MNS-17-034, 16C4435-RPT-002, Rev. 1, 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station.

16C4435-RPT-002, Rev. 1, 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station.

ML17230A089
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	07/24/2017
From:	Masiunas A Stevenson & Associates
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17230A085	List: ML17230A088 MNS-17-034, 16C4435-RPT-002, Rev. 1, 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station.
References
MNS-17-034 16C4435-RPT-002, Rev. 1
Download: ML17230A089 (103)

Text

Document No: 16C4435-RPT-002 SA Stevenson & Associates Engineering Solutions for Nuclear Energy Revision 1 July 24, 2017 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Prepared for:

Duke Energy 550 South Tryon Street Charlotte, NC 28202 Stevenson & Associates 1626 North Litchfield Road, Suite 170 Goodyear, AZ 85395

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

• ., 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

" t ' Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 2of103 REVISION RECORD Initial Issue (Rev. 0)

Prepared by:

~2~ Andrew Masiunas 7/6/2017 Reviewed by: 7/6/2017 Konstantinos 0 konomou Approved by: 7/6/2017 Revision History Rev. Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date 1 ~$~~ 1~- '/.* , *-

I~ 4 , , Corrected Drawing Titles for Two A. Masiunas A. Karavoussianis A. Karavoussianis Citations 7/24/2017 7/24/2017 7/24/2017

'~A 50.54(f) N!TF 2.1 Seis~ic High Frequ~ncy 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I

• ~ Confirmat10n for McGmre Nuclear Stat10n Page 3of103 TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 7 1.1 Purpose ............................................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Background ...................................................................................................................... 7 1.3 Approach .......................................................................................................................... 8 1.4 Plant Screening ................................................................................................................. 8

2. Selection of Components for High Frequency Screening ....................................................... 9 2.1 Reactor Trip/Scram .......................................................................................................... 9 2.2 RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control ........................................................................... 9 2.2.1 Reactor Coolant System Valves .............................................................................. 10 2.2.2 Chemical and Volume Control Valves ................................................................... 10 2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal System Valves .................................................................. 11 2.3 RCS/Reactor Vessel Pressure Control ........................................................................... 11 2.4 Core Cooling .................................................................................................................. 11 2.4.1 Nuclear Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Supply Valves .............................. 12 2.4.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Flow Control and Isolation Valves ...................... 12 2.4.3 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Valves .................................... 12 2.5 AC/DC Power Support Systems .................................................................................... 13 2.5.1 Emergency Diesel Generators ................................................................................. 14 2.5 .2 Battery Chargers ..................................................................................................... 18 2.5.3 Inverters .................................................................................................................. 20 2.5.4 EDG Ancillary Systems .......................................................................................... 20 2.5.5 Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs .................................................................... 24

3. Seismic Evaluation................................................................................................................ 26 3.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand ........................................................................................... 26 3.2 Vertical Seismic Demand ............................................................................................... 26 3 .3 Component Horizontal Seismic Demand ....................................................................... 29 3.4 Component Vertical Seismic Demand ........................................................................... 30

4. Contact Device Evaluations .................................................................................................. 31

5. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 32 5.1 General Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 32 5.2 Identification of Follow-Up Actions .............................................................................. 32

6. References ............................................................................................................................. 33

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 4of103 A. Representative Sample Component Evaluations .................................................................. 67 A. I High Frequency Seismic Demand .................................................................................. 67 A.1.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand ................................................................................... 67 A.1.2 Vertical Seismic Demand ....................................................................................... 69 A.2 High Frequency Capacity ............................................................................................... 70 A.2.1 Seismic Test Capacity ............................................................................................. 70 A.2.2 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor ..................................................................... 71 A.2.3 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor ..................................................... 71 A.2.4 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration ...................................... 71 A.2.5 Component Margin ................................................................................................. 71 B. Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation ................................................... 73 TABLE OF TABLES:

Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity vs. Depth Profile ..................................................... 26 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra ...................................... 28 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation ........................................ 73 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation ..... 95 Table B-3: Core Cooling Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation .................... 99 Table B-4: ElectricalPower Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation .............. 100 TABLE OF FIGURES:

Figure 3-1: Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios ......................................................................................................................... 29

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

~ 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

• Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 5of103 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements ofltem (4), , Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [ 1].

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine ifthe agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena [2].

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CPR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [3] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation, [4] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [6].

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for McGuire Nuclear Station. The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

SA

' 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 6of103 EPRI 3002004396 [4] is used for the McGuire Nuclear Station engineering evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [4], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I

' 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

• Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 7of103 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(+/-) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements ofltem (4)i, Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

1.2 Background Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine ifthe agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena [2].

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(+/-) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(+/-)

letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(+/-) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [3] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(+/-) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [4] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [6]. ii On March 20, 2014, McGuire Nuclear Station submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [7]. By letter dated December 22, i Seismic Hazard Evaluation on page 7 of Enclosure I ii In this letter, McGuire Nuclear Station was not included in the list of plants requiring High Frequency Confirmation. The necessity for high frequency evaluations at McGuire was established in further correspondence with the NRC [463, 8].

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

• Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I Page 8of103 2016 [8], the NRC transmitted revised results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for McGuire Nuclear Station using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation, as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

1.3 Approach EPRI 3002004396 [4] is used for the McGuire Nuclear Station engineering evaluations described in this report. Section 4.1 of Reference [4] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• McGuire Nuclear Station's SSE and GMRS Information

• Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

• Summary of Results 1.4 Plant Screening McGuire Nuclear Station submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on March 20, 2014 [7]. In a letter dated July 20, 2015, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the McGuire Nuclear Station site [9].

The NRC revised screening determination letter [8] concluded that the McGuire Nuclear Station GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [3].

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

! i.

\ 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 9of103

2. SELECTION OF COMPONENTS FOR HIGH FREQUENCY SCREENING The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited equipment to fail to perform as necessary.

An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [4], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout (SILO) circuits.

Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference [4] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions. iii 2.1 Reactor Trip/Scram The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [4] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that, "the design requirements preclude the application ofseal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAMfunctions" and that "No [high-frequency] review [of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is] necessary. "

2.2 RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout (SILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

Reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control system reviews were performed for valves associated with the following functions:

• Pressurizer Pressure Relief,

• Pressurizer Spray,

• Reactor Vessel Head Vent,

• Chemical and Volume Control,

• Residual Heat Removal iii The selection of components for high frequency screening is described in Stevenson & Associates report 16C4435-RPT-001 [429] and is summarized herein.

1

~A 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

'~ Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 10of103 A table listing the valves selected for analysis and their associated flow diagrams is included as Table B-2 of this report.

2.2.1 Reactor Coolant System Valves Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves l/2NCOOOJ/2/3 Based on review of the mechanical drawing for these valves [10, 11, 12], these valves are mechanically-operated pressure relief valves. Because they lack electrical control these valves are excluded from high frequency analysis.

Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves l/2NC0032B, l/2NC0034A, l/2NC0036B Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via rugged hand switches and relays that energize on high pressurizer pressure [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] (Ul), [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]

(U2) [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31] (Common). There is no seal-in of the pressure signal or valve control. Chatter in the vulnerable devices could only lead to momentary valve opening, and no device would prevent valve closure via the hand switch. Thus, no devices meet the selection criteria.

Pressurizer Spray Valves l/2NC0027C, l/2NC0029C Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via rugged hand switches and relays that energize on activation of the standby shutdown system [32, 33, 34]. Chatter in the vulnerable devices could only lead to momentary valve opening, and no device would prevent valve closure via the hand switches. Thus, no devices meet the selection criteria.

Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves l/2NC0272AC, l/2NC0273AC, l/2NC0274B, l/2NC0275B Electrical control for these solenoid-operated valves is via rugged hand control switches with interposing control relays for the standby shutdown system [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40] (Ul), [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46] (U2). Chatter in the vulnerable devices could only lead to momentary valve opening, and no device would prevent valve closure via the hand switches. Thus, no devices meet the selection criteria.

2.2.2 Chemical and Volume Control Valves Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves l/2NVOOOJA, 112NV0002A Electrical control for these solenoid-operated valves is via rugged hand control switches and relays that energize on pressurizer low level [47, 48, 49, 50, 27]. Chatter may momentarily delay closure of these normally open valves, however there is no circuit seal-in which would prevent manual or automatic valve closure after the period of strong shaking. Thus, no devices meet the selection criteria.

Reactor Coolant to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves l/2NV0024B, l/2NV0025B Electrical control for these solenoid-operated valves is via rugged hand control switches with a seal-in relay and permissive from the safety injection logic [51, 52, 53, 54]. Chatter in the seal-in contacts ofBB(NV24L) or BA(NV25L) in panel 1ATC4A, or DA(NV24L) or DAl(NV25L) in panel 2ATC4A, may energize their coils and open the associated valves. If this were to occur

SA

' 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 11of103 the valves would remain open until closed manually or automatically on safety injection actuation. These relays meet the selection criteria for the high frequency program.

2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal System Valves Reactor Coolant Discharge to Residual Heat Removal Isolation Valves 1/2NDOOJB, 112ND002AC These normally-closed motor-operated valves are controlled by rugged hand switches only [55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62]. Permissive logic in the opening control circuit prevents the valves from being opened without proper alignment of other valves. This permissive logic is comprised of the limit switches associated with these other valves. Since limit switches are considered rugged, and one of these valves, 1/2FW0027A, is open during normal operation [63, 64], chatter in the opening circuit is blocked. The control circuit for l/2ND002AC includes contacts from the standby shutdown system which may cause partial opening due to contact chatter, however 1/2ND001B would remain closed and prevent a LOCA condition. Thus, no devices meet the selection criteria.

2.3 RCS/Reactor Vessel Pressure Control The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [4] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices" and that "no specific high frequency component chatter review is required for this function." [4, pp. 4-6]

2.4 Core Cooling Core cooling is also a key function in Reference [4]. The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning.

For PWR plants, the decay heat removal mechanism involves the transfer of mass and energy from the steam generators to the atmosphere. This requires replacement of that mass to the steam generators via some feedwater system, e.g. turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump. Therefore, for this evaluation the following functions were checked:

• Steam from the steam generators to the TDAFW turbine and exhausted to atmosphere

• Coolant from the nuclear service water system iv to the steam generators via the TDAFW pump The selection of contact devices for the TDAFW pump was based on the premise that pump operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to pump operation is desirable and for this reason does not meet the selection criteria. Only contact devices which could render the TDAFW system inoperative were considered. The power-operated valves in the flow paths above are listed in Table B-3.

iv Flow paths within the nuclear service water system up to the TDAFW tie-ins are analyzed in Section 2.5.4.6.

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I Page 12 of I 03 2.4.1 Nuclear Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Supply Valves Nuclear Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves l/2RN0069A, l/2RN0162B; Nuclear Service Water Supply Valves l/2CA0086A, l/2CAOJ 16B These motor-operated valves are normally closed and must open to provide a safety-related suction source for the TDAFW pump. The valves are controlled by hand switches and pressure switches via a reversing motor starter [65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70] (Ul), [71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76] (U2).

When closed, chatter in the opening circuit could cause the valve to open, which is desired; and chatter in the closing circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches. When open, chatter in the opening circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches; and chatter in the closing circuit could cause the valve to close. If an open valve were to close and the non-seismic sources were unavailable, low suction pressure in the non-seismic source piping would cause the valve to automatically open after the period of strong shaking. Based on this analysis, chatter in the control circuits of these valves would not lead to a sustained loss of cooling water; and thus, no devices in the control circuits for these valves meet the selection criteria.

2.4.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Flow Control and Isolation Valves Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Flow Control Valves l/2CA0036AB, l/2CA0048AB, l/2CA0052AB, l/2CA0064AB These air operated valves are normally closed and open when their associated solenoid valves de-energize [77, p. 25]. The solenoid valves are controlled by the auxiliary feedwater turbine start circuit via normally closed contacts ofrelays BD and HEl [78, 79, 80, 81]. When the TDAFW pump is started, relays BD and HEl energize, opening these contacts and deenergizing the solenoids. There is no seal-in associated with these relays that would prevent valve opening once the TDAFW pump is started. Chatter in the contacts of these relays, or in contacts in their coil circuits could only delay valve opening. Once strong shaking subsides valve operation would return to normal, and thus no devices in the control circuits for these valves meet the selection criteria.

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Isolation Valves l/2CA0038B, J/2CA0050B, l/2CA0054AC, l/2CA0066AC These motor-operated valves are normally open and must remain open to provide water flow from the TDAFW pump to the steam generators [82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89]. The valves are controlled by hand switches via a reversing motor starter. Chatter in the opening circuits is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches. Chatter in the auxiliary contact of the closing contactors could cause the closing contactor to seal-in and close their respective valve. For this reason, MIC contactors in 1/2EMXB-03D, 1/2EMXB2-F04B, 1EMXA5-03D, 1EMXA5-02A, 2EMXA4-01C, and 2EMXA4-01D are selected for high frequency seismic analysis.

2.4.3 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Valves Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valves l/2SA0048ABC, l/2SA0049AB These air operated valves are normally closed and open when their associated solenoid valves de-energize [90, p. 1O]. The solenoid valves are controlled by the auxiliary feed water turbine start circuit via normally open contacts of automatic start relays BE and HF2 and manual start

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 13 of I 03 relays BG and HG [79, 91]. The manual start relays are energized when the pump control hand switches are in the stop position. The automatic start relays are energized and sealed-in when the pump is not running. Loss of offsite power or a low-low steam generator level breaks the seal-in and deenergizes the automatic start relays. Chatter in the either start circuit could only delay the opening of these valves and start of the pump during the period of strong shaking. Once strong shaking subsides valve operation would return to normal, and thus no devices in the control circuits for these valves meet the selection criteria.

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip and Throttle Valves 1/2SA0003 These valves are mechanically-operated and close on turbine overspeed [90, p. 15]. Because they lack electrical control these valves are excluded from high frequency analysis.

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Governor Valves 1/2SA0004 These valves are mechanically-operated and controlled by turbine speed [90, p. 15]. Because they lack electrical control these valves are excluded from high frequency analysis.

2.5 AC/DC Power Support Systems The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

• Emergency Diesel Generators,

• Battery Chargers and Inverters,

• EDG Ancillary Systems, and

• Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs.

Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 [4] requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip was spurious due to contact chatter or in response to an actual system fault.

The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the EDGs to the Battery Chargers and EDG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EDGs, was obtained from McGuire's UFSAR [92]. McGuire has four (4) EDGs which provide emergency power for their two (2) units. Each unit has two (2) divisions of Class IE loads with one EDG for each division.

SA 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 14of103 Table B-4 contains the complete list of components included in the analysis for this category, along with the primary reference drawing used to determine its inclusion.

The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available.

The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus under-voltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class IE control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EDGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EDG operation as well as Class 1E battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices that could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions.

2 .5 .1 Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators is broken down into the generator circuit breaker control and protective relaying, sequencer, and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the UFSAR [92]. The control and protective circuits for the diesel generator function differently depending on whether the diesel is stopped (immediately prior to starting), starting automatically in response to a loss of bus voltage (emergency start), or manually started (with offsite power available). Only two of these states is considered possible during the period of strong shaking, stopped prior to startingv and automatically started. It is expected that under degraded voltage conditions the normal power feeder breakers would be tripped manually or automatically via the Degraded Voltage Relaying (analyzed herein), and the diesel generator would start automatically on the loss of voltage on the bus. Manual starting during strong shaking (as only a precaution in cases where offsite power has not been affected) is not considered in this analysis.

2.5.1.1 Generator Circuit Breaker Control and Protective Relaying The diesel generator circuit breakers are closed manually by rugged hand switches, or automatically via the sequencer with engine speed permissives [93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98] (Ul), [99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104] (U2). Lockout relays for the breaker failure circuits and the main and standby feed breakers are permissives for both manual and automatic closure [105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110] (Ul), [111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116] (U2). These lockout relays are rugged and their associated protective relaying is solid state, so the lockout circuits are not susceptible to v Due to uncertainties in predicting seismic events, this analysis does not assume a strict time correlation between loss of offsite power (LOOP) and start of strong shaking at the site. Loss of offsite power could occur at any point immediately prior to or during the period of strong shaking.

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 15of103 chatter. Simultaneous Chatter in the sequencer relays CG(LSATX)/CG(LSBTX) and speed permissive relays MU(SSTA) and MV(SSTB) could lead to premature closure of their associated diesel generator circuit breaker. Chatter in the coil circuits of these relays are covered in the discussion of the sequencer and diesel engine circuits below, Sections 2.5.1.2 and 2.5.1.3, respectively. All other vulnerable devices in the diesel generator circuit breaker closure circuits are blocked by rugged contacts.

The diesel generator circuit breakers are tripped manually by rugged hand switches, or automatically by either the diesel engine control circuits or breaker protective relaying and lockout circuits [93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98] (Ul), [99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104] (U2). Chatter in the diesel generator start relays DK(2TRA) after breaker closure could trip their associated breakers.

Chatter in the voltage restrained overcurrent relays PA( 51 V), PB( 51 V), PC( 51 V) could cause them to seal-in. If this occurs in two out of three of any set than the lockout relay for that breaker will be energized and the breaker will be tripped and locked out. Simultaneous chatter in two out of three of the auxiliary relays associated with these overcurrent relays, RD(51 VA),

RE(51 VB), and RF(51 VC), could also cause circuit breaker lockout. For this reason, these protective relays and their associated auxiliary relays meet the selection criteria. Additional protective relaying and a trip signal associated with safety injection are only associated with parallel operation and will not normally trip the circuit breakers during emergency start.

Auxiliary contacts AF(52S) from the main and standby feed breakers block these functions when these breakers are both tripped [117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124]. Chatter in these additional relays would be blocked by the breaker auxiliary contacts provided the auxiliary contacts are sufficiently rugged. The main and standby feeder breakers were selected to determine if their auxiliary contracts are sufficiently rugged to high frequency motions.

Finally, the diesel generator circuit breakers themselves are vulnerable and could potentially trip after closure but before strong shaking subsides [125, 126, 127, 128]. For this reason, the diesel generator circuit breakers meet the selection criteria.

2.5.1.2 Sequencer Due to the dependence of the diesel generator, essential auxiliary power switchgear, chargers, and nuclear service water valves on signals from the sequencer, the sequencer is included in the High Frequency Program. The following scenarios were analyzed:

• Chatter which could lead to premature breaker closure loading the busses prior to or during EDG start

• Chatter which could lead to breaker trip after normal reclosure

• Chatter which could interfere with signaling to charger or valve motor starters For this analysis, relay descriptions contained in the device indices [129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134] (typical) were used in conjunction with the design basis specification [135] to determine the function of the relays in the sequencer circuits [136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143] (Train IA) [144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151] (Train lB) [152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159]

(Train 2A) [160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167] (Train 2B).

