MNS-14-016, Emergency Plan, Revision 14-1

Emergency Plan, Revision 14-1

ML14043A082
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	01/30/2014
From:	Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Corp
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
MNS-14-016, FOIA/PA-2015-0025
Download: ML14043A082 (140)

Text

Steven D. Capps D K Vice President ENERGY. McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy MG01VP 1 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 o: 980.875.4805 f: 980.875.4809 Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com January 30, 2014 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Serial No: MNS-14-016 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370 Emergency Plan, Revision 14-1 Please find attached Revision 14-1 to the McGuire Nuclear Station Emergency Plan. This revision is submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and does not result in a reduction in the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

Questions regarding this submittal should be directed to Kay Crane, McGuire Regulatory Affairs, at (980) 875-4306.

Steven D. Capps Attachments www.duke-energy.com

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission January 30, 2014 Page 2 (Two Copies) cc: Mr. V.M. McCree, Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 (One Copy)

Mr. E. William Brach, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Mail Stop T-8A23 Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 (w/o attachments)

Mr. Jason Paige NRC Project Manager (McGuire)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 08C2 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. John Zeiler NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station

Attachment I January 31, 2014 Page 1 of 2 SECTION REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES Coversheet Revision 13-3 Revision 14-1 Emergency Plan Revision 13-3 Revision 14-1 Revision List List of Effective Complete Section, Rev. 13-3 Complete Section, Rev. 14-1 Pages (LOEP) Pages 1 thru 4 Pages 1 thru 4 Table of Contents Complete Section, Rev. 13-3 Complete Section, Rev. 14-1 Pages 1 thru 6 Pages 1 thru 6 Section D Complete Section, Rev. 13-3 Complete Section, Rev. 14-1 Pages D1 thru D84 Pages DI thru D83 Section P Complete Section, Rev. 13-3 Complete Section, Rev. 14-1 Pages P1 thru P 10 Pages P 1 thru P 10

DUKE ENERGY McGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY PLAN APPROVED: _________

SITE VICE PRESIDENT DATE APPROVED: 'lJ,,. 3o0 Zo /4 REVISION 14-1: January, 2014 EFFECTIVE DATE: January, 2014 ORIGINAL DATE: August 25, 1980 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014

DUKE ENERGY COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION LIST August 25, 1980 Date Issued Revision 37, March 1992 Change 1, October, 1980 Revision 92-1, August 1992 Change 2, February, 1981 Revision 92-2, October 1992 Change 3, June, 1981 Rev. 93-1, April 1993 Change 4, August, 1981 Rev. 93-2, June, 1993 Revision 1, November 16, 1981 Rev. 93-3, December 1993 Revision 2, February, 1982 Rev. 94-1, January, 1994 Revision 3, February, 1982 Rev. 94-2, June, 1994 Revision 4, April, 1982 Rev. 94-3, August 1994 Revision 5, June, 1982 Rev. 94-4, October 1994 Revision 6, July, 1982 Rev. 95-1, February 1995 Revision 7, September, 1982 Rev. 95-2, April 1995 Revision 8, November, 1982 Rev. 96-1, April 1996 Revision 9, January, 1983 Rev. 96-2, July 1996 Revision 10, February, 1983 Rev. 97-1, April 1997 Revision 11, June, 1983 Rev. 97-2, May 1997 Revision 12, November, 1983 Rev. 97-3, July, 1997 Revision 13, March, 1984 Rev. 98-1, January, 1998 Revision 14, August, 1984 Rev. 98-2, February, 1998 Revision 15, January, 1985 Rev. 98-3, May, 1998 Revision 16, March, 1985 Rev. 98-4, July, 1998 Revision 17, May, 1985 Rev. 98-5, August, 1998 Revision 18, November, 1985 Rev. 98-6, November, 1998 Revision 19, January, 1986 Rev. 99-1, March, 1999 Revision 20, July, 1986 Rev. 99-2, July, 1999 Revision 21, May, 1987 Rev. 99-3 November, 1999 Revision 22, June, 1987 Rev. 00-1, April, 2000 Revision 23, November, 1987 Rev. 00-2, May, 2000 Revision 24, March, 1988 Rev. 00-3, November, 2000 Revision 25, July, 1988 Rev. 01-1, January, 2001 Revision 26, July, 1989 Rev. 01-2, June, 2001 Revision 27, September, 1989 Rev. 02-1, March, 2002 Revision 28, October, 1989 Rev. 02-2, August, 2002 Revision 29, November, 1989 Rev. 03-1, April, 2003 Revision 30, March, 1990 Rev. 03-2, June, 2003 Revision 31, April, 1991 Rev. 04-1, February, 2004 Revision 32, July, 1991 Rev. 04-2, July, 2004 Revision 33, September, 1991 Rev. 05-1, July, 2005 Revision 34, October, 1991 Rev. 06-1, January, 2006 Revision 35, December, 1991 Rev. 06-2, September, 2006 Revision 36, January, 1992 Rev. 07-1, May, 2007 I

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014

Rev. 07-2, December, 2007 Rev. 08-1, September, 2008 Rev. 09-1, July, 2009 Rev. 09-2, December, 2009 Rev. 10-1, May, 2010 Rev. 10-2, November, 2010 Rev. 11-1, March, 2011 Rev. 11-2, August, 2011 Rev. 11-3, October, 2011 Rev. 12-1, May, 2012 Rev. 12-2, June, 2012 Rev. 12-3, November, 2012 Rev. 12-4, December, 2012 Rev. 13-1, March, 2013 Rev. 13-2, June, 2013 Rev. 13-3, October, 2013 Rev. 14-1, January, 2014 2

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014

McGuire Emergency Plan List of Effective Pages Emergency Plan Approval Cover Sheet Coversheet Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Emergency Plan Revision List Page 1 thru 2 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Table of Contents Page 1 thru 6 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 List of Figures Page I thru 2 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Introduction Pages i-I thru i-7 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 A. Assignment of Responsibility Pages A-I thru A-5 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 B. Onsite Emergency Organization Pages B-1 thru B-13 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 C. Emergency Response Support & Resources Pages C-I thru C-2 Rev. 09-1 July, 2009 D. Emergency Class System/EAL Basis Document Pages D-I thru D-83 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 E. Notification Methods & Procedures Pages E-1 thru E-11 Rev. 12-1 May, 2012 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014

McGuire Emergency Plan List of Effective Pages F. Emergency Communications Pages F-I thru F-7 Rev. 06-2 September, 2006 G. Public Education & Information Pages G-1 thru G-4 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 H. Emergency Facility & Equipment Pages H-I thru H-17 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 I. Accident Assessment Pages I-1 thru 1-3 Rev. 12-1 May, 2012 J. Protected Response Pages J-1 thru J-22 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 K. Radiological Exposure Control Pages K-I thru K-4 Rev. 00-3 November, 2000 L. Medical & Public Health Support Pages L- I thru L-2 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 M. Recovery & Re-entry Planning Pages M-1 thru M-5 Rev. 06-2 September, 2006 N. Exercises & Drills Pages N-I thru N-3 Rev. 10-2 November, 2010 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014

McGuire Emergency Plan List of Effective Pages

0. Radiolopical Emergency Response Train'n Pages 0-1 thru 0-2 Rev. 10-2 November, 2010 P. Development Periodic Review & Distribution of Emergency Plans Pages P-1 thru P-10 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 Q. Appendices 1-4 Pages Q-1 thru Q-15 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Appendix 5 Agreement Letters Index - Page Q-16 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Agreement Letter 1 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 2 Rev. 13-2 June, 2013 Agreement Letter 3 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 4 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 5 Rev. 00-1 (Deleted) May, 2000 Agreement Letter 6 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 7 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 8 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 9 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 10 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 11 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 12 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Agreement Letter 13 Rev. 12-3 November, 2012 Agreement Letter 14 Rev. 11-2 August, 2011 Agreement Letter 15 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Agreement Letter 16 Rev. 13-2 June, 2013 Agreement Letter 17 Rev. 11-2 August, 2011 Agreement Letter 18 Rev. 12-2 June, 2012 Agreement Letter 19 Rev. 12-2 June, 2012 Agreement Letter 20 Rev. 11-2 August, 2011 Agreement Letter 21 Rev. 12-2 June, 2012 Agreement Letter 22 Rev. 12-2 June, 2012 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014

McGuire Emergency Plan List of Effective Pages Appendix 6 Emergency Plan Distribution Page Q-17 thru Q-20 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Appendix 7 SPCC Plan Coversheet Rev. 12-3 November, 2012 Table of Contents Rev. 12-3 November, 2012 Pages 1 thru 75 Rev. 12-3 November, 2012 Appendix 8 Hazardous Waste Contingency Plan Pages 1 thru 19 Rev. 13-1 March, 2013 Appendix 9 Hazardous Materials Response Plan Pages 1 thru 14 Rev. 13-3 October, 2013 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014

DUKE ENERGY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY PLAN Table of Contents Page#

i. Introduction A. Purpose i-I B. Scope i-I C. Planning Basis i-3 A. Assignment of Responsibility A. L.a Organization A-1 A. 1.b Concept of Operations A-3 A. 1.c Block Diagram Interrelationships A-3 A. 1.d Key Decisionmaking A-3 A. i.e 24 Hour Emergency Response A-4 A.2.a Responsibility for and Functions of Emergency A-4 Response Organization A.2.b Legal Basis for Authority A-4 A.3 Agreement Letters for Emergency Response Support A-4 A.4 Individuals Responsible for Continuity of Resources A-5 B. On-site Emergency Organization B.1 Plant Staff Under Emergency Conditions B-1 B.2 Emergency Coordinator B-1 B.3 Emergency Coordinator (line of succession) B-1 B.4 Functional Responsibilities of Emergency Coordinator B-2 B.5 Minimum Staffing Requirements B-2 B.6 On-site Functional Area Interfaces B-2 B.7 Augmented Support of On-site Emergency Organization B-2 B.8 Contractor and Private Organizations B-3 thru B-4 B.9 Local Agency Support Services B-4 B.9.a Law Enforcement, Emergency Traffic Control, Related B-4 Police Matters B.9.b Early Warning or Evacuation of the Populace B-5 B.9.c Radiological Emergency Monitoring Assistance B-5 B.9.d Hospitals, Medical Support B-5 B.9.e Ambulance Service B-5 B.9.f Fire-fighting B-5 B.9.g Public Health and Safety, Evaluation of the B-5 Radiological Situation B.9.h Local, State and Federal Support Responsibilities B-6 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 I

Table of Contents Page #

C. Emergency Response Support and Resources C.i.a Individuals Authorized to Request Federal Assistance C-1 C. 1.b Federal Resources Arrival Time C-1 C. 1.c Emergency Operations Facility Resources C-1 Available to Federal Response Organizations C.2.a State and County Representation at the Emergency C-1 Operations Facility (EOF)

C.2.b Licensee Representation at the Off-Site EOC's C-1 C.3 Radiological Laboratories-Availability and Capability C-2 C.4 Emergency Support From Other Organizations C-2 D. Emergency Classification System/EAL Basis Document Emergency Classification System/EAL D-1 thru D-83 Basis Document E. Notification Methodology E. 1 Notification of Response Organization E- 1 E.2 Activation of Emergency Organization E-1 E.2.a Notification of Unusual Event E- 1 E.2.b Alert E-2 E.2.c Site Area Emergency E-4 E.2.d General Emergency E-6 E.3 Emergency Message Format (Initial) E-8 E.4 Emergency Message Format (Follow-up) E-9 E.5 State and Local Organizations-Disseminating Public E-9 Information E.6 Alert and Notification System E-9 E.7 Supporting Information for Public Information Message E-9 F. Emergency Communications F. L.a 24 Hour Notification Capability F-1 F. i.b Communications With State/Local Governments F-i F. I .c Communications With Federal Organizations F-2 F. 1.d Communications Between Site, EOF, EOC's F-2 and Monitoring Team F. I.e Activation of Emergency Personnel F-2 F. 1.f Communications Between NRC, EOC and F-2 Monitoring Teams F. .g ERDS Data Transfer F-2 F.2 Medical Support Communications F-3 F.3 Communications System Testing F-3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 2

Table of Contents Page#

G. Public Education and Information G.1/G.2 Public Education and Information Program G-I G.3.a News Group - Location and Contacts G-1 G.3.b News Group - Media Center G-1 G.4.a Public Spokesperson G-2 G.4.b Spokesperson Information Exchange G-2 G.4.c Rumor Control G-2 G.5 News Media Training Sessions G-2 H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment H.1 Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center H-1 H.l.a Control Room H-1 H.l.b Technical Support Center (TSC) H-1 H.l.c Operations Support Center (OSC) H-2 H.l.d Alternate Facilities H-2 H.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) H-2 thru H-3 H.3 State and Local Government Emergency Operations Center H-4 H.4 Activation and Staffing H-4 H.5 Assessment Actions H-4 H.5.a Meteorological, Hydrologic and Seismic H-4 thru H-5 H.5.b Radiological Monitors H-6 H.5.c Plant Parameters H-6 H.5.d Fire Detection H-6 H.6 Data, Monitoring Equipment and Analysis Facilities H-6 H.7 Off-site Radiological Monitoring H-7 H.8 Meteorology Instrumentation and Procedures H-7 H.9 Operations Support Center H-7 H.10 Emergency Equipment/Instrumentation Inspection, H-7 Inventory, Operational Check, Calibration H.11 Emergency Kits H-7 H.12 Receipt and Analysis of Field Monitoring Data H-7 I. Accident Asse ssment 1.1 Emergency Action Level Procedures I-1 1.2 On-site Capability and Resources to Provide Initial I-1 Values and Continuing Assessment I.2.a Post Accident Sampling I-1 I.2.b Radiation and Effluent Monitors I-1 1.2.c In-plant Iodine Instrumentation 1-2 I.3.a/ Method for Determining Release Source Term 1-2 1.3.b 1.4 Effluent Monitor Readings Vs On-site/Off-site Exposure 1-2 1.5 Meteorological Information Availability 1-2 1.6 Release Rates/Projected Doses for Offscale Instrumentation 1-2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 3

