IR 05000445/1989074
| ML19325E406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1989 |
| From: | Livermore H, Runyan M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325E405 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-89-74, 50-446-89-74, NUDOCS 8911060461 | |
| Download: ML19325E406 (14) | |
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S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ' OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION E NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/89-74 Parmits: CPPR-126' 50-446/89-74 CPPR-127 Dockets:'50-445 Construction Permit . 50-446 Expiration Dates: E
Unit 1: August 1, 1991 Unit 2: August 1, 1992
' = Applicant: TU Electric'. { Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 . Dallas, Texas 75201 .. L Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: September 6 through October 3, 1989 if f', 16l19 89 Inspector: tw em - l M.~ F. Runyar,, Resident Inspector, Date ! Civil Structural.
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(paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6)
Consultant: J. Dale, EG&G (paragraph 5) W.
Richins, Parameter (paragraphs 2 and 6) l' i "
Reviewed by: ' Z A 4 4 // L L D'EL-O . H. H.
Livermore, Lead Senior Inspector Date ' . , .I lu l= h, a L j.', 8911060461 891023 , ,, , '" > PDR ADOCK 05000445 -- '# fBIML. . - -. . - - - .. - . -
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Inspection Sunenary: ' Inspection conducted: September'6 through October 3, 1989 (Report - 50-445/89-74 50-446/89-74[ ' Areas Inspected:'.Ur.innounced, resident safety inspection of applicant's actions on. previous inspection findings, action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) defici.encies identified by the applicant, Unit 2 service water system piping coating removal, welder qualifications, and plant tours.
Resultsi Within the areas inspected, no weaknesses, strengths, violations, or deviations were identified.
. An equipment failure resulted in a sandblasted hole in a-Unit 2 Service Water System pipe (paragraph 4).
This event was caused by uneven erosion of the discharge nozzle of an abrasive removal. pump.
The NRC inspector concurred with the applicant's corrective actions in response to this event.
A discrepancy was discovered concerning a welder's qualification test (paragraph 5).
Due to nitigating circumstances, a finding was not identified for this error.
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! D I DETAILS , 1.
Persons Contacted ,
- J.
L. Barker, Manager, ISEG, TU Electric
- D. P.'Barry, Senior, Manager, Engineering, SWEC-i
- 0.
Bhatty, Issue Interface Coordinator, TU Electric '
- M..R.' Blevins, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support,
- .TU Electric
- R.
C. Byrd, Manager, Quality control (QC), TU Electric
- H.
M. Carmichael,; Senior.QA Program Manager, CECO.
- W.
J. Cahill, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, TU Electric
- J.
T. Conly, APE-Licensing, SWEC-
- W.
G. Counsil, Vice Chairmhn, Nuclear, TU Electric
- B.
S. Dacko,.. Licensing. Engineer, TU Electric "R.
J. Daly, Manager,'Startup, TU Electric i
- G.
G-. Davis, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item - Coordinator, TU Electric
- S.
L. Ellis, Performance'and Testing, TU Electric
- J.
C. Finneran, Jr., Manager, Civil Engineering, TU Electric ~ '*J.
L. French, Independent Advisory Group
- W.
G. Guldemond, Manager of Site Licensing, TU Electric
- T.'L.
Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer,
TU Electric .
- J.
C. Hicks', Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric
- A.
Husain,, Director, Reactor Engineering, TU Electric 1-
- J.
J. Kelley, Manager, Plant Manager, TU Electric l
- J.
E. Krechting, Director of Technical Interface, TU Electric
- 0.
W. Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric
- D.
M. McAfee, Manager, QA, TU Electric ,, L
- S.
G. McBee, NRC Interface, TU Electric.
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- J.
W. Muffett, Manager of Project Engineering. TU Electric l
- E.
F. Ottney, Program Manager, CASE
- S.
S. Palmer, Project Manager, TU Electric & '
- P. Raysircar, Deouty Director / Senior Engineer Manager, e
CECC
- M. J. Riggs, Plant Evaluation Manager, Operations, TU Electric L.
- J.
C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric
- R. L. Spence, TU/QA Senior Advisor, TU Electric
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- P. B. Stevens, Manager of Operations Support, TU Electric
- J.
F.
Streeter, Director, QA, TU Electric
- C.
L. Terry, Unit 1 Project Manager, TU Electric
- 0.