SA 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 16of103 Load Shed Chatter in the load shed circuit after normal sequencing vi could lead to tripping of the nuclear service water pump or 4160/600V stepdown transformer circuit breakers. For this reason, relays EC(LT2A)/EC(LT2B), GC(LSAT)/GC(LSBT), AB(LSA 1)/AB(LSB 1), AA(LSA2)/AA(LSB2),

as well as the AE(52S) auxiliary contacts on the main and standby feeder breakers [117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 121, 124, 123] meet the selection criteria.

Sequencing Chatter in the auto-advance circuit relays, the sequence timers, or the seal-in relays for each sequence could lead to premature sequencing prior to diesel generator breaker closure. For this reason, the following relays vii meet the selection criteria:

CB(127AX)

• JA(STlA)

• GB(ST2B)

• IB(ST9A)

• CB(l27BX)

• JA(STIB)

• 2DA(RA2)

• IB(ST9B)

• CB(227AX)

• 2CA(RA1)

• 2DA(RB2)

• 2HB(RA9)

• CB(227BX)

• 2CA(RB1)

• HB(ST6A)

• 2HB(RB9)

• 4AA(lEQBRL27AX)

• BD(lESGAXl)

• HB(ST6B)

• IA(STlOA)

• 4AA(1EQBRL27BX)

• BD(lESGBXl)

• 2HA(RA6)

• IA(STlOB)

• 4AA(2EQBRL27AX)

• BD(2ESGAX1)

• 2HA(RB6)

• 2IB(RA10)

• 4AA(2EQBRL27BX)

• BD(2ESGBX1)

• HA(ST7A)

• 2IB(RB10)

• MW(SSTC)

• 2EA(RA3)

• HA(ST7B)

• JB(STl lA)

• DC(BOA)

• 2EA(RB3)

• 2IA(RA7)

• JB(STl lB)

• DC(BOB)

• GA(ST4A)

• 2IA(RB7)

• 2JB(RA11)

• 2CB(AA1)

• GA(ST4B)

• IC(ST8A)

• 2JB(RB11)

• 2CB(AB1)

• 2FA(RA4)

• IC(ST8B)

• 2AB(LRA4)

• 2FA(RB4)

• 2JA(RA8)

• 2AB(LRB4)

• GB(ST2A)

• 2JA(RB8)

In addition to these, chatter in relay FA(RGA)/F A(RGB) could lead to premature EDG breaker closure by energizing CG(LSATX)/CG(LSBTX) via GC(LSAT)/GC(LSBT). See Section 2.5.1.1 for the EDG breaker circuit analysis.

Signaling Chatter in the relays that, in response to the loss of essential auxiliary power and EDG start, signal the realignment of nuclear service water valves and the start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump would only delay these functions during the period of strong shaking. Once strong shaking subsides the signals would be applied to those control systems [139, 147, 155, vi In this scenario, loss of offsite power occurs, loads are shed, and the diesel starts and is loaded normally. After this occurs and before strong shaking subsides, chatter causes a false load shed signal while the sequencer is sending a sustained breaker closure signal. Due to the anti-pumping feature in the circuit breakers, it is expected that the tripped breaker would not automatically close and some form of operator action would be required to reclose the breaker.

vii This list applies to all four trains. Devices with the same identification in the same train of both units, or the same identification in all four trains, are not repeated.

SA 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 17 of 103 163]. SILO relays that these signals are derived from, DC(BOA)/DC(BOB) and EC(LT2A)/EC(LT2B), are already selected above.

Degraded Voltage Relaying The degraded voltage relaying trips the main and standby feeder breakers when there is a sustained degraded voltage condition affecting the essential auxiliary power system [168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175]. Once these breakers are tripped the loss of bus voltage triggers diesel generator start. There is no seal-in in this circuit and chatter within the circuit could only lead to a delay in tripping the feeder breakers or lead to a premature trip. This chatter would not prevent diesel generator start after the period of strong shaking and for that reason no devices in this circuit meet the selection criteria.

2.5.1.3 Diesel Engine Control Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was performed on the start and shutdown circuits of eachEDG [176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183] (Train IA), [184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191] (Train IB), [192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199] (Train 2A), [200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207] (Train 2B). For this analysis, relay descriptions contained in the device indices were used [208, 209, 210, 211] (typical) in conjunction with the design basis specification [212] to determine the function of the relays in these circuits.

Upon a sustained loss of voltage on the essential auxiliary power busses, the sequencers signal the diesel generators to start. These signals energize the automatic start relays. Once energized, automatic start relay GL(DASR) seals-in and bypasses several non-critical engine interlocks.

Provided this relay is sufficiently rugged, chatter in the sequencer signal or non-critical interlocks have no effect on diesel generator start. For this reason, GL(DASR) is selected for the high frequency program.

The diesel start relays control the diesel stop relays, and in tum the stop relays control the fuel rack solenoids. Chatter in either circuit having the potential to deenergize the fuel rack solenoids could lead to engine shutdown. For this reason, diesel start relays DJ(2TRC) and FJ(2TRB), and diesel stop relays GM(RVG2) and DL(RVG3) meet the selection criteria. (Diesel start relay

-DK(2TRA) is already selected above.) Other relays in the start circuit have separate coil circuits which need to be analyzed, these are discussed below.

Overspeed Relays Chatter in the overspeed trip circuits could cause the relays associated with this fault to seal-in and stop the diesel or block starting. For this reason, the following relays meet the selection criteria: *

• AB(IEQCSW7740)

• MA(1EQCSW7720)

• MB(IEQCSW7730)

• BA(SSTD)

• AB(IEQCSW7770)

• MA(IEQCSW7750)

• MB(IEQCSW7760)

• BB(SSTE)

• AB(2EQCSW7740)

• MA(2EQCSW7720)

• MB(2EQCSW7730)

• BC(SSTF)

• AB(2EQCSW7770)

• MA(2EQCSW7750)

• MB(2EQCSW7760)

• CA(SSTDl)

• CB(SSTEI)

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 18of103 Lube Oil Relays Prior to diesel start, lube oil pressure is low and the pressure switches are closed. Open contacts on the alarm restrain relay FL(ARR) prevent the lube oil relays JK(SRXl) and LO(SRX2) from energizing and sealing-in until 30 seconds after the diesel reaches 95% speed. Chatter in the alarm restraint relay contacts or in the lube oil relay seal-in contacts could cause these relays to seal in and stop the engine or block starting. The 30-second time delay associated with the alarm restraint relay prevents chatter in its coil circuit from affecting the lube oil relays. Due to the time delay associated with the sequencer issuing a start signal, the time to reach 95% speed, and the additional 30 seconds the alarms are restrained, strong shaking would have subsided prior to the closure of the alarm restraint relay. This prevents chatter in the oil pressure switches from causing a seal-in of the lube oil relays. Based on this analysis, the only devices in this circuit that meet the selection criteria are FL(ARR), JK(SRXl), and LO(SRX2).

Emergency Stop Relays The emergency stop relays are controlled by rugged hand switches, however the relay includes a seal-in contact which if it were to chatter could seal in, stopping the engine, or preventing start.

For this reason, the emergency stop relay LN(ESX) meets the selection criteria.

Engine Speed Relays Chatter in the 40% speed circuit could lead to chatter in the diesel start circuit. Chatter in relays JJ(S1A2X), JL(SlAlX), EK, EL, and EM all have the potential to de-energize the fuel rack solenoids via the start and stop relays. For this reason, these relays meet the selection criteria.

Speed signals used for the sequencer and diesel breaker control have already been covered by the selection of speed switches above, and in the discussion of the sequencer and diesel breaker circuits above. There are no further devices in the engine speed circuits meeting the selection criteria.

2.5 .2 Battery Chargers 2.5.2.1 J25VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Normal Battery Chargers EVCA, EVCB, EVCC, EVCD These battery chargers are powered from the 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System via non-reversing motor starters and a charger conne.ction box that provides a manual transfer scheme between normal and alternate power sources [213, 214, 215, 216, 217]-. Since transfer between power sources is a manual operation using rugged molded-case circuit breakers, the connection box circuitry is not included in this analysis and normal power feeds are credited only. The motor starters are controlled manually by rugged hand switches or automatically from the sequencer [218, 219, 220, 221]. Chatter in the sequencer is covered in Section 2.5.1.2. There is a seal-in circuit in the motor starter associated with manual start. This circuit is comprised of an auxiliary relay, contactor, and time delay drop-out relay, all of which energize to seal-in when the contactor is started. If a seismic event occurs but does not lead to loss of offsite power, chatter in the seal-in circuit would be blocked by the time delay relay. If there is a loss of offsite power due to the event, a sustained contact closure from the sequencer bypasses the seal-in and keeps the charger started. Chatter in the sequencer contact may delay the start of the charger,

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• Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 19of103 however normal motor starter function would be restored when strong shaking subsides. The sequencing of the chargers is concurrent with the sequencing of the 600V Essential Auxiliary Power Load Centers they are powered from. Since the motor starter control power originates from the load center feed, premature sequencing of the motor starter due to chatter in its sequencer contact is not possible due to the lack of control power prior to its sequence. Based on this analysis, no devices in the battery charger motor starters meet the selection criteria.

Chatter analysis on the battery chargers themselves was performed using information from the Design Basis Specification [222, p. 28], as well as vendor schematic diagrams contained in the battery charger manual [223]. Each battery charger has a high voltage shutdown circuit which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure. In an overvoltage condition, the X320 High DC Voltage Sense Board will shunt-trip the AC Input Circuit Breaker B301 via time delay pickup relay K307. Chatter in the K307 contacts could cause an unintended circuit breaker trip, which would render the chargers unavailable. Any effect from chatter in X320 is blocked by the 5-second pick up delay of K307. Based on this analysis, K307 in battery chargers EVCA, EVCB, EVCC, and EVCD are selected for high frequency analysis.

I 25VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Spare Battery Charger EVCS The spare battery charger requires operator action to close circuit breakers prior to use, and for that reason is not included in this analysis [92, pp. 8.3-34].

2.5.2.2 125VDC Diesel Generator Control Power I 25VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Normal Battery Chargers 112EDGA, l/2EDGB These battery chargers are powered from 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System motor control centers via rugged molded-case circuit breakers [224, 225, 226, 227, 228]. AC power to these chargers is not separately controlled and is instead present whenever the motor control centers are powered.

• Chatter analysis on the battery chargers themselves was performed using information from the design basis specification [229, p. 14], as well as vendor schematic diagrams [230, 231]. Each battery charger has a high voltage shutdown circuit which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure. In an overvoltage condition, the X309 High DC Voltage Sense Board will shunt-trip the AC Input Circuit Breaker B301 via time delay pickup relay K301. Chatter in the K301 contacts could cause an unintended circuit breaker trip, which would render the chargers unavailable. Any effect from chatter in X309 is blocked by the 15-second pick up delay ofK301. Based on this analysis, K301 in battery chargers lEDGA, lEDGB, 2EDGA, and 2EDGB are selected for high frequency analysis.

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• Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 20 of 103 2.5.3 Inverters l 20VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Inverters 1/2EVIA, 1/2EVIB, 1/2EVIC, 1/2EVID The inverters are powered from 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power distribution centers via rugged molded case circuit breakers [217, 232, 222, p. 32]. Review of the design basis specification [233], as well as vendor schematic diagrams [234, 235, 236] revealed no SILO contact devices are present in the inverter control circuits, and thus no devices associated with the inverters meet the selection criteria.

2.5.4 EDG Ancillary Systems To start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators, several components and systems are required. For identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed. Information in the UFSAR [92] as well as various one-line drawings, flow diagrams, and system design basis specifications were used as necessary for this analysis.

2.5.4.1 Starting Air Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition, the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [237, 238, 239], which are covered under the EDG engine control analysis in Section 2.5 .1.3.

2.5.4.2 Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems which do not rely on electrical control [240, 241, 242].

2. 5. 4. 3 Lube Oil During operation, the Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps which do not rely on electrical control [243, 244, 245, 246, 247]. The Before and After Lube Oil Pump and Lube Oil Heater Pump are not necessary during EDG operation, and any short-term loss of operation between the start of strong shaking and EDG start would not impact generator availability. For these reasons, no lube oil pumps are included in the High Frequency Program.

Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil Bypass Valves 112LDOJ OBA, 1/2NVOJ 13B This motor-operated valve is normally closed and is opened by a pressure switch or rugged hand switches via a reversing motor starter [248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255]. Chatter in the pressure switch or motor starter opening contactor auxiliary contact could cause the contactor to seal-in and open the valve. This would bypass the Lube Oil Filter; however, a bypassed filter would not impact the emergency operation of the Diesel Generators. For this reason, these contact devices are excluded from the High Frequency Program.

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2. 5. 4. 4 Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical pumps viii and DC-powered booster pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks [256, 257, 258, 259, 260]. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered fuel oil transfer pumps.

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Booster Pumps .

The starter contactor for the booster pumps energize and seal-in on a low fuel pressure signal while its associated diesel generator is operating, and deenergize when the diesel generator stops or fuel pressure is sufficiently high [261, 262, 263, 264]. Chatter in the booster pump control circuit when the diesel generator is stopped could cause the pump to start momentarily, however seal-in is blocked by an open EDG start permissive. Similarly, chatter when the diesel generator is operating and fuel pressure is above the high-pressure threshold could cause the pump to start momentarily, however seal-in is blocked by the open high-pressure switch. Chatter when the diesel generator is operating but fuel pressure is between the low- and high-pressure thresholds would cause the pump to start and contactor to seal-in, however this would not impact diesel generator operation, and the pump would stop when pressure rises above the high-pressure threshold. Since none of these potential chatter consequences impact diesel generator availability or operation, no devices in the fuel oil booster pump control circuit meet the selection criteria.

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps The fuel oil transfer pumps are controlled automatically by the fuel level in the day tanks, or manually via rugged hand switches, with permissives from the EDG auto-start, fire detection, and power monitor circuits [265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272]. The auto-start circuit is*

covered under the EDG engine control analysis in Section 2.5.1.3. An automatic start signal prevents the fire detection relay from energizing and sealing-in,.and the power monitor relay has no seal-in. As stated above the day tanks are considered full at the start of strong shaking. In this condition, the pump is stopped and chatter in the motor starter circuit could only cause temporary pump operation during the period of strong shaking. Once shaking subsides pump operation would return to normal (automatic control based on day tank level). Based on this analysis, no devices in the fuel oil transfer pump control meet the selection criteria.

2.5.4.5 Engine Cooling Water An analysis of the design basi~ specification [~73] and flow diagrams [274, 275, 276~ 277] for the diesel generator engine cooling water system identified only three electrically controlled components, the intercooler and jacket water pumps, the jacket water circulating pump, and the intercooler temperature controller. . *.

Diesel Generator Intercooler and Jacket Water Pumps The intercooler and jacket water pumps are controlled via a non-reversing motor starter manually by a rugged hand switch or automatically by the EDG engine control system [278, 279, 280, 281]. The motor starter has no seal-in, and the EDG engine control system is already covered in Section 2.5.1.3. Chatter in the motor starter circuit would only have a temporary effect on the viii The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control.

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• ~ Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 22 of 103 pumps during the period of strong shaking, and normal operation would return after strong shaking subsides. No devices specific to the control of the intercooler and jacket water pumps meet the selection criteria.

Diesel Generator Jacket Water Circulating Pumps The jacket water circulating pumps maintain flow through the jacket water heaters to keep their respective engine warm when not operating [273, p. 21]. The pump starters are controlled by a normally closed auxiliary contact of the intercooler and jacket water pump motor starter contactor [282, 283, 284, 285], preventing them from running during diesel generator operation.

An interruption in pump operation from the start of strong shaking until diesel generator start would have no impact on the availability of the diesel generator. For this reason, these pumps are not included in the High Frequency Program.

Diesel Generator Intercooler Temperature Controllers The intercooler temperature controllers provide a continuous signal to position the intercooler water temperature control valves [273, p. 14]. Because the signal is continuous, discrete SILO devices are not used and therefore these controllers are excluded from the High Frequency Program.

2. 5. 4. 6 Nuclear Service Water Nuclear service water is required to cool the diesel generator jacket water heat exchangers.

Besides the nuclear service water pumps, an analysis of the design basis specification [286] and flow diagrams [287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292] (Ul and Common), [293, 294, 295, 296] (U2) indicated the following valves either need to change their state or remain open to establish the credited flow path:

• ORN0009B

• lRNOOOl

• 1RN0073A

• 2RN0043A

• ORNOOllB

• 1RN0016A

• 1RN0171B

• 2RN0063B

• ORN0012AC

• 1RN0018B

• 1RN0174B

• 2RN0064A

• ORN0013A 1RN0041B

• 1RN0296A

• 2RN0070A

• ORN0147AC

• 1RN0043A

• 1RN0297B

• 2RN0073A

• ORN0148AC

• 1RN0063B

• 2RN0016A

• 2RN0171B

• ORN0152B

• 1RN0064A 2RN0018B

• 2RN0174B

• ORN0284B

• 1RN0070A

• 2RN0041B

• 2RN0296A

• 2RN0297B These valves are included in the High Frequency Program to ensure contact chatter in their control circuits does not prevent proper cooling flow to the EDG heat exchangers.

Nuclear Service Water Pumps All protective relaying for the nuclear service water pump circuit breakers are solid state [297, 298, 299, 300]. The only vulnerable devices associated with the control of these circuit breakers are the sequencer relays, which are discussed in section 2.5.1.2 [301, 302, 303, 304], and circuit breaker auxiliary contacts for the auxiliary feedwater pump circuit breakers [305, 306, 307, 308].

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• ~ Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 23 of 103 Chatter in these auxiliary contacts could cause the nuclear service water pump circuit breaker to close prematurely, prior to closure of the diesel generator circuit breaker, leading to miss-sequencing. In addition, the nuclear service water pump circuit breakers themselves are vulnerable and could potentially trip after closure but before strong shaking subsides [3 09, 310, 311, 312]. For this reason, the circuit breakers for the auxiliary feed water and nuclear service water pumps meet the selection criteria.

Nuclear Service Water Low-Level Intake Isolation Valve JRNOOJ This motor operated valve is normally open and must remain open to maintain the credited flow path necessary to cool the A-train diesel generators for both units. The valve is controlled by rugged hand switches only, via a reversing motor starter [313]. Power to the valve motor is routed from the motor starter and control circuit in MCC SMXL compartment 3D to a separate disconnect circuit breaker in SMXL-3C. The breaker in SMXL.:.3C is normally disconnected preventing any seal-in in the valve motor starter from closing the valve [286, p. 61]. For this reason, no devices in the control circuit for this valve meet the selection criteria.

Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Control Valves 1/2RN073A, 1/2RN174B These motor operated valves are normally throttled and are controlled by rugged hand switches only, via a reversing motor starter [314, 315, 316, 317]. The motor starter has no seal-in and any chatter would be blocked by the open hand switches. No devices in these valve controls meet the selection criteria.

All Other Nuclear Service Water Valves Listed Above The remaining valves are all motor operated and automatically controlled by the diesel generator start circuit or sequencer such that they are commanded to the proper alignment once the diesels start [318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323] (Common TrainA Suction), [324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329]

(Common Train B Suction), [330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338] (Ul), [339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347] (U2), [348, 349] (Common Control), [350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355] (Common Train A Discharge), [356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361] (Common Train B Discharge). Chatter in the diesel generator start circuit is covered in Section 2.5.1.3; and chatter in the sequencer circuit is covered in Section 2.5.1.2. Chatter in the motor starter circuits of any of these valves could only lead to temporary misalignment. Due to the sustained signals from the diesel generator start and sequencer circuits, normal alignment would be restored after the period of strong shaking. No devices specific to the control of these valves meet the selection criteria.

2. 5. 4. 7 Ventilation Safety-related ventilation of the diesel buildings is provided by two fans per train, with exhaust via a set ofrelief dampers [362, 363, 364].

Diesel Building Ventilation Fans DSF-JA, DSF-JB, DSF-2A, DSF-2B These ventilation fans are controlled by room temperature with diesel generator start and fire detection (halon) permissives [365, 366, 367, 368]. The diesel start circuit is covered under the EDG engine control analysis in Section 2.5.1.3, and the fire detection signal has no seal-in [369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376]. These fans are stopped when their associated diesel

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• Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 24 of 103 generator is stopped, or when the diesel generator is running but room temperature is below 60°.

In either of these states, chatter in the fan motor control circuit could only cause momentary operation of the fan. When the diesel generator is operating and room temperature is above 85° chatter could only delay starting the fan until strong shaking subsides. When the diesel generator is operating and room temperature is between 60° and 85° chatter could lock out the fan, however once room temperature rises above 85° the lockout clears and the fan would start automatically. None of these potential scenarios would impact the availability of the diesel generator to provide emergency electrical power, and for this reason no devices in the fan control circuits meet the selection criteria.

Diesel Building Ventilation Fans DSF-JC, DSF-JD, DSF-2C, DSF-2D These ventilation fans operate whenever the diesel generator is running, with a fire detection (halon) permissive [377, 378, 379, 380]. The diesel start circuit is covered under the EDG engine control analysis in Section 2.5.1.3, and the fire detection signal is covered in the previous paragraph. There is no seal-in or lock-out associated with the fan control circuit. Chatter in the control circuit would only cause momentary fan operation when the diesel generator is stopped or, when the diesel generator is running, delay fan operation until strong shaking subsides.

Neither of these potential scenarios would impact the availability of the diesel generator to provide emergency electrical power, and for this reason no devices in the fan control circuits meet the selection criteria.

Diesel Building Relief Dampers DGA-RAID-JAIB/C/D, DGA-RAID-2A/B/CID The relief air actuators for these dampers are controlled by the fire detection (halon) system via an interposing relay [381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388]. As mentioned previously, the fire detection system has no seal-in, and there is no seal-in in the coil circuit of the interposing relay.

Contact chatter in the relief damper control circuits would only have a temporary effect on the relief dampers during the period of strong shaking. Damper operation would return to normal after strong shaking subsides. Based on this analysis, none of the devices in the damper control circuits meet the selection criteria.

2. 5. 4. 8 Crankcase Vacuum The only active components in this system are the crankcase vacuum blowers [389, 390, 391].

The crankcase vacuum blowers are controlled via a non-reversing motor starter manually by a rugged hand switch or automatically by the EDG engine control system [392, 393, 394, 395].

The motor starter has no seal-in, and the EDG engine control system is already covered in Section 2.5 .1.3. Chatter in the motor starter circuit would only have a temporary effect on the blowers during the period of strong shaking, and normal operation would return after strong shaking subsides. No devices specific to the control of the crankcase vacuum blowers meet the selection criteria.

2.5.5 Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (battery chargers, inverters, fuel oil pumps, jacket water pumps, nuclear service water pumps and valves, ventilation fans, and crankcase vacuum blowers) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 25 of 103 circuit breaker trip and interruption in power. This effort excluded the EDG circuit breakers and their control devices, which are covered in Section 2.5.1.1, sequencing, which is covered in 2.5.1.2, the service water pump circuit breakers and their control devices, which are covered in Section 2.5.4.6, and component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above.

Due to their high frequency sensitivity, the medium- and low-voltage circuit breakers in 4160V switchgear [396, 397] and 600V load centers [398, 399, 400, 401] which are supplying power to loads identified in this section must be included in the High Frequency Program. Circuit breakers in the following cubicles have been identified for evaluation because they have the potential trip during strong shakingix:

• 1ETA3

• 1ETB3

• 2ETA14

• 2ETB14

• 1ELXA-04B

• 1ELXB-04B

• 2ELXA-04B

• 2ELXB-04B

• 1ELXA-04D

• 1ELXB-05C

• 2ELXA-04D

• 2ELXB-04C

• 1ELXA-05D

• 1ELXB-05D

• 2ELXA-05D

• 2ELXB-05C

• 2ELXB-05D The 600V AC MCCs and DC power distribution use Molded-Case Circuit Breakers [402, p. 19, 222, p. 32] which are seismically rugged [4, pp: 2-11], and thus excluded from evaluation.

The only medium-voltage circuit breaker control circuits not covered in other sections were those that distribute power via stepdown transformers from the 4160 switchgear to their associated 600V load centers. All protective relaying for the 4160/600V transformer circuit breakers (1ETA3, 1ETB3, 2ETA14, 2ETB14) are solid state [403, 404, 405, 406]. The only vulnerable devices associated with the control of these circuit breakers are the sequencer relays, which are discussed in section 2.5.1.2 [407, 408, 409, 410]. All load center circuit breakers listed above are controlled by rugged hand switches only [411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416] (Ul)

[417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423] (U2). Based on this analysis, only the medium- and low-voltage circuit breakers meet the selection criteria.

ix In the case of 4160 switchgear breakers, which are automatically tripped during load shed and then closed again by the sequencer, strong shaking may be sustained after reclosure depending upon the duration of the event and the timing between the event and loss of offsite power. If the breakers are not sufficiently rugged to high frequency motions, they may trip after reclosure.

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3. SEISMIC EVALUATION 3.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand Per Reference [4], Section 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the McGuire Nuclear Station horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS), which was generated as part of the McGuire Nuclear Station Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [7] submitted to the NRC on March 20, 2014, and accepted by the NRC on July 20, 2015 [9].

It is noted in Reference [4] that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Reference [4], "The Control Point GMRS developed/or these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessary for the high frequency confirmation effort."

All major Category 1 structures are founded on sound rock per McGuire Nuclear Station Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report [7]. Therefore, the Control Point GMRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2 Vertical Seismic Demand As described in Section 3.2 of Reference [4], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VGMRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference [7] Table 2.3.2-2, and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity vs. Depth Profile Layer Depth Thickness, di VSi di/Vsi I [di I Vsi] Vs30

. (ft) (ft) (ft/s) '(s) (s) (ft/s) 1 0.0 0 4,750 0.00000 0.00000 2 6.5 6.5 4,750 0.00137 0.00137 3 13.0 6.5 7,200 0.00090 0.00227 4 20.0 7 7,200 0.00097 0.00324 7000 5 20.5 0.5 7,200 0.00007 0.00331 6x 98.4 77.9 7,251 0.01074 0.01406 7 3301.3 3280.8 9,285 0.35334 0.36740 x The shear wave velocity in Layer 6 is calculated by interpolating shear wave velocities from Layer 5 and 7.

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50.54(:f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 27of103 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m (98.4ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [4], Section 3.2.

• The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (di) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vsr).

• The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 3Om to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m 02[diNsr]).

• The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/L[diNsr].

The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (V s30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference

[4], Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of0.305g and the shear wave velocity of 7000ft/s, the site soil class is C-Hard.

Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[4], Table 3-2.

The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [4],

Table 3-2 values are constant between O. lHz and 15Hz.

The V/H ratios and VGMRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for McGuire Nuclear Station.

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100 0.305 0.81 0.247 90 0.310 0.84 0.260 80 0.322 0.88 0.283 70 0.351 0.93 0.326 60 0.424 0.94 0.399 50 0.565 0.92 0.520 40 0.670 0.87 0.583 35 0.676 0.82 0.554 30 0.660 0.77 0.508 25 0.629 0.71 0.447 20 0.603 0.7 0.422 15 0.559 0.7 0.391 12.5 0.528 0.7 0.370 10 0.486 0.7 0.340 9 0.455 0.7 0.319 8 0.421 0.7 0.295 7 0.384 0.7 0.269 6 0.344 0.7 0.241 5 0.300 0.7 0.210 4 0.241 0.7 0.169 3.5 0.209 0.7 0.146 3 0.177 0.7 0.124 2.5 0.143 0.7 0.100 2 0.129 0.7 0.090 1.5 0.104 0.7 0.073 1.25 0.089 0.7 0.062 1 0.075 0.7 0.052 0.9 0.072 0.7 0.051 0.8 0.070 0.7 0.049 0.7 0.067 0.7 0.047 0.6 0.062 0.7 0.043 0.5 0.054 0.7 0.038 0.4 0.044 0.7 0.030 0.35 0.038 0.7 0.027 0.3 0.033 0.7 0.023 0.25 0.027 0.7 0.019 0.2 0.022 0.7 0.015 0.15 0.016 0.7 0.011 0.125 0.014 0.7 0.010 0.1 0.011 0.7 0.008

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--HGMRS 0.60 . 0.95

--VGMRS

- - -V/H Ratio (C-Hard) 0.50 0.90 I

bD

-c 0.40 0

, 0.85 0

' ro re

.... l a:.

ClJ :r:

ClJ 8 0.30 0.80 >

<t I

J 0.20 J 0.75 I

0.10 ----------~ \* 0.70 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 3-1: Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V IH Ratios 3.3 Component Horizontal Seismic Demand Per Reference [4] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

• Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the control point elevation

• Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AF c to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [4]. The in-cabinet amplification factor, AFc is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [4] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148

[424] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148 [424] classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

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50.54(£) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 30of103 All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [4] as follows:

• Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

• Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

• Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width.

Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which result in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

3.4 Component Vertical Seismic Demand The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VGMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

• Vertical in-structure amplification factor AF sv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the control point elevation

• Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AF c to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [4]. The in-cabinet amplification factor, AFc is derived in Reference [4] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

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4. CONTACT DEVICE EVALUATIONS Per Reference [4], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(1) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [425],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [425], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station, manufacturer/vendor, or from the SQURTS testing program).

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [426] and [427].

(c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [4]. The high-frequency evaluations as described above were performed in Reference [428].

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B.

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5. CONCLUSIONS 5.1 General Conclusions McGuire Nuclear Station has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 [4].

The evaluation identified a total of 317 components that required evaluation. As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, 289 of the devices have adequate seismic capacity, and 28 components required resolution following the criteria in Section 4.6 of Reference [4].

To improve plant safety, McGuire Nuclear Station intends to address equipment sensitive to high frequency ground motion for the reevaluated seismic hazard information through mitigation strategies in lieu of a separate resolution of the 28 components identified under the letter [1]

which do not impact the credited path for mitigation strategies.

5.2 Identification of Follow-Up Actions Based on the general conclusions above, no follow-up actions are necessary.

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6. REFERENCES

[1] NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(+/-)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340, March 12, 2012.

[2] NRC Report, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century,"

ADAMS Accession Number MLI 11861807, July 12, 2011.

[3] EPRI Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization, and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," Final Report, February 2013.

[4] EPRI Report 3002004396, "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," Final Report, July 2015.

[5] NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer), "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility.'," ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569, September 17, 2015.

[6] NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List, "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(+/-) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 'Seismic' of the Near-Term Task Force Review oflnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015, October 27, 2015.

[7] McGuire Nuclear Station (S. Capps) Letter (MNS-14-029) to NRC, "Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(+/-) Request for Information Pursuant fo Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(+/-) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review oflnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML14098A421, March 20, 2014.

[8] NRC (M. Franovich) Letter to Duke Energy Carolina, LLC (E. Kapopoulos), "Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, and McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review oflnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML16344A313, December 22, 2016.

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[9] NRC (F. Vega) Letter to McGuire Nuclear Station (S. Capps), "McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Assessment oflnformation Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review oflnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML15182A067, July 20, 2015.

[10] McGuire Document MCM-1205.09-0001.001 Rev. C, Nozzle Type Relief Valve.

[11] McGuire Document MCM-1205.09-0001.002 Rev. DOD, Nozzle Type Relief Valve.

[12] McGuire Document MCM-1205.09-0001.003 Rev. 0, Nozzle Type Relief Valve.

[13] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.02 Rev. 20, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 1NC32B.

[14] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.02-01 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 1NC32B.

[15] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.03 Rev. 17, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 1NC34A.

[16] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.03-01 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 1NC34A.

[17] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.04 Rev. 17, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 1NC36B.

[18] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.04-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 1NC36B.

[19] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.02 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Opf!rated Safety Relief Valve 2NC32B.

[20] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.02-01 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 2NC32B.

[21] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.03 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 2NC34A.

[22] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.03-01 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 2NC34A.

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[23] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.04 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 2NC36B.

[24] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.04-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer #1 Power Operated Safety Relief Valve 2NC36B.

[25] McGuire Document MCM-1399.08-0121.003 Rev. D06, Wiring Diagram Auxiliary Relay Rack 1.

[26] McGuire Document MCM-1399.08-0122.003 Rev. D03, Wiring Diagram Auxiliary Relay Rack 2.

[27] McGuire Document MCM-1399.09-0001.125 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

[28] McGuire Document MCM-1399.09-0001.129 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

[29] McGuire Document MCM-1399.09-0001.187 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Remote Operated Valve l-PCV-455A.

[30] McGuire Document MCM-1399.09-0001.188 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Remote Operated Valve l-PCV-456A.

[31] McGuire Document MCM-1399.09-0001.189 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Remote Operated Valve l-PCV-456B.

[32] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.34 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer Spray Valves Positioner Air Block Solenoids 1NCSV0270, 1NCSV027l, 1NCSV0290, 1NCSV0291.

[33] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.34-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant (NC) System Pressurizer Spray Control 1NCLL0270, 1NCLL0290.

[34] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.34 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Pressurizer Spray Valves Positioner Air Block Solenoids 2NCSV0270, 2NCSV0271, 2NCSV0290, 2NCSV0291.

[35] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.28 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) Solenoid Valve 1NC273A.

[36] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.29 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) Solenoid Valve 1NC272A.

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[37] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.31 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) Solenoid Valves 1NC274B and 1NC275B.

[38] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.32 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) SSF Controls Power Transfer and Alarm Relays.

[39] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.32-01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) HFB Breaker WI KKI Power Circuit lEVDAl-lA and lEVDAl-lB.

[40] McGuire Document MCEE-150-00.33 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) SSF Controls for Solenoid Valves 1NC272A and 1NC273A.

[41] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.28 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) Solenoid Valve 2NC273A.

[42] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.29 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) Solenoid Valve 2NC272A.

[43] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.31 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) Solenoid Valves 2NC274B and 2NC275B.

[44] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.32 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) SSF Controls Power Transfer and Alarm Relays.

[45] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.32-01 Rev. 0, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) HFB Breaker WI KKI Power Circuit 2EVDAJ-JA and 2EVDAJ-1B.

[46] McGuire Document MCEE-250-00.33 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Reactor Vessel Vent Head System (NC) SSF Controls for Solenoid Valves 2NC272A and 2NC273A.

[47] McGuire Document MCEE-157-00.03 Rev. 16, Elementary Diagram NC Letdown Isolation to Regenerative Heat Exchanger #1 lNVlA.

[48] McGuire Document MCEE-157-00.04 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram NC Letdown Isolation to Regenerative Heat Exchanger #l 1NV2A.

[49] McGuire Document MCEE-257-00.03 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram NC Letdown Isolation to Regenerative Heat Exchanger #1 2NV1A.

[50] McGuire Document MCEE-257-00.04 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram NC Letdown Isolation to Regenerative Heat Exchanger #1 2NV2A.

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[51] McGuire Document MCEE-157-00.12 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Supply to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger #1 Isolation Valve 1NV24B.

[52] McGuire Document MCEE-157-00.13 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Supply to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger #1 Isolation Valve 1NV25B.

[53] McGuire Document MCEE-257-00.12 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Supply to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger #1 Isolation Valve 2NV24B.

[54] McGuire Document MCEE-257-00.13 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Supply to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger #1 Isolation Valve 2NV25B.

[55] McGuire Document MCEE-0141-00.01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Discharge to ND System Isolation Valve lNDOOOlB.

[56] McGuire Document MCEE-0141-00.02 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Discharge to ND System Containment Isolation Valve Inside 1ND0002AC.

[57] McGuire Document MCEE-0141-00.02-02 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Discharge to ND System Containment Isolation Valve Inside 1ND0002AC.

[58] McGuire Document MCEE-0155-01.05 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram RWST to ND Pump Isolation Valve 1FW0027A.

[59] McGuire Document MCEE-0241-00.01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Discharge to ND System Isolation Valve 2ND0001B.

[60] McGuire Document MCEE-0241-00.02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Discharge to ND System Containment Isolation Valve Inside 2ND0002AC.

[61] McGuire Document MCEE-0241-00.02-02 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram NC Loop 3 Discharge to ND System Containment Isolation Valve Inside 2ND0002AC.

[62] McGuire Document MCEE-0255-01.05 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram RWST to ND Pump Isolation Valve 2FW0027A.

[63] McGuire Document MCFD-1571-01.00 Rev. 29, Flow Diagram Refueling Water System (FW).

[64] McGuire Document MCFD-2571-01.00 Rev. 33, Flow Diagram Refueling Water System (FW).

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[65] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.26 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram IA Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Isolation Valve 1RN69A.

[66] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.26-01 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram IA Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Isolation Valve JRN69A.

[67] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.45 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram JB Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Isolation Valve JRN162B.

[68] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.45-01Rev.11, Elementary Diagram JB Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Isolation Valve JRN162B.

