IR 05000397/2020002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000397/2020002

ML20210M406
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	07/29/2020
From:	Jeffrey Josey NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To:	Sawatzke B Energy Northwest
References
IR 2020002
Preceding documents:	ML20028E151 (27 January 2020)
Download: ML20210M406 (22)

Text

July 29, 2020

SUBJECT:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2020002

Dear Mr. Sawatzke:

On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Columbia Generating Station. On July 9, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. W. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer/Vice President Nuclear Generation, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Jeffrey Digitally signed by Jeffrey Josey Josey Date: 2020.07.29 08:42:04 -05'00'

Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000397 License No. NPF-21

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000397 License Number: NPF-21 Report Number: 05000397/2020002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0011 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station Location: Richland, WA Inspection Dates: April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020 Inspectors: G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector L. Merker, Acting Senior Resident Inspector C. Roettgen, Senior Resident Inspector J. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Columbia Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedure in 2008 Leads to Recirculation Pump Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71152 FIN 05000397/2020002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, finding for the licensees failure to follow plant Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, that describes the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence. Specifically, in 2008, the licensee had a corrective action to perform a causal evaluation to understand the obsolescence of the adjustable speed drive (ASD) system gate turn-off thyristors (GTOs), but did not have a follow-on corrective action to address the noted increase in failure rates of the ASD system GTOs. This resulted in several ASD channel failures since 2008, and a recirculation pump trip and reactor transient on February 14, 2020.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

The reactor unit began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 19, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 65 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On May 21, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 60 percent to recover an adjustable speed drive channel following maintenance and returned to 65 percent. The unit returned to rated thermal power on May 25, 2020. On May 30, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 65 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On June 1, 2020, the reactor unit returned to 85 percent and then down powered to 65 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On June 5, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 60 percent for control rod scram time testing and sequence exchange, and maintenance on circulating water valve 2C, and returned to 65 percent. On June 6, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 25 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On June 9, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 15 percent for the licensee to remove the main turbine generator from the grid and balance the turbine. On June 10, 2020, the main turbine generator was synchronized to the grid. On June 11, 2020, the reactor unit returned to 40 percent. On June 12, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 25 percent due to high vibrations on the turbine. On June 13, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 15 percent to remove the main turbine generator from the grid and to rebalance the turbine. On June 14, 2020, the main turbine generator was synchronized to the grid and the reactor unit returned to 40 percent. On June 15, 2020, the reactor unit down powered to 25 percent to close an open bleed steam valve and returned to 65 percent. On June 21, 2020, the reactor unit returned to 85 percent. The unit returned to rated thermal power on June 22, 2020. On June 26, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 40 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration, where it remained for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal high temperatures for the following systems on June 26, 2020:

• standby service water system A

• standby service water system B

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding for the standby service water systems A and B pump rooms on May 28, 2020.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) low pressure core spray system following annual maintenance on May 7, 2020

(2) standby gas treatment system A following annual maintenance on May 21, 2020

(3) residual heat removal system C on June 19, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Area RC-19/2, vital island corridor, on April 17, 2020

(2) Fire Area RC-2/1, cable spreading room, on April 23, 2020

(3) Fire Area R-8/1, low pressure core spray system pump room, on May 5, 2020

(4) Fire Areas RC-14/1 and RC-8/2, division 1 and 2 switchgear rooms, on June 5, 2020

(5) Fire Areas RC-5/1 and RC-6/2, division 1 battery and security equipment room and division 2 battery room, on June 5, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the division 1 and 2 electrical switchgear rooms on June 16, 2020.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a reactor downpower for economic dispatch, May 19-20, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification training drill (Crew C) on June 1, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of low pressure core spray system maintenance to ensure the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remained capable of performing their intended function on May 5, 2020.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) yellow risk for reactor core isolation cooling planned maintenance on April 13, 2020

(2) high risk for recirculation pump A relay maintenance on breaker S5 on April 15, 2020

(3) high risk for adjustable speed drive system maintenance on May 21, 2020

(4) yellow risk for diesel generator 3 pre-start checks (bar over) and load testing on May 29, 2020

(5) emergent, high risk work on circulating water valve 2C during economic dispatch and station yellow risk on June 5, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with operability determinations and functionality assessments of degraded bolting on electrical manholes E-MH-E10, E-MH-E11, and E-MH-E15 on May 14, 2020.