Table of Contents Page #

1.7/ Field Monitoring Within EPZ 1-3 1.8 1.9 Detect and Measure Radioiodine Concentration in the EPZ 1-3 1.10 Relationship Between Contamination Levels 1-3 and Integrated Dose/Dose Rates 1.11 Plume Tracking 1-3 J. Protective Response J. L.a Onsite Alerting and Notification J- 1 thru J. l.d J.2 Evacuation Routes and Transportation J-1 J.3 Personnel Monitoring J-1 J.4 Site Evacuation Procedures - Decontamination J-2 J.5 Personnel Accountability J-2 J.6 Protective Equipment Breathing Apparatus, Protective J-2 Clothing, KI J.7 Protective Action Recommendations J-3 J.8 Evacuation Time Estimates J-4 J.9 Implementing Protective Measures J-4 J. 10 Implementation of Protective Measures for Plume J-5 Exposure Pathway J. I0.a EPZ Maps J-6 J. 10.b EPZ Population Distribution Map J-6 J. 10.c EPZ Population Alerting and Notification J-6 J. 10.d EPZ Protecting Immobile Persons J-6 J.10.e Use of Radioprotective Drugs for Persons in EPZ J-6 J.10.f Conditions for Use of Radioprotective Drugs J-6 J. 10.g State/County Relocation Plans J-6 J. 1O.h Relocation Center Locations J-6 J. 10.i Evacuation Route - Traffic Capacities J-6 J. I0.j Evacuated Area Access Control J-6 J. 1O.k Planning for Contingencies in Evacuation J-6 J. 10.1 State/County Evacuation Time Estimates J-6 J. 10.m Bases for Protective Action Recommendations J-6 J. 11 Ingestion Pathway Planning J-7 J.12 Relocation Center - Registering and Monitoring J-7 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 4

Table of Contents Page #

K. Radiological Exposure Control K. 1 Onsite Exposure Guidelines K-1 K.2 Doses in Excess of 10CFR Part 20 K-1 K.3 Emergency Personnel Exposure and Records K-1 K.3.a Distribution of Dosimetry K-1 K.3.b Dose Records K-2 K.4 State/Local Plan for Authorizing Doses Exceeding PAG's K-2 K.5 Decontamination K-2 K.5.a Action Levels for Determining the Need for Decontamination K-2 K.5.b Radiological Decontamination K-2 K.6 Contamination Control Measures K-2 K.6.a Area Access Control K-2 K.6.b Drinking Water and Food Supplies K-2 K.6.c Recovery Efforts K-3 K.7 Decontamination of Personnel at Relocation K-3 Assembly Area L. Medical and Public Health Support L. 1 Hospital and Medical Support L-1 L.2 On-site First Aid Capability L-1 L.3 Public, Private, Military Hospitals, Emergency Medical L-1 Facilities L.4 Transport of Accident Victims L-2 M. Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-Accident Operations M.1 Recovery/Reentry Plans and Procedures M-1 M.l.a Outline of Site Recovery Plans M-1 M. 1.b Outline of Recovery Plans M-2 M.2 Recovery Organization M-3 M.3 Information to Members of Recovery Organization M-4 M.4 Total Population Exposure Estimates M-4 N. Exercises and Drills N.l.a Exercises N-i N.l.b Exercise Scenario/Response N-1 N.2 Drills N-i N.2.a Communications N-i N.2.b Fire Drills N-2 N.2.c Medical Emergency Drills N-2 N.2.d Radiological Monitoring Drills N-2 N.2.e Radiation Protection Drills N-2 N.3 Exercise and Drill Execution N-3 N.4 Exercise Critique N-3 N.5 Critique Action Items N-3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 5

Table of Contents Page #

0. Radiological Emergency Response Training 0.1 Offsite Agency Training 0-1

0. .a Emergency Response Training (Offsite Agency) 0-1 0.1 .b Off-site Support Agency - Participation in Training 0-1 0.2 Site Organization Training 0-1 0.3 First Aid Training 0-1 0.4 Training For Radiological Emergency Response 0-2 Personnel 0.5 Training Period 0-2 P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort P. 1 Emergency Planning Staff Training P-1 P.2 Emergency Response Planning P-1 P.3 Site Emergency Planning Manager P-1 P.4 Review of Emergency Plan P-1 P.5 Distribution of Revised Plans P-1 P.6 Supporting Plans P-2 P.7 Implementing Procedures P-2 P.8 Table of Contents P-2 P.9 Audit of Emergency Plan P-2 P.10 Telephone Number Updates P-3 Q. Appendices Index Q-1 Appendix I Definitions Q-2 Appendix 2 Meteorological Program Q-6 Appendix 3 Alert and Notification System Description Q-1O Appendix 4 Evacuation Time Estimates Q-15 Appendix 5 Agreement Letters Q-16 Appendix 6 McGuire Nuclear Site Emergency Plan Distribution Q-17 Appendix 7 SPCC Plan Appendix 8 Hazardous Waste Contingency Plan Appendix 9 Hazardous Materials Response Plan Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 6

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2 Activity Description and

References:

MNS EPLAN Change 14-1, Section D

• Add Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) and Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to Operating Mode Applicability.

• Delete statement referring to TAvg>500oF.

• Add Modes 4 and 5 to Basis.

Activity Scope:

v The activity is a change to the emergency plan LiThe activity is not a change to the emergency plan Change Type: 0 Change Type:

The change is editorial or typographical Z The change does conform to an activity that has Z The change is not editorial or typographical prior approval El The change does not conform to an activity that has prior approval Planning Standard Impact Determination:

F1 §50.47(b)(1) - Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)

FEl §50.47(b)(2) - Onsite Emergency Organization R"] §50.47(b)(3) - Emergency Response Support and Resources E] §50.47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System*

E] §50.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures*

FEl §50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Communications E] §50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information El1 §50.47(b)(8) - Emergency Facility and Equipment L_] §50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment*

El §50.47(b)(10) - Protective Response*

El §50.47(b)( 11) - Radiological Exposure Control El §50.47(b)( 12) - Medical and Public Health Support El §50.47(b)(13) - Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations El]§50.47(b)(14) - Drills and Exercises El §50.47(b)(1 5) - Emergency Responder Training El §50.47(b)(16) - Emergency Plan Maintenance

• Risk Significant Planning Standards

[E]The proposed activity does not impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination:

Revision 12 I

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2 L--The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:

F-] The activity does not involve a site specific EP commitment lesults:

M The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation Eli The activity cannot be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation This change corrects a procedure change made to the subject document in Revision 9, dated 1/30/2003 making this condition only applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. This change conforms to the original Safety Evaluation Report dated January 28, 1998, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370. Per the SER, NUMARC EAL SU4.2 recognizes site-specific levels of reactor coolant activity as measured by sample as indicators of fuel cladding degradation greater than technical specification limits. McGuire EAL 4.2.U.3-1 is listed as equivalent to this NUMARC EAL. Although the NUMARC EAL IC SU4 is listed as applicable in operating modes, McGuire IC 4.2.U.3 is only listed as applicable in Modes 1-5. The refueling condition (Mode 6) and the defueled condition are not included in the McGuire IC. This is because there is no technical specification limit for coolant activity in either of these conditions. Because it would be impossible to satisfy the IC in these conditions, and because the McGuire scheme contains ICs and EALs for all credible events in these operating conditions, which, in turn, would trigger either equivalent or higher classifications than would NUMARC IC SU4 (e.g., damage to irradiated fuel, loss of reactor vessel, spent fuel pit or reactor cavity level), the deletion of refueling and defueled conditions from the equivalent McGuire IC is an acceptable deviation from the NUMARC guidance.

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Revision 12 2

D. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM Regulatory Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, August 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an alternative methodology for the development of Emergency Action Levels. McGuire Nuclear Site used the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergency action levels. The emergency action levels provided in this section have been modified to implement the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, NEI guidance as endorsed in Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12 and to support the implementation of NEI 03-12.

The emergency classification system utilizes four categories for classification of emergency events.

D.I.a UNUSUAL EVENT Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

The purpose of this class is to provide notification of the emergency to the station staff, State and Local Government representatives, and the NRC.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in this Basis Document.

D.I.b ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of hostile action. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

The purpose of this class is to assure that emergency personnel are readily available to:

1. Activate the onsite response centers.

2. Respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required.

3. Provide offsite authorities current status information.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in this Basis Document.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D1

D.I.c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or hostile action that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

The purpose of the Site Area Emergency is to:

1. Activate the offsite response centers.

2. Assure that monitoring teams are mobilized.

3. Assure that personnel required for taking protective actions of near site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious.

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in this Basis Document.

D.l.d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or hostile action that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

The purpose of the General Emergency is to:

1. Initiate predetermined protective actions for the public.

2. Provide continuous assessment of information from onsite and offsite measurements.

3. Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases.

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in this Basis Document.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D2

D.2. INITIATING CONDITIONS The initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are contained in the Basis Document beginning on page D6. Classification procedure (RP/OIAI57001000) provides the guidance necessary to classify events and promptly declare the appropriate emergency conditions within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to cognizant facility staff that an emergency action level threshold has been exceeded. Specific response procedures are in place which delineate the required response during the appropriate classification.

D.3. ALPHABETICAL LIST OF IMPORTANT DEFINED TERMS FOR EVENT CLASSIFICATION {5}

ALL - (As relates to Operating Mode Applicability) - At all times.

BOMB - Refers to a explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage plant systems or structures.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of ten (10) or more people violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered to be violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

COGNIZANT FACILITY STAFF - Any member of facility staff, who by virtue of training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the licensee's emergency classification scheme. (Does not include staff whose positions require they report, rather than assess, abnormal conditions to the facility.)

CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY - The barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment.

EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components.

EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat of force.

FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. An electrical breaker flash that creates high temperatures for a short duration and merely localized scorching to that breaker and its compartment should not be considered a fire.

HOSTAGE - A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure demands will be met by the station.

HOSTILE ACTION - An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and / or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end.

This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D3

should be used to address such activities, (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

HOSTILE FORCE - One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

IMMINENT - Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur. Where IMMINENT time frames are specified, they shall apply.

INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are not readily available to the operator.

INTRUSION - A person(s) present in a specified area without authorization. Discovery of a BOMB in a specified area is indication of INTRUSION into that area by a HOSTILE FORCE.

ISFSI - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

NO MODE - Defueled.

PROJECTILE - An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

PROLONGED - a duration beyond normal limits, defined as "greater than 15 minutes" or as determined by the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator.

PROTECTED AREA - Typically the site specific area which normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS/NCS) LEAKAGE - RCS Operational Leakage as defined in the Technical Specification Basis B 3.4.13.

RUPTURED - (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may not meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.

SECURITY CONDITION - Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT- An unplanned event involving one or more of the following: (I) automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) reactor trip, (4) safety injection, (5) thermal power oscillations --10%.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D4

SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the protected area, in which Duke Power Company has the authority to control all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property.

SLC - Selected Licensee Commitments.

SUSTAINED - A duration of time long enough to confirm that the CSF is valid (not momentary).

TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (TEDE) - The sum of external dose exposure to a radioactive plume, to radionuclides deposited on the ground by the plume, and the internal exposure from inhaled radionuclides deposited in the body.

TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine).

UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

UNPLANNED - An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (I ) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

VISIBLE DAMAGE - Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

VITAL AREA - Areas within the PROTECTED AREA that house equipment important for nuclear safety. Access to a VITAL AREA is allowed only if an individual has been authorized to be in that area per the Security plan, therefore VITAL AREA is a Security term.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D5

Enclosure 4.1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barrier status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 barriers. Classify according to the table on page D7.

Note 1: This table is only applicable in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is imminent (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this imminent loss situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

Note 3: When determining Fission Product Barrier status, the Fuel Clad Barrier should be considered to be lost, or potentially lost, if the conditions for the Fuel Clad Barrier loss or potential loss EALs were met previously (validated and sustained) during the event, even if the conditions do not currently exist.

Note 4: Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipment. A CSF condition is satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained.

The STA should be consulted to affirm if any CSF has been validated and an appropriate function restoration procedure implemented prior to that CSF being used as the basis to classify an emergency. {1}

EAL # Unusual Event EAL # Alert EAL # Site Area Emergency EAL # General Emergency 4.1.U.1 Potential Loss of 4.1.A.1 Loss OR Potential 4.1.S.1 Loss OR Potential Loss 4.1.G.1 Loss of All Three Containment Loss of of Both Barriers Nuclear Coolant Nuclear Coolant System System AND Fuel Clad 4.1.U.2 Loss of Containment 4.1 .A.2 Loss OR Potential 4.1.S.2 Loss 4.1 .G.2 Loss of Any Two Loss of AND Barriers AND Fuel Clad Potential Loss Potential Loss of the Combinations of Both Third Nuclear Coolant System AND Fuel Clad 4.1 .A.3 Potential Loss of 4.1.S.3 Loss of Containment Containment AND AND Loss OR Potential Loss Loss OR Potential of Any Other Barrier Loss of Any Other Barrier Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D6

Enclosure 4.1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX NOTE: If a barrier is affected, it has a single point value based on a "potential loss" or a "loss". "Not Applicable" is included in the matrix as a place holder only, and has no point value assigned.

Barrier Points (1-5) Potential Loss Loss (X) Total Points Classification (X)

Containment 1 3 1 -3 Unusual Event NCS 4 5 4-4 Alert Fuel Clad 4 5 7-10 Site Area Emergency Total__Points I_______________________ 11-13 General Emergency

1. Compare plant conditions against the Fission Product Barrier Matrix on page D8.

2. Determine the "potential loss" or "loss" status for each barrier (Containment, NCS and Fuel Clad) based on the EAL symptom description.

3. For each barrier, write the highest single point value applicable for the barrier in the "Points" column and mark the appropriate "potential loss" OR "loss" column.

4. Add the points in the "Points" column and record the sum as "Total Points".

5. Determine the classification level based on the number of "Total Points".

6. In the table on page D6, under one of the four "classification" columns, select the event (e.g. 4.1.A.1 for Loss of Nuclear Coolant System) that best fits the loss of barrier description.

7. Using that EAL number (e.g. 4.1 .A. 1) select the preprinted notification form OR a blank form and complete the required information for Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director approval and transmittal.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D7

4.1.C CONTAINMENT BARRIER 4.1.N NCS BARRIER 4.1.F FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - (3 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - (5 Points) POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - (5 Points)

. (1 Point)

II (4Points) I II (4Points) I

1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status 1.Critical Safety Function Status

• Containment-RED. . Not applicable.

• NCS Integrity-RED.

• Not applicable.

• Core Cooling-ORANGE.

• Core Cooling-RED.

• Core cooling - RED path is " Heat Sink-RED.

• Heat Sink-RED.

indicated for> 15 min.

2. Containment Condition._ 2. NCS Leak Rate 2. Primary Coolant Activity Level

• Containment Pressure Rapid unexplained decrease in

• Unisolable leak exceeding the GREATER THAN available 0 Not applicable.

• Coolant Activity GREATER THAN

> 15 PSIG. containment pressure following capacity of one charging pump makeup capacity as indicated 300 pCi/cc Dose Equivalent Iodine initial increase. in the normal charging mode by a loss of NCS subcooling. (DEI) 1-131.

" H2 concentration > 9%. with letdown isolated.