[69] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-28.00 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve JCA86A.

[70] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-29.00 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve JCAJ 16B.

[71] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.13 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram 2A Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps isolation Valve 2RN69A.

[72] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.13-01 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 2A Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Isolation Valve 2RN69A.

[73] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.26 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram 2B Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Isolation Valve 2RNJ 62B.

[74] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.26-01 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram 2B Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Isolation Valve 2RN162B.

[75] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-28.00 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve 2CA86A.

[76] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-29.00 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve 2CAJ 16B.

[77] McGuire Document MCS-1592.CA-00-0001 Rev. 36, Design Basis Specification for the CA System.

[78] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-08.00 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Selector Station Control Circuit.

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[79] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-13.00 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Turbine Start Circuit (Auto).

[80] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-08.00 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Selector Station Control Circuit.

[81] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-13.00 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Turbine Start Circuit (Auto).

[82] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-23.00 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Isolation Valve ICA0038B.

[83] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-24.00 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Isolation Valve ICA0050B.

[84] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-25.00 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Isolation Valve ICA0054AC.

[85] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-26.00 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Isolation Valve ICA0066AC.

[86] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-23.00 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge to Steam Generator 2D Isolation Valve 2CA0038B.

[87] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-24.00 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge to Steam Generator 2C Isolation Valve 2CA0050B.

[88] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-25.00 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge to Steam Generator 2B Isolation Valve 2CA0054AC.

[89] McGuire Document MCEE-0247-26.00 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge to Steam Generator 2A Isolation Valve 2CA0066AC.

[90] McGuire Document MCS-1593.SA-00-0001 Rev. 8, Design Basis Specification/or the SA and TE Systems.

[91] McGuire Document MCEE-0147-14.02 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System Miscellaneous Controls.

[92] McGuire Nuclear Station, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report," Revision 19, October 9, 2015.

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[93] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.15-02 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I4 Diesel Generator IA Feeder Breaker (Part 3).

[94] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.15-03 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I4 Diesel Generator IA Feeder Breaker (Part 4).

[95] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.15-05 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I4 Diesel Generator IA Feeder Breaker (Part 6).

[96] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.34-02 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 4I 60V Switchgear IETB Unit #I4 Diesel Generator IB Feeder Breaker (Part 3).

[97] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.34-03 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETB Unit #I4 Diesel Generator IB Feeder Breaker (Part 4).

[98] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.34-05 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 4I 60V Switchgear I ETB Unit #I 4 Diesel Generator I B Feeder Breaker (Part 6).

[99] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.02-02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2A Feeder Breaker (Part 3).

[100] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.02-03 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2A Feeder Breaker (Part 4).

[101] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.02-05 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 4I 60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2A Feeder Breaker (Part 6).

[102] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.21-02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2B Feeder Breaker (Part 3).

[103] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.21-03 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2B Feeder Breaker (Part 4).

[104] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.21-05 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2B Feeder Breaker (Part 6).

[105] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.01-01 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[106] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.02 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Breaker Failure Circuits.

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[107] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.03-01 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1ETA Unit #2 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[108] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.20-01 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETB Unit #1 Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[109] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.21Rev.12, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETB Breaker Failure Circuits (Part 1).

[110] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.22-01 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETB Unit #2 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[111] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.16-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #16 Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[112] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.15 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Breaker Failure Circuits.

[113] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.14-01 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #15 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[114] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.35-01 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #16 Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[115] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.34 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Breaker Failure Circuits.

[116] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.33-01 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #15 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 2).

[117] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.01 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETA Unit #1 Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 1).

[118] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.03 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETA Unit #2 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 1).

[119] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.20 Rev. 15, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETB Unit #1 Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 1).

[120] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.22 Rev. 16, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1ETB Unit #2 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part 1).

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[121] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.16 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #I6 Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[122] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.14 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #I 5 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[123] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.35 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #I6 Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[124] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.33 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #I5 Standby Incoming Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[125] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.15 Rev. 19, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I4 Diesel Generator IA Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[126] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.34 Rev. 18, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETB Unit #I4 Diesel Generator IB Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[127] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.02 Rev. 14, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2A Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[128] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.21Rev.14, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #2 Diesel Generator 2B Feeder Breaker (Part I).

[129] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.00-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Device Index Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer.

[130] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.00-02 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Device Index Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer.

[131] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.00-03 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Device Index Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer.

[132] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.00-04 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Device Index Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer.

[133] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.00-05 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Device Index Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer.

[134] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.00-12 Rev. 0, Elementary Diagram Device Index Degraded Voltage Relaying 4I60V Switchgear IETA.

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[135] McGuire Document MCS-114.00-EQB-0001 Rev. 17, Design Basis Specification for the EQB System.

[136] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.01 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part I).

[137] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.02 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part 2).

[138] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.03 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part 3).

[139] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.04 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part 4).

[140] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.05 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part 5).

[141] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.06 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part 6).

[142] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.07 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part 7).

[143] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.08 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Load Sequencer (Part 8).

[144] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.09 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Load Sequencer (Part I).

[145] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.10 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Load Sequencer (Part 2).

[146] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.11 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Load Sequencer (Part 3).

[147] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.12 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Load Sequencer (Part 4).

[148] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.13 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Load Sequencer (Part 5).

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[149] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.14 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 1B Load Sequencer (Part 6).

[150] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.15 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator lB Load Sequencer (Part 7).

[151] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.16 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 1B Load Sequencer (Part 8).

[152] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.01 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 1).

[153] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 2).

[154] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.03 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 3).

[155] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.04 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 4).

[156] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.05 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 5).

[157] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.06 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 6).

[158] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.07 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 7).

[159] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.08 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Load Sequencer (Part 8).

[160] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.09 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 1).

[161] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.10 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 2).

[162] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.11 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 3).

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[163] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.12 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 4).

[164] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.13 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 5).

[165] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.14 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 6).

[166] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.15 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 7).

[167] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.16 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Load Sequencer (Part 8).

[168] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.08-04 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear JETA Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[169] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.08-05 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear JETA Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[170] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.16-03 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1ETB Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[171] McGuire Document MCEE-114-00.16-04 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1ETB Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[172] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.08-04 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[173] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.08-05 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[174] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.16-03 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[175] McGuire Document MCEE-214-00.16-04 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Degraded Voltage Relaying.

[176] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.01 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Start Circuit.

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[177] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.01-02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Start Circuit.

[178] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.02 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Start Circuit.

[179] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.03 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Start and Control Circuit.

[180] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.04 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA AC Control Circuit.

[181] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.05 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Governor Control Circuit.

[182] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.06 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Voltage Regulator Control Circuit.

[183] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-01.07 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Start Circuit.

[184] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Start Circuit.

[185] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.01-02 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Start Circuit.

[186] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.02 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Start Circuit.

[187] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.03 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Start and Control Circuit.

[188] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.04 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB AC Control Circuit.

[189] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.05 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Governor Control Circuit.

[190] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.06 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Voltage Regulator Control Circuit.

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[191] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-09.07 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 1B Start Circuit.

[192] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Start Circuit.

[193] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.01-02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Start Circuit.

[194] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.02 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Start Circuit.

[195] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.03 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Start and Control Circuit.

[196] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.04 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A AC Control Circuit.

[197] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.05 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Governor Control Circuit.

[198] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.06 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Voltage Regulator Control Circuit.

[199] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-01.07 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Start Circuit.

[200] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start Circuit.

[201] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.01-02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start Circuit.

[202] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.02 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start Circuit.

[203] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.03 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start and Control Circuit.

[204] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.04 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B AC Control Circuit.

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[205] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.05 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Governor Control Circuit.

[206] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.06 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Voltage Regulator Control Circuit.

[207] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-09.07 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start Circuit.

[208] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-00.01-01 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Device Designation Index JA Relays.

[209] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-00.01-02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Device Designation Index JA Instruments.

[210] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-00.01-03 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Device Designation Index JA Instruments.

[211] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-00.01-04 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Device Designation Index JA Miscellaneous Devices.

[212] McGuire Document MCS-120.00-EQC-0001 Rev. 14, Design Basis Specificationfor the EQC System.

[213] McGuire Document MCCD-1703-06.01 Rev. 44, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 1EMXA.

[214] McGuire Document MCCD-1703-07.01 Rev. 18, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 1EMXB.

[215] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-06.01 Rev. 24, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 2EMXA.

[216] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-07.01 Rev. 20, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 2EMXB.

[217] McGuire Document MC-1705-01.00 Rev. 111, One Line Diagram 125VDC/120VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System .

[218] McGuire Document MCEE-106-00.01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Vital Instrument and Control Power System Battery Charger EVCA.

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[219] McGuire Document MCEE-106-00.02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Vital Instrument and Control Power System Battery Charger EVCB.

[220] McGuire Document MCEE-206-00.03 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Vital Instrument and Control Power System Battery Charger EVCC Normal Feeder Breaker.

[221] McGuire Document MCEE-206-00.04 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Vital Instrument and Control Power System Battery Charger EVCD Normal Feeder Breaker.

[222] McGuire Document MCS-105.18-EPL-0001 Rev. 12, Design Basis Specificationfor the 125 VDC Vital Instrument and Control Power System (EP L).

[223] McGuire Document MCM-1356.05-0021.001 Rev. D07, Vital I&C Charger Instruction/Technical Manual.

[224] McGuire Document MCCD-1703-06.09 Rev. 12, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center JEMXE and 120V Power Panel JDGJA.

[225] McGuire Document MCCD-1703-07.04 Rev. 10, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center IEMXF and 120V Power Panel JDGJB.

[226] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-06.06 Rev. 12, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 2EMXE and 120V Power Panel 2DG2A.

[227] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-07.05 Rev. 11, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 2EMXF and 120V Power Panel 2DG2B.

[228] McGuire Document MC-1705-04.00 Rev. 17, One Line Diagram 125VDC Diesel Generator Control System.

[229] McGuire Document MCS-191.00-EPQ-0001 Rev. 10, Design Basis Specification for the EPQSystem.

[230] McGuire Document MCM-1356.08-0018.001 Rev. 6, Schematic 50 Amp Battery Charger 600VAC 60Hz 125VDC.

[231] McGuire Document MCM-1356.08-0018.002 Rev. Dl, Schematic 50 Amp Battery Charger Alarms.

[232] McGuire Document MC-2705-01.00 Rev. 7, One Line Diagram 120VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System.

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[233] McGuire Document MCS-105.18-EPG-0001 Rev. 5, Design Basis Specification for the l 20VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System (EPG).

[234] McGuire Document MCM-1358.03-0026.001 Rev. H, Schematic 15KVA Inverter 125VDC 120VAC 10 60Hz.

[235] McGuire Document MCM-1358.03-0026.002 Rev. H, Schematic 15KVA Inverter l 25VDC 120VAC 10 60Hz.

[236] McGuire Document MCM-1358.03-0028.001 Rev. G, Schematic l 5KVA Manual Bypass Switch 125VDC 120VAC 10 60Hz.

[237] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-04.00 Rev. 16, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Starting Air System (VG).

[238] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-04.00 Rev. 13, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Starting Air System (VG).

[239] McGuire Document MCS-1609.VG-00-0001 Rev. 21, Design Basis Specification for the VG System.

[240] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-05.00 Rev. 9, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System (VN).

[241] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-05.00 Rev. 9, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System (VN).

[242] McGuire Document MCS-1609.VN-00-0001 Rev. 5, Design Basis Specification for the VN System.

[243] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-02.00 Rev. 9, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System (LD).

[244] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-02.01 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System (LD).

[245] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-02.00 Rev. 11, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System (LD).

[246] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-02.01 Rev. 13, Flow Diagram ofDiesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System (LD).

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[247] McGuire Document MCS-1609.LD-00-0001 Rev. 13, Design Basis Specification for the LDSystem.

[248] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-02.05 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve ILDOI08A.

[249] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-02.05-01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve ILDOI08A.

[250] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-10.05 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve ILD0113B.

[251] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-10.05-01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve ILD0113B.

[252] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-02.05 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve 2LDOI08A.

[253] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-02.05-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve 2LDOI08A.

[254] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-10.05 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve 2LDOI I 3B.

[255] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-10.05-01 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Lube Oil Filter Bypass Valve 2LDOI I 3B.

[256] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-03.00 Rev. 21, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine IA Fuel Oil System (FD).

[257] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-03.01 Rev. 17, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine IB Fuel Oil System (FD).

[258] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-03.00 Rev. 18, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine 2A Fuel Oil System (FD).

[259] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-03.01 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine 2B Fuel Oil System (FD).

[260] McGuire Document MCS-1609.FD-00-0001 Rev. 17, Design Basis Specification for the FD System.

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[261] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-05.02 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Booster Pump Diesel Generator IA.

[262] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-13.02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Booster Pump Diesel Generator Pump I B.

[263] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-05.02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Booster Pump Diesel Generator 2A.

[264] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-13.02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Booster Pump Diesel Generator Pump 2B.

[265] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-05.01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Diesel Generator IA.

[266] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-05.01-01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Fuel Oil Day Tank Level.

[267] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-13.01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Diesel Generator I B.

[268] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-13.01-01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Fuel Oil Day Tank Level.

[269] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-05.01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Diesel Generator 2A.

[270] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-05.01-01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Fuel Oil Day Tank Level.

[271] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-13.01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Diesel Generator 2B.

[272] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-13.01-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Fuel Oil Day Tank Level.

[273] McGuire Document MCS-1609.KD-00-0001 Rev. 14, Design Basis Specificationfor the KDSystem.

[274] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-01.00 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System (KD).

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[275] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-01.01 Rev. 13, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System (KD).

[276] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-01.00 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System (KD).

[277] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-01.01 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System (KD).

[278] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-04.01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water and Intercooler Water Pump Diesel Generator IA.

[279] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-12.01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water and

• Intercooler Water Pump Diesel Generator IB.

[280] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-04.01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water and Intercooler Water Pump Diesel Generator 2A.

[281] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-12.01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water and Intercooler Water Pump Diesel Generator 2B.

[282] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-04.02 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water Circulating Pump Diesel Generator IA.

[283] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-12.02 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water Circulating Pump Diesel Generator I B.

[284] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-04.02 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water Circulating Pump Diesel Generator 2A.

[285] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-12.02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Jacket Water Circulating Pump Diesel Generator 2B.

[286] McGuire Document MCS-1574.RN-00-0001 Rev. 51, Design Basis Specification for the RN System.

[287] McGuire Document MCFD-1604-02.00 Rev. 5, Flow Diagram of Low Level Intake Cooling Water System (RC).

[288] McGuire Document MCFD-1574-01.00 Rev. 31, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN).

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[289] McGuire Document MCFD-1574-01.01 Rev. 36, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN).

[290] McGuire Document MCFD-1574-02.00 Rev. 35, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN).

[291] McGuire Document MCFD-1574-03.00 Rev. 38, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN).

[292] McGuire Document MCFD-1604-01.02 Rev. 19, Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water (RC).

[293] McGuire Document MCFD-2574-01.01 Rev. 39, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN).

[294] McGuire Document MCFD-2574-02.00 Rev. 29, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN).

[295] McGuire Document MCFD-2574-03.00 Rev. 20, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN). *

[296] McGuire Document MCFD-2574-04.00 Rev. 30, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Service Water System (RN).

[297] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.13-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I2 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor IA (Part 2).

[298] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.32-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETB Unit #I2 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor IB (Part 2).

[299] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.04-01 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 4I 60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #5 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2A (Part 2).

[300] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.23-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #5 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2B (Part 2).

[301] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.13-02 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram 4I 60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I2 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor IA (Part 3).

[302] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.32-02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4I 60V Switchgear IETB Unit #I2 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor IB (Part 3).

SA 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 55 of 103

[303] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.04-02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #5 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2A (Part 3).

[304] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.23-02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #5 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2B (Part 3).

[305] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.12 Rev. 18, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I I Auxiliary Feedwater Pump IA Motor (Part I).

[306] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.31Rev.18, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I I Auxiliary Feedwater Pump IB Motor (Part I).

[307] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.05 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #6 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Motor (Part I).

[308] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.24 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #6 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Motor (Part I).

[309] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.13 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETA Unit #I2 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor IA (Part I).

[310] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.32 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear IETB Unit #I2 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor IB (Part I).

[311] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.04 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #5 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2A (Part I).

[312] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.23 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram 4I60V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #5 Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor 2B (Part I).

[313] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Low Level Intake Isolation Valve IRNI.

[314] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.28 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Heat Exchanger Control Valve I RN73A.

[315] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.47 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Heat Exchanger Control Valve IRNI74B.

[316] McGuire Document MCEE-23 8-00.15 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Heat Exchanger Control Valve 2RN73A.

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[317] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.28 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Heat Exchanger Control Valve 2RN174B.

[318] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.07 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram SNSWP Supply B Shutoff Valve ORN9B.

[319] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.07-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram SNSWP Supply B Shutoff Valve ORN9B.

[320] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.07-02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram SNSWP Supply B Shutoff Valve ORN9B.

[321] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.09 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply B Shutoff Valve ORNJ JB.

[322] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.09-01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply B Shutoff Valve ORN11 B.

[323] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.09-02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply B Shutoff Valve ORNJ JB.

[324] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.10 Rev. 16, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply A Shutoff Valve ORNJ 2AC.

[325] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.10-01 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply B Shutoff Valve ORNJ 2A.

[326] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.10-02 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply A Shutoff Valve ORN12AC.

[327] McGuire Document MCEE-13 8-00.11 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply A Shutoff Valve ORNl 3A.

[328] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.11-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply A Shutoff Valve ORN13A.

[329] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.11-02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Low Level Supply A Shutoff Valve ORN13A.

[330] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.14 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram RN Channel IA Supply Isolation Valve JRN16A.

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[331] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.15 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram RN Channel IB Supply Isolation Valve IRNI8B.

[332] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.21 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Non-Essential Header Supply IB Valve IRN4IB.

[333] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.23 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram AIB Non-Essential Supply Isolation Valve IRN43A.

[334] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.24 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram A/B Non-Essential Return Isolation Valve IRN63B.

[335] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.25 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram AIB Non-Essential Return Isolation Valve IRN64A.

[336] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.27 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Heat Exchanger Supply Isolation Valve IRN70A.

[337] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.65 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Essential Header IA Return Isolation Valve I RN296A.

[338] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.66 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram Essential Header IB Return Isolation Valve IRN297B.

[339] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram RN Channel 2A Supply Isolation Valve 2RNI 6A.

[340] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.02 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram RN Channel 2B Supply Isolation Valve 2RNI 8B.

