IR 05000373/1988004

Insp Repts 50-373/88-04 & 50-374/88-04 on 880210-0325.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Surveillance, Training,Lers,Outages,Unit Trips & Mgt Meeting

ML20151B057
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	04/04/1988
From:	Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151B052	List: IR 05000373/1988004 ML20151B049
References
50-373-88-04, 50-373-88-4, 50-374-88-04, 50-374-88-4, NUDOCS 8804080030
Download: ML20151B057 (11)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report hos. 50-373/8SC04(DRP); 50-374/88004(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-373; E0-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted: February 10 through March 25, 1988 Inspectors: R. Kopriva Approved By: M. A. Ring, Chie [# '

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Reactor Projects Section IB Date Inspection Summary Inspection on February 10 through March 25, 1988 (R(ports N /68004(DRP); 50-374/88064(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operatior.al safety; surveillance; training; Licensee Event Reports; outages; unit trips; and management meetin r Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no violations nr deviations were identified. The licensee has had several problems during this report peri d in which the resident inspector has expressed his concerns. Some of these are the persunnel error resulting in a reactor scram, a missed Technical Specification surveillance and a problem not idertifying degraded equipre".

Several of these items are still being investigate The licensee started a planned 15 week outage on Unit I which, to date,

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j appears to be progressing well. Major items to be accomplished are drywell

, cooling nodification, decontamination of the reactor recirculation piping, l and snubber reduction.

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, 8804080030 880404 POR A30CK 05000373 i G FFJG

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• s DETAILS Persons Contacted Conmonwealth Edison Campany (CECO)

• + J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station

• W. Huntington, Services Superintendent

• J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning J. Schmeltz, Assistant Superintendent, Operations P. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services T. Hamerich, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor W. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintea nce J. Atchley, Operating Engineer

+D. A. Brown, Quality Assurance Supervisor M. Harper, Quality Assurance Engineer A. Settles, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

+D. Rahn Director, Signals and Safeguards

+E. Seckinger, LaSalle Project Engineering (BWREO)

+C. Allen, Nuclear Licensing

+R. Bishop. BWR Operations

+ Santic, Master Instrument Engineer

+E. Spitzner, Supervisor of Instrument Maintenance

+B. Rybak, BWR Engineering U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (USNRC)

+ Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects

+ Forney, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1

+ Ring, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IB

+ Jones, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section IB

+P. Shemanski, LaSalle Project Manager

+ Jordan, Chief, BWR Licensing Examiner Section

• +R. Kopriva, Resident Inspector, LaSalle

+K. Naidu, NRR/DRIS/VIB

+0. Butler, Reactor Inspector, DRS

+ Westburg, Reactor Inspector, DRS

+ Newneyer, Engineering Aide

• Denotes personnel attending the exit interview on March 25, 198 + Denotes personnel attendirg the management meeting held on Feburary 16, 198 Adoitional licensee technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Violation (373/87034-03; 374/87033-03): The licensee did not establish treasures to adequately control the use of out of celibration neasuring equipment and evaluate the effects of fleceters on cperating

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equipment during the period from the previous calibration to the

! subsequent calibration date. The local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) data is 1 now maintained on a computer based 109 The technical steff documents

specific uses of the equipment and will continue to include references

) to the test equipment used in perfcrming the LLRT's.

l (Closed) Violation (373/87035-08;374/87034-01): This violation refers i to two examples of not adhering to procedures. Both examples pertained

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to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems. The Unit 1 RCIC l'

keep fill pump seized up rendering the RCIC system inoperable. The licensee did not make the proper notification to the NRC within the l

required 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> The second example was the Unit 2 RCIC turbine test. The nuclear station operator did not adhere to the proc? dure resulting in a turbine overspeed

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and subsequent turbine trip. In both events, the personnel involved were

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interviewed and instructed on proper use of procedures. Also, both the

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Unit I and Unit 2 procedures have been revised to mitigate further j occurrences of these events, i (Closed) Unresolved Item (373/85012-06; 374/85012-06): On May 10, 1985, while in cold shutdown, Unit 2 received a scram signal from 'C'

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Intermediate Power Range Monitor (IRM) as a result of spurious spiking in the monitor cabling. This item became a violation (374/85017-04) in i

inspection report 374/85017. Issuance of the violation closes this

unresolved item.