• Containment pressure or sump

. Containment pressure greater than level response not consistent 3 psig with either a failure of both with LOCA conditions.

trains of NS OR a failure of both trains of VX-CARF

3. Containment Isolation Valves Status After Containment Isolation Actuation 3. SG Tube Rupture 3. Containment Radiation Monitorino 0 Not applicable.

• Containment isolation is 0 Primary-to-Secondary leak

• Indication that a SG is 0 Not applicable.

• Containment radiation monitor 51 incomplete and a release path rate exceeds the capacity of Ruptured and has a Non- A or 51 B reading at time since from containment exists. one charging pump in the Isolable secondary line fault. shutdown; normal charging mode with letdown isolated.

• Indication that a SG is ruptured 0-0.5 hrs. > 99 R/hr and a prolonged release of 0.5 -2 hrs > 43R/hr contaminated secondary 2-4 hrs 31 R/hr coolant is occurring from the 4-8 hrs > 22 R/hr affected SG to the >8 hrs > 13 R/hr environment.

4. SG Secondany Side Release With Primary-to-Secondary Leakaoe 4. Containment Radiation Monitoring 4. Emermency CoordinatorlEOF Director Judoement

. Not applicable.

• Release of secondary side to . Not applicable.

• Not applicable. 0 Any condition, including inability to monitor the barrier, that in the opinion the environment with primary to of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicates LOSS or secondary leakage GREATER POTENTIAL LOSS of the fuel clad barrier.

THAN Tech Spec allowable.

5.Sionificant Radioactive Inventory InContainment a. -memencv j,,oruonaworilur uiret'or Jgugemern 0 Containment Rad. Monitor

• Not aapplicable.

• Any condition, including inability to monitor the barrier, that in the opinion EMF51A or 51B of the Emergency Coordinator /EOF Director indicates LOSS or Reading @ time since shutdown: POTENTIAL LOSS of the NCS barrier.

• 390 R/hr @ 0 - 0.5 hr

> 170 R/hr @ 0.5- 2 hr

>125R/hr@ 2-4 hr

• 90R/hr @ 4-8 hr

• 53 R/hr @ >8 hr.

6. Emeraencv Coordinator IEOF Director Judgement

• Any condition, including inability to monitor the barrier, that inthe opinion of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of the containment barrier.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D8

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs:

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipment. A CSF condition is satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained.

4.1.C.1 Critical Safety Function Status

" Containment - RED indicates containment conditions which may challenge the containment integrity. Therefore, this condition represents a potential loss of the containment barrier.

" Core Cooling - RED for greater than 15 minutes in this potential loss EAL represents imminent core damage that, if not terminated, could lead to reactor vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. The potential for containment challenge as a result of events at reactor vessel failure makes it prudent to consider an unmitigated core damage condition as a potential loss of the containment barrier.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG- 1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be, ineffective.

" There is no "Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.2 Containment Conditions Containment pressure above 15 psig (the design pressure) indicates that the containment or its heat removal systems are not functioning as intended. This degradation of containment pressure control represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D9

" A containment hydrogen concentration of 9 volume percent is sufficient to expect that any ignition would result in complete combustion of the hydrogen in containment and a significant pressure rise. At some initial containment pressures, this pressure rise may exceed the capacity of the containment.

Therefore, this level of hydrogen in the containment represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

• Once the Residual Heat Removal system is taking suction from the containment sump, with containment pressure greater than 3 psig and procedural guidance, one train of containment spray is manually aligned to the containment sump. If unable to place one NS train in service or without an operating train of VX-CARF (the CARF with a 10-minute delay) a potential loss of containment exists. At this point a significant portion of the ice in the ice condenser would have melted and the NS system would be needed for containment pressure control.

This EAL for a potential loss of containment applies after automatic or manual alignment of the containment spray system has been attempted with containment pressure greater than 3 psig and less than one full train of NS is operating.

This EAL for a potential loss of containment also applies if containment pressure is greater than 3 psig and at least one train of VX-CARF is not operating after a 10 minute delay. Without a single train of VX-CARF in service following actuation, the potential loss should be credited regardless of whether ECCS is in injection or sump recirculation mode.

" Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity.

• Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

Thus, sump level or containment pressure not increasing indicates an interfacing systems LOCA which is a containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity, or some other containment pressure boundary failure.

4.1.C.3 Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation Actuation

" There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

" Failure to isolate those containment pathways which would allow containment atmosphere to be released from containment is a loss of the containment barrier.

(Containment Isolation Valve(s) not closed AND downstream pathway to the environment exists after Containment Isolation Signal.) PIP G 08-00333 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D10

4.1.C.4 Steam Generator (SG) Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage

• There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

" Secondary side releases to the environment include those from the condenser air ejectors, CA turbine exhaust, SG Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs),

atmospheric dump valves, faulted steam lines, and main steam safety valves.

Steam releases, in combination with primary to secondary leakage, constitute a bypass of the containment and, therefore, a loss of the containment barrier. The appropriate classification can be determined in combination with the SG Tube Rupture EAL under the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) barrier.

4.1.C.5 Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment NOTE: If EMF-51A and EMF-51B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/02, "Alternative Method for Determining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

• These values indicate significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of NCS Barriers. NUREG-1228, Source Estimations DuringIncident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%. This amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment.

By treating the radioactive inventory in containment as a potential loss, a General Emergency will be declared when the conditions of the fuel clad and NCS barriers are included in the evaluation. This will allow the appropriate protective actions to be recommended.

" There is no "Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.C.6 Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement

• This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in determining whether the containment barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (NCS) BARRIER EALs:

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D11

The NCS Barrier includes the NCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

4.1.N.1 Critical Safety Function Status

• NCS Integrity - RED indicates NCS pressure and temperature conditions which may challenge the Reactor Vessel integrity. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potential loss of the NCS Barrier.

" There is no "Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4.1.N.2 NCS Leak Rate

" Small leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the NCS by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated. If letdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

• The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory loss from the primary system exceeds the capacity of the inventory control systems. If the loss of subcooling is indicated, the NCS barrier is considered lost.

4.1.N.3 SG Tube Rupture

• Small Steam Generator tube leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (NCS) by operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System, which is considered as one centrifugal charging pump discharging to the charging header with the letdown line isolated.

If letdown cannot be isolated, and a second charging pump is required, this is still considered a potential loss of the NCS barrier. The need for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory is an indication of a degraded NCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

" A tube rupture with an unisolable secondary line fault is generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant inventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers.

In conjunction with containment barrier loss #4, this condition will result in the Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D12

declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

• Secondary radiation increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, SG Blowdown, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampling System. Determination of the "uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the NCS that does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves.

These conditions represents a loss of the NCS and containment fission product barriers.

4.1.N.4 Containment Radiation Monitoring This EAL has been deleted for the following reasons. The containment process radiation monitors (EMF-38, 39, and 40) serve to provide early indication of reactor coolant (NC) leaks in containment to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments. These monitors alarm on small NC leaks in and below the Unusual Event (IC 4.2.U.4) range. Also, these monitors automatically isolate on a safety injection. For these reasons, it is not appropriate to use these monitors as an indication of a loss of the reactor coolant system barrier. The reactor building monitors (EMF.-5 IA and 51 B) used for the Fuel Clad EAL 4. I.F.3 are not able to indicate clearly the lower levels of activity in containment resulting from a leak of reactor coolant with normal activity levels. Thus, this EAL will be omitted and other indication will be used to determine a potential loss or loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier.

4.1.N.5 Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in determining whether the NCS barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs:

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

4.1.F.1 Critical Safety Function Status Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D13

" Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink - RED indicates the ultimate heat sink function is under extreme challenge. Either of these conditions indicate a potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

" Core Cooling - RED indicates significant reactor coolant superheating and core uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication of loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

4.1.F.2 Primary Coolant Activity Level

" There is no equivalent "Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

" The value of 300 [tCi/cc 1-131 equivalent coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage.

This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.

4.1.F.3 Containment Radiation Monitoring

" There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

NOTE: IfEMF-51A and EMF-51B are unavailable, readings can be calculated from procedure HP/0/B/1009/02, "Alternative Method for determining Dose Rates within the Reactor Building."

" These values indicate the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment. Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 5% clad failure depending on core inventory and NCS volume). This EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and a loss of NCS barrier.

4.1.F.4 Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgement that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-O0 7, REV 2, 01/92, BASIS INFORMATION FOR TABLE 4 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D14

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a N/A Required Shutdown or All Safety System Significant Transient in Within Technical Annunciation or Indication Progress.

Specification Limits. in Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2) Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators Unavailable.

4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation.

4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant System (NCS) Leakage.

4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D15

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.1-1 Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

BASIS:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, SU2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D16

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment. "Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicator excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities. Quantification of "most" is arbitrary; however, this judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SU3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D17

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.U.3-1 Dose Equivalent 1-131 greater than the Technical Specification allowable limit.

BASIS:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The EAL addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spike.

Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs. This EAL applies in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SU4 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D18

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant System (NCS) Leakage.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operations)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.4-1 Unidentified leakage > 10 gpm.

4.2.U.4-2 Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm.

4.2.U.4-3 Identified leakage > 25 gpm.

BASIS:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. NCS leakage is leakage into the containment area or outside the containment area from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). The RCPB is defined by 10CFR50.2 (Definitions) and from this definition the RCPB applicability at McGuire is:

RCPB means all those pressure-containing components of pressurized water-cooled reactors, such as pressure vessels, piping, pumps, and valves, which are:

1. Part of the Reactor Coolant System, or

2. Connected to the Reactor Coolant System, up to and including any and all of the following:

a. The outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates containment,

b. The second of two valves normally closed during normal reactor operation in system piping which does not penetrate containment (MNS has not currently identified any examples),

c. The pressurizer safety valves and PORVs.

Interconnected system leakage (ie: letdown, RHR) that can be easily detected and readily isolated is not included in this IC. This IC applies to any leak source that cannot be readily detected or isolated (ie:

intersystem LOCA, letdown that cannot be isolated). NCS leakage, identified and unidentified, are used in this IC as their Tech Spec definitions. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g., mass balances). The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC, "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUMARCiNESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SU5 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D19

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.2.U.5-1 Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

4.2.U.5-2 Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC ETS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SU6 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D20

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ALERT 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators Unavailable.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

AND

c. Either of the following:

" A significant plant transient is in progress.

" Loss of the Operator Aid Computer (OAC).

BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient. Quantification of "Most" is arbitrary; however, this judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D21

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as reactor trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

Significant indication is available from the OAC. Loss of the OAC in conjunction with the loss of other indications would further impair the ability to monitor plant parameters.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2,01/92, SA4 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D22

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.2.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of most (>50%) annunciators associated with safety systems.

AND

b. A significant plant transient is in progress.

AND

c. Loss of the OAC.

AND

d. Inability to provide manual monitoring of any of the following Critical Safety Functions:

0 subcriticality

• core cooling a heat sink

• containment.

BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the control room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SS6 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D23

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY Not Applicable Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D24

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELSIRADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release 4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose Resulting of Gaseous or Liquid of Gaseous or Liquid from an Actual or from an Actual or Radioactivity to the Radioactivity to the Imminent Release of Imminent Release of Environment that Environment that Radioactivity that Radioactivity that Exceeds Two Times the Exceeds 200 Times the Exceeds 100 mRem Exceeds 1000 mRem SLC Limits for 60 Minutes SLC Limits for 15 Minutes TEDE or 500 mRem CDE TEDE or 5000 mRem or Longer. or Longer. Adult Thyroid for the CDE Adult Thyroid Actual or Projected for the Actual or Duration of the Release. Projected Duration of the Release.

4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Plant Radiation or Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Airborne Concentration. Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D25

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EALs AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

4.3.U.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49L, EMF-44L, or EMF-31 (when aligned to RC) of> 5.45E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes or will likely continue for >60 minutes, which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/010, HP/O/B/1009/029, or SH/0/B/2005/001.

4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of> 2.05E+04 cpm for > 60 minutes or will likely continue for >60 minutes, which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/010, HP/0/B/1009/029, or SH/0/B/2005/001.

4.3.U.1-3 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-31 (when aligned to WC or WWCB) of

_>9.174E+03 cpm for > 60 minutes or will likely continue for >60 minutes, which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/010, HP/0/B/1009/029, or SH/0/B/2005/001.

4.3.U.1-4 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 1.6.11-6 for> 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure.

4.3.U.1-5 Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11-1 for> 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D26

BASIS:

The term "Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

Unplanned releases in excess of two times the site Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) that continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes.

The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC and Technical Specification (TS) are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC and TS are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2.

Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/fB/1 009/010, "Release of Radioactive Effluents Exceeding Selected Licensee Commitments", HP/0/B/1009/029, "Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment" or SH/0/B/2005/001 "Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections" to quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-O0 7, REV 2, 01/92, A U1 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D27

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.U.2-1 Indication of uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the reactor refueling cavity with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-2 Uncontrolled water level decrease of greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

4.3.U.2-3 Unplanned valid area EMF reading exceeds the levels shown in Enclosure 4.10 of RP/0/A/5700/000.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary; thus, impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via EALs I and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff. A threshold value of 6 inches is used to allow time for mitigating actions to successfully terminate the inventory loss. Credit should not be taken for inventory additions to maintain level above the 6 inch threshold. Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. The EMF readings for an Unusual Event are 1000 times the normal value. Enclosure 4.10 of RP/0/A/5700/000 will provide the actual readings for these monitors. This EAL escalates to an Alert if the increases impair safe operation.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-O0 7, REV 2, 01/92, A U2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D28

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times the SLC limits for 15 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

NOTE: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EALs AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

4.3.A.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-49H of > 1.56E+03 cpm for >_15 minutes or will likely continue for >15 minutes, which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/ 1009/010, HP/0/B/ 1009/029, or SH/0/B/2005/00 1.

4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36L of> 2.05E+06 cpm for > 15 minutes or will likely continue for >_15 minutes, which indicates that the release may have exceeded the initiating condition and indicates the need to assess the release with procedure HP/0/B/1009/010, HP/0/B/1009/029, or SH/0/B/2005/001.

4.3.A.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-6 for > 15 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure.

4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11-1 for > 15 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection (RP) procedure.

BASIS:

The term "Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm set points, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D29

It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

The gaseous release rate SLC and Technical Specification (TS) are based on limiting gaseous release rates to the SITE BOUNDARY to 500 mr/year total body.

The liquid release rate SLC and TS are based on limiting liquid release rates to the UNRESTRICTED AREA to 10 times the Effluent Concentration (EC) valves given in 10CFR20.1001-20.2401, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2.

Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/010, "Release of Radioactive Effluents Exceeding Selected Licensee Commitments,", HP/0/B/1009/029, "Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment", or SH/0/B/2005/001 "Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections" to quantify a release.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV. 2, 01/92, AA1 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D30

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

Does not apply to spent fuel in dry cask storage. Refer to basis for additional information.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.2-1 An unplanned valid trip II alarm on any of the following radiation monitors:

a. Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge IEMF-17 2EMF-4.

b. Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation 1EMF-42 2EMF-42.

c. Reactor Building Refueling Bridge 1EMF- 16 (Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only) 2EMF-3 (Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only).

d. Containment Noble Gas Monitors 1EMF-39 (Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only) 2EMF-39 (Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only).

4.3.A.2-2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that any irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range level < 358 inches after initiation of NC system make-up.

AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D31

4.3.A.2-4 Spent Fuel Pool or Fuel Transfer Canal level decrease of >2 feet after initiation of make-up.

AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being fully lowered into the spent fuel pool racks or transfer canal fuel transfer system basket.

BASIS:

This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and does not apply to spent fuel in dry cask storage. There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate.

Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement.

The intent of the "does not apply to spent fuel in dry cask storage" statement is to ensure that spent fuel in dry cask storage is not considered for application under Initiating Condition 4.3.A.2.

Spent fuel in dry cask storage can be defined as spent fuel assemblies stored in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) cask which has been totally evacuated of liquid coolant and completely sealed to preclude leakage to the environment.

It is NOT the intent of the "does not apply to spent fuel in dry cask storage" statement to eliminate any or all consideration of Initiating Condition 4.3.A.2 where spent fuel or other equipment is being manipulated to support loading, evacuating, sealing, or preparing a dry cask for transportation to the ISFSI pads. Several examples of this include:

1) Spent fuel is physically damaged during handling operations to support loading a cask with spent fuel, resulting in a valid trip II alarm on a listed radiation monitor. EAL 4.3.A.2-1 would apply in this case.

2) A dry cask which has been loaded, evacuated, and sealed is tipped over or dropped greater than 12 inches while still in the Spent Fuel Building, resulting in a valid trip II alarm on a listed radiation monitor. In this case, EAL 4.3.A.2-1 would not apply, but EAL 4.7.U. 1-6 Independent Spent Fuel Cask tipped over or dropped greater than 12 inches would apply because the cask has been loaded, evacuated, and sealed as a unit.

3) During dry cask operations, actual spent fuel damage occurs prior to evacuating and sealing the cask due to other unassociated events, resulting in a valid trip II alarm on a listed radiation monitor. EAL 4.3.A.2-1 would apply in this case.

The key to evaluating such an event is when the spent fuel damage occurs. After a dry cask has been evacuated and sealed, this IC does not apply, but IC 4.7.U. 1 could apply. Damage to spent fuel that may occur in the dry cask storage process prior to completion of evacuation and sealing of the dry cask should be considered under this IC.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D32

EAL 2: Due to concerns for ALARA and personnel safety, personnel should not remain in the area to observe that irradiated fuel is uncovered. Personnel should exit the area as quickly as possible and report the occurrence to the Control Room.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, AA2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D33

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.3.A.3-1 Valid reading on EMF-12 greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.A.3-2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

4.3.A.3-3 Valid area EMF reading exceeds the limits shown in Enclosure 4.10 of RP/O/A/5700/000.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This initiating condition (IC) addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. This situation is indicative of a significant radiological problem that warrants additional resources to assess and mitigate.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

The Control Room, CAS, and SAS are areas that require continuous occupancy. The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 (general design criteria) value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D34

McGuire has chosen to use a generic emergency action level of greater than or equal to 5000 mRad/hr for areas in the plant that are normally accessible as low dose rate areas that have equipment installed, operated, and used for safe operation or safe shutdown of the unit.

Radiation levels at or above this range may make it difficult to complete tasks necessary for safe operation of the plant or to establish or maintain cold shutdown without exceeding normal occupational dose limits of 5 Rem per year TEDE. Enclosure 4.10 of RP/0/A/5700/000 provides the monitor number and the location of the area monitor.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, AA3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D35

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity that Exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H of> 3.4E +03 cpm sustained for >15 minutes.

4.3.S.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.S.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 100 mRem integrated dose in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guide (PAG) values given in EPA-400-R 001.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, AS]

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D36

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

NOTE 1: These EMF readings are calculated based on average annual meteorology, site boundary dose rate, and design unit vent flow rate. Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate.

Therefore, these EMF readings should not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available.

NOTE 2: If dose assessment team calculations cannot be completed in 15 minutes, then valid monitor readings should be used for emergency classification.

4.3.G.1-1 A valid indication on radiation monitor EMF-36H of_> 3.4 E +04 cpm sustained for > 15 minutes.

4.3.G.1-2 Dose assessment team calculations indicate dose consequences greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

4.3.G.1-3 Analysis of field survey results or field survey samples indicates dose consequences greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid at the site boundary.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The 1000 mRem TEDE and 5000 mRem CDE thyroid integrated doses are based on the EPA PAG values given in EPA-400-R-92-001, which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if doses exceed these values. This is consistent with the emergency class description of a general emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, AG1 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D37

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY N/A 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System Protection Protection System to Instrumentation to System Instrumentation Complete an Automatic Complete or Initiate an to Complete or Initiate an Trip and Manual Trip Automatic Reactor Trip Automatic Reactor Trip WAS NOT Successful Once a Reactor Once a Reactor and There is Indication of Protection System Protection System an Extreme Challenge to Setpoint Has Been Setpoint Has Been the Ability to Cool the Exceeded and Manual Exceeded and Manual Core.

Trip WAS Successful. Trip WAS NOT Successful.

4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of in Cold Shutdown. Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D38

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT Not Applicable Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D39

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip WAS Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or NCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator(s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical. Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion.

Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SA2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D40

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of Residual Heat Removal (ND) and/or Nuclear Service Water (RN) and/or Component Cooling (KC)

AND One of the following:

0 Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200 OF S Uncontrolled reactor coolant temperature rise to >1 80'F.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses loss of functions required for core cooling during cold shutdown and refueling conditions. This IC and associated EALs are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, NCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, "Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel," or by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SA3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D41

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Trip WAS NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor. This EAL is equivalent to the Subcriticality CSF-RED.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and NCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SS2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D42

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.2-1 Subcriticality CSF-RED.

4.4.S.2-2 Heat Sink CSF-RED.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SS4 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D43

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.4.S.3-1 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3-2 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Reactor Coolant (NC) system narrow range level less than 6 inches and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3-3 a. Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND

b. Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 6 inches and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage may be imminent due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via radiological effluent IC.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SS5 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D44

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Trip and Manual Trip WAS NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Valid reactor trip signal received or required and automatic reactor trip was not successful.

AND

b. Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND

c. Either of the following conditions exist:

" Core Cooling CSF-RED

" Heat Sink CSF-RED.

BASIS Automatic and manual trip are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.

The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200OF or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of active fuel. This equates to a Core Cooling-RED condition.

Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence. If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D45

design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist.

This equates to a Heat Sink-RED condition.

In the event either of these challenges occurs during or following a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design, core damage may be imminent. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SG2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D46

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite Power 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All to Essential Busses for and Loss of All Onsite and Loss of All Onsite AC (Offsite and Onsite) AC Greater Than 15 Minutes. AC Power to Essential Power to Essential Power.

Busses During Cold Busses.

Shutdown Or Refueling Mode.

4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of 4.5.A.2 AC Power to Essential 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Required DC Power Busses Reduced to a Power.

During Cold Single Power Source for Shutdown or Refueling Greater Than 15 Minutes Mode for Greater than 15 Such That an Additional Minutes. Single Failure Could Result in Station Blackout.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D47

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Both emergency diesel generators are supplying power to their respective essential busses.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.1-2 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of offsite power to essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. One emergency diesel generator is supplying power to its respective essential bus.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D48

BASIS:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Unusual Event, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to that specified for the Alert EAL The event will escalate to an Alert in these modes if both essential busses are lost. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SU1 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D49

LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling Mode for Greater than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.U.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Unplanned loss of both unit related EVDA and EVDD busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

"Unplanned" is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert is via "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SU7 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D50

LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the essential busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SA1 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D51

LOSS OF POWER ALERT 4.5.A.2 AC Power to Essential Busses Reduced to a Single Power Source for Greater Than 15 Minutes Such That an Additional Single Failure Could Result in Station Blackout.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.A.2-1 The following condition exists:

AC power capability has been degraded to one essential bus powered from a single power source for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one of:

SATA SATB ATC ATD D/G A D/G B.

BASIS:

This IC and the associated EAL is intended to provide an escalation from IC, "Loss of All Offsite Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that an additional single failure could result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its essential busses. Another related condition could be the loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from the unit main generator, or the loss of onsite emergency diesels with only one train of essential busses being back fed from offsite power. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC, "Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses."

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SA5 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D52

LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.1-1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one essential bus within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity; thus, this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC, "Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

REFERENCE:

NUMARCNESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SS1 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D53

LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.S.2-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of both unit related EVDA and EVDD busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND

b. Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

BASIS:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Escalation to a General Emergency would occur by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, SS3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D54

LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All (Offsite and Onsite) AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.5.G.1-1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

a. Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to supply NC pump seal injection OR CA supply to steam generators.

AND

c. At least one of the following conditions exist:

" Restoration of at least one essential bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely.

• Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, NCS, and containment.

The SSF is capable of providing the necessary functions (reactor coolant pump seal injection and auxiliary feedwater supply to the steam generators) to maintain a hot shutdown condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is functioning as intended.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D55

Analysis in support of the station blackout coping study indicates that the plant can cope with a station blackout for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without core damage.

The likelihood of restoring at least one essential bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT?

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgement as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2,01/92, SGJ Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D56

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIREIEXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.1 FireWithin Protected 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting 4.6.S.1 HOSTILE ACTION within 4.6.G.1 HOSTILE ACTION Area Boundary NOT the Operability of Plant the PROTECTED AREA Resulting in Loss of Extinguished Within Safety Systems Required Physical Control o fthe 15 Minutes of Detection to Establish or Maintain Facility.

OR Explosion Within the Safe Shutdown.

Protected Area Boundary.

4.6.U.2 Confirmed SECURITY 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting CONDITION or threat the Operability of Plant Which Indicates a Safety Systems Required Potential Degradation in to Establish or Maintain the Level of Safety of the Safe Shutdown.

Plant.

4.6.A.3 HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or Airborne Attack Threat Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D57

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.1 Fire Within Protected Area Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection OR Explosion Within the Protected Area Boundary.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.U.1-1 Fire in any of the following areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm.

• Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Building

" Diesel Generator Rooms

• Control Room

• Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

" Central Alarm Station (CAS)

" Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

" Doghouses

" Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST)

" Turbine Building

" Service Building

• Interim Radwaste Building

• Equipment Staging Building

• ISFSI.

4.6.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structures or equipment or to a loaded cask in the ISFSI.

BASIS:

EAL 1: The purpose of this EAL is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings outside the protected area. Waste-basket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence should easily be extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings or Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D58

areas. Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alarm is not spurious.

EAL 2: Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the protected area or to a loaded cask in the ISFSI area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

Escalation to a higher emergency class is by, "Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown".

INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) These ICs are categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude that a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is damaged or violated. This includes classification based on a loaded fuel storage cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY loss leading to the degradation of the fuel during storage or posing an operational safety problem with respect to its removal from storage.

ISFSI Technical Specifications allow time to complete required actions if cask seal integrity is not maintained; therefore, classification should not be made based on a loss of seal integrity by itself. However, loss of seal integrity coincident with an accident condition affecting a cask would justify classification.

For these EALs the results of the ISFSI Safety Analysis Report (SAR) per NUREG 1536 was used to develop the site-specific list of accident conditions.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-0O7, REV 2, 01/92, HU2, NEI 99-01 (Methodologyfor Development of Emergency Action Levels) Draft FinalRev 4, McGuire ISFSI Safety Analysis Report.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D59

FIRE/EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT 4.6.U.2 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or Threat Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.U.2-1 A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the MNS Security shift supervision.

4.6.U.2-2 A credible site-specific security threat notification.

4.6.U.2-3 A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

BASIS:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between security shift supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under 4.6.A.3, 4.6.S. 1 and 4.6.G. 1.

A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the security threat and potential consequences. The licensee shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification level in accordance with the site's Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan.

EAL #1 Reference is made to site specific security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event classifcation confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the plant Safeguards Contingency Plan.

The threshold is based on site specific security plans. Site specific Safeguards Contingency Plans are based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D60

EAL #2 This threshold is included to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a credible threat. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Notification of an Unusual Event.

The determination of "credible" is made through use of information found in the site specific Safeguards Contingency Plan.

EAL #3 The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the aircraft threat are made in a timely manner and thatOROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. It is not the intent of this EAL to replace existing non-hostile related EALs involving aircraft.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an aircraft threat from NRC.

Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication.

Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Unusual Event.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation to Alert emergency classification level would be via 4.6.A.3 would be appropriate if the threat involves an airliner within 30 minutes of the plant.

REFERENCE:

NEI 99-01 rev 5, (HU4)Methodology for Developement of Emergency Action Levels. This change is to supportNEI 03-12 implementation. (PIPG-09-0360}

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D61

FIRE/EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 (Power Operation)

Mode 2 (Startup)

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)

Mode 6 (Refueling)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.1-1 The following conditions exist:

(includes non-security events)

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

• Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Building

" Diesel Generator Rooms

• Control Room

• Standby Shutdown Facility

• CAS

" SAS

" FWST

" Doghouses (Applies in Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 only).

AND

b. One of the following:

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

" Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance

" Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment within the specified area.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D62

BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. The inclusion of a "report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The key to classifying fires/explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire/explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire/explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire/explosion and to discriminate against minor fires/explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2,01/92, HA2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D63

FIRE/EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: No Mode (Defueled)

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.2-1 The following conditions exist:

(includes non-security events)

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

" Spent Fuel Pool

" Auxiliary Building.

AND

b. One of the following:

Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

" Spent Fuel Pool level and/or temperature show degraded performance.

" Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment supporting Spent Fuel Pool cooling.

BASIS:

In a Defueled condition, the plant safety systems of interest are those that support Spent Fuel Pool inventory and cooling.

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. Fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D64

observed. The inclusion of a "report of visible damage" should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification.

The key to classifying fires/explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident. The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire/explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire/explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire/explosion and to discriminate against minor fires/explosions.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HA2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D65

FIRE/EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT 4.6.A.3 HOSTILE ACTION within OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.6.A.3-1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the MNS Security Shift Supervision.

4.6.A.3-2 A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

BASIS:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

These EALs address the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal or sheltering).