71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from April 13-17, 2020:

(1) 5059EVAL-17-0003, Approve Use of GOTHIC for Analysis of Certain High Energy Line Breaks, Revision 0

(2) 5059EVAL-18-0001, Changing Methodology to GOTHIC 8.1 for RWCU HELB Analysis, Revision 0

(3) 5059SCREEN-16-0012, Main Steam Line Flow Restrictor Chocked Flow, Revision 0

(4) 5059SCREEN-17-0034, RWCU-MO-1 & 4 Modifications (Actuator Replacements),

Revision 0

(5) 5059SCREEN-19-0106, RHR-MO-4A Gear Change for RHR-V-4A, Revision 0

(6) 5059SCREEN-19-0110, Major Leak from Turbine Building Oil System, Revision 0

(7) 5059SCREEN-19-0118, ABN-FLOODING, Revision 0

(8) 5059SCREEN-19-0130, EC 16816, Replace the Valve Wedge and Change the Gear Ratio in RHR-V-8, Revision 0

(9) 5059SCREEN-19-0135, LDCN-19-045, Revision 0

(10) 5059SCREEN-17-0145, Backseat HV-V-31B by its Electrical Motor, Revision 0

(11) 5059SCREEN-17-0146, Installation of Protective Plate on Reactor Building ECCS Room Water Tight Doors, Revision 0

(12) 5059SCREEN-17-0150, PPM ABN-FAZ Procedure Revision to Make the Procedure More Efficient, Revision 0

(13) 5059SCREEN-17-0167, Temporary Modification EC 16899 Will Use Nitrogen to Maintain BS-RV-26A in the closed position, Revision 0

(14) 5059SCREEN-18-0030, Keep Mechanical Gag on AR-AO-1 to Permanently Keep AR-V-1 Open, Revision 0

(15) 5059SCREEN-19-0017, Add Sentence to FSAR Section 11.4.2.4 for the Radwaste Disposal System for Fuel Pool, Floor Drain, and Waste Collector Filter Resin, Revision 0

(16) 5059SCREEN-16-0076, Replaces Existing GE NGV 125 VDC Battery Ground Detection Relays E-RLY-4PG/B5, and -64PG/B6 With an ABB 27B Model. EC

===15414, Revision 0

(17) 5059SCREEN-16-0148, Replace Existing E-EF-IN4/ACIN With a New AC Filter, Revision 0

(18) 5059SCREEN-17-0161, Level 8 Setpoint Setdown Software Changes, Revision 0

(19) 5059SCREEN-18-0003, FSAR Revision For Use of GOTHIC in Safety Analysis (LDCN-18-002), Revision 0

(20) 5059SCREEN-18-0014, Replace ITE Safety Related E-CB-8A4A MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8A4A, Revision 0

(21) 5059SCREEN-18-0015, Replace ITE Augmented Quality E-CB-8C1C MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8C1C, Revision 0

(22) 5059SCREEN-18-0015, Replace ITE Augmented Quality E-CB-8C4A MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8C4A, Revision 0

(23) 5059SCREEN-18-0016, Replace ITE Augmented Quality E-CB-8C4A MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8C4A, Revision 0

(24) 5059SCREEN-19-0064, Install CCTV for the Main Transformers, Revision 0

(25) 5059SCREEN-19-0120, Replace Existing ITE Molded Case Circuit Breakers E-CB-8B2D, E-CB-2C1D, and WCH-CB-8E1E With Fused Disconnects, Revision 0

(26) Applicability Determination LS-19-0233, Procedure 5.6.1, SBO/ELAP, Revision 030, Revision 0

(27) Applicability Determination LS-20-0074, Procedure 5.6.2, Station Blackout (SBO)and Extended Loss of AC Power ELAP Attachments, Revision 015, Revision 0

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

=

(1) The inspectors evaluated the temporary modification of concrete block placement on manhole covers E-MH-E11 and E-MH-E15 on April 30, 2020.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) eight-hour report 54466, loss of seismic assessment instrumentation, on April 2, 2020

(2) replacement of fire pump 110 batteries, week of April 16, 2020

(3) reactor water cleanup system pump 3A maintenance on April 20, 2020

(4) low pressure core spray system annual maintenance on May 6, 2020

(5) standby gas treatment system A on May 20, 2020

(6) fire protection pump 2B on June 24, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) OSP-CRD-W101, control rod SCRAM accumulator verification, on April 15, 2020