L. Thero, QTC Consultant to CASE
- R.
G. Withrow, EA Manager, TU Electric ..,. The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employeer , during this inspection period.
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- Denotes personnel present'at the October 3 1989, exit
, meeting.
' 2.
Applicant's Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701) ] (Closed) Open Item (445/8706-0-08; 446/8705-0-03): This item i addressed the sf.gnificance of exposed rebar, tha potential for.
additional rebar to have less than adequate concrete coverage, l and the'reduct. ton in concrete wall thickness due to inspection ' ' and repair. activities for the seismic air gaps between concrete structures.
The NRC inspector has witnessed gap ' width adjustment activities where grinding and chipping were used to widen the gap.
The NF.C inspector also witnessed final.
as-built inspections of both gap width and condition.
Exposed ' rebar (subsequently coated to prevent corrosion) was present-at the surface of the concrete at some locations within the . . gap being inspected.
Since rebar is exposed within the gap, ' additional rebar must have less than adequate concrete.
coverage.
In addition, the reduction in wall thickness could.
affect structural integrity.
., ^ The applicant addressed the above NRC concerns in office memorandum NE-11871 dated September 21, 1987, and TU Electric letter ~to the NRC, TXX-6859, dated October 30,' 1987.
Tne applicant stated that the cleaning and widening of the gaps . have not caused rebar to be exposed, but that the removal of E debris from the concrete surfaces have revealed locations t where rebar is exposed.
The 40 nonconformance reports 'NCRs) icsued for exposed: rebar discoverei during gap cleaning and-repair activities (May 1985 to February.1989) document that the' exposed rebar cases were the result of (1) misplaced rebar at the time of placement, (2) inadequ te concrete.
consolidation, (3) underpouring of conci te, or (4) spalling ' a of the concrete.
In each cas'a, the expos d rebar was deter;ined not to be detrimental to the structural integrity of the concrete structure.
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The walls at seismic building to building gaps were designed as exterior walls with typical minimum concrete coverage over rebar of 2 inches.
The seismic air gaps are not exposed to earth or weather since the gaps are totally sealed.
These ' walls can, therefore, be considered interior walls for which concrete coverage requirements are less stringent (typically 3/4 inch).
The amount of concrete removed to widen the gaps was generally ' less than 1/4 inch with isolated locations where 3/8 inch was removed.
The total area where concrete removal was necessary e was less than 2000 square feet of wall area out of more than . 100,000 square-feet of gap surface area.
The appliccnt concluded that the concrete removal activities within the , y 4% , w - .. uw-- ,-e--,, ,n-~ , - -,,, - - -.. - -, -.. -n --r, . - - - w,-w-- -.-,- , --e
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a solemic gaps will not affect the structural integrity of the , structures.' . - The NRC inspector reviewed the above documentation, associated.
NCRs,:and' construction travelers and concluded that the ,
concerns have been adequately addressed.
This item is closed.
, 3.
' Action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Deficiencies Identifit2 by the Applicant (32700) - ? \\ g a.
(Closed Unit 1 only) Conetruction Deficiency (.5DAR CP-82-02): " Design of, Horizontal-Fire Dampers."
By letter.TKX-3523 dated May 28, 1982, the applicant informed the NRC<that a deficiency involving the design of' horizontal fire dampers was a reportable item.
During preoperational rtartup testing (in 1982), several.
horizontal fire dampers-located in the heating, ventilating,'and air-conditioning (UVAC) system failed to
operate due-to problems associated with long-term construction, including debris buildup and corrosion.
.' These problems ere not typically encountered during routine operation of the HVAC system.
The applicant's , original corrective action plan was to evaluate each
damper and make specific necessary corrections.
However, issues associated with SDAR 84-08 (see paragraph 3.b) necessitated the complete replacement ;f all essential fire dampers.- This replacement is complete for Unit 1.
L The new dampers will be tested extensively during the current pr2 operational testing phase to prove-their i ! operability.
Nonessential dampers have been abandoned _ with their blade packages removed.
The NRC inspector reviewed the SDAR file and corrective actions as presented for SDAR 84-08 and concurred that the damper replacement program will fully correct the deficiency L associated with SDAR 82-02.
This construction deficiency ' la closed for Unit 1.
b.