! (Closed) Noncompliance (373/85012-03B; 374/85012-03B): An isolation of j the Unit 2 Shutdown Cooling System occurred on April 13, 1985 due to j inadequate instructions being utilized to return the 135 psig system

isolation switch to service. The isolation was reset. Blown fuses were

! replaced. Miswiring of the main steam line hi flow pressure switches

! was corrected. All electrical contractor personnel were trained on the l work procedures involved. The inspector finds the licensee's actions j adequate.

(Closed) Noncompliance (373/85012-03A; 374/85012-03A): On April 12, l

1985, a blown fuse went undetected and caused a Group I isolation when I the condenser low vacuum isolation switches were returned to service, j The fuses were replaced and the half isolation on trip system ' A' was

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cleared. The main steam line hi flow pressure switches were found

miswired after being returned to service for post maintenance testin The wiring problem was corrected and the half isolation on trip system

'B' was cleared. The inspector finds the licensee's actions adequat .

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(Closed) Noncompliance (373/85012-04; 374/85012-04): A maintenance j mechanic started work on an electrical cabinet for the Unit 2 Shutdown i Cooling System on April 13, 1985 without an authorized work reques I resulting in grounding a wire and isolating the Shutdown Cooling System.

The broken wire was repaired properly and the electrician advised of the

! proper procedures necessary for performing electrical maintenance. The i

inspectcr finds the licensee's actions adequate, t

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(Closed) Open Item (373/85019-01): The open item concerned instrument connection points and valve labeling problems. The licensee has labeled all of the valves and instruments throughout both units. The inspector, through direct observatier, and inspection, has verified the labelin The inspector finds the licensee's actions adequat No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71881, 71709) The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected componentt. Tours of Unit 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipnent conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan including the following:

the appropriate number of security personnel were on site; access contrcl barriers were operational; protected areas were well maintained, and vital area barriers were well maintaine The inspector verified the licensee's radiological protection program was implemented in accordance with the facility policies and programs and in compliance with regulatory requirement During the month of March 1988, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:

Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray Unit 1 & 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Unit,Comon ('0') Diesel Generator On March 11, 1988, the licensee was taking Unit 2 fror Conditicn 3 (hot shutdcwn) to Condition 4 (cold shutdow.n). In order to perforn this task, the operators needed to unisolate the shutdcwn coolir; syster and place it into servic The operators tried to open l 2E12-F009, which is the inboard isolation valve, and the motor operator tripped on therral overloa The operator tried to cpen the valve a second time with the same results. To expedite the opening of the 2E12-F009 va' ?, operations personnel, already in the drywell, were instructed to nually get the 2E12-F009 valve off its sea The operations personnel did get the velve off its seat at I

which tire the operator in the control roon was able to rove the valve using thc rotor operator. Thi operator then conpleted placing the shutdown cooling system into service. The licensee has had an l ongoing problem with the shutdown cooling inboard isolation valves on both units. The Unit I lE12J009 valve now has a larger motor cperator on it wh1ch appears to have solved the probler of nct teing I

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able to open the IE12-F009 valve. Unit 2 is scheduled to receive a larger motor operator for its 2E12-F009 valve during the Unit 2 second refueling outag ;

I On March 17, 1988, at approximately 10:30 p.m. CST, the licensee [

1 having completed the necessary items in the CAL issued on the morning of March 17, 1988, reconnenced their startup of Unit 2.

Circumstances relating to the CAL and the events associated with it are described in paragraph 8 of this report and in Inspection Reports

373/88008 and 374/88008. The unit achieved criticality at approxi-mately 3

07 a.m. CST on March 18, 1988, and the generator synchronized i

to the grid at 7:45 p.m. on March 18, 1988. Major work items

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completed during the unit shutdown were replacement of the 'B'

reactor recirculation pump seal, replacement of the main steam isolatior valve solenoids, retermination of the 'C' residual heat removal pump motor with an EQ qualified Kerite termination kit, and the repair of two major steam leak No violations or deviations were identified in this are l J 4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

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The inspector observed Technical Specification required surveillance

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testing and verified, for actual activities cbserved, that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumenta-

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tion was calibrat'd, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met,

