IR 05000445/1997013
| ML20141J765 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141J763 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-97-13, 50-446-97-13, NUDOCS 9705280216 | |
| Download: ML20141J765 (10) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.'S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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l Docket Nos.:
50-445;50-446
License Nos.:
Report No.:
50-445/97-13;50-446/97-13 l
j Licensee:
TU Electric i
Facility:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
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Location:
FM-56 I
Glen Rose, Texas
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Dates:
April 28 through May 2,1997
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Inspector:
Bruce Earnest, Physical Security Specialist Plant Support Branch i
Approved By:
Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch
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Division of Reactor Safety i
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i ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
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9705280216 970521
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PDR ADOCK 05000445
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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-445/97-13; 50-446/97-13 This routine, announced inspection focused on the licensee physical security program. The areas inspected included records and reports, vehicle access control, protected area detection, emergency power supply, compensatory measures, vital area barriers, vital area detection, access authorization, and security plans and procedures.
Plant Sucoort An excellent records and reports system was in place (Section S1.1).
- An efficient vehicle access control program was in place (Section S2.1).
- An effective perimeter detection system was installed and maintained
(Section S2.2).
The security systems emergency power supply system was effective in providing
uninterruptible power (Section S2.3).
The compensatory measu es program was properly implemented (Section S2.4).
- An effective vital area barrier system was in place ( Section S2.5).
- The vital area detection aids would detect an intruder attempting to enter the vital
areas (Section S2.6).
The access authorization program was properly implemented (Section S2.7).
- The security plan changes and the implementing procedures were effective in
meeting regulatory requirements (Section S2.8).
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Report Details.
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j E Plant Support
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities i
S 1.1 Record and Reports
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Inspection Scope
The security program records and reports were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b) and (c),10 CFR 73.70(al-(c), and the physical security plan. The inspector reviewed '... safeguards event logs for the first and second quarters of 1997.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory and license requirements to report security events. The licensee's security staff was correctly identifying sechrity events required by regulations. In addition, the licensee used the information contained in their records and reports to track and trend problem areas.
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Conclusion The licensee had an excellent records and reports system.
S2 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors (81700)
S 2.1 Access Control - Vehicles a.
Insoection Scone The vehicle access control program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (d)(4) and the physical necurity pla.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector observed searches of three vehicles to ensure that they were properly searched prior to entering the protected area. The security officers conducted the search in compliance with their procedural requirements.
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Conclusion An efficient vehicle access control program was in place.
S2.2 Detection Aids - Protected Area a.
Inspection Scope The detection aids program for the protected area was inspected to determine
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compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(4), (e)(2) and (3) and the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected included the detection systems' capabilities, zoning of the alarm systems, detection system security, and maintenance of the detection aids system.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector observed licensee's tests of the perimeter microwave and E-field detection system. The tests conducted included 17 microwave zones and 2 E-field *
zones. All of the zones tested successfully passed all tests. The detection system was well designed and maintained. The microwave heads were double and triple stacked and provided an effective detection capability to detect any intruder attempting to enter the plant undetected.
c.
Conclusion An effective perimeter detection system was installed and maintained.
S2.3 Security Systems Power Sucolv a.
Inspection Scope The security systems power supply was inspected to determine compliance vw.'..
the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (c)(1) and (2), and (f)(4), and the requirements of the physical seemity plan. The areas inspected included the uninterruptible power supplied by their battery system and automatic switchover capabilitie.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector observed a test of the uninterruptible power supply. The licensee switched off the station power to the security systems in order to demonstrate the capabilities of the emergency power' supply system. The uninterruptible power supply (battery system) adequately took over supplying the security systems with power. Test alarms at vital area doors and perimeter detection zones were
conducted, and the system performed as required under the alternate power source.
Radio communications remained unaffected by the loss of off site power. There was an automatic indication to the alarm station operators that indicated the loss of station power and the immediate assumption by the uninterruptible power system.
There were no spurious alarms, c.
Conclusion The security systems emergency power supply system was effective in providing uninterruptible power.
S2.4 Compensatorv Measures a.
Inspection Scone The compensatory measures program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (g)(1), and the physical security plan. The araas inspected included the deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measures.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector confirmed that the licensee deploys compensatory measures in a manner that adequately compensates for degraded security systems. The inspector reviewed security instruction / procedure 4.0, Compensatory and Contingency Instructions, and determined that the licensee procedure follows NRC guidance, contained in NUREG 1055, Guidance on the Application of Compensatory Measures
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for Power Reactors. The ms,nector observed a demonstration of compensatory posting of the protected area boundary. Seven security officers were posted and the inspector walked down the posts and determined that the perimeter of the protected area would be adequately compensated if the security detection system became totally degraded due to the loss of the security computer. The inspector determined through observation and the interview of security officers posted for the test, that the security officers assigned to compensatory posts were adequately trained for those duties. The inspector also observed and interviewed a security officer posted for a degraded vital area barrier (train 2 diesel fuel tank) and determined that the officer was cognizant of his duties and posted in accordance with the procedure.