(Closed - Unit 1 only) Ccnstruction Deficiency L (SDAR CP-84-08): " Curtain Fire Dampers."
By letter TXX-4257 dated August 13, 1984, the applicant , informed the NRC that a discrepancy involving the ' . installation of curtain fire dampers was a reportable L item.
The dampers were installed without sufficient - ' clearance to account for the thermal expansion which , would accompany the heat of a fire.
The fire dampers in this event may fail to clore and, therefore, not perform " their function of containing the fire.
'- ' ' The applicant reviewed the general fire protection plan and determined that several fire areas could be combined, thus eliminating the need for a nuraber of fire dampers.
The blade packages of these nonessential fire dampers l l' / ' ,. - - - - .-. - . -. - .. .
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) a , . .were removed per Design Change Authorization-(DCA)-25689, l Revision:2.
All essential fire dampers in Unit 1 were i replaced withinew dampers which meet Underwriters l ,f Laboratory (UL) requirements and should close under l design fire conditions.
This work was completed under , DCA 51454, Revision 1.
Th'e NRC inspector-reviewed the SDAR file, DCAs 25689 cnd ' 51454, and determined that.the applicant had taken.
t adequate corrective action to address this concern.
lt Other similar cases of improper installation of equipment ,* l: were addressed within the Corrective Action Plan (CAP).
This construction deficiency is closed for Unit 1.
c.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency:(SDAR CP-86-78): l< " Bolted Connections in Shear Planes."
By . , ' L letter TXX-88017 dated February 5, 1988, the applicant l-informed the NRC that a deficiency involving structural s';2el. bolted connections with threads in the shear plane ~ - was a reportable issue.
Specification 2323-SS-16B stated ' ' F that all field connections made with high strength steel i bolts in bearing type connections shall have threads: ? l excluded from the shear planes except where otherwise.
L stated or shown on engineering drawings.
In the. Unit:1 l cable spreading room, several bolted connemtions were > observed to have threads in the shear plane which were o not authorized as such on the engineering drawings.
u Also, QC inspection. procedures did not address this " p specification ~ requirement.
A high strength bolt's capability of resisting shear.
loads is substantially decreased u en the hearing surface-i area is reduced from a smooth contour to one containing.
" threads.
Since many structural steel calcuir.clons.
assumed'that threads were excluded from the shear plane and QC had not field-verified this configuration, the.
acceptability of the affected structures was in question.
The applicant determined that this condition was - potentially applicable to all structural steel installations utilizing high strength bolt.d connections subject to specification 2323-SS-16B, Revision 0.
This t applicability also extended to a small number of bolted connections associated with cable tray, conduit,-and HVAC T supports (which were normally welded).
, The applicant performed an extensive review of all Unit 1 - and 2 structural calculations potentially subject to this deficiency.
Due to the generous margin of safety designed into belted' connections, only one structural , installation, a platform, required that the bolt thrauds be excluded from the shear plane.
All other structural
installations were determined to be acceptable assuming , i f e e ,,.,- - -.a w- ,, ~ ., . - - + - - - - - -, - - - _ - - - - - - - - -... - - - - --..- - -- - -,- .
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' shear plane.
DCA 68030, Revision 1, and DCA 5567, Revision 6, were issued to inspect this one structural a platform and'to replace bolts as necessary.
The work was ' performed on Traveler CCE-89-3039-8902, and is now i ' complete.
As: preventive' action, the applicant issued DCA 60598, ) Revision.2, revising Specification 2323-SS-16B to allow ' threads in shear planes'for bearing type connections.
This will ensure that future derign calculations will'not.
assume that threads are excludad from the shear plane - , unless it is so'specified.
This DCA also included.
' nspection criteria to ensure that QC will verify.that
O i - tthreads are excluded from:the shear plane where required.
The-NRC inspectoLLreviewed the SDAR correspondence file, - , the revisions to Specification 2323-SS-16B DCAs 68030, 5567, and 60598; and' Traveler CCE-89-3039-8902; and a ,, determined.that the applicant had satisfactorily resolved: this issue.
This construction deficiency is closed.
m E d.
(Open) Constriation Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-61): " Snug ' Tight Torquing of Structural Bolts."
By letter TXX-88015, dated January 5, 1988, the applicant L , ' informed'the'NRC that a deficiency involving incorrectly h L torqued high strength bolts was a reportable' item.