(2) OSP-CRD-M101, SCRAM discharge volume vent and drain valve monthly operability, on April 16, 2020

(3) ESP-BAT-W101, weekly battery test, on April 14, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) OSP-CCH/IST-M702, control room emergency chiller system B operability, on April 29,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) ===

(1) (April 1, 2019-April 30, 2020)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensee's ability to identify when prohibited items are brought onsite, evaluate each occurrence, and implement corrective actions; and documented one observation on June 30, 2020.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) evaluation of the February 14, 2020, trip of recirculation pump 1A on June 3, 2020

(2) evaluation of the January 15, 2020, loss of adjustable speed drive channel 1A/2 on June 15, 2020

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Reporting (IP Section 03.05)

(1) The inspectors evaluated a June 2, 2020, inadvertent emergency response organization callout and the licensee's response on June 4,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedure in 2008 Leads to Recirculation Pump Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71152 FIN 05000397/2020002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, finding for the licensees failure to follow plant Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, that describes the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence. Specifically, in 2008, the licensee had a corrective action to perform a causal evaluation to understand the obsolescence of the adjustable speed drive (ASD) system gate turn-off thyristors (GTOs), but did not have a follow-on corrective action to address the noted increase in failure rates of the ASD system GTOs. This resulted in several ASD channel failures since 2008 and a recirculation pump trip and reactor transient on February 14, 2020.

Description:

On February 14, 2020, recirculation pump 1A tripped off when both ASD channels 1A/1 and 1A/2 tripped due to internal faults. The reactor recirculation system is designed to provide forced coolant flow through the reactor core and consists of two loops, each with a recirculation pump. The ASD system controls recirculation pump flow by varying the frequency of the electrical power supplied to the pump motor. Each recirculation pump is controlled by two ASD channels. Both channels are required for the recirculation pump to operate at full speed. A recirculation pump can be operated with only one ASD channel in service at a reduced speed.

In 2008, the licensee initiated action request (AR) 186054 that identified the ASD system GTOs failure rate was increasing. The AR also stated the cards were greater than 12 years old and may be nearing end of life. The licensee performed a causal evaluation that restated the GTO failure rate was increasing after 10-12 years of service. However, no corrective action assignment was initiated to address the increased failure rate of the GTO cards. This AR was cross referenced to engineering technical evaluation (AR-EVAL) 178017 that documented the obsolescence of the ASD system.

Engineering technical evaluation AR-EVAL 178017 had three assignments. The first assignment was to find a replacement part for the obsolete GTO; this assignment was closed out stating a replacement did not exist and that the ASD system would need to be replaced. The second assignment was to evaluate a new ASD system since the GTOs were obsolete with no repair or replacement available; this assignment was closed out with no action recommended as the licensee had enough spare GTOs available to last approximately 10 years. The third assignment was to review the evaluation and either take appropriate action or recommend AR closure; this assignment recommended the AR to be closed since the licensee had spare parts available for 10 years. Again, no corrective action assignment was initiated to address the increased failure rate of the GTO cards. The ASD obsolescence issue was then put on the licensee's 2009 long-range plan. In 2014, the ASD obsolescence issue was removed from the long-range plan and AR-EVAL 316044 was initiated to track resolution of the obsolescence of the ASD system.

The inspectors noted the purpose of Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, is to describe the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence. Step 4.11.1j states, in part, that corrective actions that require preliminary evaluation to understand the problem should have a separate corrective action for the preliminary activity and a follow on corrective action for implementation. In 2008, the licensee performed a causal evaluation that stated the GTO failure rate was increasing after 10-12 years of service. However, no corrective action assignment was initiated to address the increased failure rate of the GTO cards. This resulted in the GTO cards being replaced with spare parts after experiencing failure. The most recent GTO card failure resulted in the February 14, 2020, recirculation pump trip and reactor transient.

Corrective Actions: The licensee's corrective actions included replacing one GTO card in the 1A/1 channel and six GTO cards and a power supply in the 1A/2 channel, restoring both channels to service, and restarting the recirculation pump. The licensee also entered the issue into the corrective action program and completed an event investigation.