[341] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.08 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Non-Essential Header Supply 2B Valve 2RN4IB.

[342] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.10 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram AIB Non-Essential Supply Isolation Valve 2RN43A.

[343] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.11Rev.4, Elementary Diagram AIB Non-Essential Return Isolation Valve 2RN63B.

[344] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.14 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Heat Exchanger Supply Isolation Valve 2RN70A.

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[345] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.27 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Heat Exchanger Supply Isolation Valve 2RN171B.

[346] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.43 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Essential Header 2A Return Isolation Valve 2RN296A.

[347] McGuire Document MCEE-238-00.44 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Essential Header 2B Return Isolation Valve 2RN297B.

[348] McGuire Document MCM-1399.08-0086.003 Rev. D06, Test Relay Coil Schematic Safeguards Test Cabinet.

[349] McGuire Document MCM-1399.08-0086.005 Rev. D07, AC/DC Test Circuit Schematic Figure A Safeguards Test Cabinet.

[350] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.39 Rev. 13, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve ORN147AC.

[351] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.39-01 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve ORN147AC.

[352] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.39-02 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve ORN147AC.

[353] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.40 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve ORNJ 48AC.

[354] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.40-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve ORNJ48AC.

[355] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.40-02 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve ORNJ 48AC.

[356] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.44 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram SNSWP Discharge B Isolation Valve ORNJ 52B.

[357] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.44-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram SNSWP Discharge B Isolation Valve ORNJ 52B.

[358] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.44-02 Rev. 6, Elementary Diagram SNSWP Discharge B Isolation Valve ORN152B.

16C4435~RPT-002 Rev. 1 SA

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[359] McGuife Document MCEE-138-00:64 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge B

• Isolation Valve ORN284B.

[360] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.64-01 Rev. 5, Elem~ntary Diagram CCW Discharge B Isolation Valve ORN284B.

[361] McGuire Document MCEE-138-00.64-02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram CCW Discharge B Isolation Valve ORN284B.

[362] McGuire Document MC-1579-01.00 Rev. 16, Flow Diagram ofDiesel Building Ventilation System (VD).

[363] McGuire Document MC-2579-01.00 Rev. 16, Flow Diagram of Diesel Building Ventilation System (VD).

[364] McGuire Document MCS-1579.VD-00-0001 Rev. 10, Design Basis Specification for the VD System.

[365] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-07.02 Rev. 12, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan IAI (DSF-IA).

[366] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-15.02 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan IBI (DSF-IB).

[367] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-07.03 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan 2AI (DSF-2A). *

[368] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-15.03 Rev. 8, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan 2BI (DSF-2B).

[369] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-08.08 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Halon Control Circuit.

[370] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-08.07 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IA Halon Control Circuit.

[371] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-16.08 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator I B Halon Control Circuit.

[372] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-16.07 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator IB Halon Controf.Circuit.

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[373] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-08.08 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Halon Control Circuit.

[374] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-08.07 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Halon Control Circuit.

[375] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-16.08 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Halon Control Circuit.

[376] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-16.07 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Halon Control Circuit.

[377] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-07.03 Rev. 10, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan JA2 (DSF-JC).

[378] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-15.03 Rev. 11, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan JB2 (DSF-JD).

[379] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-07.02 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan 2A2 (DSF-2C).

[380] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-15.02 Rev. 9, Elementary Diagram Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Building Ventilation Fan 2B2 (DSF-2D).

[381] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-07.01-01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-1, 4, 5, 6, 7.

[382] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-07.06 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-1, 4, 5, 6, 7.

[383] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-15.01-01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-10, 13, 14, 15, 16.

[384] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-15.06 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-10, 13, 14, 15, 16.

[385] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-07.01-01 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-28, 31, 32, 33, 34.

[386] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-07.06 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-28, 31, 32, 33, 34.

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[387] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-15.01-01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-19, 22, 23, 24, 25.

[388] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-15.06 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram Diesel Building Isolation and ReliefAir Damper Actuators QA-DGDM-19, 22, 23, 24, 25.

[389] McGuire Document MCS-1609.ZD-00-0001 Rev. 3, Design Basis Specification/or the ZDSystem.

[390] McGuire Document MCFD-1609-06.00 Rev. 1, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Crankcase Vacuum System (ZD).

[391] McGuire Document MCFD-2609-06.00 Rev. 1, Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Crankcase Vacuum System (ZD).

[392] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-06.01 Rev. 0, Elementary Diagram Diesel Engine IA Auxiliaries Crankcase Vacuum Blower.

[393] McGuire Document MCEE-0120-14.01 Rev. 0, Elementary Diagram Diesel Engine JB Auxiliaries Crankcase Vacuum Blower.

[394] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-06.01 Rev. 0, Elementary Diagram Diesel Engine 2A Auxiliaries Crankcase Vacuum Blower.

[395] McGuire Document MCEE-0220-14.01 Rev. 0, Elementary Diagram Diesel Engine 2B Auxiliaries Crankcase Vacuum Blower.

[396] McGuire Document MCCD-1702-02.00 Rev. 13, One Line Diagram 4160V Essential Auxiliary Power System.

[397] McGuire Document MCS -0115.00-EPC-0001 Rev. 15, Design Basis Specification for the 4.16KV Essential Auxiliary Power.

[398] McGuire Document MCCD-1703-06.00 Rev. 4, One Line Diagram 600VAC Load Centers JELXA and JELXC.

[399] McGuire Document MCCD-1703-07.00 Rev. 6, One Line Diagram 600VAC Load Centers 1ELXB and 1ELXD.

[400] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-06.00 Rev. 7, One Line Diagram 600VAC Load Centers 2ELXA and 2ELXC.

s 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 62 of 103

[401] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-07.00 Rev. 8, One Line Diagram 600VAC Load Centers 2ELXB and 2ELXD.

[402] McGuire Document MCS-0112.00-EPE-0001 Rev. 12, Design Basis Specification for the 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System (EPE).

[403] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.04-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETA Unit #3 4160/600VTransformer lELXA (Part 2).

[404] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.23-01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETB Unit #3 4160/600VTransformer lELXB (Part 2).

[405] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.13-01 Rev. 1, Elementary Diagram 4 l 60V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #14 4160/600VTransformer 2ELXA (Part 2).

[406] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.32-01Rev.1, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #14 4160/600VTransformer 2ELXB (Part 2).

[407] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.04-02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETA Unit #3 4160/600VTransformer lELXA (Part 3).

[408] McGuire Document MCEE-115-00.23-02 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear lETB Unit #3 4160/600VTransformer lELXB (Part 3).

[409] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.13-02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETA Unit #14 4160/600VTransformer 2ELXA (Part 3).

[410] McGuire Document MCEE-215-00.32-02 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2ETB Unit #14 4160/600VTransformer 2ELXB (Part 3).

[411] McGuire Document MCEE-112-00.01 Rev. 5, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 1ELXA Compartment 4B Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker.

[412] McGuire Document MCEE-112-00.03 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center lELXA Compartment 4D MCC lEMXE Feeder Breaker.

[413] McGuire Document MCEE-112-00.06 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center lELXA Compartment 5D MCC lEMXA Feeder Breaker.

[414] McGuire Document MCEE-112-00.14 Rev. 7, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 1ELXB Compartment 4B Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker.

SA

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[415] McGuire Document MCEE-112-00.18 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center JELXB Compartment 5C MCC JEMXB Feeder Breaker.

[416] McGuire Document MCEE-112-00.19 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 1ELXB Compartment 5D MCC 1EMXF Feeder Breaker.

[417] McGuire Document MCEE-212-00.01 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 2ELXA Compartment 4B Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker.

[418] McGuire Document MCEE-212-00.03 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 2ELXA Compartment 4D MCC 2EMXE Feeder Breaker.

[419] McGuire Document MCEE-212-00.06 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 2ELXA Compartment 5D MCC 2EMXA Feeder Breaker.

[420] McGuire Document MCEE-212-00.14 Rev. 4, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 2ELXB Compartment 4B Normal Incoming Feeder Breaker.

[421] McGuire Document MCEE-212-00.15 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 2ELXB Compartment 4C MCC 2EMXH Feeder Breaker.

[422] McGuire Document MCEE-212-00.18 Rev. 2, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 2ELXB Compartment 5C MCC 2EMXB Feeder Breaker.

[423] McGuire Document MCEE-212-00.19 Rev. 3, Elementary Diagram 600VAC Essential Load Center 2ELXB Compartment 5D MCC 2EMXF Feeder Breaker.

[424] EPRI Report NP-7148-SL, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality," Final Report December 1990.

[425] EPRI Report 3002002997, "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary," Final Report, September 2014.

[426] EPRI Report NP-7147-SL, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays," Final Report August 1991.

[427] SQUG Advisory 2004-02, "Relay GERS Corrections," September 7, 2004.

[428] Stevenson & Associates Calculation 16C4435-CAL-001 Rev. 0, "High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Components," July 5, 2017.

[429] Stevenson & Associates Report 16C4435-RPT-001 Rev. 1, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation at McGuire Nuclear Station," July 24, 2017.

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/

I 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 64 of 103

[430] McGuire Document MCFD-1553-01.00 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[431] McGuire Document MCFD-1553-02.00 Rev. 10, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[432] McGuire Document MCFD-1553-02.01Rev.10, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[433] McGuire Document MCFD-1554-01.00 Rev. 11, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[434] McGuire Document MCFD-1554-01.01 Rev. 11, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[435] McGuire Document MCFD-1554-01.02 Rev. 14, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[436] McGuire Document MCFD-1561-01.00 Rev. 23, Flow Diagram of Residual Heat Removal System (ND).

[437] McGuire Document MCFD-1562-01.00 Rev. 8, Flow Diagram of Safety Injection System (NI).

[438] McGuire Document MCFD-1562-02.00 Rev. 8, Flow Diagram ofSafety Injection System (NJ).

[439] McGuire Document MCFD-1562-02.01 Rev. 7, Flow Diagram ofSafety Injection System (NJ).

[440] McGuire Document MCFD-1562-03.00 Rev. 17, Flow Diagram ofSafety Injection System (NJ).

[441] McGuire Document MCFD-1572-01.00 Rev. 15, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Sampling System (NM).

[442] McGuire Document MCFD-2553-01.00 Rev. 18, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[443] McGuire Document MCFD-2553-02.00 Rev. 9, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. l 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 65 of l 03

[444] McGuire Document MCFD-2553-02.01Rev.12, Flow Diagram of Reactor Coolant System (NC).

[445] McGuire Document MCFD-2554-01.00 Rev. 11, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[446] McGuire Document MCFD-2554-01.01Rev.12, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[447] McGuire Document MCFD-2554-01.02 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram of Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

[448] McGuire Document MCFD-2561-01.00 Rev. 26, Flow Diagram of Residual Heat Removal System (ND).

[449] McGuire Document MCFD-2562-01.00 Rev. 5, Flow Diagram ofSafety Injection System (NI).

[450] McGuire Document MCFD-2562-02.00 Rev. 7, Flow Diagram ofSafety Injection System (NI).

[451] McGuire Document MCFD-2562-02.01 Rev. 4, Flow Diagram ofSafety Injection System (NI).

[452] McGuire Document MCFD-2562-03.00 Rev. 19, Flow Diagram of Safety Injection System (NI).

[453] McGuire Document MCFD-2572-01.00 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram ofNuclear Sampling System (NM).

[454] McGuire Document MCFD-1592-01.01 Rev. 34, Flow Diagram ofAuxiliary Feedwater System (CA).

[455] McGuire Document MCFD-1592-01.00 Rev. 9, Flow Diagram ofAuxiliary Feedwater System (CA).

[456] McGuire Document MCFD-1593-01.02 Rev. 12, Flow Diagram ofMain Steam Supply to Auxiliary Equipment System (SA) Turbine Exhaust System (TE).

[457] McGuire Document MCFD-2592-01.01 Rev. 33, Flow Diagram ofAuxiliary Feedwater System (CA).

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 66 of 103

[458] McGuire Document MCFD-2592-01.00 Rev. 13, Flow Diagram ofAuxiliary Feedwater System (CA).

[459] McGuire Document MCFD-2593-01.02 Rev. 8, Flow Diagram of Main Steam Supply to Auxiliary Equipment System (SA) Turbine Exhaust System (FE).

[460] McGuire Document MCCD-1703-07.06 Rev. 13, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 1EMXB2.

[461] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-07.09 Rev. 14, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 2EMXB2.

[462] McGuire Document MCCD-2703-07.02 Rev. 15, One Line Diagram 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center 2EMXH and 120V Power Panel Board EXB.

[463] Duke Energy Carolina, LLC (E. Kapopoulos) Letter (MNS-16-075, CNS-16-066) to NRC, "Supplemental Information Regarding Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Screening and Prioritization Results - Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML16295A342, October 20, 2016.

.::~A 50.54(f) N!TF 2.1 Seis1?ic High Frequ~ncy 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

• ~ Confirmation for McGmre Nuclear Station Page 67 of 103 A. REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE COMPONENT EVALUATIONS

• A detailed example analysis of two components is provided within this section. This example is intended to illustrate each step of the high frequency analysis methodology given in Section 4 of Reference [4].

A.1 High Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the components per the methodology from Reference [4].

Sample.calculations for the high-frequency seismic demand of components 4AA(1EQBRL27AX) contained in control cabinet lDGLSA, located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 750', and JJ(S1A2X) contained in control cabinet lDGCPA, located in the Diesel Generator Building at elevation 736.5'. Reference [428] calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all the subject components.

A.1.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for McGuire Nuclear Station can be found in Section 3, Table 3-2.

• Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

Peak Acceleration of Horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Section 3, Table 3-2): SAHGMRS = 0.676g (at 35 Hz)

Compute the distance between the subject floor elevation and the building foundation elevation.

Per Attachment F of Reference [428], the foundation elevation for the Auxiliary Building (AB) is 712' and for Diesel Generator (DG) Building is 726'. Per Reference [429], components 4AA(lEQBRL27AX) and JJ(S1A2X) are mounted on panel lDGLSA and lDGCPA, respectively. The panel type and elevation for lDGLSA and lDGCPA is provided in Attachment D of Reference [428]; lDGLSA is located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) and lDGCPA is located in the Diesel Generator Building (DGB).

Foundation Elevation (Attachment F of Ref. [428]): ELfound = 712 ft Auxiliary Building

• ELfound = 726 ft Diesel Generator Building Component Floor Elevation: ELcomp = 750 ft 4AA(JEQBRL27AX)

ELcomp = 736.5 ft JJ(SJA2X)

SA 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

• 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

' Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 68 of I 03 Distance Between Component Floor and Foundation Elevation: hcomp = ELcomp - ELfound = 38.0 ft 4AA(l EQBRL27AX) (in AB) hcomp = ELcomp - ELfound = 10.5 ft JJ(SJA2X) (in DGB)

Per Reference [4], Figure 4-3, calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation:

Slope of Amplification Factor Line, Oft < hcomp < 40ft: 21 12

• -

• 0.0225 ~

m1i = 40ft-Oft = ft Intercept of Amplification Factor Line with Amplification Factor Axis:

Horizontal In-Structure Amplification Factor [4, pp. 4-11]: AFsH(hcomp) = (mh

• hcomp + b1i) if hcomp <= 40ft 2.1 otherwise AFsH(hcomp) = 2.055 4AA(JEQBRL27AX)

AFsH(hcomp) = 1.436 JJ(SJA2X)

Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject component. Per Attachment D of Reference [428], lDGLSA and lDGCPA are both control cabinets. Per Ref. [4], Section 4.4, the effective horizontal amplification of 4.5 (AFc) is applicable to Control Cabinets/Panels:

Type of Cabinet: cabl ="Control Cabinet for 4AA(JEQBRL27AX)"

(enter "MCC", "Switchgear",

"Control Cabinet", or "Rigid") cab2 ="Control Cabinet for JJ(SJA2X)"

Horizontal In-Cabinet Amplification Factor [4, pp. 4-13]: AFc.1i(cab) = 3.6 if cab= "MCC" 7.2 if cab= "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab= "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab= "Rigid" AFc.1i(cabl) = 4.5 AFc.1i(cab2) = 4.5

'. . *~.

/

I 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 69 of 103 Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the components:

Horizontal In-Cabinet Response Spectrum: ICRSc.h = AFsH

• AFc.h

• SAGMRS ICRSc.h =2.055*4.5*0.676=6.25g 4AA(J EQBRL27AX)

ICRSc.h =1.436*4.5*0.676=4.3 7g JJ(SIA2X)

A.1.2 Vertical Seismic Demand The vertical site-specific GMRS for McGuire Nuclear Station can be found in Section 3, Table 3-2.

Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

Peak Acceleration of Vertical GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Section 3, Table 3-2): SAvGMRS = 0.583g (at 40 Hz)

Use the distance between the component floor and foundation calculated in Section A.1.1 above to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor:

Distance Between Component Floor and Foundation Elevation (from Section A.1.1): hcomp = 38.0 ft 4AA(IEQBRL27AX) hcomp = 10.5 ft JJ(SJA2X)

Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation:

27 10 Slope of Amplification Factor Line: m = * - * - 0.017 2.

v 100/t-Oft - ft Intercept of Amplification Factor Line with Amplification Factor Axis: bv = 1.0.

Vertical In-Structure Amplification Factor: AF sv(hcomp) = mv

• hcomp + bv AFsv(hcomp) = 1.646 4AA(IEQBRL27AX)

AFsv(hcomp) = 1.179 JJ(SIA2X)

Per Reference [4] the vertical in-cabinet amplification factor is 4. 7 regardless of cabinet type:

Vertical In-Cabinet Amplification Factor: AFc.v =4.7

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 70 of 103 Multiply the peak vertical GMRS acceleration by the vertical in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the component:

Vertical In-Cabinet Response Spectrum (Ref. [4, pp. 4-12], Eq. 4-lb): ICRSc.v=AFsv

• AFc.v

• SAVoMRs ICRSc.v =1.646*4.7*0.583=4.51g 4AA(lEQBRL27AX)

ICRSc.v =1.179*4.7*0.583=3.23g JJ(SlA2X)

A.2 High Frequency Capacity A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of components 4AA(1EQBRL27AX) (contained in lDGLSA) and JJ(S1A2X) (contained in lDGCPA) is presented here.

A.2.1 Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a component can be determined from the EPRI High Frequency Testing Program or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) or other qualification reports.

A.2.1.1 4AA(lEQBRL27AX) Capacity The make and model for component 4AA(1EQBRL27AX) is ITE ITE-27H(211B0171D) per Table 9.1 of Reference [429] and was not tested as part of the high-frequency testing program.