E Cont.I&ry to the AISC Steel Construction Manual, E 7th Edition, site steel erection procedures and L.
spe :ifications allowed high strength bolts in bearing , con ivrt. ons to be installed only snug tight.
The AISC ,.
Mar s. requires all high strength bolts to be torqued to
a s p.tified pretension.
Under design seismic loads,. untertorqued high strength bolts in safety-related.
' betring connections could fail, resulting in structural ! and system failure.
This deficiency resulted from the failure of the original - ' design organization, Gibbs and Hill, to maintain.
- ' procedure and specification requirements in compliance with FSAR commitments.
It extends in scope to all high strength bolts in bearing-type connections.
The generic , aspects of this deficiency were addressed by the 7; Li... applicant's Corrective Action Program-(CAP).
, i-The applicant revised the controlling Specification ' ' 2323-SS-16B, " Structural Steel / Miscellaneous Steel," and >< subtier procedures to require that high strength bolts be torqued to a specified pretension unless otherwisa specified.
To evaluate the torque on high strength bolts currently installed in the plant, field verification .i method (FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE/ME/IC/CS-086 was issued n ',
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.under the Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program '(PCHVP).
The FVM-086 inarpectionsl are completc though a .large number of resulting NCRs temain outstanding.
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The NRC1 inspector reviewed the SDAR file correspondence,
Specification 2323-SS-16B revisions, and the list of
L outstanding NCRs.. Previous NRC field inspection related ! to FVM-086 for high strength' bolts is documented in NRC
. Inspection Reports 50-445/88-64, 50-446/88-60; . 50-445/88-70,.50-446/88-66; 50-445/88-76, 50-446/88-72, l . and'50-445/88-82, 50-446/88-78.
Based on the results of if this previous ~ inspection effort and the current review, a the NRC inspector concluded that the applicant had taken.
adequate action to correct the identified deficiency.
This construction deficiency will remain open pending-completion of the repairs specified in th? outstanding-
NCRs.
, t l o.- (open) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-67): '
.' ' " Undersized' Bolts and Missing Jam Nuts."
By letter TXX-88131 dated February 4, 1988, the applicant , i I informed the NRC that a deficiency involving undersized.
' , bolts and miasing jam nuts was a: reportable item.
Jam o L . nuts were found to be missing on a Unit 1 stre:tural '
platform.
Undersized bolts.were discovered to be installed in vendor fabricated structural steel installations.
The corrective actions for these ' . deficiencies were addressed by Corrective Action Request . L .(CAR)-011.
' Nonconformance Report (NCR) M86-102057X was issued documenting missing jam nuts for high strength bolts. on " the Unit i rocating platform.
DCA 18853 had added the ' requirement to Specification 2323-SS-16B to install. jam.
nuts on all high strength bolts greater than one inch in diame'er.
The missing jam nuts resulted from.the failure c , to fully implement this change on previously installed connections.
The applicant's evaluation of this issue resulted in the elimination of the requirements for jam nuts altogether.
In ordet to provide the same protection against the loosening of bolts, Specification 2323-SS-16B a was revised to require the torquing'of all high strength bolts.
The corrective action for the new torquing.
requirement was addressed in SDAR CP-87-61 (see- < paragraph 3.d).
, J Numerous vendor fabricated structural steel connections , ' - were installed with bolts smaller than those specified on the design drawings.
Though the smaller bolts were consistent with the vendor shop drawings, an error existed between the vondcr shop drawings and the design es 'I- , ~ -,,, ,, , . _, ..,_.....e..-,,_ .,...., -.. _ -,,,,. _ _., _ _., _ _ _ _...,.. _ _. _,. . ..... m , _
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This error was not identified during the installation and' inspection of the affected connections.
-The root,cause of this deficiency was the failure of the original design organization to adequately control bolt
size substitutions made by the vendor.
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During.the'PCHVP, under FVM-090, bolt diameters were.
, validated to the existing design drawings (disregardiLJ
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' information from the vendor drawings).
NCRs were written-fortany discrepancy regarding bolt size.
FVM-090 i inspections are complete though a large number of resulting NCRs remain open.
As preventive actior., i - specification 2323-SS-16B was revised to require'the vendor * c 'obtain. written permission from the responsible engine ring organization prior to making any bolt diameter substitutions.