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that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, j that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure 1

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requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual

! directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the l

testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate j management personnel.

j The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:

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.lS-RH-417 Unit 2 RFR Shutdewn Cooling Pressure Interface Alarm l

Functional Test

! LIS-MS-20 Unit 2 Main Steam Tunnel High Temperature MSIV Isolation i Calibration LIS-AR-305 Unit 1 Main Control Root Radiaticn t%r.itor Functienal Test

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LIS-NB-30E Unit 1 Peactor vessel Low Low Water Level HPCS Initiatien l

Functional Test

. LIS-NR-301 Unit 1 Source Range Monitor Rod Block Functional Test l LOS-SC-M1 Standby Liquid Control Pump Flow lest, Inservice Test and l Explosive Valve Continuity Check

LES-FP-20 Aux Electric Equipment Room Supply Air Filter Units Fire l Protection Deluge System Channel Functional Test

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! On February 23, 1986, at 6:05 p.m. CST, durins Unit I surveillance l LIS R1-112. "Unit 1 Reactor Vessel High Water Level Reactor Core

! Isolatien Cooling (RCIC) Turbine Trip Calibration," the instrument nechanic found reactor water level switch IB21-NICIA out of calibration. This switch isolates the RCIC turbine on high water

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leve Level switch 1821-N101A is a Barton level switch, model N A. The licensee placed the switch in a tripped condition per their Technical Specification There are two of these level switches in the trip circuitry and both switches must be actuated in order for the RCIC system to isclate. With less than the required amount of channels operable, the licensee declared the RCIC system inoperable. The ENS notification was made at 9:30 on February 23, 1988. The Barton switch has four sets of contacts of which only one set was in use. The licensee investigated the use of another set of contacts on the Barton switch. They found another set of contacts that actuated at the required trip setpoin The licensee then proceeded to calibrate the switch, which was satisfactory and placed it back in service. The RCIC system was then declared operable, b. On March 2,1988, at approximately 4:15 p.m. CST, the licensee was performing surveillance LOS-DG-SR4, "Unit 2 B Diesel Generator Action Statement Operability Test." As the 28 diesel generator attained a speed of approximately 750 RPM, the 2B diesel generator cooling water purp failed to automatically start. The cooling water pump was then started manually. The licensee proceeded to declare the 28 diesel generator inoperable. The 2B diesel generator supplies emergency pcwer only to the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)

system. Per the lttensee's Technical Specifications, the licensee had 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to cor re t the problem and to perform surveillances on offsite power source verification and to run the remaining diesel generator At approximately 6:45 p.m., the licensee made a courtesy ENS call l

to inform the cocmission that they had two (2) diesel generators

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out of service at the sare time. The '0', or common, diesel generator was taken out of service on March 1, 1988, for routine preventive maintenance and sore surveillances and was already on a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> tire clock. The resident inspector, upon being informed of the licensee having two (2) diesel generators out of service et the same time, went to the site. The resident inspector was present for the operability rur of the diesel generator to review the licensee's actions for correctirg the problem, and to review the licensee's Technical Specifications to verify that the liter!ee had taken the appropriate actions in accordance with the Technical Specification The 28 diesel generator cooling water pump f ailure to automatically start was caused by pitted contacts on the K-18 relay. By 10:30 the contacts were repaired. The diesel generator surveillance was performed again, this time satisf actorily. The 2B diesel generator was then returned to service, On March 3,1988, at 4:45 p.m. CST, the licensee was perferr.ing instrument surveillance L15-PC-401, "Unit 2 High Drywell Pressure Scran, Primary Containrent Isolation and Secondary Containment Isolation Furctienal Test," wher they received an ESF actuatict l

signal that closed three (3) istletion valves. The valves that

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close:d 5.ere Instrurent hitrogen to Drpell Valve 21h017, Drpf.11 f

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) Suction Isolation Valve 21N001A, and Instrument Nitrogen Dryer Purging Valve 2!N074 These are all inboard isolation valves.