Corrective Action References: Action Request 404225

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to follow plant Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, that describes the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, in 2008, the licensee had a corrective action to perform a causal evaluation to understand the obsolescence of the ASD system GTOs, but did not have a follow on corrective action to address the noted increase in failure rates. This resulted in several ASD channel failures since 2008 and a recirculation pump trip and reactor transient on February 14, 2020.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using the questions in Exhibit 1, initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Observation: Increase in Prohibited Items Identified 71152 The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions related to a potential trend increase of prohibited items identified at the security checkpoint. From January 1, 2020, to June 30, 2020, the licensee initiated 12 action requests (ARs) related to prohibited items declared at the security checkpoint. The inspectors noted that 8 of the ARs were initiated in the second quarter, between April 1, 2020, to June 30, 2020, during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic when less individuals than normal accessed the site. Conversely, from January 1, 2019, to June 30, 2019, the licensee initiated 9 similar ARs with 6 initiated in the second quarter, between April 1, 2019, to June 30, 2019, during a quarter that included Refueling Outage R24 when more individuals than normal accessed the site. The inspectors noted that the overwhelming majority of individuals with prohibited items in their possession were either contractors or delivery personnel and not licensee employees. The inspectors verified no prohibited items entered the protected area.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, evaluations, and corrective actions related to these ARs. In each instance, the licensee adequately followed site procedures to identify, evaluate, and correct the issue. The inspectors identified that the licensee was aware of the increasing trend of prohibited items identified at the security checkpoint and took corrective actions, but had not initiated an AR to document the trend. The inspectors also noted that the licensee's use of trend codes was inconsistently applied to ARs documenting prohibited items brought onsite. The licensee initiated AR 408442 to document the concern.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 16, 2020, the inspectors presented the Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inspection exit meeting inspection results to Mr. W. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer/Vice President Nuclear Generation, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On July 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. W. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer/Vice President Nuclear Generation, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Calculations CE-02-13-18 Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) Analysis for Columbia 000

Generating Station

CE-02-13-22 Effects of Local Intense Probable Maximum Precipitation 000

Analysis for Columbia Generating Station

ME-02-92-41 Calculation for Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis 007

ME-02-92-43 Room Temperature Calculation for DG Building, Reactor 013

Building, Radwaste Building and Service Water

Corrective Action Action Requests 396990, 407275, 393438, 393813, 398976, 400018, 402976,

Documents (ARs) 403992, 406096, 406680, 406733, 406737, 406949, 407290

Engineering 18010 Provide Power to E-TR-M2 Cooler Group 2 Cooler 2 Oil 001

Changes Pump

Miscellaneous GO2-16-143 Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50-397 Flooding 10/06/2016

Hazard Reevaluation Report, Response to NRC Request for

Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding

Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-term Task Force Review of

Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

Procedures 4.840.A5; 840.A5 Annunciator Panel Alarms 028

ABN-FLOODING Flooding 022

SOP- Cold Weather Operations 034

COLDWEATHER-

OPS

SOP- Hot Weather Operations 006

HOTWEATHER-

OPS

SOP- Warm Weather Operations 016

WARMWEATHER-

OPS

Work Orders 02126293, 02126294, 02129776, 29154662, 29154977

71111.04 Corrective Action Action Requests 402800, 396502, 407980, 407981

Documents (ARs)

Drawings M520 Flow Diagram HPCS and LPCS Systems 105

M521-3 Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal Loop C 012

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

M544 Flow Diagram HVAC-Standby Gas Treatment 076

Miscellaneous Instrument Master Data Sheet for SGT-FR-2A2 009

Instrument Master Data Sheet for SGT-FT-1A2 009

Procedures 1.3.29 Locked Valve Checklist 085

ABN-SGT- Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal High 006

TEMP/RAD Temperature/Radiation

SOP-LPCS-LU LPCS Valve and Breaker Lineup 003

SOP-LPCS-STBY Placing LPCS in Standby Status 002

SOP-RHR-LU RHR System Valve and Breaker Lineup 008

SOP-RHR-STBY Placing RHR in Standby Status 005

SOP-SGT-LU Standby Gas Treatment System Lineup 000

SOP-SGT-STBY Placing Standby Gas Treatment In Standby Status 002

Work Orders 29153347

71111.05 Calculations FP-02-85-03 Combustible Loading Calculation 010

Corrective Action Action Requests 406072, 406195

Documents (ARs)