The NRC inspector reviewed the SDAR file correspondence, ' CAR-Cll, and theIrelevant revisions to Specification . 2323-SS-ISB.
Previous NRC field. inspections of PCHVP.
L activities' involving bolt size verification on structural.
, h-steel components arc documented in NRC Inspection.
. Reports 50-445/88-64, 50-446/88-60; 50-445/88-70, t b 50-445/88-66;-50-445/88-76, 50-446/88-72; and . E 50-445/88-82,L50-446/88-78.
Based on the results of this ' E previous-inspection effort and the current documentation.
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review, the NRC inspector concluded that the applicant ' j had taken cdequate action to correct thc identified deficiency.
L This construction deficiency will remain open, pendinc closure of the outstcnding NCRs.
f.
(0 peti) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-68).
"Hilti i Bolt Inadeglaciess" By letter TXX-88174 dated ' February 5, 1988, the applicant informed the NRC that n - several deficiencies involving concrete expansion anchors supplied by Hilti (Hilti bolts) constitute a reportable item.
One of the deficiencies was the use of Hilti bolts , for anchoring rotating equipment.
Hilti boltt are-not well suited for this type of cycli: load.
In addition, i Hilti bolts were found to be improperly torqued and *n
v have bottomed-out' nuts (where the nut covers part of the u unthreaded shank on the bolt).
These discrepancies were ' the result of inadequate engineering criteria governing L the usa of Hilti bolts.
$ To resolve the issue of Hilti bolts on ratating equipment l; anchors, FVM CPE-IM-FVM-EQ-103 was issued to authorize a D 100 percent walkdown of these anchors to provide ' b information necessary for specific engineering ? r l . p, '. , G L.
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NCRs were used to document the final.
LU disposition.for each. anchor.
' ! < J dm .. K ' To' resol */c the concerns regarding Hilti bolt torque and U bottomed-out nuts, FVM CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE/ME/IC/CS-090 was ) s l issued to-inspect all accessible Hilti bolts for these-
' s attributes.
NCRs were written for~all discrepant.
conditions and'for inaccessible bolts.
The FVM inspections are. complete.
' To prevent these problems from recurring, the applicant.
revised Specification 2323-MS-101 (Mechanical Erection) to prohibit fu:*ther'use of Hilli bolts to anchor rotating - .,. equipment and revised specification 2323-SS-30 l (Structural Embedments) to incorporate verifications of- ! ,, L Hilti bolt torque and to provide appropriate. methods for l avoiding. bottomed-out nuts.
I t . ^ L The generic implications of these discrepancies include L all areas where inadequate engirseering criteria was
applied to the construction of.the plant.
The applicant's extensive PCHVP provided this necessary - ), wide-scope review.
. I The NRC inspector reviewed the SDAR correspondence file - , and the revisions to Specifications 2323-MS-101'and - 2323-SS-30, and concluded that the technical issues have ,, L been. adequately addressed.
This construction deficiency- '
L will remain open pending closure of the associated NCRs.
! s g.
(Open) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-71): " Missing i , Welds and Undersined Members."
By letter TXX-88175 dated- ' February 5, 1988, the-applicant informed the NRC that a ' deficiency involving undersized welds, missing welds, and undersized members was a reportetle item.
These discrepancies were discovered during reinspection.
activities by the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) and
were addressed in CAR-87-012.
FVM-090 was issued under the PCHVP to provide a means of~1ccating all other similar existing discrepancies.
A NCR was written to identify each discrepancy.
The root cauce for undersized members and m3ssing and >: undersized welds was determined to be inadequate o construction supervision, poor workmanship, and incomplete inspection procedures.
The applicant ' determined that the generic implication of undersized members and missing welds was limited to the structural steel population, whereas, undersized wclds extended to all American Welding Society (AWS) welding.
CAR-017 was ' issued to address this concern, out pertained only to the structural steel population.
Other populations, such as . . '1 < to
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) - , i cable tray and conduit supports, were addressed by individual inspection programs within the PCHVP and.
assessed to the same specirications.
Several procedural changes were made to prevent simile.r problems from.
.' occurring in the future.
Specification 2323-SS-16B-(Structural Steel / Miscellaneous Steel) was revised to include more extensive inspection criteria.
