IR 05000397/2022003
| ML22298A087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2022 |
| From: | Patricia Vossmar NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBA |
| To: | Schuetz R Energy Northwest |
| Vossmar P | |
| References | |
| IR 2022003 | |
| Download: ML22298A087 (19) | |
Text
October 31, 2022
SUBJECT:
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2022003
Dear Robert Schuetz:
On September 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Columbia Generating Station. On October 20, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Grover Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief Projects Branch A Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000397 License No. NPF-21
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000397
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-003-0004
Licensee:
Energy Northwest
Facility:
Columbia Generating Station
Location:
Richland, WA
Inspection Dates:
July 1 to September 30, 2022
Inspectors:
P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Donley, Resident Inspector
N. Hernandez, Operations Engineer
S. Hedger, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved By:
Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief
Projects Branch A
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Columbia Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Follow Fire Protection Program Implementation Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000397/2022003-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS)5.4.1.d, Procedures, with two examples, when the licensee failed to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38. The first example was identified on June 27, 2022, when the inspectors discovered welding in the cable spreading room with the suppression system out of service. The second example was identified on August 10, 2022, when the inspectors identified a transient combustible permit in the reactor building truck bay was not followed which required a continuous fire watch.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000397/2021-002-01 LER 2021-002-01 for Columbia Generating Station, Integrated Leak Rate Test 71153 Closed LER 05000397/2021-002-00 LER 2021-002-00 for Columbia Generating Station, Integrated Leak Rate Test 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Columbia began the inspection period at rated thermal power (RTP). On August 23, 2022, the operators reduced power to approximately 94 percent RTP by lowering core flow as a result of an issue with the 'A' recirculation pump adjustable speed drive glycol cooling system. Following restoration of the cooling system, the operators reduced power to approximately 77 percent RTP and recovered the 1A2 adjustable speed drive. On August 24, operators began raising reactor power and achieved 100 percent RTP on August 25. On September 17, operators reduced power to approximately 80 percent RTP for a control rod pattern adjustment, isolation of a feedwater heater drain level control valve, and main turbine bypass valve testing. Columbia returned to approximately 100 percent RTP later that day and remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)standby service water system B while the standby service water system C was out of service for annual maintenance on July 26, 2022 (2)low-pressure core spray system on August 29, 2022 (3)high-pressure core spray system while the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)system was out of service for maintenance on September 12, 2022 (4)standby gas treatment system (SGT) A when SGT B was out of service for maintenance on September 26, 2022
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)fire area SW-2, standby service water pumphouse 1B, on July 26, 2022 (2)fire area R-1, reactor building 441 elevation, specifically the reactor truck bay, while a heavy load flatbed trailer was stored there from August 10 through 12, 2022 (3)fire area R-3, reactor building 422 elevation, high-pressure core spray pump room, on September 28, 2022 (4)fire area SW-1, standby service water pumphouse 1A, on September 28, 2022
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the reactor building 548' elevation south pipe chase (room R511) on August 11, 2022.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during:
post-maintenance testing of HPCS-V-4 on July 30, 2022
a 5 percent power transient due to a drop in resistivity on the 1A2 drive of the adjustable speed drive system on August 23, 2022
monthly operability run of emergency diesel generator 3 on August 24, 2022
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator training scenario on August 22, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)reviewed the licensees periodic evaluation a(3) report for the period of January 2019December 2020 on July 18, 2022 (2)reviewed the performance improvement plan, corrective actions, and goals for the control air system which transitioned from a(2) to a(1) status on July 27, 2022
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Yellow risk for planned maintenance on residual heat removal pump A, low-pressure core spray minimum flow switches, and inoperable main control room remote air intake 1 on July 6, 2022
- (2) Yellow risk for high-pressure core spray system outage for yearly maintenance on July 28, 2022
- (3) Yellow risk for planned maintenance on residual heat removal pumps B and C, low
-pressure core injection minimum flow switches, on August 16, 2022
- (4) Yellow risk for planned maintenance on the reactor core isolation cooling system on September 12, 2022
- (5) Yellow risk for standby gas treatment system B outage for yearly maintenance on September 26, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) CR 435023, heavy sediment deposits found during diving in service water system A and high-pressure core spray service water pump pits, discovered on August 3, 2022
- (2) CR 435640, cause determination for failed as found local leak rate testing of RHR-V-27B and impact on operability, on August 30, 2022
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors verified the site Severe Accident Management Guidelines were updated in accordance with the boiling-water reactor generic severe accident technical guidelines and validated in accordance with NEI 14-01, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and Severe Accidents, revision 1.