Miscellaneous BIP 20-0062 Transient Combustible Permit for Vital Island - General Area 04/08/2020

BIP 20-0160 Barrier Impairment Permit: Electrical Access Area, Door 04/29/2020

C218

BIP 20-0161 Barrier Impairment Permit: Electrical Access Area, Door 06/01/2020

C218

BIP 20-0178 Barrier Impairment Permit: Vital Island Door C216 04/27/2020

BIP 20-0244 Barrier Impairment Permit: Battery Room #1, Door C219 04/29/2020

BIP 20-0245 Barrier Impairment Permit: Battery Room #1, Door C219 06/01/2020

TCP 20-0014 Transient Combustible Permit: Cable Path TG501, TG471, 05/04/2020

RW467, RW487

TCP 20-0046 Transient Combustible Permit for Vital Island Div 1 Battery 04/07/2020,

Room C210, Inside Door 06/04/2020

TCP 20-0048 Transient Combustible Permit: Vital Island - General Area 05/26/2020

TCP 20-0053 Transient Combustible Permit for Vital Island - General Area 04/06/2020

TCP 20-0085 Transient Combustible Permit: RW 467 - In Front of Tool Crib 05/18/2020

General Area

Procedures 1.3.10C Control of Combustibles 021

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

1.3.57 Barrier Impairment 038

ABN-FIRE Fire 041

PFP-RB-422 Reactor 422 006

PFP-RW-467 Radwaste 467 005

PFP-RW-484-487 Radwaste 484-487 005

Work Orders 02115649, 02128947

71111.06 Calculations ME-02-02-23 PFSS Flooding Analysis - Radwaste Building 001

ME-02-03-04 Radwaste Building Flooding Analysis 001

ME-02-11-12 Concrete Floor Flood Barrier Analysis 000

Corrective Action Action Requests 398295, 400176, 400183, 403999, 404242, 407275

Documents (ARs)

Miscellaneous BIP 20-0124 Barrier Impairment Permit: R548 L7/8.3 at FPC Pump/HX 03/18/2020

Room

FPF 1.1-40 Fire Rated Penetration Seals 002

PSA-1-SM-0001 CGS PSA Internal Event Summary 008

PSA-2-FL-0002 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Model Notebook: Internal 003

Flooding Propagation, Screening, and Accident Scenario

Development Report

PSA-2-FL-0003 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Model Notebook: Internal 002

Flooding Initiating Events Frequency Development Report

Procedures 1.3.57 Barrier Impairment 038

15.4.6 Essential Fire Rated Penetration Seal and Essential Fire and 011

Flood Barrier Operability Inspection

4.FCP.3 FCP.3 Annunciator Panel Alarms 024

ABN-FLOODING Flooding 022

SOP- Reactor Building, Turbine Building, Radwaste Building and 017

DOOR/HATCH- Containment, Personnel, Equipment Access Area Doors, and

OPS Hatches

Work Orders 02138317, 02138318, 02138319, 02138320, 02138321

71111.11Q Corrective Action Action Requests 389186, 402277, 406797, 407009, 407012, 407013, 404679,

Documents (ARs) 407204

Miscellaneous Reactivity Control Plan Economic Dispatch to 65% CTP May 05/19/2020

20

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

LR002488 Columbia Generating Station Simulator Scenario 20-3 000

Evaluated Scenario

Procedures 3.3.1 REACTOR Scram 066

5.1.1 RPV Control 022

5.2.1 Primary Containment Control 028

ABN-CORE Unplanned Core Operating Conditions 017

ABN-POWER Unplanned Reactor Power Change 016

OI-07 Training Expectations 015

OI-09 Operations Standards and Expectations 077

SOP-CR- Control Rod Movement 003

MOVEMENT

SOP-FWH- Extraction Steam and Heater Vents/Drains System Shutdown 004

SHUTDOWN

SOP-RRC-FLOW- Reactor Power Change with RRC Flow Controllers - Quick 005

QC Card

TDI-06 Simulator Management 021

71111.12 Corrective Action Action Requests 390944, 404026, 406546

Documents (ARs)