EAL #1 This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees with the OCA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Note that this EAL is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes ISFSI's that may be outside the PROTECTED AREA but still within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D66

[Although nuclear plant security officers are well trained and prepared to protect against HOSTILE ACTION, it is appropriate for OROs to be notified and encouraged to begin activation (if they do not normally) to be better prepared should it be necessary to consider further actions.]

[If not previously notified by the NRC that the airborne HOSTILE ACTION was intentional, then it would be expected, although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency would follow. In this case, appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD, FBI FAA or NRC. However, the declaration should not be unduly delayed awaiting Federal notification.]

EAL #2 This EAL addreses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this EAL list to ensure that notifications for the airliner attack threat are made in a timely manner and that OROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. Airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding a airliner attack threat from NRC and the airliner is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

REFERENCE:

EI 99-01 rev 5 (HA4) Methodologyfor Development of Emergency Action Levels.

This change is to supportNEI 03-12 implementation. (PIP G-09-0360}

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D67

FIRE/EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.6.S.1 HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.S.1-1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the MNS Security Shift Supervision.

BASIS:

This condition represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert in that a HOSTILE FORCE has progressed from the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to the PROTECTED AREA.

This EAL addresses the cotingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and inderterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires ORO readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

[Although nuclear plant security officers are well trained and prepared to protect against HOSTILE ACTION, it is appropriate for OROs to be notified and encouraged to begin preparations for public protective actions (if they do not normally) to be better prepared should it be necessary to consider further actions.]

[If not previously notified by NRC that the airborne HOSTILE ACTION was intentional, then it would be expected, although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency would follow. In this case, appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD, FBI, FAA or NRC. However, the declaration should not be unduly delayed awaiting Federal notification.]

Escalation of this emergency classifcation level, if appropriate, would be based on actual plant status after impact or progression of attack.

REFERENCE:

El 99-01 rev 5 (HS4) Methodologyfor Development of Emergency Action Levels.

This change is to support NEI 03-12 implementation. (PIPG-09-0360}

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D68

FIRE/EXPLOSION AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.G.1 HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.6.G.1-1 A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are uable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions.

4.6.G.1-2 A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

BASIS:

EAL #1 This EAL encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of VITAL AREAS (containing vital equipment or controls of vital equipment) required to maintain safety functions and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location.

[Typically, these safety functions are reactivity control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown) reactor water level (ability to cool the core), and decay heat removal (ability to maintain a heat sink) for a BWR. The equivalent functions for a PWR are reactivity control, RCS inventory, and secondary heat removal.]

[Loss of physical control of the control room or remote shutdown capability alone may not prevent the ability to maintain safety functions per se. Design of the remote shutdown capability and the location of the transfer switches should be taken into account. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that supply protection for and information about safety functions.]

If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain safety functions can be transferred to another location, then the threshold is not met.

EAL #2 This EAL addresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if IMMINENT fuel damage is likely, such as when a freshly off-loaded reactor core is in the spent fuel pool.

A freshly off-loaded reactor core is: The complete removal and relocation of all fuel assemblies from the reactor core and placed in the spent fuel pool. (Typical of a "No Mode" operation during a refuel outage that allows safety system maintenance to occur and results in maximum decay heat load in the spent fuel pool system).

REFERENCE:

NEI 99-01 rev 5 (HG1) Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels. This change is to supportNEI 03-12 implementation. (PIPG-09-0360}

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D69

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUALEVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Phenomena Affecting the Phenomena Affecting the Has Been Initiated and Which in the Judgement of Protected Area. Plant Vital Area. Plant Control Cannot Be the Emergency Established. Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing Flammable Gases Deemed Flammable Gases Within a Which in the Judgement of Detrimental to Safe Facility Structure Which The Emergency Operation of the Plant. Jeopardizes Operation of Coordinator/EOF Director Systems Required to Warrant Declaration of Site Maintain Safe Operations Area Emergency.

or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Which in the Judgement of Has Been Initiated.

the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D71

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.1-1 Tremor felt and valid alarm on the Syscom Seismic Monitoring System (OAC MID2422).

4.7.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of tornado striking within protected area boundary including the ISFSI.

4.7.U.1-3 Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within protected area boundary including the ISFSI.

4.7.U.1-4 Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

4.7.U.1-5 ISFSI cask tipped over or dropped greater than 12 inches.

4.7.U.1-6 Uncontrolled flooding in the ISFSI area.

4.7.U.1-7 Tornado generated missile(s) impacting the ISFSI.

BASIS:

The protected area boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the site security plan.

EAL 1: Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection can be based on instrumentation, validated by a reliable source, or operator assessment. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake", dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is:

An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators, and (b) valid alarm on seismic instrumentation occurs.

Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D72

EAL 2: A tornado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert. See ISFSI information covered under EAL 5, 6 & 7.

EAL 3: Addresses such items as a car, truck, plane, helicopter, or train crash that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may be escalated to Alert.

See ISFSI information covered under EAL 5, 6 & 7.

EAL 4: Addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via other EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by the missiles generated by the failure or by the radiological releases in conjunction with a steam generator tube rupture. These latter events would be classified by the Radiological ICs or Fission Product Barrier ICs.

EALs 5, 6 & 7: These ISFSI related ICs are categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude that a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is damaged or violated. This includes classification based on a loaded fuel storage cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY loss leading to the degradation of the fuel during storage or posing an operational safety problem with respect to its removal from storage.

ISFSI Technical Specifications allow time to complete required actions if cask seal integrity is not maintained; therefore, classification should not be made based on a loss of seal integrity by itself. However, loss of seal integrity coincident with an accident condition affecting a cask would justify classification.

For these EALs the results of the ISFSI Safety Analysis Report (SAR) per NUREG 1536 was used to develop the site-specific list of accident conditions.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-0O7, REV. 2, 01/92, HUI, NE! 99-01 (Methodologyfor Development of Emergency Action Levels) Draft FinalRev 4, McGuire ISFSI Safety Analysis Report.

NOTE: NUMARC EAL #5 moved to Fire/Security Recognition Category Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D73

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

4.7.U.2-1 Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect safe operation of the plant.

4.7.U.2-2 Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

BASIS:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.).

Gases within the owner controlled area that are below life threatening or flammable concentrations do not meet this EAL.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HU3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D74

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT 4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.U.3-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2. 01/92. HU5 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D75

BASIS:

EAL 1: Based on the FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude (> OBE) can cause damage to safety functions.

EAL 2: Based on the available instrumentation and the FSAR design basis. Wind loads of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

EAL 3: This EAL is intended to address the threat to safety related structures or equipment from uncontrollable and possibly catastrophic events. This list of areas includes areas containing safety-related equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if events have damaged areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HA1 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D77

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

Structures for both EALs:

" Reactor Building

• Auxiliary Building

• Diesel Generator Rooms

• Control Room

• Standby Shutdown Facility

• Doghouses

• CAS

• SAS.

4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

BASIS:

This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the safe operation of the plant. Safe operations are affected when the area can not be accessed by plant personnel to ensure continued operability or availability of safety systems/components. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (i.e., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HA3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D78

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.3-1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/1(2)/A/5500/017 or AP/1 (2)/A/5500/024. {2}

BASIS:

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or Emergency Operations Facility is necessary. Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain NCS or SG inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HA5 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D79

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT 4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.A.4-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the Alert emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HA6 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D80

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Control room evacuation has been initiated per AP/1(2)/A/5500/017 or AP/1 (2)/A/5500/024. {2}

AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or the Standby Shutdown Facility within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has not been accomplished. This failure to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters. For purposes of classification, the 15 minutes begins at the time that the determination to staff the alternate location is made. For most conditions, Reactor Coolant Pump seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer in the necessary time.

Escalation of this event, if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgement ICs.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HS2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D81

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.S.2-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate actual or likely major failures of plant finctions needed for protection of the public.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HS3 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D82

NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

4.7.G.1-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate: (1) actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment, or (2) potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases. These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guideline levels outside the site boundary.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

REFERENCE:

NUMARC/NESP-007, REV 2, 01/92, HG2 Rev. 14-1 January, 2014 D83

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2

§50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

MNS Emergency Plan Figure P-2 rev 14-1 January 2014 Superseded SR/O/B/2000/002 (Standard Procedure for EOF Services) and moved actions into SR/O/B/A/2000/003 (Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility) rev 001. Roles, responsibilities and action steps for groups that do not routinely report to the EOF but support the ERO (Telecommunications, Transportation Services, Risk Management and Insurance, and Procurement) are being placed in new Administrative Procedure AD-EP-DEC-0 107 (EOF Services) rev 000.

Per these Duke Energy Fleet procedure changes; reference to SR/0/B/2000/002 (Standard Procedure for EOF Services) was deleted from McGuire Emergency Plan Figure P-2.

There are no impacts upon any planning standard especially 50.47(b)(3) (Emergency Response Support and Resources) and 50.47(b)(8) (Emergency Facility and Equipment) or Appendix E of 10CFR part 50 per this new procedure. There is no reduction in effectiveness per MNS Emergency Plan sections B.8 (Contractor and Private Organizations) and M.2 (Recovery Organization) therefore a 50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation is not required.

A disposition document has been created to show how each step from the superseded SR/O/B/2000/002 has been addressed in AD-EP-DEC-0107 or justified for deletion. This document is attached to this screen evaluation.

Click here to enter text.

Activity Scope:

0 The activity is a change to the emergency plan LI The activity is not a change to the emergency plan Change Type: 0 Change Type:

E] The change is editorial or typographical El The change does conform to an activity that has Z The change is not editorial or typographical prior approval Z The change does not conform to an activity that has prior approval Revision 12

Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Attachment 3.10.7.2 Planning Standard Impact Determination:

El §50.47(b)(1) - Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)

L1 §50.47(b)(2) - Onsite Emergency Organization El §50.47(b)(3) - Emergency Response Support and Resources El §50.47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System*

Ej §50.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures*

LI §50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Communications El §50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information El §50.47(b)(8) - Emergency Facility and Equipment Ej §50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment*

Ln §50.47(b)(10) - Protective Response*

El §50.47(b)(1 1) - Radiological Exposure Control E] §50.47(b)(12) - Medical and Public Health Support EL §50.47(b)(13) - Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations El §50.47(b)(14) - Drills and Exercises LI §50.47(b)(1 5) - Emergency Responder Training 13 §50.47(b)(16) - Emergency Plan Maintenance

• Risk Significant Planning Standards Z The proposed activity does not impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination:

13 The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:

Z The activity does not involve a site specific EP commitment.

Screening Evaluation Results:

Z The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation 13 The activity cannot be implemented without perfor*ng a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation Pr~g rName' Prt *r ae 7 ...............

.............Date...................:-. ..........

le . - . .. PinaRe .......................

rev e --rNNLd.........................

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P. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING EFFORT To assure that responsibilities for plan development, review and distribution of emergency plans are established and that the Emergency Planning staff are properly trained.

P. I Emergency Planning Staff Training Emergency Planning Group personnel will attend training/workshops, infonnation exchange meetings with other licensees, and conferences held by industry and government agencies, as available, to maintain current knowledge of the overall planning effort. The Emergency Planning Manager is required to attend offsite training on an annual basis. This training will be documented in site Emergency Planning files or the Training group database (i.e. People Soft, etc.).

P.2 Emergency Response Planning The Site Vice President has the overall authority and responsibility for the Site Emergency Plan. This planning effort is delegated to the Emergency Planning Manager.

P.3 Site Emergency Planning Manager The Emergency Planning Manager has the overall authority and responsibility for site emergency response planning as well as the responsibility for the development and updating of the site Emergency Plan and coordination of this plan with other response organizations.

P.4 Review of Emergency Plan Review and updating of the site Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures shall be certified to be current on an annual basis. Any changes identified by drills and exercises shall be incorporated into the Site Emergency Plan.

On an annual basis, the Emergency Planning Manager will provide each state and local organization responsible for off-site activation and protective action decision-making, a copy of the nuclear site procedures appropriate for their area on emergency classification and notification. A response will be requested by letter within 30 days that a review has been completed with concurrence with the EAL's used for event classification and for protective action recommendations. If problem areas are identified, the Emergency Planning Manager will ensure resolution.

P.5 Distribution of Revised Plans The Emergency Plan and approved changes shall be forwarded to individuals and organizations listed in App. 6. Revised pages shall be dated and marked to show where changes have been made.

Rev. 14-1 P-1 January, 2014

P.6 Supporting Plans Figure P-I gives a detailed listing of supporting plans to the McGuire Nuclear Site Emergency Plan.

P.7 Implementing Procedures Written procedures will be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities associated with emergency plan implementation. Each procedure, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed and approved by the responsible implementing manager prior to implementation and shall be reviewed periodically as set forth in administrative procedures.

McGuire Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures are listed in Figure P-2 with a reference to the section of Emergency Plan implemented by each procedure. Figure P-3 contains the distribution list for McGuire Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

P.8 Table of Contents The McGuire Nuclear Site Emergency Plan contains a specific table of contents. The McGuire Nuclear Site Emergency Plan has been cross referenced to the applicable sections of NUREG-0654 Rev. 1.

P.9 Audit of Emergency Plan The Nuclear Safety Review Board Chairman will arrange for an independent review of McGuire Nuclear Station's Emergency Preparedness Program as necessary, based on an assessment against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect emergency preparedness, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, all elements of the emergency preparedness program will be reviewed at least once every 24 months. Guidance for performing the assessment against the performance indicators is provided in the Emergency Preparedness Administrative Procedure AD-EP-ALL-0001. The independent review will be conducted by the Nuclear Oversight - Audits and will include the following plans, procedures, training programs, drills/exercises, equipment, and State/local government interfaces:

1. McGuire Nuclear Site Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures

2. State/Local Support Agency Training Program

3. Site Training Program

4. Public and Media Training/Awareness

5. Equipment - Communications, Monitoring, Meteorological, Public Alerting

6. State/Local Plan Interface Rev. 14-1 P-2 January, 2014

The review findings will be submitted to the appropriate corporate and nuclear site management. Appropriate portions of the review findings will be reported to the involved federal, state, and local organizations. The corporate or nuclear site management, as appropriate, will evaluate the findings affecting their area of responsibility and ensure effective corrective actions are taken. The result of the review, along with reconmnendations for improvements, will be documented and retained for a period of five years.

P.10 Telephone Number Updates Telephone numbers reflected in the online organization charts, will be updated quarterly in accordance with PT/O/A/4600/09 1, Periodic Test of Technical Support Center Communications and Supplies.

