responsibilities during a safeguards contingency. This condition was corrected and observed to be satisfactory during subsequent drills.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
17.
Material Control and Accountability (85102)
The program for material control and accountability methods was inspected to determine the applicant's compliance with the requirements of
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10 CFR 50.34(b), 70.3, and 70.51(b) and (c). The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the adequacy of the applicant's material control and accountability program.
At the time of the inspection, all of the applicant's fuel assemblies were
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under appropriate access control and in dry storage.
The inspectors
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randomly selected 10 fuel assemblies and confirmed that the corresponding nozzle serial numbers matched those serial numbers on inventory documentation. The inspectors paid specific attention to the shipment records on a particular fuel assembly that had been returned to and subsequently received back from the manufacturer following a modification.
The applicant's Forms NRC 741 and 742 appeared to be in proper order.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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18.
Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedures Verification (TI 2515/102)
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The applicant's program for protecting against an attempted radiological sabotage involving a land vehicle bomb if such a threat was to materialize was _ inspected to verify that the applicant has performed the contingency planning required by Generic Letter 89-07. The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews and determined that the applicant's procedures and contingency planning program were adequate.
No violations er deviations were identified in this program area.
19.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the resident inspectors and applicant representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on January 17, 1990. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.