The old i ' structural steel site fabrication and installation ' > - s Procedure (QI-QP-11.14-1) was superseded by-
NQA 3.09-2.01, " Inspection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel."
other subtier procedures were also revamped ta conform to the. revised vecification.
Construction and QA personnel received training in line l with the new inspection criteria.
a NRC field and document inspection of FVM-090 pertaining to structural steel is documented in NRC Inspection L Reports. 50-445/88-64, 50-446/88-G0; 50-445/88-70, i 50-446/88-66 r 50-445/88 76, 50-446/88-72; and 50-445/88-82, 50-446/88-79.
This inepection effo.t, summarized in NUREG-0797, Supplement.20, concluded that the reinspection program adequately addressed the:CPRT findings.
The NRC inLpector reviewed the SDA2.
correspondence file, the relevant portions of n Specification 2323-SS-16B cnd Procedure NQA.3.09-1.01, and concluded that the applicant had satisfactorily addressed the resulting technical and administrative-
. issues.
The FVM-090 inspections are complete.
Approximately 150 NCRs remain open pending resolution.
This construction deficiency is closed on a technical basis, but will remain open entil all NCRs are resolved.
' h.
(Open) Constructicn Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-120): " Tornado Missile Barriers."
By Jetter TXX-88036 dated ' February 4, 1988, the applicant informad the NRC that a deficiency introlving tornado missile barriers was a , reportable item.
Various examples of inadequate tornado missile protection were discovered during the design ' v basis validation program including: (1) undersized.
b perimeter curbs on equipment hatch openings on the roof of the Safeguards building, (2) inadequately anchored manhole covers on the eltetrical ductbanks in the yard areas and on the Service Water pipe tunnel, and ' (3) inadequately braced tornado missile barrier doors located over the equipment hatches of the Diesel s Generator buildings.
In addition, a concern was raised.
over potential missile damage to pipes spanning the- , ..,. 3-inch seises.c gap between buildings.
A probabilistic study (work order 18051) concluded that the probability of damage in the seismic gaps was too low to be - considered a legitimate safety concern.
For all other identified problem areas, DCAs 60014, 60017, 60019, , q.
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+ n;.,. \\ ~ .60020, and 64599 were issued tu provide the necessary ' , modifications.- This included, for example, the placement.
of stiffener bars on theJdiesel generator missile barrier doors and the inclusion of hold-down bolts on various o R manhole. covers.- To prevent rec'Mrence of this problem, the applicant
issued Design Lasis Document (DBD)-CS-081, " General ' ' Structural ~ Design criteria," which includes the design criteria for tornado missile barriers.
, s, > The NRC inspector reviewed the SDAR file, DBD-CS-081, ! Work Order,18051, and the referenced DCAs and concluded.. ' that the applicant had formulated a sufficient correction-i action plan to resolve this safety concern.
The' field + ! work is still in progress with four DCAs remaining to be D' completed.: This construction deficiency will remain open pending cornpletion of these DCAs.
' i.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-88-26): , " Turbine Building Seismic Design."
By letter TXX-88194 dated February 4, 1989, the applicant informed the NRC , . that a deficiency involving the potential failure of the
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Turbine building during a seismic event was a reportable item.
Preliminary calculations had concluded that the.
- turbine building structural steel frame-required.
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mcoifications to prevent the pctential impact of the '" ~ turbine building on adjacent seismic Category I structures during an earthquake.
Subsequently, a new " calculation (16345/6-CS[S]-534) showed that the turbine , concrete pedestal had. sufficient support to resiar the ~ previously caleclated collapse of the turbine building in .' the direction.(east) where adjacent seismic Category I ' structures are located.
The applicant, therefore, concluded that no modifications are necessary and that this item is no longer considered reportable.
, The NRC inspector reviewed the SDAR correspondence file , and Calculation 16345/6-CS[S)-534 and concluded that the applicant had satisfactorily addressed this issue.
This construction deficiency is closed.
i , ' 4.
Unit 1 Service Water System Piping Coating Removal (49063) ' . m.
The NRC inspector viewod a segment of post-blast videotape of a portion of the Unit 2 10-inch service water cystem (SWS) piping.
The visual clarity of the tape was outstanding.
All ' inspected attributes were satisfactory other than several residual patches of plasite coating which exceeded the maximum size criteria.