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The instrument mechanic was checking the PS-2C71-N002C test switch when the valve actuation occurred. Upon further investigation, it was found that the PS-2C71-N002D test switch was bad. When the instrument mechanic opened the N002C test switch with the N002D test switch not functioning properly (causing on open condition), the '

isolation logic was satisfied to actuate the closure of the three d

(3)isolctionvalves. The unit operator noticed the valve closures a

and immediately informed the instrument mechanic of the same. The instrument mechanic reset the PS-2071-N002C test switch and the unit operator reopened the closed valves after he had verified the cause

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of the valve closure. The licensee has replaced the PS-2071-N002 On March 16, 1988, at approximately 10:00 a.m. CST, the licensee performed surveillance LTS 100-6, "Primary Containment Vent and Purge Outlet Valves Local Leak Rate Test." At the conclusion of the surveillance, it was noted that the total type 'B' and type 'C'

leakage was observed to be in excess of 0.6 La (the leakage coefficient). The actual through line leakage has not yet been determined. The unit was in cold shutdown at the time of the surveillanc The licensee is currently in a 15 week refueling /

, maintenance outag The licensee is performing further analysis

of the excessive leakage and will correct the problem prior to Unit I returning to servic ' On March 21, 1988, at approximately 5:00 p.m. CST, the licensee

' i!dormed the resident inspector that they had missed a surveillance of Unit 2 that is required by the Technical Specification The

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surveillance, LOS-MS-M1, "Main Steam Isolation Valve - Leakage

Control System Blower and Heater Operability Tests Surveillance,"

) was due on March 20, 1988. When the licensee recognized that they

had missed the required surveillance, they declared both the inboard

and outboard Main Steam Line (MSL) leakage control systems

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inoperable at 12:45 p.m. CST on March 21, 1988. Since the Technical Specifications do not address an LCO associated with both divisions (systems) ceing inoperable, the licensee took the actions associated with Technical Specification 3. Technical Specification 3. simply state, that within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in an Operational Condition ir. which the specifica- i tion does net apply by conrencing a controlled shutdown. The licensee then made the evaluation that they could perform the required surveillance and, if the results were not acceptable, would still be able to comply with Technical Specification 3.0.3. At 1:25 p.m. the inbc;rd MSL leakage control system surveillance was completed satisfactorily. This removed the unit from Technical Specification 3.0.3 and placed it into Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 which is the specification for one leakage control system being inoperabl The outboard MSL leakage control system surveillance was completed satisfactorily at 1:55 p.m. at which time the licensee exited the Technical Specification LC hc violaticnt or deviations were identified in this are I

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. Trainino (41400)

The inspector, through discussions with personnel and a review of training records, evaluated the licensee's training program for operations and raintenance personnel to determine whether the general knowledge of the individuals was sufficient for their assigned task In the areas examined by the inspector, no items cf concern were identifie No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Event Reports (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to detennine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, irrrediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications, The following reports of nonroutine events were reviewed by the inspectors. Based on this review it was determined that the events were of minor safety significance, did not represent program deficiencies, were properly reported, and were properly compensated for. These reports are closed:

374/87016-01 - Defective Low Pr?ssure Core Spray Minimum Flow Switch. This revision (01) includes the inspection of the failed diaphrag /87041-00 Anmonia Detector Trip Due to Chemcassette Out of Tape Caused by Procedural Weakness, The following reports of nonroutine events involved violations of regulatory requirements. These reports are considered close Event closure is being tracked by the associated violation.

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! Appropriate cross references are provide /E7M9-01 - Reactor Core Isolation Co' cling Water Leg Pump

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Failure Due to Lact of Proper Lubrication. This is a revision ( to the original LER due to a more conclusive cause of failure, l

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Outages (717_071 On March 13,19EE, at approxirrately 2:10 a.m. CST, Unit I was manually scrarTred f rcn 151 power as part of the licensee's normal shutdewn procedure ir preparaticn for a scheduled 15 wed refuel ng/naintenance outag Major activities planned during the outage are drywell cooling rodification, alternate control rod insertion modification, control rod Wive replacement, snutber reduction modification, and decer.taninetion of the ' A' and 'E' reactor recirculation pipin No violatior.s or deviations were icentified in this are E

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I 8. Unit Trips (93702)

On March 9, 1988, at approximately 5:30 p.m. CST, while performing the functional test on a differential pressure switch, an Instrument '

Maintenance (IM) technician inadvertently valved in the variable and reference legs of the switch with the equalizing valve open. This initiated a "pressure equalization" between the variable and reference legs, and resulted in a high "indicated" level to feedwater level .