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
(1)work order 02164986 for reactor protection system electrical protection assemblies 3E and 3F on July 22, 2022 (2)work order 02162026 for high-pressure core spray service water following HPCS-P-2 pump replacement on July 30, 2022
- (3) TSP-DG3-B502, HPCS Diesel Generator DG3 Load Testing, following a high-pressure core spray system outage for preventive maintenance on August 1, 2022 (4)work order 02166953 for high-pressure core spray service water following annual system maintenance window on August 1, 2022
- (5) OSP-RHR/IST-Q704, RHR Loop C Operability Test, following residual heat removal pump C planned system outage on August 15, 2022
- (6) OSP-RCIC/IST-Q701, RCIC Operability Test, following a reactor core isolation cooling system planned outage on September 14, 2022
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)work order 02165039, high risk response time testing of main steam isolation valve logic actuation on reactor level 1 A and C channels, on July 13, 2022
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill on September 13, 2022.
71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preliminary exercise scenario that was submitted to the NRC on August 17, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22229A150) for the exercise scheduled to occur on October 25, 2022. The inspectors discussed the preliminary scenario with Ms. J. Kuklinski, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the emergency preparedness staff on September 22, 2022. The inspectors' review does not constitute NRC approval of the scenario.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022
MS07: High-Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) CR 434636, follow up on licensee-identified instance of two reactor operators being on shift completed on August 17, 2022
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000397/2022-002-00, Integrated Leak Rate Test, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML21333A262) and LER 05000397/2022-002-01, Integrated Leak Rate Test, (ML22160A432)
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and cause of the condition described in the LERs and discussed with licensee staff. No additional performance deficiencies were identified other than the performance deficiency identified and addressed in 050000397/2021012-01 Failure to perform a cause evaluation after exceeding an administrative limit during local leak rate test of containment isolation valve, (ML21306A196).
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Follow Fire Protection Program Implementation Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000397/2022003-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS)5.4.1.d, Procedures, with two examples, when the licensee failed to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38. The first example was identified on June 27, 2022, when the inspectors discovered welding in the cable spreading room with the suppression system out of service. The second example was identified on August 10, 2022, when the inspectors identified a transient combustible permit in the reactor building truck bay was not followed which required a continuous fire watch.
Description:
On June 27, 2022, the inspectors discovered welding activities in progress in the cable spreading room. The old fire protection piping had been removed, and the licensee was preparing the new piping for installation by welding two shorter length pipes together to form an approximate 8-foot-long section of new fire protection piping with flanges at both ends.
The licensee was planning to install the newly welded piping in the fire protection system at flanged connections after the welding was completed. The welding was taking place in an area of the cable spreading room that was free of cables and nearby combustibles. A qualified fire watch was stationed in the room to observe the welding activities as required.
The inspectors challenged Operations personnel on whether the activities were appropriate, and their initial response was that they were aware of the welding activities in the cable spreading room, but believed it was properly controlled with the approved ignition source permit 22-0029 and fire protection system impairment permit 22-0048. Section 3.1.6.a of licensee procedure 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, revision 18, stated that ignition source work shall not be permitted in sprinklered areas where the sprinkler system is impaired (unless required to prevent inadvertent actuation). According to the fire permits discussed above, ignition source work (welding) was not allowed in the area while the suppression system was out of service. By reviewing the ignition source permit, the inspectors confirmed that the suppression system was considered impaired (out of service).
Since two new pipe sections were being welded together and the welding was not occurring on the installed fire protection system piping, the inspectors determined that the welding activities should not have occurred inside the cable spreading room to ensure compliance with station procedures and fire protection system impairment permit 22-0048.