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Conclusion
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The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. The security j
officers were well trained on the program requirements.
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S2.5 Physical Barriers - Vital Area i
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Insoection Scope i
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The vital area physical barriers were inspected to determine compliance with the
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requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (c)(1), (2) and (6), (e)(1), and the physical j
security plan.
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Observations and Findinas l
The inspector conducted a walkdown of a sample of the vital area barriers. The
inspector confirmed that the vital equipment was contained in vital areas that were
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protected by physical barriers that provided penetration resistance to both forced
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and surreptitious entry. The barriers were maintained in an adequate manner. Prior
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to the removal of vital area barriers, security will be notified in order to adequately
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compensate for the degraded barrier. The inspector determined through observation
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that the vital areas were contained within a protected area and that an intruder
would have to penetrate two physical barriers prior to access to vital equipment.
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The inspector confilmed that the control room and central aiarm station were i
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protected within a bullet resistant structure.
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Conclusion
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An effective vital area barrier system was in place.
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S2.6 Vital Area Detection Aids
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a.
Insoection Scone
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l The vital area detection aids were inspected to determine compliance with
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l 10 CFR 73.55(a), (d)(7), and (e)(3) and the requirements of the physical security plan.
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b.
Observations and Findinas l
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The inspector observed tests of the detection system on vital area portals. The l
j alarm system performed as required and would effectively detect a forceful or j
i surreptitious attempt at entry into the vital areas. The transmission lines were line-
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I indicating, and the balanced magnetic switches were tamper-alarmed.
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Conclusion
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The vital area detection aids would effectively detect an intruoer attempting to enter j
the vital areas.
i S 2.7 Access Authorization a.
Inspection Scope Portions of the access authorization program was reviewed in order to determine
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compliance with 10 CFR 73.56 and the physical security plan, i
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Observations and Findinas
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f The inspector reviewed 10 access authorization records that resulted in denial of unescorted access. The records indicated a conservative but fair approach. All files
indicated that individuals were informed of their right to appeal the decision to deny
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i authorization. The review revealed that the licensee was correctly denying
unescorted access.
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Another 10 access authorization records of personnel who were granted unescorted
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access were reviewed. The records were complete in all aspects, The background j
investigations were thorough and contained all the elements required by the j
physical security plan. The records were correctly safeguarded in locked safeguards t
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The inspector reviewed access authorization Audit NOE-EVAL-96-000145. The i
audit was comprehensive and indicated no significant problems with the access
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Conclusion
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The access authorization program was very effectively implemented.
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S2.8 Security Plans and Procedures
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inspection Scoce The licensee's physical security plan and severalimplementing procedures were
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reviewed to determine comp. fiance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p),
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j 10 CFR 50.90, and 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3).
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8-b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed 10 CFR 50.54(p) Revision 27 to the physical security plan
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and Revisions 8 and 9 to the training and qualifications plan. The changes met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) in that they did not reduce the effectiveness of the plans. In addition, the inspector reviewed procedures TRA-102-R10-1, TRA-
102-R10-1, TRA 101-R8-3, (Plant Access Training Procedures) and security
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instruction / procedure 4.0 (Compensatory and Contingency Instructions). The i
procedures were comprehensive and effectively implemented the requirements of the regulations and the physical security plan.
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Conclusion i
The security plan changes and the implementing procedures were effective in meeting regulatory requirements.
V. Management Meetings
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X1 Exit Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 2,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
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j ATTACHMENT
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i
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Licensee C. L. Terry, Group Vice President
j M. Blevins, Plant Manager D. R. Alps, Security Manager J. Ardizzoni, Admin Security Supervisor
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i J. M. Ayres, Plant Support Overview Manager j
J. Braun, Security Coordinator j
J. B. Britt, Corporate Security
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i K. Britt, Compliance Security Coordinator j
W. Cravey, Training Security Coordinator j
i L. Fuller, Site Security i
l N. Harris, Licensing Engineer i
K. Hayes, Burns Security Chief T. Hope, Regulatory Compliance Manager f
B. Isom, Plant Security Supervisor I
j B. T. Lancaster, Manager, Plant Support
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M. Marciniak, SMART Team 1 - Security J.' Martin, SMART Team 1, Supervisor
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P. E. Mills, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist, Operations Quality Assurance
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M. Millsap, Training Supervisor NRC V. Ordaz, Resident inspector
R. Nease, Reactor Engineer
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED TRA-102-R10-1, Plant Access Training TRA-102-R10-2, Plant Access Training TRA 101-R8-3, Plant Access Training Security instruction / Procedure 4.0, Compensatory and Contingency Instructions
Safeguards Event Logs, First and Second Quarters of 1997 i
Safeguards Event Reports, 97-01-021 and 97-04-296 Physical Security Plan Revision 27
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Training and Qualification Plan Revisions 8 and 9
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