Procedures 1.5.11 Maintenance Rule Program 016

OSP-LPCS/IST- LPCS System Operability Test 044

Q702

SYS-4-22 Maintenance Rule Program 014

Work Orders 02117856, 02118311, 02118312, 02118313, 02117856,

2123922, 02131741, 02131742, 02131745, 02153301,

2153302

71111.13 Corrective Action Action Requests 406705, 406799, 407060, 393083, 398408, 407136, 407139,

Documents (ARs) 407333, 407430, 407463, 407479, 407510, 407481

Drawings M507-1 Flow Diagram Circulating Water System Turbine Generator 178

BLDG & Yard

Miscellaneous High Risk Work Plan to Install Gag Device on CW-V-2C 000

High Risk Work Plan for Work Orders 02112977, 02158041, 05/19/2020

and 02161630

Procedures 1.3.76 Integrated Risk Management 060

1.3.76 Integrated Risk Management 059

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

1.3.83 Protected Equipment Program 031

1.3.86 Online Fire Risk Management 005

ESP-RLYS5-B401

ISP-RCIC-Q907 RCIC Isolation on Low Steam Supply Pressure - Channels B 005

& D - CFT/CC

TSP-DG3-B502 HPCS Diesel Generator DG3 Load Testing 025

Work Orders 02126770, 02121810, 02112977, 02158041, 02161630,

2085269, 02120123, 02163244

71111.15 Calculations 6.08.01-SII-6 Calculation for Transformer Yard Electrical Manholes 001

Corrective Action Action Requests 304266, 304289, 381023, 405330, 406119

Documents (ARs)

Miscellaneous 5059SCREEN-14- Screening for Temporary Concrete Deadmen Will be Placed 03/12/2014

0063 on Top of Class 1 Electrical Manholes E10, E11, and E15

AD-14-0339 Applicability Determination for Missing Bolts on Outer Covers 000

for Class 1 Electrical Manholes E10, E11, and E15

GO2-14-077 Columbia Generating Station, docket No. 50-397 Licensee 05/12/2014

Event Report No. 2014003-0

Procedures SWP-CAP-01 Corrective Action Program 041

Work Orders 02124766

71111.17T Calculations ME-02-08-10 Flow Restrictor Chocked Flow Calculation 002

Engineering EC0000016355 RWCU-MO-1 & 4 Modifications (Actuator Replacements) 002

Changes EC0000016816 Perform Repairs to RHR-V-8 Based on EN inspections and 000

Results of EPRI MOV PPM Calculations Which Predicted a

TYPE 1 Error

EC0000017929 RHR-MO-4A Gear Change for RHR-V-4A 000

LDCN-19045 Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Overpressure Analysis Basis at 25 000

%RTP

Miscellaneous 10.25.187A Motor Control Center Starter Maintenance - NLI Starters 002