On August 10, 2022, the inspectors identified some wood in poor condition on a trailer staged in the reactor building truck bay and questioned if it was fire treated. The trailer was staged in the truck bay to transport the recirculation pump impeller to a new location in the radwaste building. The initial response from the fire marshal was that the area was under an hourly fire watch, as controlled by the transient combustible permit 22-0033, which assumed the wood was fire treated. Attachments 7.3 and 7.6 of licensee procedure 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, revision 24, stated that if a significant amount (greater than 20 pounds) of untreated or uncoated wood is left unattended in a vital area, a continuous fire watch shall be posted until the material is removed. The truck bay is considered a fire protection vital area per attachment 7.6 of licensee procedure 1.3.10C. Additionally, transient combustible permit 22-0033 contained a note which stated if the trailer had a wood deck that was not fire retardant treated, then a continuous fire tour was required. Further investigation by the fire marshal confirmed that the wood on the trailer was untreated, greater than 20 pounds, and as such, the reactor building truck bay should have had a continuous fire watch posted while the trailer was staged. The trailer was in the reactor building truck bay for 3 days and an hourly fire watch was completed for the duration.
Section 3.8.2 of licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38, required the licensee to follow procedure 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, for fire hazards associated with planned ignition source fire hazards and to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, for fire hazards associated with transient combustibles.
Corrective Actions: For the first example, the licensee completed the welding activities the same day and initiated CRs 434198 and 434563 to evaluate procedure changes. For the second example, the licensee removed the trailer from the reactor building truck bay after 3 days and initiated CR 435836.
Corrective Action References: CRs 434198, 434563, 435836
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Failure to follow section 3.8.2 of licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38, was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the procedural requirements in licensee procedures 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, revision 18, when they failed to prevent ignition source work (welding) in the cable spreading room on June 27, 2022; and 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, revision 24, when they failed to establish a continuous fire watch for transient combustibles in the reactor building truck bay August 10 through August 12, 2022.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, for the first example, the attribute was adversely affected since an ignition source was introduced into an impaired fire suppression area such that an equivalent level of protection for the cable spreading room was not maintained during welding. For the second example, the attribute was adversely affected since the amount of untreated wood exceeded the maximum limit. This resulted in posting an incorrect compensatory measure, an hourly fire watch, rather than a continuous fire watch.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings issued on December 13, 2019. Because the finding involved a failure to implement fire prevention and administrative controls, the finding was screened using IMC 0609, Appendix F, attachment 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet issued on May 2, 2018. As part of the Phase 1, the inspectors assigned this finding to the Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls category and reviewed IMC 0609 Appendix F, attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance issued May 2, 2018. Since a properly equipped and qualified fire watch was in the cable spreading room while the pipe was welded, and there was no active ignition source occurring while the truck trailer was staged with an hourly fire watch, the inspectors assigned this finding a low degradation rating.
Consistent with the guidance above, because of the low degradation rating, the finding screened as Green, very low safety significance.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. For these examples, the inspectors determined that licensee staff failed to verify assumptions used in approving the ignition source permit and transient combustible permit.