The seismic capacity is 15.00g for 5% damping, based on low frequency GERS qualification data [426, pp. B-92].

A.2.1.2 JJ(SlA2X) Capacity The make and model for component JJ(S1A2X) is Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP per Table 9.1 of Reference [429] and was not tested as part of the high-frequency testing program. The electrical state of component JJ (S 1A2X) located in Panel 1DGCP A is non-operate (de-energized), with a normally-open contact configuration. The seismic capacity is 7.50g for 5% damping, based on low frequency GERS qualification data [426, pp. B-29].

GERS spectral acceleration for the components 4AA(1EQBRL27AX) and JJ(S1A2X) is used as the seismic test capacity. Therefore, there is no spectral acceleration increase and the effective spectral test capacity is equal to the seismic test capacity.

Effective Spectral Test Capacity (Ref. [4, pp. 4-16]): SAT= 15.0 g 4AA(JEQBRL27AX)

SAT=7.5g JJ(SlA2X)

SA.;

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50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I

, ( I Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 71 of 103 A.2.2 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor The seismic capacity for components 4AA(1EQBRL27AX) and JJ(S1A2X) was obtained from the GERS test program [426]. There is no clear indication provided in that program as to whether a specific relay was tested to test table limits or the lowest level without chatter.

Therefore, it is reasonable (conservative) that a 1.5 factor is considered for all components under GERS testing. Using Table 4-2 of Reference [4], the knockdown factors are chosen as:

Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor: FK = 1.50 GERS, Lowest Level without Chatter 4AA(IEQBRL27AX)

FK = 1.50 GERS, Lowest Level without Chatter JJ(SJA2X)

A.2.3 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not. Per Reference [4, pp. 4 4-18], relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bolted together in a row, mounted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.0. Relays mounted within cabinets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2 per Reference [4, pp. 4-18].

Single-Axis Correction Factor (Ref. [4, pp. 4 4-18]

and Attachment A of Ref. [428]): FMs = 1.0 4AA(JEQBRL27AX)

FMs = 1.0 JJ(SJA2X)

A.2.4 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration per Reference [4], Eq. 4-5:

Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration (Ref. [4], Eq. 4-5):

TRS = 10.00g 4AA(IEQBRL27AX)

TRS = 5.00g JJ(SJA2X)

A.2.5 Component Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for relays per Reference [4], Eq. 4-6:

(A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 4AA(1EQBRL27AX) and JJ(S 1A2X) is presented here. A table that calculates the high-

'~A 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

• • VM Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 72 of 103 frequency seismic margin for all the subject relays is contained in Attachment A of Reference

[428].)

Horizontal Seismic Margin TRS 1.60 > 1.0, OK 4AA(JEQBRL27AX)

(Ref. [4], Eq. 4-6): ICRSc.h 1.14 > 1.0, OK JJ(SJA2X)

Vertical Seismic Margin TRS 2.22 > 1.0, OK 4AA(JEQBRL27AX)

(Ref. [4], Eq. 4-6): ICRSc.v 1.55 > 1.0, OK JJ(SJA2X)

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 73 of 103 B. COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED FOR HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

.... Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. *=

~ Device ID Type System Manufacturer Model ID Type Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation Function (ft) Capacity Result Control Control Auxiliary McGuire I I NV24L(BB) Seal-In Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al IATC4A 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 2 1 NV25L(BA) Seal-In Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al IATC4A 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 3 I DJ(2TRC) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 4 I DK(2TRA) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 5 I DL(RVG3) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 6 I EK Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 7 1 EL Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 8 I EM Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cab_inet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 9 1 FJ(2TRB) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 10 I FL( ARR) Alarm Restraint Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Diesel Automatic Start Control Diesel 736+ McGuire II I GL(DASR) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 12 I GM(RVG2) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

13 I JJ(SIA2X) Struthers-Dunn 219DXBP IDGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 14 I JK(SRXI) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 74of103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

... Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. *=

i Device ID Type System Manufacturer Model ID Type Building Elev. Basis for Evaiuation Function (ft) Capacity Result Control Control Diesel 736+

15 I JL(SIAIX) 40% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPA GERS Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 16 I LN(ESX) Emergency Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 17 1 LO(SRX2) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 18 1 MA(lEQCSW7720) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A IDGCPA Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 19 1 MB(! EQCSW7730) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A IDGCPA Cap>Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+

20 1 MU(SSTA) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPA GERS Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

21 1 MV(SSTB) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

22 I MW(SSTC) 97% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 23 I DJ(2TRC) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 24 I DK(2TRA) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 25 I DL(RVG3) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 26 1 EK Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 27 1 EL Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 28 1 EM Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 29 1 FJ(2TRB) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 75 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

• =-

Component Enclosure Ffoor component Evaiuation No. ;;; :System '" Building Elev. Basis* for Evaluation

. Device ID Type Manufacturer* Model ID Type ' (ft)

Function capa~ify Resl!lt Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 30 I FL(ARR) Alarm Restraint Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Diesel Automatic Start Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 31 1 GL(DASR) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 32 1 GM(RVG2) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

33 1 JJ(SlA2X) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPB GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 34 I JK(SRXl) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+

35 1 JL(SIAIX) 40% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPB GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 36 I LN(ESX) Emergency Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 37 I LO(SRX2) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al IDGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 38 I MA(IEQCSW7750) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A IDGCPB Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 39 I MB(IEQCSW7760) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A IDGCPB Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+

40 I MU(SSTA) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPB GERS Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

41 I MV(SSTB) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPB GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

42 I MW(SSTC) 97% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP IDGCPB GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Blackout and/or LOCA Control Auxiliary McGuire 43 I 2AB(LRA4) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 44 1 2CA(RAI) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 76of103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• =

i Device ID l)pe Component System Function Manufacturer Model ID Enclosure Type Buildiiig Floor Ete

v.

(ft)

<;:oinponent Eyaiuatimi Basis for

. Capa~ity

• .Evaluation

~~suit Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 45 I 2CB(AAI) Auto-Advance Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 46 I 2DA(RA2) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 47 I 2EA(RA3) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 48 I 2FA(RA4) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 49 I 2HA(RA6) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 50 I 2HB(RA9) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 51 I 21A(RA7) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 52 I 2IB(RAIO) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 53 I 2JA(RA8) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 54 I 2JB(RAll) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Protective ITE-27H Control Auxiliary 55 I 4AA(IEQBRL27AX) Undervoltage Relay  !TE IDGLSA 750 GERS Cap>Dem Relay (211801710) Cabinet Building Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 56 I AA(LSA2) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 57 I AB(LSAI) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 58 I BD(IESGAXI) LOCARelay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Undervoltage Auxiliary Control Auxiliary McGuire 59 I CB(l27AX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I Page 77 of I 03 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

• =-

Component

Enclosure Floor Component Eval,uation No. System,' Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

.i Device ID . Type ManufaCturer Model ID Type Function (ft) C~pacity Result Control DG Breaker Closure Control Auxiliary McGuire 60 I CG(LSATX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Control Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 61 I DC(BOA) Blackout Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 62 I EC(LT2A) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 63 I FA(RGA) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 64 I GA(ST4A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-08-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 65 I GB(ST2A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-08-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 66 I GC(LSAT) Load Shed Timer TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 67 I HA(ST7A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 68 1 HB(ST6A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 69 I IA(STIOA) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 70 I IB(ST9A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-09-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 71 I IC(ST8A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 72 I JA(STIA) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 IDGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 73 I JB(STI IA) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 lDGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Blackout and/or LOCA Control Auxiliary McGuire 74 I 2AB(LRB4) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 78 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• =

i Device ID Type Component System Manufacturer Model ID Enclosure Type Building Floor Elev.

(ft)

Component Evaiuation Basis for Capacity Evaluation Res11lt Function Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 75 I 2CA(RBI) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 76 I 2CB(ABI) Auto-Advance Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 77 I 2DA(RB2) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 78 I 2EA(RB3) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Auxiliary McGuire Control 79 I 2FA(RB4) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB Cabinet 733 Cap>Dem Relay Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 80 I 2HA(RB6) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB Cabinet 733 Cap> Dem Relay Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 81 I 2HB(RB9) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB Cabinet 733 Cap> Dem Relay Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 82 1 2IA(RB7) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB Cabinet 733 Cap> Dem Relay Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 83 I 2IB(RBIO) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 84 I 2JA(RB8) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 85 I 2JB(RBI I) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Protective ITE-27H Control Auxiliary 86 I 4AA( I EQBRL27BX) Undervoltage Relay  !TE IDGLSB 733 GERS Cap> Dem Relay (21IBOl71D) Cabinet Building Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 87 I AA(LSB2) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 88 I AB(LSBI) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 89 I BD(IESGBX!) LOCARelay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al !DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I Page 79 of I 03 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• a

i Device ID Type Component System Manufacturer* Model ID Enclosure Type Building Floor Elev.

Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation Function (ft) Capacity Result Control Undervoltage Auxiliary Control Auxiliary McGuire 90 I CB(I27BX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report Control DG Breaker Closure Control Auxiliary McGuire 91 I CG(LSBTX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30AI IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Control Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 92 I DC(BOB) Blackout Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 93 1 EC(LT2B) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 94 1 FA(RGB) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 95 I GA(ST4B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-08-0 IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 96 1 GB(ST2B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-08-0 IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 97 I GC(LSBT) Load Shed Timer TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 98 1 HA(ST7B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 lDGLSB 733 Cap>Dem

~elay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 99 1 HB(ST6B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 100 1 IA(STIOB) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 101 I IB(ST9B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-09-0 lDGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 102 1 IC(ST8B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 IDGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 103 1 JA(STIB) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 lDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 104 1 JB(STl 18) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 IDGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 80 of I 03 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

.... Component Enclosure Flooi: Comp'rinent Evaiuation No. *=

i Device ID Type System Manufacturer Model ID Type Building* Elev. Basis

for *Evaluation Function (ft) Capacity

• Result Control Over Voltage Time Control Auxiliary 736+ McGuire Mitigation 105 I K301 <Unknown> <Unknown> IEDGA Relay Delay Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Strategies Control Over Voltage Time Control Auxiliary 736+ McGuire Mitigation 106 I K301 <Unknown> <Unknown> IEDGB Relay Delay Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Strategies LV Load Center Feeder Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 107 I 52@1ELXA-04B Circuit ITE K-2000S IELXA 750 Cap>Dem Breilker gear Building Report Breaker LV Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 108 I 52@1ELXA-04D Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker ITE K-1600S IELXA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Report Breaker LV Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 109 1 52@1ELXA-05D Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker ITE K-1600S lELXA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Report Breaker LV Load Center Feeder Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 110 I 52@1ELXB-04B Circuit ITE K-2000S lELXB 733 Cap> Dem Breaker gear Building Report Breaker LV Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 111 I 52@1ELXB-05C Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker  !TE K-1600S lELXB 733 Cap> Dem gear Building Report Breaker LV Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 112 I 52@1ELXB-05D Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker  !TE K-1600S IELXB 733 Cap>Dem gear Building Report Breaker Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 113 I M/C@I EMXA5-02A Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U031-76 IEMXA5 MCC 750 GERS Contactor Building Strategies Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 114 1 M/C@l EMXA5-03D Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U031-76 IEMXA5 MCC 750 GERS Contactor Building Strategies Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 115 I M/C@1EMXB-03D Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U031-76 IEMXB MCC 733 GERS Contactor Building Strategies M/C@IEMXB2- Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 116 1 Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U03 l-76 1EMXB2 MCC 733 GERS F04B Contactor Building Strategies MV Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 117 I 52@1ETA12 Circuit Pump Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 !ETA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker MV Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 118 I 52@1ETA14 Circuit DO Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 !ETA 750 Cap>Dem gear Building Test Breaker

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 81of103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

..... Component. Enclosure Floor Compon.ent Evaiuation No. *=;;:; Device ID* Type.

System Manufacturer .

• Model ID TYP!!

Building Elev.

(ft)

Basis for . ~valuation FunctiOn ~apacity' R~sult MY Load Center Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 119 I 52@1ETA3 Circuit Transformer Primary ABB/JTE 5HK-250 IETA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 120 I 52S@IETA11 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 !ETA 750 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 121 I AE(52S/F)@IETAI Circuit ABB/I TE 5HK-250 IETA 750 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 122 I AE(52S/F)@I ETA2 Circuit ABB/JTE 5HK-250 !ETA 750 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 123 I AF(52S)@IETAI Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 IETA 750 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 124 I AF(52S)@IETA2 Circuit ABB/JTE 5HK-250 IETA 750 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 125 I PA(51V)@IETA14 Over Current Protective Westinghouse !ETA 750 SQURTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 126 I PB(51V)@IETA14 Over Current Protective Westinghouse !ETA 750 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Voltage-Controlled Protective . COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 127 I PC(51V)@IETA14 Over Current Protective Westinghouse IETA 750 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay MY Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 128 I 52@1ETB12 Circuit Pump Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 IETB 733 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker MY Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 129 I 52@1ETB14 Circuit DG Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 IETB 733 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker MY Load Center Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 130 I 52@1ETB3 Circuit Transformer Primary ABB/ITE 5HK-250 IETB 733 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 131 I 52S@IETB11 Circuit ABB/JTE 5HK-250 IETB 733 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 132 I AE( 52S/F)@l ETB 1 Circuit ABB/JTE 5HK-250 IETB 733 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker

SA 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 82 of I 03 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• a

i Device ID Type Component System Manufacturer Model ID Enclosure Type Building Floor Elev.

(ft)

Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation Function Capacity Result MV Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 133 1 AE(52S/F)@lETB2 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 lETB 733 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MV Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 134 1 AF(52S)@lET81 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 lETB 733 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MV Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 135 1 AF( 52S)@l ETB2 Circuit ABB/I TE 5HK-250 IETB 733 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 136 I PA(51V)@IETB14 Over Current Protective Westinghouse IETB 733 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relav Voltage-Control led Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 137 1 PB(51V)@lETB14 Over Current Protective Westinghouse IETB 733 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 138 I PC(51V)@lETB14 Over Current Protective Westinghouse lETB 733 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Control High DC Voltage Time Control Auxiliary McGuire Mitigation 139 I K307 <Unknown> <Unknown> EVCA 733 Relay Delay Relay Cabinet Building Report Strategies Control High DC Voltage Time Control Auxiliary McGuire Mitigation 140 I K307 <Unknown> <Unknown> EVCB 733 Relay Delay Relay Cabinet Building Report Strategies Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 141 1 RD(51VA) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMPlA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Rel av Voltage-Control led Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 142 I RE(51VB) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMPIA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Relay Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 143 1 RF(51VC) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMPlA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Relay Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 144 1 RD(51VA) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMPlB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Relay Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 145 I RE(51VB) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMPIB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Rel av Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 146 I RF(51VC) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMPIB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Rel av

SA 50.54(£) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 83 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

.... Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. *a System Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

i Manufacturer Model ID Type Device ID Type (ft)

Function Capacity Result Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 147 1 AB(! EQCSW7740) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A TB672 Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

148 I BA(SSTD) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB672 GERS Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

149 I BB(SSTE) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB672 GERS Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

150 I BC(SSTF) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB672 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 151 I CA(SSTDI) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB672 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 152 I CB(SSTEI) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB672 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 153 I AB( 1EQCSW7770) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A TB673 Cap>Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

154 I BA( SS TD) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB673 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

155 I BB(SSTE) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB673 GERS Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

156 1 BC(SSTF) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB673 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 157 1 CA(SSTDI) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB673 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 158 1 CB(SSTEI) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB673 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 159 2 NV24L(DA) Seal-In Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2ATC4A 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 160 2 NV25L(DAI) Seal-In Auxiliary Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2ATC4A 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 161 2 DJ(2TRC) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 84 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• =p ' .

Device ID. Type Component System Function*,

Manufacturer Model ID Enciosure Type Building Floor Elev.

(ft)

Component. Evaluation Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 162 2 DK(2TRA) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 163 2 DL(RVG3) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 164 2 EK Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 165 2 EL Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 166 2 EM Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 167 2 FJ(2TRB) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 168 2 FL( ARR) Alarm Restraint Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Diesel Automatic Start Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 169 2 GL(DASR) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 170 2 GM(RVG2) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

171 2 JJ(SlA2X) Struthers-Dunn 219DXBP 2DGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 172 2 JK(SRXl) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+

173 2 JL(SIAlX) 40% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 174 2 LN(ESX) Emergency Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 175 2 LO(SRX2) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPA Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 176 2 MA(2EQCSW7720) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I Page 85 of I 03 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

..... CoiIJPonent Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. *=*

"Device ID Type

• System Manufacturer Model ID Type Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation.

Function (ft) Capacity Result Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 177 2 MB(2EQCSW7730) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A 2DGCPA Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+

178 2 MU(SSTA) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

179 2 MV(SSTB) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

180 2 MW(SSTC) 97% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPA GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 181 2 DJ(2TRC) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 182 2 DK(2TRA) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 183 2 DL(RVG3) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 184 2 EK Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 185 2 EL Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 186 2 EM Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 187 2 FJ(2TRB) Diesel Start Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 188 2 FL(ARR) Alarm Restraint Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Diesel Automatic Start Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 189 2 GL(DASR) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704A 1 2DGCPB Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 190 2 GM(RVG2) Diesel Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

191 2 JJ(SIA2X) Struthers-Dunn 219DXBP 2DGCPB GERS Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 86 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

• =-

Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluatio.n

,No. System Building Elev. Basis for, Evaluation

~ Device ID Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function (ft) Capacity Result Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 192 2 JK(SRXI) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+

193 2 JL(SlAlX) 40% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPB GERS Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 194 2 LN(ESX) Emergency Stop Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 195 2 LO(SRX2) Lube Oil Low Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 196 2 MA(2EQCSW7750) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 197 2 MB(2EQCSW7760) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A 2DGCPB Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+

198 2 MU(SSTA) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPB GERS Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

199 2 MV(SSTB) 95% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPB GERS Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+

200 2 MW(SSTC) 97% Speed Relay Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP 2DGCPB GERS Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Blackout and/or LOCA Control Auxiliary McGuire 201 2 2AB(LRA4) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 202 2 2CA(RA1) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 203 2 2CB(AA1) Auto-Advance Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 204 2 2DA(RA2) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 205 2 2EA(RA3) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 206 2 2FA(RA4) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. I Page 87of103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

• =-

Component, Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation, No. ;;;;; System Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

, Device ID ,' 1:ype Manufacturer Model ID Type (ft)

Function Capacity Result Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 207 2 2HA(RA6) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 208 2 2HB(RA9) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 209 2 2IA(RA7) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 210 2 2IB(RA10) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 211 2 2JA(RA8) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 212 2 2JB(RA11) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Protective ITE-27H Control Auxiliary 213 2 4AA(2EQBRL27 AX) Undervoltage Relay  !TE 2DGLSA 750 GERS Cap> Dem Relay (211B0171D) Cabinet Building Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 214 2 AA(LSA2) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 215 2 AB(LSAI) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 216 2 BD(2ESGAX1) LOCARelay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Undervoltage Auxiliary Control Auxiliary McGuire 217 2 CB(227AX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report Control DG Breaker Closure Control Auxiliary McGuire 218 2 CG(LSATX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Control Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 219 2 DC(BOA) Blackout Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 220 2 EC(LT2A) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 221 2 FA(RGA) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 88of103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• =

i Device ID Type Component System Function Manufacturer Model ID Enclosure Type Building Floor Elev.