These patches will be reblasted prior to final at.ceptance.
Several corrosion pits were observed, but none of
- nese exceeded the 50-mil depth criteria as measured by
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R [ '.t ] h, ultrasonic test measurement.
The NRC inspector also witnessed.
' ' e some real-time videotaping of the 10-inch pipe during which, y again, only residual.plasite patchen were nonconforming.
Additionally, the NRC inspector witnessed a QC close-out: housekeeping-video-inspection of a segment of 10-inch pipe and_ q observed that the personnel involved were thorough and conservative in their judgements.
On September 14,'1989, a 4-inch abrasive removal line that was under pressure split at the discharge of a mucking pump that tj was being used_ to ren.ove spent abrasive particles; to the collection pit.
The leaking abrasive spray eroded a . 3" x 1 3/8" hole-in'a portion of Unit 2 10-inch SWS pipe that was being used as a conduit for the-abrasive removal line.
'
- he' external coatings on other pipes in the vicinity of the
blasted hole were affected by this event though no apparent structural damage occurred other than to the SWS pipe.
'NCR-89-10233,was issued and a stop-work order was placed in . effect.
The NCR disposition Inquired replacement of the damaged pipe..The event was caused by uneven erosion of the mucking pump discharge nozzle.
To prevent recurrence, the ' sbrasive exhaust system was reconfigured to include two ' */ mucking pumpe located in an area outside of the SWS pipe.
' ' Pump nozzles are to.be checked every shift for any indication ' , of erosion'. The c. top-work order was lifted on' September'28, . . ' 1989, and work resumed.
l L The NEC inspector observed the damaged pipo in the field, I examined the eroded mucking pump nozzle and exhaust hose, and reviewed NCR 89-10233.
The NRC inspector determined that the H applicant had appropriately addressed this event and that the lifting of'the stop-work order was justified.
The possibility
p, that a similar event occurred during the coating remove?. project for Unit 1 SWS piping is negligible since mucking $ pumps were not used in the Unit 1 effort.
All extracted sand was under vacuum and could not have damaged the piping.
5.
Welder Qualifications (55050) p<? The NRC inspector reviewed approximately 200 performance qualification test records for welders employed by Daniel.
,e This documentation was reviewed against the requirements or ASME Boiler and Prossure Vessel Code, Section IX, 1974 edition.
One qualification test record was found to be discropant.
Table QW-452.3 of the Code requires a face and , root bend test for pipe groove weld tests except in cases , where the material thickness exceeds 3/8-inch, for which two " side-bend tests can be substituted.
In the noted example, 'p, side-bend tests were substituted for the face and root bend tests on a material thickness of 0.337 inch.
This thickness ' is less than 3/6-inch and does not meet the exception < , '1.- - . - - - -. ,-,. - -, ~. . - _.,,... - _... _... .,,.__,_-__~e_ _,,_._ .__.---._m,m _ -~ -___, _ . ,r
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. criteria,.therefore, rendering the substituted tests invalid.- In; addition,, Table QW-466.1 of the code requires the weld to
- be bent around a mandrel of a diameter not to exceed four
' times the material thickness.
For the above-test, the mandrel.
' diameter should not exceed 1.348' inches.
Instead, a mandrel ' of 1.5 inches was used.
> ' , Normally, these violations of Code requirements would constitute an'NRC violation.
However, the noted example was . clearly isolated (1 in approximately 200) and the applicant.
' , provided documentation showing that'the welder in question was , on site for only 45 days and performed-work only on AWS D9.1 " w ccmponents (sheet metal).
AWS D9.1 components require only.
visual examination of: welder qualification test coupons, and , for the welder in question, the' visual examinations were acceptable.
Given' these extenuating circumstances, a finding will not be issued for this discrepancy.
, ' 6.
Plant Tours (42051C. 46053)
' The NRC inspector made frequent tours of Unit 1, Unit 2, and common areas of the facility to observe items such as _
housekeeping, equipment protection, and in-procers work.
,, activities.
No violations or deviations were identified and no items of' significance were observed.
7.
Exit Meeting (30703)
AnLexit meeting was conducted October 3, 1989, with the.
applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report.
No written material was provided to the applicant by "~ ' the inspector during this reporting period.
The applicant did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
During this meeting, the NRC inspector summarized the' scope-and ' findings of the inspection.
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