10.25.48 Testing Molded Case Circuit Breakers 016

50.59EVAL-18- Changing Methodology to GOTHIC 8.1 for RWCU HELB 000

0001 Analysis

29SCREEN-19- RHR-MO-4A Gear Change for RHR-V-4A 000

0106

5059EVAL-17- Approve Use of GOTHIC for Analysis of Certain High Energy 000

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

0003 Line Breaks

5059SCREEN-16- Main Steam Line Flow Restrictor Chocked Flow 000

0012

5059SCREEN-17- RWCU-MO-1 & 4 Modifications (Actuator Replacements) 000

0034

5059SCREEN-19- Major Leak from Turbine Building Oil System 000

0110

5059SCREEN-19- ABN-FLOODING 000

0118

5059SCREEN-19- EC 16816, Replace the valve wedge and change the gear 000

0130 ratio in RHR-V-8

5059SCREEN-19- LDCN-19-045 000

0135

999-00,214 5600 Series Motor Control Center Cubicles Instruction 002

Manual

LS-19-0233 Procedure 5.6.1, SBO/ELAP, Revision 030 000

LS-20-0074 Procedure 5.6.2, Station Blackout (SBO) and Extended Loss 000

of AC Power ELAP Attachments, Revision 015

TAC N

O. MB5096 River Bend Station, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment RE: High 04/20/2004

(ML041410566) Energy Line Break Analysis

Procedures 5.6.1 SBO/ELAP 030

5.6.2 Station Blackout (SBO) and Extended Loss of AC Power 015

ELAP Attachments

ABN-FLOODING Flooding 022

ENG-DES-50 Interface Procedure for IP-ENG-001 002

IP-ENG-001 Standard Engineering Process 001

Major Leak from 000

Turbine Building

Oil Systems

PPM 1.3.76 Integrated Risk Management 049

PPM 3.2.1 Normal Plant Shutdown 088

SWP-LIC-02 Licensing Basis Impact Determinations 015

SWP-PRO-02 Preparation, Review, Approval and Distribution of Procedures 050

71111.18 Engineering 13266 Alternate Hold Down Detail for Manholes E-MH-E10, E-MH- 001

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Changes E11, and E-MH-E15

13650 Calc 6.08.01-SII-6 Rev 0 - Modification to Tornado Holddown 000

Bolting for E-MH-E10, E-MH-E11, and E-MH-E15 Manhole

Covers

212 TMOD for Placing Concrete Blocks on Manhole Covers E- 000

MH-E11/E-MH-E15

Procedures SWP-CM-02 Temporary Configuration Changes 003

Work Orders 02124766, 02153631

71111.19 Corrective Action Action Requests 406566, 406584, 406795, 406900, 406969, 407121, 407133,

Documents (ARs) 407258, 407544, 407555, 407962

Engineering 17870 FP-P-2B Replacement 000

Changes

Procedures 15.1.3 FP-P-110 Operability Test 009

15.1.6 FP-P-2B Operability Test 014

15.4.8 Fire Protection System Functional Test 024

ISP-SEIS-M202 Seismic System Channel Check 002

ISP-SEIS-S404 Seismic System Channel Functional Test 001

ISP-SEIS-X308 Seismic System Channel Calibration 002

OSP-LPCS-M101 LPCS Fill Verification 015

OSP-LPCS/IST- LPCS System Operability Test 044

Q702

OSP-SGT-M701 Standby Gas Treatment System A Operability 018

OSP-SGT/IST- SGT Valve Operability (System A) 010

Q701

SOP-OG-LU Offgas System Lineup 001

SOP-RWCU-OPS Reactor Water Cleanup System Operations 013

Work Orders 02159994, 02128013, 02128194, 02131742, 02131745,

2151690, 02153301, 02153302, 02131510, 02131511,

2131513, 02124025, 02146082, 02138843, 02107662,

2122123, 02046143, 02146952, 02160512

71111.22 Corrective Action Action Requests 403221, 405472, 406406

Documents (ARs)

Miscellaneous IST-4 Inservice Testing Program Plan Fourth Ten-year Inspection 003

Interval

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Procedures 1.5.1 Surveillance Testing Program 041

1.5.19 Surveillance Frequency Control Program 001

OSP-CCH/IST- Control Room Emergency Chiller System B Operability 044

M702

OSP-CRD-W101 Control Rod SCRAM Accumulator Verification 008

SWP-IST-01 ASME Inservice Testing 003

Work Orders 02150623, 02131655, 02150840

71151 Corrective Action Action Requests 399463, 399557

Documents (ARs)

Miscellaneous Operations Logs April 1, 2019 - April 30, 2020 05/19/2020

GO2-19-158 Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50-397 Licensee 11/25/2019

Event Report No. 2019-001-00

71152 Corrective Action Action Requests 178017, 186054, 316044, 391432, 391991, 404225, 405176,

Documents (ARs) 405183, 316044, 353763, 355428, 357897, 359747, 359748,

361492, 363946, 378928, 389577, 404225, 403173, 390327,

391189, 391430, 392724, 392965, 394214, 394942, 395529,

395904, 398063, 398301, 398350, 402101, 402572, 402886,

403574, 405059, 405297, 405723, 406670, 407030, 407276,

407805

Procedures 10.25.68 RRC-IMD-ASD1A/1 and RRC-IMD-ASD1A/2 Induction Motor 000

Drive Software Settings and Self-Test

DES-2-9 Technical Evaluations 039

GBP-CAP-03 Trending Program 001

SOP-RRC-START Reactor Recirculation, System Start 021

SWP-CAP-01 Corrective Action Program 016, 041

SWP-SEC-03 Security Responsibilities of Site Personnel 030

SYS-2-18 Life Cycle Management 001, 005

TM-01 Trending Manual 003

Work Orders 02158380, 02158041, 02158042, 02161630, 29153498

71153 Corrective Action Action Requests 407465

Documents (ARs)

Procedures OI-34 Notifications 039

OI-36 NRC Notifications 009

19