(ft)

Component Evaluation Basis for Capacity Evaluation Result Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 222 2 GA(ST4A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-08-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 223 2 GB(ST2A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-08-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 224 2 GC(LSAT) Load Shed Timer TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 225 2 HA(ST7A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 226 2 HB(ST6A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 227 2 IA(STIOA) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 228 2 IB(ST9A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-09-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 229 2 IC(ST8A) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 230 2 JA(STIA) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 231 2 JB(STI IA) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 2DGLSA 750 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Blackout and/or LOCA Control Auxiliary McGuire 232 2 2AB(LRB4) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 233 2 2CA(RBI) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 234 2 2CB(ABI) Auto-Advance Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 235 2 2DA(RB2) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 236 2 2EA(RB3) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report

SA 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 89of103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

• =;J-Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. System Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation Device ID Type Manufacturer Model ID Type (ft)

Function Capacity Result Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 237 2 2FA(RB4) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 238 2 2HA(RB6) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 239 2 2HB(RB9) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733- Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 240 2 21A(RB7) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 241 2 21B(RB10) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 242 2 2JA(RB8) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 243 2 2JB(RB1 l) Load Actuate Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Protective ITE-27H Control Auxiliary 244 2 4AA(2EQBRL27BX) Undervoltage Relay ITE 2DGLSB 733 GERS Cap> Dem Relay (21180171D) Cabinet Building Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 245 2 AA(LSB2) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 246 2 AB(LSBl) Load Shed Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 247 2 BD(2ESGBX1) LOCARelay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Undervoltage Auxiliary Control Auxiliary McGuire 248 2 CB(227BX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building Report Control DG Breaker Closure Control Auxiliary McGuire 249 2 CG(LSBTX) Cutler-Hammer D26MRD30Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Control Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 250 2 DC(BOB) Blackout Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704AI 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 251 2 EC(LT2B) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD704Al 2DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report

SA 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 90 of I 03 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• a

i Device ID Type Component System Manufacturer Model ID Enclosure Type Building Floor Elev.

Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation Function (ft) Capacity Result Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 252 2 FA(RGB) Generator Restart Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI 2DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 253 2 GA(ST4B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 8I2-1-6-08-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 254 2 GB(ST2B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-08-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 255 2 GC(LSBT) Load Shed Timer TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 256 2 HA(ST7B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 257 2 HB(ST6B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 258 2 IA(STIOB) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 259 2 IB(ST9B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-09-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 260 2 IC(ST8B) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-05-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 261 2 JA(STIB) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-01-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 262 2 JB(STI IB) Sequence Timer Relay TEMPO 812-1-6-07-0 2DGLSB 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Control Over Voltage Time Control Auxiliary 736+ McGuire Mitigation 263 2 K301 <Unknown> <Unknown> 2EDGA Relay Delay Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Strategies Control Over Voltage Time Control Auxiliary 736+ McGuire Mitigation 264 2 K301 <Unknown> <Unknown> 2EDGB Relay Delay Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Strategies LV Load Center Feeder Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 265 2 52@2ELXA-04B Circuit ITE K-2000S 2ELXA 750 Cap>Dem Breaker gear Building Report Breaker LV Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 266 2 52@2ELXA-04D Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker  !TE K-1600S 2ELXA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Report Breaker

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 91 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

..... Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. *=;:;, Device ID Type System Manufacturer Model ID Type Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation Function (ft) Capacity Res11lt LY Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 267 2 52@2ELXA-05D Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker  !TE K-1600S 2ELXA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Report Breaker LY Load Center Feeder Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 268 2 52@2ELXB-04B Circuit  !TE K-2000S 2ELXB 733 Cap> Dem Breaker gear Building Report Breaker LY Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 269 2 52@2ELXB-04C Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker  !TE K-1600S 2ELXB 733 Cap>Dem gear Building Report Breaker LY Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 270 2 52@2ELXB-05C Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker  !TE K-1600S 2ELXB 733 Cap>Dem gear Building Report Breaker LY Switch- Auxiliary McGuire 271 2 52@2ELXB-05D Circuit MCC Feeder Breaker  !TE K-1600S 2ELXB 733 Cap> Dem gear Building Report Breaker Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 272 2 M/C@2EMXA4-0 IC Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U03 l-76 2EMXA4 MCC 750 GERS Contactor Building Strategies Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 273 2 M/C@2EMXA4-01 D Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U03 l-76 2EMXA4 MCC 750 GERS Contactor Building Strategies Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 274 2 M/C@2EMXB-03D Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U031-76 2EMXB MCC 733 GERS Contactor Building Strategies M/C@2EMXB2- Valve Closing Auxiliary Mitigation 275 2 Contactor Joslyn Clark T30U03 l-76 2EMXB2 MCC 733 GERS F04B Contactor Building Strategies MY Load Center Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 276 2 52@2ETA14 Circuit Transformer Primary ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker Breaker MY Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 277 2 52@2ETA2 Circuit DO Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap>Dem gear Building Test Breaker MY Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 278 2 52@2ETA5 Circuit Pump Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 279 2 52S@2ETA6 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 280 2 AE(52S/F)@2ETAl5 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker

16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(+/-) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 92 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

• =-

Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. System Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

i Device ID Type Manufacturer Model ID Type Function (ft) Capacity Result MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 281 2 AE(52S/F)@2ETAl6 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 282 2 AF(52S)@2ETAI 5 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 283 2 AF(52S)@2ETAl6 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETA 750 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker Voltage-Control led Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 284 2 PA(5 I V)@2ETA2 Over Current Protective - Westinghouse 2ETA 750 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 285 2 PB(51V)@2ETA2 Over Current Protective Westinghouse 2ETA 750 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 286 2 PC( 51 V)@2ETA2 Over Current Protective Westinghouse 2ETA 750 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Rel av MY Load Center Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 287 2 52@2ETBl4 Circuit Transformer Primary ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap>Dem gear Building Test Breaker Breaker MY Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 288 2 52@2ETB2 Circuit DG Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap> Dem gear Building Test Breaker MV Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 289 2 52@2ETB5 Circuit Pump Circuit Breaker ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap>Dem gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 290 2 52S@2ETB6 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 291 2 AE(52S/F)@2ETB 15 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MY Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 292 2 AE( 52S/F)@2ETB 16 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MV Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 293 2 AF(52S)@2ETBl5 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap>Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker MV Circuit Breaker Switch- Auxiliary EPRIHF 294 2 AF(52S)@2ETB 16 Circuit ABB/ITE 5HK-250 2ETB 733 Cap> Dem Auxiliary Contact gear Building Test Breaker

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 93 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. -

• =

i Device ID Type Component System Manufacturer Model ID Enclosure Type Building Floor Elev.

(ft)

Component Evaluation Basis for Evaluation Function Capacity Result Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 295 2 PA( 51 V)@2ETB2 Over Current Protective Westinghouse 2ETB 733 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Voltage-Controlled Protective COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 296 2 PB(5 I V)@2ETB2 Over Current Protective Westinghouse 2ETB 733 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Voltage-Controlled Protective

• COV-8 Switch- Auxiliary Mitigation 297 2 PC(5 I V)@2ETB2 Over Current Protective Westinghouse 2ETB 733 SQ URTS Relay (1876244) gear Building Strategies Relay Control High DC Voltage Time Control Auxiliary McGuire Mitigation 298 2 K307 <Unknown> <Unknown> EVCC 733 Relay Delay Relay Cabinet Building Report Strategies Control High DC Voltage Time Control Auxiliary McGuire Mitigation 299 2 K307 <Unknown> <Unknown> EVCD 733 Relay Delay Relay Cabinet Building Report Strategies Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 300 2 RD(51VA) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMP2A 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Rel av Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 301 2 RE(51VB) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMP2A 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Relay Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 302 2 RF(5!VC) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMP2A 750 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Relay Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 303 2 RD(51VA) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI GMP2B 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Relay Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 304 2 RE(5!VB) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al GMP2B 733 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Relay Voltage-Controlled Control Control Auxiliary McGuire 305 2 RF(51VC) Over Current Auxiliary Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70AI GMP2B 733 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building Report Rel av Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 306 2 AB(2EQCSW7740) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A TB1672 Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

307 2 BA(SS TD) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TBl672 GERS Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

308 2 BB(SSTE) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TBl672 GERS Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06

SA 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 94 of 103 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation

.... Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. *=

i Device ID Type System Manufacturer Model ID Type Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation Function (ft) . Capacity Result Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

309 2 BC(SSTF) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB1672 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 310 2 CA(SSTDI) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB1672 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 311 2 CB(SSTEl) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB1672 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Process Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 312 2 AB(2EQCSW7770) Overspeed Switch Dynalco SST-2400A TB1673 Cap>Dem Switch Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

313 2 BA(SSTD) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB1673 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

314 2 BB(SSTE) Struthers-Dunn 219BBXP TB1673 GERS Cap>Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Speed Switch Auxiliary Control Diesel 736+

315 2 BC(SSTF) Strutl1ers-Dunn 219BBXP TB1673 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay Cabinet Building 06 Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 316 2 CA(SSTDl) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB1673 Cap> Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report Control Control Diesel 736+ McGuire 317 2 CB(SSTEl) Overspeed Trip Relay Cutler-Hammer D26MRD70Al TB1673 Cap>Dem Relay Cabinet Building 06 Report

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 95 of 103 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Evaluation Valve Flow Diagram Comment Needed Unit 1 1NC0004 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No 1NC0013 MCFD-1553-01.00 r4301 Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No 1NC0014 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No 1NC0015 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No 1NC0019 MCFD-1553-01.00 [4301 Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No 1NC0022 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Manual Valve Normally Closed No Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. Both 1NC0024 MCFD-1553-01.00 [430] sides of the Head Gasket would have to Fail and No there are no Relays Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Both sides of 1NC0025A MCFD-1553-01.00 [430] No the Head Gasket would have to Fail 1NC0026 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 1NC0037 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No 1NC0094 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No lNCOl 12 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No 1NC0228 MCFD-1553-01.00 r430] Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No lNCOOOl MCFD-1553-02.00 r43 ll Safety Relief Valve Yes 1NC0002 MCFD-1553-02.00 [4311 Safety Relief Valve Yes 1NC0003 MCFD-1553-02.00 r43 ll Safety Relief Valve Yes Packless Air Valve Failed Closed. Bypass has 3/8" 1NC0027C MCFD-1553-02.00 [431] Potential flow restrictors Packless Air Valve Failed Closed. Bypass has 3/8" 1NC0029C MCFD-1553-02.00 [431] Potential flow restrictors 1NC032B MCFD-1553-02.00 r4311 Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes 1NC034A MCFD-1553-02.00 r43 ll Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes 1NC036B MCFD-1553-02.00 r431 l Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes 1NC0272AC MCFD-1553-02.01 r432l Potential leak path only if 1NC0273AC fails to close Potential 1NC0273AC MCFD-1553-02.01 r432l Failed Closed Valve Yes 1NC0274B MCFD-1553-02.01 [4321 Potential leak path only if 1NC0275B fails to close Potential 1NC0275B MCFD-1553-02.01 r432l Failed Closed Valve Yes 1NV0031 MCFD-1554-01.00 r433l Simple Check Valve No Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 1NV0034A MCFD-1554-01.00 [433] No Simple Check Valve 1NV1020 1NV0038 MCFD-1554-01.00 r4331 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV0041 MCFD-1554-01.00 [433] Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV0047 MCFD-1554-01.00 r433l Simple Check Valve No Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 1NV0050B MCFD-1554-01.00 [433] No Simple Check Valve 1NV1021 1NV0054 MCFD-1554-01.00 [4331 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV0057 MCFD-1554-01.00 r433l Packless Check Valve Operator. No Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 1NV0810 MCFD-1554-01.00 [433] No 1NV0031 Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 1NV0811 MCFD-1554-01.00 [433] No 1NV0047 1NV1020 MCFD-1554-01.00 [4331 Simple Check Valve No 1NV1021 MCFD-1554-01.00 r433l Simple Check Valve No 1NV0063 MCFD-1554-01.01 r434l Simple Check Valve No

SA 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1

50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

' Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 96 of 103 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Evaluation Valve *Flow Diagram Comment Needed Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 1NV0066A MCFD-1554-01.01 [434] No Simple Check Valve 1NV1022 1NV0070 MCFD-1554-01.01 r434l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV0073 MCFD-1554-01.01 r434l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV0079 MCFD-1554-01.01 f434l Simple Check Valve No Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 1NV0082B MCFD-1554-01.01 [434] No Simple Check Valve 1NV1023 1NV0086 MCFD-1554-01.01 f434l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV0089 MCFD-1554-01.01 r434l Packless Check Valve Operator. No Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 1NV0812 MCFD-1554-01.01 [434] No 1NV0063 Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 1NV0813 MCFD-1554-01.01 [434] No 1NV0079 1NV1022 MCFD-1554-01.01 r434l Simple Check Valve No 1NV1023 MCFD-1554-01.01 f434l Simple Check Valve No lNVOOOlA MCFD-1554-01.02 r435l Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes Piston Valve Failed Closed. Potential only if 1NV0002A MCFD-1554-01.02 [435] Potential lNVOOlA fails to close 1NV0015 MCFD-1554-01.02 r435l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV0018 MCFD-1554-01.02 r435l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NV024B MCFD-1554-01.02 f435l Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes Piston Valve Failed Closed. Potential only if 1NV025B MCFD-1554-01.02 [435] Potential 1NC024B fails to close lNDOOlB MCFD-1561-01.00 f436l MOV Valve Normally Closed. Yes MOV Valve Normally Closed. Potential only if 1ND002AC MCFD-1561-01.00 [436] Potential 1NDOO1B fails to close 1NI0015 MCFD-1562-01.00 f437l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NI0017 MCFD-1562-01.00 f437l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NI0019 MCFD-1562-01.00 f437l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NI0021 MCFD-1562-01.00 r437l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 1NI0060 MCFD-1562-02.00 f438l Simple Check Valve No 1NI0071 MCFD-1562-02.00 f438l Simple Check Valve No 1NI0082 MCFD-1562-02.01 r439l Simple Check Valve No 1NI0094 MCFD-1562-02.01 f439l Simple Check Valve No 1NI0126 MCFD-1562-03.00 f440l Simple Check Valve No 1NI0134 MCFD-1562-03 .00 f4401 Simple Check Valve No 1NI0157 MCFD-1562-03 .00 f4401 Simple Check Valve No 1NI0160 MCFD-1562-03.00 f440l Simple Check Valve No 1NI0885 MCFD-1562-03.00 f440l Simple Check Valve - Internals removed No 1NI0887 MCFD-1562-03.00 f440l Simple Check Valve - Internals removed No MOV Valve Normally Open. Not considered a leak 1NM022AC MCFD-1572-01.00 [441] No Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream MOV Valve Normally Closed. Not considered a 1NM025AC MCFD-1572-01.00 [441] No leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream Unit 2 2NC0004 MCFD-2553-01.00 f442l Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No 2NC0013 MCFD-2553-01.00 r442l Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No 2NC0014 MCFD-2553-01.00 f442l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 97 of 103 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Evaluation Valve Flow Diagram Comment Needed 2NC0015 MCFD-2553-01.00 r442l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No 2NC0019 MCFD-2553-01.00 r442l Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No 2NC0022 MCFD-2553-01.00 r442l Manual Valve Normally Closed No Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. Both 2NC0024 MCFD-2553-01.00 [442] sides of the Head Gasket would have to Fail and No there are no Relays Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Both sides of 2NC0025A MCFD-2553-01.00 [442] the Head Gasket would have to Fail and there are no No Relays 2NC0026 MCFD-2553-01.00 f4421 Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed No 2NC0037 MCFD-2553-01.00 r442l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No 2NC0094 MCFD-2553-01.00 [4421 Packless Manual Valve Normally Closed. No 2NC0112 MCFD-2553-01.00 r442l Packless Manual Valve Normally Open. No Relays No 2NC0001 MCFD-2553-02.00 r443l Safety Relief Valve Yes 2NC0002 MCFD-2553-02.00 r443l Safety Relief Valve Yes 2NC0003 MCFD-2553-02.00 r443l Safety Relief Valve Yes Packless Air Valve Failed Closed. Bypass has 3/8" 2NC0027C MCFD-2553-02.00 [443] Potential flow restrictors Packless Air Valve Failed Closed. Bypass has 3/8" 2NC0029C MCFD-2553-02.00 [443] Potential flow restrictors 2NC032B MCFD-2553-02.00 r443l Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes 2NC034A MCFD-2553-02.00 r443l Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes 2NC036B MCFD-2553-02.00 r443l Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes 2NC0272AC MCFD-2553-02.01 r444l Potential leak path only if 1NC0273AC fails to close Potential 2NC0273AC MCFD-2553-02.01 r444l Failed Closed Valve Yes 2NC0274B MCFD-2553-02.01 r444l Potential leak path only if 1NC0275B fails to close Potential 2NC0275B MCFD-2553-02.01 r444l Failed Closed Valve Yes 2NV0031 MCFD-2554-01.00 r445l Simple Check Valve No Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 2NV0034A MCFD-2554-01.00 [445] No Simple Check Valve 1NV1020 2NV0038 MCFD-2554-01.00 f445l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV0041 MCFD-2554-01.00 [4451 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV0047 MCFD-2554-01.00 r445l Simple Check Valve No Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 2NV0050B MCFD-2554-01.00 [445] No Simple Check Valve 1NV1021 2NV0054 MCFD-2554-01.00 r445l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV0057 MCFD-2554-01.00 f4451 Packless Check Valve Operator. No Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 2NV0810 MCFD-2554-01.00 [445] No INV0031 Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 2NV081 l MCFD-2554-01.00 [445] No INV0047 2NV1020 MCFD-2554-01.00 r445l Simple Check Valve No 2NVI021 MCFD-2554-01.00 r445l Simple Check Valve No 2NV0063 MCFD-2554-01.01 r4461 Simple Check Valve No Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 2NV0066A MCFD-2554-01.01 [446] No Simple Check Valve INV1022 2NV0070 MCFD-2554-01.01 r4461 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV0073 MCFD-2554-01.01 r446l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV0079 MCFD-2554-01.01 r4461 Simple Check Valve No