control, causing the feedwater pumps to begin reducing flow. Realizing the valving error was made, the reference leg was immediately isolated from the variable leg which resulted in a low "indicated" level spik The level spike caused other level switches, utilizing the same reference

, leg to also actuate, including the switches to trip the Reactor Recirculation (RR) pumps from an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) signal. With the RR pump trip switches actuated, the RR pumps both tripped, Due to the large and rapid power reduction from the tripped RR pumps, feedwater heater high level alarms were received and the extraction steam to the heaters began isolating. With feedwater level control adequately handling the level transient, the licensee tried to re-establish the heaters and to restart the RR pumps. Attempts to restart the RR pumps were unsuccessfu With the unit being in a high control rod line condition (power was approximately 85% prior to the event) and low flow condition (natural circulation), the unit started experiencing neutron flux oscillation j The General Electric Company, manufacturer of the nuclear steam supply i

system, had previously identified this condition (high rod line, low

! flow) to be susceptible to neutron flux oscillations.

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Approximately 5 minutes into the event, the Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) downscale alarms began annunciating. The Average Power Range Monitors (APRM) recorders were oscillating between 25% and 501 power with

! an approximate 2-3 second period. The APRM recorders have an approximate 1-2 second lag time in their response which dampened the actual magnitude

! of the power oscillation The neutron flux oscillations continued to l increase.

The shif t wa; preparing to manually scram the unit when an automatic j scram occurred on Upscale heutron Flux Trip (1181 trip on APRMs),

i Immediately prior to the scram the operators noticed that a majority

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of the LPRM hi alarms were lit. The setpoint for the LPRM hi alarms l is 105% of their scal !

Because of the vendor's inexperience with large power oscillations in l their reactors within the United States, General Electric Company issued l' a Rapid Information Comunication Services Informaticn Letter (RICSIL)

No. 006 on March 11, 1988, pertaining to BWR Core Thermal Hydraulic

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Stability. The RICSIL supplements GE Service Information Letter (SIL)

l No. 380, revision 1, on the same subjec Because of the reactor core

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instability condition prior to the reactor scram, the Comission forred j an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) on March 16, 198 Also, a l

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Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued on March 16, 198 The j CAL prohibited the restart of Unit 2 until the licensee completed the

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following items:

' Check equipment performance and verify that all equipment functioned satisfactorily.

' Verification of reactor coolant samples for potential core damag Complete interim procedural changes, including a requirement to trip the reactor if no reactor recirculation loops are in operation, and the reactor is in Operational Conditions 1 or The AIT members reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions

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on the items addressed in the CAL and, on March 17, 1988, with regional

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concurrence, authorized restart of Unit The inspection performed by the AIT will be addressed in a separate report (373/88008; 374/88008).

! During the initial review of the transient and subsequent unit scram, the resident inspector became aware of two areas of concern. The first area was the personnel error which caused the perturbations in the

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instrumentation causing the ATW5 RR purp trips. The second item is that

after reviewing the operating procedures and operator training, there

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appeared to be no specific guidance for contending with a reactor core power oscillation of the magnitude incurred on Unit 2. Due to the fact that the inspector is still resiewing all of the information, the personnel error will be an unresolved item (374/88004-01) and the potentially inadequate procedures and trainin unresolved items (373/88004-01; 374/88004-02)g will be carried as

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Two unresolved items were identified in this area.

, Management Meeting (30703)

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On February 16, 1985, the Director of the Division of Reactor Projects and members of the regional and residert staff met with Ccmmonwealth

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Edison Corpany officials in the Region 111 office to discuss the status l of static-o-ring instrurentation at LaSalle. The meeting was initiated j in response to recent failures of static-o-ring differential pressure switches, included in the discussion were the causes of the recent

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failures, actions the licensee has taken for replacement of the

{ static-o-ring switches and details of the licensee's surveillance j program.

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11. Unresolved Items l

! Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required

in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, open items, l deviatier.s, or violetions. Unresolved items disclosed during the j inspection are discussed in Paragraph E.

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11. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors ret with licensee representatives (denoted in' Paragraph 1)

throughout the ronth and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the in.pection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational contents of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar p.

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