Rev. 14-1 P-3 January, 2014

DUKE ENERGY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE FIGURE P- I SUPPORTING PLANS

1. North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in support of McGuire Nuclear Site

2. South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan in support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities (McGuire Nuclear Site)

3. Iredell County, N.C., Radiological Emergency Response Plan in Support of the McGuire Nuclear Site

4. Mecklenburg County, N.C., Radiological Emergency Response Plan in Support of the McGuire Nuclear Site

5. Gaston County, N.C., Radiological Emergency Response Plan in Support of the McGuire Nuclear Site

6. Lincoln County, N.C., Radiological Emergency Response Plan in Support of the McGuire Nuclear Site

7. Catawba County, N.C., Radiological Emergency Response Plan in Support of the McGuire Nuclear Site

8. Cabarrus County, N.C., Radiological Emergency Response Plan in Support of the McGuire Nuclear Site

9. Emergency Response Plan, Water Reactors Division, Westinghouse Electric Corporation

10. N.R.C. Region II Incident Response Plan

11. Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan - Region 3 - U.S. Department of Energy

12. INPO Emergency Response Plan Rev. 14-1 P-4 January, 2014

MCGUIRE FIGURE P-2 PAGE 1 OF 4 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Procedure # Title Emergency Plan Section Implemented AP/O/A/5500/047 Security Events (Proprietary Info) Section J RP/O/A/5700/000 Classification of Emergency Section D, E, I RP/O/A/5700/001 Notification of Unusual Event Section D, E, 1.1, J.7 RP/O/A/5700/002 Alert Section D, E, 1.1, J.7 RP/O/A/5700/003 Site Area Emergency Section D, E, 1.1, J.7, M. 1 RP/O/A/5700/004 General Emergency Section D, E, 1.1, J.7, M. 1 RP/O/A/5700/006 Natural Disasters Section D RP/O/A/5700/007 Earthquake Section D, H.6 RP/0/A/5700/008 ,..n- or 1 a*1 le Gases Section D RP/O/A/5700/09 Collisions/Explosions Section D RP/O/A/5700/01 0 NRC Immediate Notification Section D RP/O/A/5700/011 Conducting a Site Assembly, Site Evacuation or Section E.2, J, K.7 Containment Evacuation RP/0/A/5700/012 Activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Section B, H, M.1 Rev. 14-I P-5 January, 2014

MCGUIRE FIGURE P-2 PAGE 2 OF 4 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Procedure # Title Emergency Plan Section Implemented RP/O/A/5700/018 Notifications to the State and Section E Counties from the TSC RP/O/A/5700/019 Core Damage Assessment RP/O/A/5700/020 Activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC) Section H RP/O/A/5700/022 Spill/Incident Response Procedure Appendices 7, 8, 9 RP/0/A/5700/024 Recovery and Reentry Section M RP/0/A/5700/026 Operations/Engineering Required Actions in the Technical Support Center (TSC)

RP/0/B/5700/023 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Section G Plan RP/O/B/5700/029 Notifications to Offsite Agencies from the Control Section E Room HP/0/B/1009/002 Alternative Methods for Determining Dose Rate Section D, 1.6 within the Reactor Building HP/O/B/1009/003 Recovery Plan Section M HP/O/B/1009/006 Procedure for Quantifying High Level Gaseous Section D, 1.3 Radioactivity Release During Accident Conditions Rev. 14-1 P-6 January, 2014

MCGUIRE FIGURE P-2 PAGE 3 0F4 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Procedure # Title Emergency Plan Section Implemented HP/0/B/1009/010 Releases of Liquid Radioactive Materials Section D, 1.3 Exceeding Selected Licensee Commitments HP/0/B/1 009/021 Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post-Accident I.10 Conditions HP/0/B/1009/022 Accident and Emergency Response Section I, Section E HP/0/B/1 009/023 Environmental Monitoring for Emergency Section E, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 Conditions HP/0/B 1009/024 Personnel Monitoring for Emergency Conditions J.3, K.7 Rev. 14-1 P-7 January, 2014

MCGUIRE FIGURE P-2 PAGE 4 OF 4 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Procedure # Title Emergency Plan Section Implemented HP/0/B/1009/029 Initial Response On-Shift Dose Assessment Section I.3.alb SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections Section I SH/0/B/2005/002 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator Section 1.8 SH/O/B/2005/003 Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the J.6 Event of a Radioiodine Release SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure for Public Affairs Response to Section G the Emergency Operations Facility SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Section B, H, M. 1 SR/O/A/2000/004 Notifications to States and Counties from the EOF Section E EP Manual Section 1.1 Emergency Organization Sections B, E, H PTr"/0A/4600/088 Functional Check of Emergency Vehicle and Section H. 1 IEquipmentI Rev. 14-1 P-8 January, 2014

FIGURE P-3 McGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DISTRIBUTION Control No.

2. Radiation Protection Manager

3. Emergency Planning Manager, Oconee

4. McGuire Nuclear Training

5. Operations Staff Manager

6. Site Emergency Planner, MGO1EP

7. NRC Site Representative, McGuire Nuclear Site (forwarded by McGuire Emergency Planning)

8. Operator Training Director

13. Emergency Planning Manager, CNS

14. Director, Division of Radiation Protection

16. NCEM REP Program Manager

17. Tina Kuhr, Emergency Planning Consultant!NSRB Staff

19. Emergency Operations Facility, EOF Director's Area (MNS Emergency Planning, custodians)

20. McGuire Nuclear Site, Document Control

21. NCEM Western Branch Office Manager

22. NRC Document Control Desk, Washington D.C. (forwarded 1 copy by McGuire Emergency Planning)

Rev. 14-1 P-9 January, 2014

FIGURE P-3 McGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DISTRIBUTION Control No.

23. NRC, Regional Administrator, Atlanta, GA (forwarded I copy by McGuire Emergency Planning)

24. NRC, Regional Administrator, Atlanta, GA (forwarded 1 copy by McGuire Emergency Planning)

25. NRC Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Rev. 14-1 P-10 January, 2014

Disposition of SR/0/B3/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Change Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation or Difference or None? I I. 1. Symptoms An emergency condition exists AD-EP-DEC- Symptoms not required per Duke N/A N/A requiring EOF activation. 0107 Step 1. Energy Procedure Writers Manual Purpose Revision 12 and AD-DC-ALL-0201.

Replaced by

Purpose:

Provides responsibilities and actions for the following areas that support the EOF Ser.iccs Manager during EOF activation and recovery operations:

• Telecommunications e Transportation Services a Risk Management and Insurance 0 Procurement

2. 2. Immediate Activate the EOF Services functions. SR/O/A/2000/0 Activate the EOF Services Function by B.2 - The Difference Actions The following services functions are 03 Enclosure establishing duty function contacts for process for established or made available: 6.19 Step 4 EOF service areas and post in EOF timely

- Communication Systems (Enclosure Service area: augmentation of 4.1) onshift staff is

" Administration/Commissary

- Transportation Services (Enclosure established and

" Communications (24-hour 4.2) maintained.

number is 704-382-1961)

- Administration/Commissary

• Transportation Services (Enclosure 4.3)

- Risk Management and Insurance

• Risk Management and (Enclosure 4.4) Insurance

- Procurement (Enclosure 4.5)

• Procurement

3. 3. Subsequent Shutdown EOF per Enclosure 4.6. N/A Subsequent Actions not required per N/A N/A Actions I I Duke Energy Procedure Writer's I I Deviation - differs in wording and is altered in meaning or intent; difference - differs in wording but agrees in meaning and intent; None - wording same as existing procedure. Differences can be screened; deviations will need to be evaluated I

V Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000!003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Change Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step VVording EP Function Deviation

1. or Difference 1

or None?

Manual Revision 12 and AD-DC-ALL-0201. See Enclosure 4.6 below for specific items.

4. 4. Enclosures 4.1 Communications See disposition Communications - AD-EP-DEC-O107 NIA N/A 4.2 Transportation Services to right Steps 4.1 and 5.1 4.3 Administration/Commissary Transportation Services - AD-EP-DEC-4.4 Risk Management and Insurance 0107 Steps 4.2 and 5.2 4.5 Procurement Risk Management and Insurance - AD-4.6 EOF Shutdown Review Items EP-DEC-0107 Steps 4.3 Procurement - AD-EP-DEC-0107 Steps 4.4 and 5.3 EOF Shutdown Review Items -

SR/O/A/2000/003 Enclosures 6.11 and 6.19 2

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step WVording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?.

5. Enclosure 4.1 Communications 4.1 Telecommunications

6. 1*.Purlpose - Provides the telephone and radio

• AD.EP.. t F.2Systems ar Devlationi .M

,.....mnts of th eoverlrecovery I DIE-slQ7. itor..ctspro. ems theestablshed f%rt*pon Responsibilities of

-*orgamization as well as electrical needsi .... :t.4*3. teo.n-a.- i -... wark-, phones,:

pagers;aand raio br r mp' ' the Informationý

Technolog Resone rga ztin.among0 prnipal; Department m.

- " . .'.** " - " --. . . * -- *. n. resp ons , u ol ar

- ~3~UAAlA..Zenc . Generatio UPre

-facilities: ard. :_Chapte 7. It does not,

- maintainied to, include electrical support emergency hookupsi

_____response

7. 2. Major Functions ________________4.1 Responsibilities_________

8. 2.1 Install and maintain telephone system. AD-EP- Intlsadmitistetlpoe F.2 - Systems are Difference. This DEC-0107 Iystallusead mantin the tmelgehney established for procedure describes Step 4. 1.1 Rsystmnsed bygniztheEmrgnc- prompt the responsibilities of ResposecOranizaion.tio the Communications among principal group during a emergency response declared event.

organizations. Responsibilities of the Information Technology Department in support of Nuclear Generation are specified in NPM 2

Devation - differs in wording and is altered in meaning or intent; difference - differs in wording but agrees in meaning and intent; None - wording same as existing procedure. Differences can be screened, deviations will need to be evaluated 3

Disposition of SR/0IB/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None?2

9. 2.2 Supply mobile radios and radio pagers. AD-EP- Provides mobile radios and pagers for F. - Systems are Difference. This DEC-0107 the Emegency Response established for procedure describes Step 4.1.2 Organization. prompt the responsibilities of communication the Communications among principal group during a emergency response declared event.

orgmnizations. Responsibilities of the Information Technology Department in support of Nuclear Generation are specified in NPM Chapter 7.

,10. 2.3 Install additional electrical hookups as: N/A , N/A H.2- Adequate Deviation.

- nede -facilities are, Responsibilities-of

- ~. niaitai1ed to the Inforato supot mergen cV- .Technology

- . -~~-- - . repone. epartment in' support, of Nuclear Y-'i G erationiare

-4 specMiedNM.

- Chapter 7. Electrical hookups aenot

___ ______ _ ___ ___ -includedf-.

11. Note before Step 2.4 NOTE: Telecommunications Operations N/A Not an Action Step. Phone number N/A N/A Center (704-382-1961) is staffed 7 days a moved into AD-EP-DEC-0107 Step week, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. 5.1___ ___________

12. 2.4 Notify Telecommunications Operations AD-EP- Notify the Telecommunications H.2 - Adequate Difference

____________________Center should any additional problem DEC-0107 Operations Center (704-382-1961) if facilities are_________

4

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-O1 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Vording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?2 solving be necessary and/or additional Step 5.1 any communication systems problem maintained to personnel be required. solving is necessary or additional support emergency personnel are required. response.

13. 3. Communications Telephone System AD-EP- Telephone System: Independent lines F.2 - Systems are Difference Systems DEC-0107 for use by Emergency Operations established for The system consist- of independent lines Step Fadciity personnel with access to prompt for use by Emergency Response 3.11 commercial local and long distance communication personnel and provisions are made for service and the Duke Energy among principal phones for NRC use and special off-site telecommunications network. emergency response agency coordination use. Telephones are located throughout the organizations.

facility.

14. Radio Systems AD-EP- Radio Systems: Independent systems F.2 - Systems are Difference DEC-0107 for use by the Offsite Agency established for These systems consist of independent Step Communicators, State Field prompt systems for use by the Off-site 3.5 Monitoring team, and Duke Field communication Communicators, State Field Monitoring Monitoring teams located in the among principal and Duke Field Monitoring (800 MHz Oflsite Agency Communicator (ECI- emergency response system). 0124-03) and Offsite Monitoring (ECI- organizations.

0126) rooms.

15. Satellite Telephones AD-EP- F.2 - Systems are Difference DEC-0107 Satellite Telephones (Fixed): Satellite established for The EOF has independent satellite step radio and telephones with access to the prompt telephones in two locations in the EOF. 3.7 North Carolina Emergency communication One is located in the Off-site Management talk groups located in the among principal Communications area; the other is Offsite Agency Communicator room emergency response located in the Field Monitoring area. (ECI-0124-03) and the Offsite organizations.

Monitoring room (ECI-0 126).

16. 4. Equipment Communications: All communication N/A N/A F.2 - Systems are Difference 5

Disposition of SRO0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-01 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None? 2 equipment for the EOF is in each established for individual room and location, prompt communication among principal emergency response organizations.

17. - Telephones (commc cal, "crowavc, AD-EP- Telephone System: independcnt lines F.2 - Systems are Difference and cellular) are located throughout the DEC-0 107 for use by Emergency Operations established for facility. Step Facility personnel with access to prompt 3.11 commercial local and long distance communication service and the Duke Energy among principal telecommunications network. emergency response Telephones are located throughout the organizations.

facility.

18. - Selective Signal Telephone AD-EP- Selective Signaling System: State and F.2 - Systems are Difference (state/county notification equipment) is DEC-01 07 County notification equipment located established for located in the Off-site Agency Step in the Offsite Agency Communicator prompt Communicator room. 3.9 room (ECI-0124-03). communication among principal emergency response organizations.

19. - Emergency Telecommunications AD-EP- Emergency Telecommunications F.2 - Systems are Difference System (formerly FTS2000 System) is DEC-0107 System: Formerly known as the established for located in the NRC room (NRC Step FTS2000 System. NRC prompt telephones and LAN connections for 3.4 communications system located in the communication laptop computers), Accident Assessment NRC room (ECI-0124-04), Accident among principal Room and Dose Assessment Room. Assessment room (ECI-0124-01) and emergency response Radiological Assessment room (ECI- organizations.

0125).

6

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?2

20. - SC Emergency Radios are located in AD-EP- South Carolina (SC) Emergency F.2 - Systems are Difference the Off-site Agency Communicator room DEC-0107 Radios: Radios on the SC Emergency established for and Field Monitoring room. Step Management Frequency located in the prompt 3.10 Off-site Agency Communicator room communication (ECI-0124-03) and Offsite Monitoring among principal room (ECI-O1 26). emergency response

21. - Duke Power Emergency Radio System AD-EP- Duke Energy Emergency Radio F.2 - Systems are Difference (800 MHz system) is located in the Field DEC-0107 System: 800 MHz system located in established for Monitoring room. Step the Offsite Monitoring room (ECI- prompt 3.30126). communication among principal emergency response organizations.