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 98 of 103 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Evaluation Valve Flow Diagram Comment Needed Air Operated Valve Normally Open. Upstream of 2NV0082B MCFD-2554-01.01 [446] No Simple Check Valve 1NV1023 2NV0086 MCFD-2554-01.01 f4461 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV0089 MCFD-2554-01.01 f446l Packless Check Valve Operator. No Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 2NV0812 MCFD-2554-01.01 [446] No 1NV0063 Packless Check Valve Operator. Upstream of 2NV0813 MCFD-2554-01.01 [446] No 1NV0079 2NV1022 MCFD-2554-01.01 f4461 Simple Check Valve No 2NV1023 MCFD-2554-01.01 f446l Simple Check Valve No 2NV0001A MCFD-2554-01.02 f44 71 Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes Piston Valve Failed Closed. Potential only if 2NV0002A MCFD-2554-01.02 [44 7] Potential lNVOOlA fails to close 2NV0015 MCFD-2554-01.02 f4471 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV0018 MCFD-2554-01.02 f4471 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NV024B MCFD-2554-01.02 r44 71 Piston Valve Failed Closed. Yes Piston Valve Failed Closed. Potential only if 2NV025B MCFD-2554-01.02 [447] Potential 1NC024B fails to close 2ND001B MCFD-2561-01.00 r448l MOV Valve Normally Closed. Yes MOV Valve Normally Closed. Potential only if 2ND002AC MCFD-2561-01.00 [448] Potential 1NDOO lB fails to close 2NI0015 MCFD-2562-01.00 f449l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NI0017 MCFD-2562-01.00 f4491 Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NI0019 MCFD-2562-01.00 f449l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NI0021 MCFD-2562-01.00 r449l Packless Check Valve Operator. No 2NI0060 MCFD-2562-02.00 f4501 Simple Check Valve No 2NI0071 MCFD-2562-02.00 r450l Simple Check Valve No 2NI0082 MCFD-2562-02.01 r45ll Simple Check Valve No 2NI0094 MCFD-2562-02.01 [451 l Simple Check Valve No 2NI0126 MCFD-2562-03.00 f452l Simple Check Valve No 2NI0134 MCFD-2562-03.00 r452l Simple Check Valve No 2NI0157 MCFD-2562-03.00 f4521 Simple Check Valve No 2NI0160 MCFD-2562-03.00 r452l Simple Check Valve No 2NI0852 MCFD-2562-03.00 f4521 Simple Check Valve - Internals removed No 2NI0853 MCFD-2562-03.00 r452l Simple Check Valve - Internals removed No MOV Valve Normally Open. Not considered a leak 2NM022AC MCFD-2572-01.00 [453] No Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream MOV Valve Normally Closed. Not considered a 2NM025AC MCFD-2572-01.00 [453] No leak Path due to the 3/8" Orifice upstream

SA 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency

" Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 99 of 103 Table B-3: Core Cooling Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component I Description I Reference Unit 1 1RN0069A Nuclear Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-02.00 r290l 1RN0162B Nuclear Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-03.00 r29ll 1CA0086A Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve MCFD-1592-01.01 r454l 1CA0116B Nuclear Service Water Sunnly Valve MCFD-1592-01.01 r454l 1CA0036AB AFWPT Discharge Flow Control Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r455l 1CA0038B AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r4551 1CA0048AB AFWPT Discharge Flow Control Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r4551 1CA0050B AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r455l 1CA0052AB AFWPT Discharge Flow Control Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r455l 1CA0054AC AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r455l 1CA0064AB AFWPT Discharge Flow Control Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r455l 1CA0066AC AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-1592-01.00 r455l 1SA0003 AFWPT Trip & Throttle Valve MCFD-1593-01.02 r456l 1SA0004 AFWPT Governor Valve MCFD-1593-01.02 r4561 1SA0048ABC AFWPT Steam Sunnly Valve MCFD-1593-01.02 r4561 1SA0049AB AFWPT Steam Sunnlv Valve MCFD-1593-01.02 r4561 Unit2 2RN0069A Nuclear Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-02.00 r2941 2RN0162B Nuclear Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-03 .00 r295l 2CA0086A Nuclear Service Water Supply Valve MCFD-2592-01.0 I r4571 2CA0116B Nuclear Service Water Suoolv Valve MCFD-2592-01.0 l r4571 2CA0036AB AFWPT Discharge Flow Control Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2CA0038B AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2CA0048AB AFWPT Discharge Flow Control Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2CA0050B AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2CA0052AB AFWPT Discharge Flow Control Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2CA0054AC AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2CA0064AB AFWPT Flow Control Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2CA0066AC AFWPT Isolation Valve MCFD-2592-01.00 r458l 2SA0003 AFWPT Trio & Throttle Valve MCFD-2593-01.02 f459l 2SA0004 AFWPT Governor Valve MCFD-2593-01.02 r4591 2SA0048ABC AFWPT Steam Sunnlv Valve MCFD-2593-01.02 r459l 2SA0049AB AFWPT Steam Suooly Valve MCFD-2593-01.02 [459]

SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 100of103 Table B-4: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component I Description I Reference Common ORN0009B SNSWP Suooly B Shutoff Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r2881 ORNOOl lB Low Level Sunnlv B Shutoff Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r2881 ORNOOl2AC Low Level Supply A Shutoff Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r288l ORNOOl3A Low Level Suoolv A Shutoff Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r288l ORNOl47AC CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r288l ORNOl48AC CCW Discharge A Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r288l ORNOl52B SNSWP Discharge B Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r288l ORN0284B CCW Discharge B Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r2881 I

Unit 1 I IEDGA Diesel Generator Battery Charger IA MCCD-1703-06.09 r224l lEDGB Diesel Generator Battery Charger I B MCCD-1703-07.04 r225l 1ELXA-04B Feeder from lELXA-XFMR MCCD-1703-06.00 r398l 1ELXA-04D IEMXE MCC Feeder MCCD-1703-06.00 r3981 1ELXA-05D IEMXA MCC Feeder MCCD-1703-06.00 r3981 IELXA-XFMR 4160/600 Volt Transformer MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 1ELXB-04B Feeder from lELXB-XFMR MCCD-1703-07.00 r399l 1ELXB-05D lEMXF MCC Feeder MCCD-1703-07.00 r399l 1ELXB-05C lEMXB MCC Feeder MCCD-1703-07.00 r3991 IELXB-XFMR 4160/600 Volt Transformer MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l lEMXA-FOlE EVCA Charger Control MCCD-1703-06.01 r213l IEMXA-F06C ICA86A Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.01 r213l 1EMXA-R09A IRN64A Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.01 r2131 1EMXA-R09B 1RN69A Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.01 r213l lEMXA-RllD 1RN43A Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.01 r213l IEMXB-02C lCAI 16B Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-07.01 r214l IEMXB-05F EVCB Charger Control MCCD-1703-07.01 r214l 1EMXB2-R02B I RN I 62B Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-07.06 r460l 1EMXB2-R03A 1RN63B Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-07 .06 r4601 l EMXB2-R04A Feeder from l EMXB Load Center MCCD-1703-07 .06 r4601 1EMXB2-R04B IRN41B Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-07.06 r460l IEMXE-FOIA lEDGA Battery Charger Feeder MCCD- 1703-06.09 r224 l lEMXE-FOlC DG IA Crankcase Vacuum Blower Motor Control MCCD- 1703-06.09 r224l 1EMXE-F03C DG IA Jacket/Intercooler Water Pump Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.09 r224l lEMXE-ROID DSFlA DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.09 r224l lEMXE-ROlE 1RN70A Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.09 r224l 1EMXE-R02B DG I A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.09 r224l 1EMXE-R02E DSFIC DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-1703-06.09 r224 l 1EMXE-R03D IDGIA Panelboard Feeder MCCD-1703-06.09 r224l IEMXF-FOIA lEDGB Battery Charger Feeder MCCD-1703-07.04 r225l lEMXF-FOIC DG I B Crankcase Vacuum Blower Motor Control MCCD-1703-07.04 [2251 IEMXF-F03C DG I B Jacket/Intercooler Water Pump Motor Control MCCD-1703-07 .04 r225l lEMXF-ROID DSFIB DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-1703-07 .04 r225l lEMXF-ROIE IRNI 71B Valve Motor Control MCCD-1703-07 .04 r225l IEMXF-R02B DG IB Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor Control MCCD-1703-07.04 r225l 1EMXF-R02E DSFID DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-1703-07 .04 r225l 1EMXF-R03D IDG 1B Panelboard Feeder MCCD-1703-07 .04 r225l lEQAGEOOOl Diesel Generator I A MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 1EQAGE0002 Diesel Generator I B MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l

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50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 101 of 103 Table B-4: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Description Reference 1ETA03 4I60/600 Volt Transformer lELXA Feeder MCCD-I 702-02.00 r396l 1ETA12 Nuclear Service Pump IA Motor Feeder MCCD-I 702-02.00 f3961 1ETA14 Feeder from Diesel Generator lA MCCD- I 702-02.00 [396]

1ETB03 4I60/600 Volt Transformer lELXB Feeder MCCD-1702-02.00 [3961 1ETB12 Nuclear Service Pump lB Motor Feeder MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 1ETB14 Feeder from Diesel Generator lA MCCD-1702-02.00 f396l lEVIA Inverter lA . Mc-1105-o 1.00 r2111 lEVIB Inverter lB Mc-1105-o 1.00 r2111 lEVIC Inverter lC Mc-1105-01.00 r2111 lEVID Inverter ID MC-1705-0 l.00 [217]

1FDPU0044 Fuel Oil Booster Pump lA MCFD-1609-03 .00 r256l 1FDPU0045 Fuel Oil Booster Pump 1B MCFD-1609-03.01 [2571 IFDPU0054 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump lA MCFD-1609-03 .00 r256l 1FDPU0055 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump I B MCFD-1609-03.0I r257l 1KDPU0009J Diesel Generator Jacket Water Pump lA MCFD-1609-01.00 r274l 1KDPU0009I Diesel Generator Intercooler Water Pump lA MCFD-1609-01.00 r274l IKDPUOOlOJ Diesel Generator Jacket Water Pump lB MCFD-1609-01.01 r275l lKDPUOOlOI Diesel Generator Intercooler Water Pump IB MCFD-1609-01.0I r275l lRNOOOI Low Level Intake Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r2ss1 1RN0016A RN Channel IA Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.01 r289l 1RN0018B RN Channel 1B Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.0I r289l 1RN0041B Non-Essential Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-I574-0l.OI r289l 1RN0043A Non-Essential Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.0I r289l 1RN0063B Non-Essential Return Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r2ss1 1RN0064A Non-Essential Return Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-0 I .oo r2ss1 1RN0070A lA Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-02.00 r290l IRN0073A IA Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Control Valve MCFD-I 574-02.00 r290l IRN0171B IB Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Suooly Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-03.00 r29ll 1RN0174B IB Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Control Valve MCFD-I574-03.00 r291l IRN0296A Essential Header IA Return Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-01.00 r288l 1RN0297B Essential Header lB Return Isolation Valve MCFD-1574-0I.oo r2ss1 IRNPU0003 Nuclear Service Water Pump IA MCCD- I 702-02.00 r3961 1RNPU0004 Nuclear Service Water Pump lB MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 1VDAH0008 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-lA MC-1579-01.00 r362l 1VDAH0003 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-lB MC-1579-01.00 f362l IVDAH0006 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-IC MC-1579-01.00 r362l lVDAHOOOl Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-lD MC-I579-0l.OO f362l IZDBW0080 Diesel Generator Crankcase Vacuum Blower IA MCFD-1609-06.00 f390l 1ZDBW0081 Diesel Generator Crankcase Vacuum Blower lB MCFD-I 609-06.00 f390l DGR-RAID-IA Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper lA MC-1579-01.00 r362l DGR-RAID-lB Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper 1B MC-1579-01.00 f362l DGR-RAID-lC Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper IC MC-I579-0l.00 r362l DGR-RAID-lD Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper ID MC-I 579-0 I .00 r362l EVCA Battery Charger A MCCD-1703-06.01 r213 l EVCB Battery Charger B MCCD-1703-07.01 r214l Unit 2 2EDGA Diesel Generator Battery Charger 2A MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EDGB Diesel Generator Battery Char.ger 2B MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2ELXA-04B Feeder from 2ELXA-XFMR MCCD-2703-06.00 r400l

' 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station Page 102of103 Table B-4: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Description Reference 2ELXA-04D 2EMXE MCC Feeder MCCD-2703-06.00 f400l 2ELXA-05D 2EMXA MCC Feeder MCCD-2703-06.00 r400l 2ELXA-XFMR 4160/600 Volt Transformer MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 2ELXB-04B Feeder from 2ELXB-XFMR MCCD-2703-07.00 r40ll 2ELXB-04C 2EMXH MCC Feeder MCCD-2703-07.00 r40ll 2ELXB-05C 2EMXB MCC Feeder MCCD-2703-07.00 r40ll 2ELXB-05D 2EMXF MCC Feeder MCCD-2703-07 .00 [40 l l 2ELXB-XFMR 4160/600 Volt Transformer MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 2EMXA-F02E EVCC Charger Control MCCD-2703-06.01 [215]

2EMXA-F06C 2CA86A Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.01 r2 l 5l 2EMXA-R09A 2RN64A Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.01 r2 l 5l 2EMXA-R09B 2RN69A Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.01 r215l 2EMXA-Rl 1D 2RN43A Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.01 r215l 2EMXB-02C 2CA116B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.01 r216l 2EMXB-06E EVCD Charger Control MCCD-2703-07.01 [2161 2EMXB2-R02B 2RN162B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.09 r46ll 2EMXB2-R03A 2RN63B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.09 r461 l 2EMXB2-R04A Feeder from2EMXB Load Center MCCD-2703-07.09 r461 l 2EMXB2-R04B 2RN41B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.09 r461l 2EMXE-F01A 2EDGA Battery Charger Feeder MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EMXE-F01C DG2A Crankcase Vacuum Blower Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EMXE-F03C DG2A Jacket/Intercooler Water Pump Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EMXE-R01D DSF2C DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EMXE-R01E 2RN70A Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EMXE-R02B DG2A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.06 [2261 2EMXE-R02E DSF2A DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EMXE-R03D 2DG2A Panelboard Feeder MCCD-2703-06.06 r226l 2EMXF-F01A 2EDGB Battery Charger Feeder MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2EMXF-F01C DG2B Crankcase Vacuum Blower Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2EMXF-F03C DG2B Jacket/Intercooler Water Pump Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2EMXF-R01D DSF2D DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2EMXF-R01E 2RN171B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2EMXF-R02B DG2B Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2EMXF-R02E DSF2B DG Building Ventilation Fan Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.05 r227l 2EMXF-R03D 2DG2B Panelboard Feeder MCCD-2703-07.05 r2271 2EMXH-F2D ORNl lB Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.02 r462l 2EMXH-F2C ORN9B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.02 r462l 2EMXH-F3D ORN152B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.02 r462l 2EMXH-F3C ORN284B Valve Motor Control MCCD-2703-07.02 r462l 2EQAGE0001 Diesel Generator 2A MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 2EQAGE0002 Diesel Generator 2B MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 2ETA02 Feeder from Diesel Generator 2A MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 2ETA05 Nuclear Service Pump 2A Motor Feeder MCCD-1702-02.00 r3961 2ETA14 4160/600 Volt Transformer 2ELXA Feeder MCCD-1702-02.00 r3961 2ETB02 Feeder from Diesel Generator 2A MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 2ETB05 Nuclear Service Pump 2B Motor Feeder MCCD-1702-02.00 f396l 2ETB14 4160/600 Volt Transformer 2ELXB Feeder MCCD-1702-02.00 r396l 2EVIA Inverter 2A MC-2705-01.00 r232l 2EVIB Inverter 28 MC-2705-01.00 r232l

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50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation for McGuire Nuclear Station 16C4435-RPT-002 Rev. 1 Page 103of103 Table B-4: Electrical Power Equipment Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Description Reference 2EVIC Inverter 2C MC-2705-01.00 r232]

2EVID Inverter 2D MC-2705-01.00 f232]

2FDPU0044 Fuel Oil Booster Pump 2A MCFD-2609-03.00 r258l 2FDPU0045 Fuel Oil Booster Pump 2B MCFD-2609-03.01 [2591 2FDPU0054 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2A MCFD-2609-03.00 r258l 2FDPU0055 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2B MCFD-2609-03.01 r259l 2KDPU0009J Diesel Generator Jacket Water Pump 2A MCFD-2609-01.00 r276l 2KDPU0009I Diesel Generator Intercooler Water Pump 2A MCFD-2609-01.00 r276l 2KDPU0010J Diesel Generator Jacket Water Pump 2B MCFD-2609-01.01 [277]

2KDPU0010I Diesel Generator Intercooler Water Pump 2B MCFD-2609-01.01 f277l 2RN0016A RN Channel 2A Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-01.01 [2931 2RN0018B RN Channel 2B Suooly Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-01.01 [293]

2RN0041B Non-Essential Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-01.01 [2931 2RN0043A Non-Essential Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-01.01 f293l 2RN0063B Non-Essential Return Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-04.00 [2961 2RN0064A Non-Essential Return Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-04.00 f296l 2RN0070A 2A Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Supply Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-02.00 [2941 2RN0073A 2A Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Control Valve MCFD-2574-02.00 f294l 2RN0171B 2B Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Suooly Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-03.00 [2951 2RN0174B 2B Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Control Valve MCFD-2574-03.00 f295l 2RN0296A Essential Header 2A Return Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-01.01 [2931 2RN0297B Essential Header 2B Return Isolation Valve MCFD-2574-03.00 f295l 2RNPU0003 Nuclear Service Water Pump 2A MCCD-1702-02.00 [3961 2RNPU0004 Nuclear Service Water Pump 2B MCCD-1702-02.00 [3961 2VDAH0008 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-2A MC-2579-01.00 [3631 2VDAH0003 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-2B MC-2579-01.00 [3631 2VDAH0006 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-2C MC-2579-01.00 [3631 2VDAH0001 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Fan DSF-2D MC-2579-01.00 [3631 2ZDBW0080 Diesel Generator Crankcase Vacuum Blower 2A MCFD-2609-06.00 [391 l 2ZDBW008l Diesel Generator Crankcase Vacuum Blower 2B MCFD-2609-06.00 [391 l DGR-RAID-2A Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper 2A MC-2579-01.00 f363l DGR-RAID-2B Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper 2B MC-2579-01.00 r363l DGR-RAID-2C Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper 2C MC-2579-01.00 [3631 DGR-RAID-2D Diesel Generator Building Relief Air Damper 2D MC-2579-01.00 [3631 EVCC Battery Charger C MCCD-2703-06.01 [2151 EVCD Battery Charger D MCCD-2703-07.01 [2161