22. - Ringdown Telephones (connected to AD-EP- Ringdown Telephones: Special F.2 - Systems are Difference MNS & CNS TSCs) are located in the DEC-0107 telephones connected point to point to established for EOF Director's Area. Step 3.6 the McGuire and Catawba TSCs prompt located in the EOF Director's arcoanication (ECI-0124). among principal emergency response organizations.

23. - Decision Line Telephones AD-EP- Decision Line Telephones: State and F.2 - Systems are Difference (State/County communications network) DEC-0107 County communications network used established for are located in the EOF Director's area. Step 3.2 for off-site agency coordination prompt located in the EOF Director's area communication (ECI-0124). among principal emergency response organizations.

7

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step WVording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?

24. Enclosure 4.2 Transportation Services 4.2 Transportation Services

25. 1. Purpose Provides necessary equipment for AD-EP- Provides transportation needs for C.1 - Difference movement of material and personnel. DEC-0107 movement of material, personnel, Arrangements for Step 4.2.1 supplies, and equipment, requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

26. 2. Major Functions 4.2 Responsibilities - Transportation Services

27. 2.1 Provide vehicles and operators for AD-EP- Provides vehicles and operators for C.1 - Difference personnel and equipment movement. DEC-0107 personnel and equipment movement Arrangements for Step 4.2.2 requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

28. 2.2 Provide common carrier and specialized AD-EP- Provides common carrier and specialized C.I - Difference carrier service for specific material and DEC-0107 carrier service for specific material and Arrangements for personnel needs. Step 4.2.3 personnel needs. requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

29. 2.3 Coordinate, trace, and expedite material AD-EP- Coordinates, traces, and expedites C.1 - Difference deliveries and shipments in and out of DEC-0107 material deliveries and shipments in and Arrangements for recovery site. Step 4.2.4 out of recovery site. requesting and using offsite assistance have 3 Deviation - differs in wording and is altered in meaning or intent; difference - differs in wording but agrees in meaning and intent; None - wording same as existing procedure. Differences can be screened; deviations will need to be evaluated 8

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Vording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?

been made.

30. 2.4 Provide fuel for on-site recovery AD-EP- Provide fuel for on-site recovery vehicles. C.1 - Difference vehicles. DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.2.5 requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

31. 2.5 Transport environmental samples for AD-EP- Transport environmental samples for C.1 - Difference analysis upon request by the Radiological DEC-0107 analysis. Arrangements for Assessment Group. Step 4.2.6 requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

32. 3. Additional Additional personnel may be required to AD-EP- Determine whether additional personnel C.1 - Difference Personnel Required handle functions such as shuttle service, DEC-0107 are required for functions such as shuttle Arrangements for garbage pickup, environmental sample Step 5.2.2.1 service, garbage pickup, and requesting and transport. Immediate needs are to be environmental sample transport. using offsite assessed upon arrival at the site. assistance have been made.

331 4. First Call-Out AD-EP- First Call-Out DEC-0107 Step 5.2.1

34. 4.1 On the first call-out, the director or AD-EP- Obtain and transport equipment and C.1 - Difference designee will organize and transport the DEC-0107 operating personnel needed initially. Arrangements for equipment and operating personnel Step 5.2.1.2 requesting and needed initially, using offsite assistance have been made.

35. 4.2 The first contingency will begin with AD-EP- Establish a base of operations, including C.1 - Difference establishment of base operations. This DEC-0107 personnel and transport equipment. Arrangements for I 9

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/OIA/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None? 3 will include personnel establishment and Step 5.2.1.4 requesting and transport equipment assessment. using offsite assistance have been made.

36. 4.3 Equipment presently harbored at the AD-EP- NOTE: Equipment stored at the General C.1 - Difference General Office, Toddville, McGuire, DEC-0107 Office, Toddville, McGuire, Catawba and Arrangements for Catawba and Oconee sites, depending on Note before Oconee sites, depending on the magnitude requesting and the magnitude and need, is available for Step 5.2.1.1, and need, is available for use at the onset using offsite use at the onset. An assessment of Step 5.2.1.1 of an event, assistance have availability will be made on arrival of the been made.

first transportation contingency. 5.2.1.1 Assess immediate needs upon arrival at the site.

37. 4.4 Environmental samples transport AD-EP- C.1 - Difference requests will be initiated by the DEC-0107 Transport environmental samples as Arrangements for Radiological Assessment Group. The Step 5.2.1.5 requested by the Radiological Assessment requesting and time and location of sample pick-up will Group. using ofliite be determined by the Transportation assistance have Director and Field Monitoring a. Determine the time and location of been made.

Coordinator. Sample destination will be sample pick-up with the Field Monitoring the Applied Science Center (ASC) or Coordinator.

unaffected station, as specified by the b. Obtain sample destination from the Radiological Assessment Group. Radiological Assessment Group.

10

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/At2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-01 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None? 4

38. Enclosure 4.3 Administration/Commissary SR/O/A/2000 EOF Services

/003 Administration/Commissary Checklist Enclosure 6.11

39. 1. Purpose To provide general administrative office N/A Not required for an SR Enclosure. Not N/A N/A support and supplies and meet basic an action step.

nutritional and personal needs of the recovery organization.

40. 2. Major N/A N/A Functions

41. 2.1 Provide office supplies and equipment. SRIO/A/2000/ Provide administrative office support H.2 - Adequate Difference 003 and supplies, such as: facilities are Enclosure maintained to 6.11 Step 6 Office supplies and equipmentupport emergency response.

42. 2.2 Provide secretarial/clerical services. SR/O/A/2000/ Provide administrative office support H.2 - Adequate Difference 003 and supplies, such as: facilities are Enclosure Secretarial/clerical services maintained to 6.11 Step 6 support emergency response.

43. 2.3 Provide copy services. SR/O/A/2000/ Provide administrative office support H.2 - Adequate Difference 003 and supplies, such as: facilities are Enclosure maintained to 6.11 Step 6

• Copy center/fax services support emergency 4Deviation - differs in wording and is altered in meaning or intent; difference - differs in wording but agrees in meaning and intent; None - wording same as existing procedure. Differences can be screened; deviations will need to be evaluated 11

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/OIA/20001003 and AD-EP-DEC-O 107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None? 4 response.

44. 2A Provide air travel, hotel, and car rental SRIOIA/20001 Provide for personal needs of ERO, such H.2 - Adequate Difference arrangements. 003 as: facilities are Enclosure

• Air travel, hotel, and car rental maintained to 6.11 Step 7 arrangements support emergency

_________________________________________________________________________________orespnse

45. 25 Contact Payroll to get checks f*r MA- N/A. - None Devialior- With

.indiiduals upon request. Diiect Deposit and mailing paychecks home, considered not

_____.. ,_..._____-_,.. -___ .. __... necessary.

46. 2.6 Provide assistance for Petty.Cash N/A N/A - CJI - Deviation- With use activities. . Arrangements. for of Corporate Ciedit requesting and, Cards, cnidered not uing f* offs~ite su necessary.-_

asistancehv

____________ ~~been madel-.. _________

47. 2.7 Provide in-house craft resources as SPJOIAI2000I IF requested, provide in-house craft C.1 - Difference requested. 003 resources Arrangements for Enclosure requesting and 6.11 Step 8 using oflisite assistance have been made.

48. 2.8 Provide food and beverage. SR/0/A/20001 Provide for personal needs of ERO, such C.1 - Difference 003 as: Arrangements for Enclosure *Food and beverage requesting and 6.11 Step 7 using offsite assistance have been made. _________

12

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/I/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?4

49. 2.9 Provide tables and chairs. SR/O/A/2000/ Provide for personal needs of ERO, such C.I - Difference 003 as: Arrangements for Enclosure

• Tables and chairs requesting and 6.11 Step 7 using offsite assistance have been made.

50. 2.10 Provide tents. SR/O/A/2000/ Provide for personal needs of ERO- such C. - Difference 003 as: Arrangements for Enclosure

• Tents requesting and 6.11 Step 7 using offsite assistance have been made.

51. 2.11 Provide portable toilets. SR/O/AI2000/ Provide for personal needs of ERO, such C.I - Difference 003 as: Arrangements for Enclosure

• Portable toilets requesting and 6.11 Step 7 using offsite assistance have been made.

52. 2.12 Provide trash receptacles. SR/O/A/20001 Provide for personal needs of ERO, such C.1 - Difference 003 as: Arrangements for Enclosure

• Trash receptacles requesting and 6.11 Step 7 using offsite assistance have been made.

53. 2.13 Ensure EOF is restocked between uses. SR/0/A/2000/ Restock office supplies. H.2 - Adequate Difference 003 facilities are Enclosure maintained to 6.11 EOF support Facility Post emergency Event response.

13

Disposition of SR/l/B/2000/002 steps into SRO//A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0 107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. I or None? 4 Checklist Step 2

54. 2.14 Maintain positive contml of food service SRIO/AI2000/ NOTE: Personnel without badge access H.2 - Adequate Difference personnel while they are within the EOF. 003 will need to be escorted into the EOF by facilities are Enclosure the Assistant EOF Director, EOF maintained to 6.11, Note Emergency Planner, EOF Services support before Step 7 Manager, or their Mentor. {6 1 emergency response.

55. 3. Action List Upon Arrival at EOF

56. 3.1 Upon arrival at EOF, members of the N/A Not an action step. N/A N/A Administration staff will be responsible for the following:

57. 3.1.1 Ensure that the EOF Services area is set SR/0/A/2000/ Ensure that the EOF Services Area is set H.2 - Adequate None up. 003 up. facilities arc Enclosure maintained to 6.11, Step 5 support emergency response.

58. 3.1.2 Contact additional personnel if needed. SR/O/A/2000/ IF needed, contact additional personnel B.2 - The process Difference 003 for support. for timely Enclosure augmentation of 6.11, Step 9 onshifi staff is established and maintained.

59. 3.1.3 Provide copy center / fax services. SR/O/A/2000/ Provide administrative office support B.2 - The process Difference 003 and supplies, such as: for timely Enclosure Copy cter/fax series augmentation of 6.11 Step 6 onshift staff is established and 14

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O0A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-O 107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?.

maintained.

60. 3.1.4 Set up food service and ensure beverages SR/0/A/2000/ Provide for personal needs of ERO, such C.1 - Difference and snacks are available. 003 as: Arrangements for Enclosure

• Food and beverage requesting and 6.11 Step 7 using offsite assistance have been made.

61. 4. Action List for SRIO/A/2000/ Action List for Changing from Changing from 003 Emergency to Recovery Mode Emergency to Enclosure Recovery Mode 6.11

62. 4.1 Replenish supplies. SRO0/A/2000/ Replenish supplies. H.2 - Adequate None 003 facilities are Enclosure maintained to 6.11, Step 1 support emergency response.

63. 4.2 Determine additional space requirements. SR/O/A/2000/ Determine additional space M.! - Plans for None 003 requirements. recovery and Enclosure reentry are 6.11, Step 2 developed

64. 4.3 Prepare weekly work schedules. SR/O/A/2000/ Prepare weekly work schedules. M. I - Plans for None 003 recovery and Enclosure reentry are 6.11, Step 3 developed

65. 4.4 Determine hotel/motel accommodations SR/O/A/2000/ Determine hotel/motel accommodations C.1 - Difference and travel requirements; contact 003 and travel requirements and contact Arrangements for Corporate Travel Center for securing Enclosure Travel Services for securing these requesting and these requirements. 6.11, Step 4 requirements. using offsite assistance have 15

Disposition of SR10/B/2000/002 steps into SRO/0A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

__or None? 4 been made.

66. 4.5 Notify Food Vendors - Set up shift SR/0/A/2000/ Notify food vendors to arrange shift C.1 - Difference operations to support recovery efforts for 003 operations to support recovery efforts for Arrangements for meals and breaks (snacks) with times and Enclosure meals and breaks (snacks) with times requesting and locations for serving. 6.11, Step 5 and locations for serving, using offsite assistance have been made.

67. 4.6 Notify chairs and table suppliers/vendors SR/O/A/2000/ Notify chairs and table suppliers for C.1 - None for appropriate needs and quantities. 003 appropriate needs and quantities. Arrangements for Enclosure requesting and 6.11, Step 6 using offsite assistance have been made.

68. 4.7 Notify tent suppliers for appropriate SR/O/A/2000/ Notify tent suppliers for appropriate C.1 - None needs and quantities. 003 needs and quantities. Arrangements for Enclosure requesting and 6.11, Step 7 using oflsite assistance have been made.

69. 4.8 Notify portable toilet suppliers for SR/0/A/2000/ Notify portable toilet suppliers for C.1 - None appropriate needs and quantities. 003 appropriate needs and quantities. Arrangements for Enclosure requesting and 6.11, Step 8 using offsite assistance have been made.

70. 4.9 Notify trash receptacles suppliers for SR/O/A12000/ Notify trash receptacles suppliers for C.1 - None appropriate needs and quantities. 003 appropriate needs and quantities. Arrangements for Enclosure requesting and 6.11, Step 9 using offsite assistance have 16

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/0IA/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference 4

or None?

been made.

71. 4.10 Establish shift coverage of commissary SR/O/A/2000/ Establish shift coverage of commissary M.1 - Plans for None personnel to support total recovery 003 personnel to support total recovery recovery and efforts. Enclosure efforts. reentry are 6.11, Step 10 developed j

j _______________________________________________________________________________________________

17

Disposition of SR/0/13/2000/002 steps into SR/O/AI2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-01 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or Nones

72. Enclosure 4A Risk Management and Insurance AD-EP- Responsibilities - Risk Management DEC-0107 and Insurance Step 4.3

73. 1. Purpose N/A

74. 1.1 Serve as liaison between Duke and AD-EP- Coordinates between Duke and insurance C.] - Difference insurance companies. DEC-0107 companies. Arrangements for Step 4.3.1 requiesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

75. 1.2 Interface with other EOF groups to AD-EP-. Coordinates with other EOF groups to C. 1 - Difference provide assistance needed by insurance DEC-0107 provide assistance needed by insurance Arrangements for companies. Step 4.3.2 companies. requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

76. 2. Major Functions N/A N/A

77. 2.1 Provide contact with insurance AD-EP- Contacts insurance companies. C.1 - Difference companies. DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.3.3 requesting and using offifte assistance have been made.

78. 2.2 Assist insurance companies in incident AD-EP- Assists insurance companies in incident C. 1 - Difference data gathering and efficient handling of DEC-0107 data gathering and handling of Duke Arrangements for Duke public nuclear liability Step 4.3.4 Energy public nuclear liability requesting and responsibilities, responsibilities, using offsite 5

Deviation - differs in wording and is altered in meaning or intent; difference - differs in wording but agrees in meaning and intent; None - wording same as existing procedure. Differences can be screened; deviations will need to be evaluated 18

Disposition of SR/0IB/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-O1 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None?s assistance have been made.

79. 2.3 Assist insurance companies in AD-EP- Assists insurance companies in C.A - Difference establishing claims offices to disburse DEC-0107 establishing claims offices to disburse Arrangements for emergency assistance funds to evacuees Step 4.3.5 emergency assistance funds to evacuees requesting and and other insurance companies response and other response functions. using offsite functions, assistance have been made.

80. 3. Interfacing with N/A N/A Other Groups

81. 3.1 Interface with appropriate technical AD-EP- Coordinates with appropriate technical C.1 - Difference support groups to obtain the necessary DEC-0107 support groups to obtain the necessary Arrangements for technical information sufficient to satisfy Step 4.3.6 technical information sufficient to satisfy requesting and the needs of the insurance companies. the needs of the insurance companies. using offsite assistance have been made.

82. 3.2 Work with Administrative Group to AD-EP- Coordinates with EOF C.I - Difference provide assistance in securing motel DEC-0107 Administration/Commissary personnel to Arrangements for reservations and other logistics if Step 4.3.7 secure motel reservations and other requesting and insurance companies should dispatch an logistics in the event that insurance using offsite investigative team or other companies dispatch an investigation team assistance have response support personnel. or other response support personnel, been made.

83. 3.3 Claims Office N/A N/A

84. 3.3.1 In the event it becomes necessary to AD-EP- NOTE: Claims would be handled by C.I - Difference evacuate members of the general public, DEC-0107 insurance company personnel. Arrangements for the insurance company would set up Note before requesting and claims offices to disburse emergency Step 4.3 using offsite assistance funds. assistance have been made.

85. 3.3.2 Risk Management and Insurance would AD-EP- Assists insurance companies in C.A - Difference 19

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference 5

1. I or None?

provide as much assistance as possible in DEC-0107 establishing claims offices to disburse Arrangements for expediting the setting up of this claims Step 4.3.5 emergency assistance funds to evacuees requesting and office. and other response functions. using offsite assistance have been made.

86. 3.3.3 Risk Management and Insurance would AD-EP- NOTE: Claims would be handled by C. i- Difference also communicate with Corporate DEC-0107 insurance company personnel. Arrangements for Communications about its location and Note before requesting and operation. Claims would be handled by Step 4.3, 4.3.8 Communicates with Corporate using offsitce insurance company personnel. Step 4.3.8 Communications about claims office assistance have locations and operations. been made.

20

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR10/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None?6

87. Enclosure 4.5 Procurement AD-EP- Responsibilities - Procurement DEC-0107

__ Step 4A

88. 1. Purpose Coordinate all activities with the AD-EP- Coordinates all activities relating to rental CA - Difference Recovery Organization relating to DEC-0107 or procurement of materials, equipment, Arrangements for procurement of materials, equipment and Step 4.4.1 and services including the following: requesting and services. using offite assistance have

_ _been made.

89. Note before NOTE: The EOF Director and Services AD-EP- The EOF Director and Services Manager C.A - Difference Step 2 Manager are authorized to approve DEC-0107 are authorized to approve expenses Arrangements for expenses incurred in the performance of Step 5.5.2.1 incurred in the performance of the duties requesting and the duties described in this procedure. described in this procedure. using offsite assistance have been made.

90. 2. Major Functions N/A N/A

91. 2.1 Issue requisitions. AD-EP- issues requisitions. C.I - None DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.4.1 .a requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

92. 2.2 Negotiate contracts. AD-EP- Negotiates contracts. C. - None DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.4.1 .b requesting and using offsite assistance have 6 Deviation - differs in wording and is altered in meaning or intent; difference - differs in wording but agrees in meaning and intent; None - wording same as existing procedure. Differences can be screened; deviations will need to be evaluated 21

Disposition of SRI0/B/2000/002 steps into SR/0/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None?6 been made.

93. 2.3 Issue purchase orders. AD-EP- Issues purchase orders. C.1 - None DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.4.1 .c requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

94. 2.4 Expedite hardware and software. AD-EP- Expedites hardware and software. C.I - None DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.4.1 .d requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

95. 2.5 Coordinate receipt of material. AD-EP- Coordinates receipt of material C.1 - None DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.4.1 .e requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

96. 2.6 Coordinate distribution of material. AD-EP- Coordinates distribution of material. C.1 - None DEC-0107 Arrangements for Step 4.4.1 .f requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

97. 3. Additional Personnel Required

98. 3.1 Since most of the purchasing function AD-EP- NOTE: Since most of the purchasing C.1 - Difference will be handled in either the Central or DEC-0107 function will be handled in either the Arrangements for the Site Procurement Groups, the entire Note before Central or the Site Procurement Groups, requesting and 22

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SRO0/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. t _or None?.

Nuclear Supply Chain and Nuclear Step 5.3.2.1, the entire Nuclear Supply Chain and using offsite Sourcing Group will be at the Step Nuclear Sourcing Group will be at the assistance have Procurement Director's disposal. The 5.3.2. .a Procurement Director's disposal. been made.

Central and Site Procurement Groups 5.3.2. l.a The Central and Site will deploy and staff back-up teams per Procurement Groups will deploy and staff the Procurement Director's instructions. back-up teams per the Procurement Directors instructions.

99. 3.2 The EOF Procurement team will utilize AD-EP- Use the clerical support provided by the C.1 - Difference the clerical support provided by the DEC-0107 EOF Administration/Commissary Group Arrangements for Administration Group for necessary 5.3.2.2 for necessary support functions. requesting and support functions in the EOF. using offiite assistance have been made.

100. 4. Arrival at EOF 5.3.1 Initial Actions 101. 4.1 The Procurement Director will assess the AD-EP- C.1 - Difference situation and activate the Central aind Site DEC-0107 Based on the assessment of the current Arrangements for Procurement teams, if necessary. 5.3.1.1 and situation and events, perform the requesting and 5.3. 1. .a following as needed: using offsite assistance have

a. Activate the Central and Site been made.

Procurement teams.

102. 4.2 Immediate work will begin on AD-EP- b. Commence procurement of needed C.1 - Difference procurement of equipment, material and DEC-0107 b.uComencep nt ofrneede Arrangements for services as may be required. 5.3.1.1 .b equipment, material and services, requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

103. 5. Interface with AD-EP- Subsequent Actions Other Groups DEC-0107 I 23

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SRIO/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-O1 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference or None?6

~5-3.2 104. 5*. 1 Work with Transportation Director and! AIY-EP- oordinate with the.Transportation C. 1 . Deviation - Withuse guppliers to ensure expeditious delivery DEC-01'07 Directorand suppliers to ensurem Arrangements for of Corporate Credit of equipment to, the site and: with the 5.3*.2.3 expeditious deliVery of requested requesting and: Cards petty cash Administration, Director to obtainý equipment to the site. using offsite considered not required finds from petty cash for small assistance have necessary..

V_______. ._ .. een made;.

105. 5.2 Work with Nuclear Generation AD-EP- Coordinate with Nuclear Supply Chain C.1 - Difference Department (NGD) site personnel DEC-0107 site group concerning the receipt and Arrangements for concerning the receipt and distribution of 5.3.2.5 distribution of equipment and materials, requesting and equipment and materials, using offsite assistance have been made.

106. 6. Recovery Stage AD-EP- Recovery DEC-0107 5.3.3 107. Note before Step 6.1 NOTE: The following is a checklist of AD-EP- The following items should be considered M.1 - Plans for Difference things to do and/or consider when DEC-0107 when moving from the emergency to the recovery and moving from the emergency to the 5.3.3.1 recovery stage of an event: reentry are recovery stage of an event, developed 108. 6.1 Activate Procurement back-up teams. AD-EP- Activating Procurement back-up teams. M.1 - Plans for Difference DEC-0107 recovery and 5.3.3.1.a reentry are developed 109. 6.2 Prepare work schedule for Procurement AD-EP- Preparing work schedules for M. I - Plans for Difference team. DEC-0107 Procurement team. recovery and 5.3.3.1.b reentry are I developed 110. 6.3 Assess need for additional personnel AD-EP- Evaluating the need for additional M. 1 - Plans for Difference I I support. DEC-0107 personnel support. recovery and 24

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O0A12000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

__or None?6 5.3.3.1.c reentry are developed I I1. 7. Procedures 112. 7.1 Requisitioning Equipment N/A N/A 113. 7.1.1 When it has been determined that AD-EP- Communicate the need for additional C.A - Difference material, equipment, or services are DEC-0107 materials, equipment, or services as Arrangements for needed, Procurement Coordinators at the 5.3.2.1 rapidly as possible to the Nuclear Supply requesting and EOF will convey that need as rapidly as Chain. using offsite possible to the Nuclear Supply Chain assistance have utilizing telephones and/or fax machines. been made.

114. 7.1.2 Requisitions for the recovery effort will AD-EP- Expediting requisitions for recovery effort C.1 - Difference be expedited through the Nuclear Supply DEC-0107 through the Nuclear Supply Chain system Arrangements for Chain system for immediate order 5.3.3.1 .d for immediate order processing. requesting and processing. using offsite assistance have been made.

115. 7.2 Receiving N/A 116. 7.2.1 Receipt of material and equipment will AD-EP- Coordinate with Nuclear Supply Chain C.A - Difference be handled by the Nuclear Supply Chain DEC-0107 site group concerning the receipt and Arrangements for Site Group. 5.3.2.5 distribution of equipment and materials. requesting and using offsite assistance have been made.

117. 7.2.2 The EOF Procurement Team director AD-EP- Coordinate with site receiving to assure C.1 - Difference will coordinate with site receiving to DEC-0107 that the material gets to the appropriate Arrangements for assure that the material gets to the 5.3.2.6 destination at the site. reeuesting and appropriate destination at the site. using offsite assistance have been made.

25

Disposition of SR/0/B/2000/002 steps into SRIO/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-O1 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?7 118. Enclosure 4.6 EOF Shutdown Review Items SR/O/A/200 EOF FACILITY POST-EVENT 0/003 CHECKLIST Enclosure 6.11, Page 2 of 2 119. 1. Administration

/Commissary 120. 1.1 Secure EOF Services area. SR/O/A/200 Secure EOF Services area. H.2 - Adequate None 0/003 facilities are Enclosure maintained to 6.11, Step I support emergency

-response.

121. 1.2 Restock office supplies as necessary. SR/O/A/200 Restock office supplies. H.2 - Adequate Difference 0/003 facilities are Enclosure maintained to 6.11, Step 2 support emergency response 122. 1.3 Arrange for return of relocated office SR/O/A/200 IF needed, H.2 - Adequate Difference equipment. 0/003

• Ensure return of relocated office facilities are Enclosure equipment maintained to 6.11, Step 3 support emergency

___response 123. 1.4 Notify Hotels/Motels of release of rooms. SR/0/A/200 IF needed, C.1 - Difference

.1 0/003 9 Notify hotels/motels of release of Arrangements for 7 Deviation - differs in wording and is altered in meaning or intent; difference - differs in wording but agrees in meaning and intent; None - wording same as existing procedure. Differences can be screened; deviations will need to be evaluated 26

Disposition of SR/0/B/20001002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference 7

or None?

Enclosure rooms. requesting and 6.11, Step 3 using offsite assistance have been made.

124. 1.5 Assist personnel needing airline SRO/0AI200 IF needed, C.1 - Difference transportation home. 0/003

• Assist personnel needing Arrangements for Enclosure transportation home. reque---sting and 6.11, Step 3 using offlsite assistance have been made.

125. 1.6 Notify vendors to discontinue food SR/O/A/200 Notify vendors to discontinue food C.i - Difference service to Emergency Operations 0/003 services to EOF. Arrangements for Facility. Enclosure requesting and 6.11, Step 4 using offsite assistance have been made.

126. 1.7 Notify vendors to pick up furniture and SR/O/A/200 IF needed, C.1 - Difference equipment not required for Recovery. 0/003

• Notify vendors to pick up furniture Arrangements for Enclosure and equipment not needed for requesting and 6.11, Step 3 recovery, using offsite assistance have been made.

1217. 1.8. Make arrangements for trash removal. N/A N/A H.2 - Adequate Deviation. - The EOF facilities are is now on a regular maintained to, daily cleaning

7. -support schedule

.. emergency

___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ____ _responses.ns 128. 2. Communications N/A Not an Action Step 129. 2.1 Secure radio base stations. SR/0/A/200 IF needed, perform the following: F.2 - Systems are Difference 27

.M Disposition of SRO/0B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-01 07 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None?.

0/003 - Request Communications secure established for Enclosure radio base stations. prompt 6.19, Step communication 18 among principal emergency response

______ ~~~~organizations. _________

130. 2.2 Return portable communications SR/O/A/200 IF needed, perform the following:. F.2 - Systems are Difference equipment to storage location (if 0/003 Request Communications return established for applicable). Enclosure portable ommunicationsprompt 6.19, 18 Step portblenommnicaion equipment to storage locations, communication 18 among principal emergency response organizations.

131. 3. Procurement Transfer information on outstanding SR/O/A/200 IF needed, perform the following: C.I - Difference requisitions to normal Procurement 0/003 R t Pt t Arrangements for contacts. Enclosure information on outstanding using and 6.19, Step requisitions to normal procurement asiste 18 cnat.assistance have contacts, been made.

132. 4. Transportation N/A Not an Action Step Services 133. 4.1 Arrange for transport of relocated SR/0/A/200 IF needed, perform the following: C.1 - Difference equipment to original location, if 0/003 Request Transportation Services Arrangements for applicable. Enclosure return relocated equipment to requesting and 6.19, Step original location. using offsite 18 assistance have been made.

134. 4.2 Arrange for transportation home for SR/O/A/200 IF needed, perform the following: C.1 - Difference 28

Disposition of SR/O/B/2000/002 steps into SR/O/A/2000/003 and AD-EP-DEC-0107 Chang Old Step # Old Step Wording New Step # New Step Wording EP Function Deviation e or Difference

1. or None? 7 personnel (as needed). 0/003 Request Transportation Services Arrangements for Enclosure provide transportation home for requesting and 6.19, Step ERO personnel. using offsite 18 assistance have been made.

135. 5. Risk Notify insurance companies of change in SR/O/A/200 IF needed, perform the following: C.1 - Difference Management And status. 0/003 Risk Management and n nRequest fo ir Insurance Enclosure 6.19, Step

• Reques insuran Insurance tnotify ce insuranceusnofst requesting and 18 companies of change in drill/event using ofhsite ts. statusbeen assistance made.have 29