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.d, Procedures, requires in part that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering Fire Protection Program implementation. Section 3.8.2 of licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38, required the licensee to follow procedure 1.3.10A for fire hazards associated with planned ignition source fire hazards and to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10C for fire hazards associated with transient combustibles. Licensee procedure 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, revision 18, section 3.1.6.a, required in part that ignition source work shall not be permitted in sprinklered areas where the sprinkler system is impaired (unless required to prevent inadvertent actuation). Licensee procedure 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, revision 24, attachments 7.3 and 7.6, required in part that if a significant amount (greater than 20 pounds) of untreated or uncoated wood is left unattended in a vital area, a continuous fire watch shall be posted until the material is removed. Contrary to these requirements, on June 27, 2022, the licensee failed to prevent ignition source work in the cable spreading room by allowing welding of two 6-inch diameter pipe sections while the suppression system was out of service. Also, from August 10 through August 12, 2022, the licensee failed to post a continuous fire watch while a trailer with a significant quantity of untreated wood was staged in the reactor building truck bay.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On September 22, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness exercise scenario review inspection results to J. Kuklinski, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to G. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
288625, 435062, 423826, 420456, 370180, 428868, 436987,
435976, 435982
M520
Flow Diagram HPCS and LPCS System Reactor Building
105
M524-2
Flow Diagram Standby Service Water System Reactor,
Radwaste, D.G. Bldgs and Yard
24
M544
Flow Diagram HVAC-Standby Gas Treatment Reactor
Building
076
M772
Compressed Air, Fire Protection, Standby Serv Water &
Mics Wtr Systems Plans at 507 & 525 Radwaste Bldg
031
Drawings
M775
Flow Diagram Emergency Chilled Water Piping System
Control Room
030
OSP-
CCH/IST/M702
Control Room Emergency Chiller System B Operability
055
OSP-LPCS/IST-
Q702
LPCS System Operability Test
046, 047
SOP-HPCS-LU
HPCS Valve and Breaker Lineup
004
SOP-LPCS-LU
LPCS Valve and Breaker Lineup
003
SOP-LPCS-STBY
Placing LPCS in Standby Status
2
SOP-SGT-LU
Standby Gas Treatment System Lineup
000
SOP-SGT-STBY
Placing Standby Gas Treatment in Standby Status
2
SOP-SW-LU
Standby Service Water System Valve & Breaker Lineup
015
SOP-SW-SPRAY
Standby Service Water Spray Header Operations
000
Procedures
SOP-SW-START
Standby Service Water Start
008
2107547, 02165187, 02190527
Work Orders
Work Requests
29106895, 29160155, 29164101
Calculations
FP-02-85-03
Combustible Loading Calculation
011
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
21423, 421432, 435836, 434082
PFP-MN-XFMR-
YD-MISC
MN XFMR YD Misc Bldgs
007
Reactor 422
007
Fire Plans
Reactor 441
005
BIP 21-0269
Barrier Impairment Permit
Miscellaneous
TCP 22-0033
Transient Combustible Permit
08/10/2022
1.3.10C
Control of Combustibles
24
15.2.16
Thermal Detector - Channel Function Test
009
Procedures
15.2.2
Function and Sensitivity Check of Ionization Detectors
21
2186800
Work Orders
Work Requests
29160630
Calculations
ME-02-02-02
Reactor Building Flooding Analysis
004
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
435635
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
435960, 435963, 435967
Miscellaneous
LR002561
Cycle 22-4 licensed operator requalification training scenario
guide
07/06/2022
ABN-POWER
Unplanned Reactor Power Change
018
ARP 4.602.A13
Annunciator Response Procedure
030
Procedures
SOP-RRC-ASD
Reactor Recirculation ASD Operations
017
2189935
Work Orders
Work Request
2153591-05
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
391839, 382165, 383381, 301063, 313942, 432057, 435499,
433259, 434911, 434921, 430580, 430585, 430642
Miscellaneous
ASD System Health Reports
1Q2019,
1Q2020,
3Q2020
SYS-4-22
015
Procedures
SYS-4-23
Maintenance Rule Structural Baseline Inspections
001
2192562, 02198084
Work Orders
Work Requests
29166972
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
435117
T22-HPCS-SYS-
1-001
eSoms tracker
Miscellaneous
T22-SGT-SYS-B-
001
eSoms tracker
1.3.83
Protected Equipment Program
036
Procedures
ECCS-LPCI (B and C) Pump Discharge Low (Minimum
Flow) - CC
009
Work Orders
2192811, 02169314, 02164164
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
408940
Drawings
M584
General Arrangement Plans and Sections Standby Service
Water Pump Houses
010
Engineering
Changes
Engineering
Evaluations
Sediment in Service Water Spray Pond Pump Pits
09/20/2013
Procedures
LLRT-01
Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program
010
Work Orders
2114538, 02109072, 02164911, 02164912, 02152237
5.0.3
EOP/SAG Flowchart Verification Records for SAG1, SAG2,
SAG3 and SAG4
08/13/2021
Letter to NRC from Energy Northwest, Commitment to
Maintain Severe Accident Guidelines
2/21/2015
Miscellaneous
TM-2120
Columbia EOP/SAG Technical Document
010
1.2.7
EOP/SAG Program Maintenance
015
5.0.14
PSTG/SATG Differences Volume 1: Introduction, Tables,
Cautions, Figures
000
5.0.3
EOP/SAG Flowchart Verification
009
5.0.4
EOP/SAG Flowchart Validation
008
5.0.9
EOP/SAG Revision
011
5.1.1
RPV Control (Mode 1-3)
23
5.7.1
Flowchart Training Manual Volume 1, SAG1 and SAG2
008
Procedures
SAG1
007
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
434709, 434757, 434789, 434803, 434810, 434917, 434922,
435128, 435163, 435223, 435207, 426573, 435208, 435205
10.25.48
Testing Molded Case Circuit Breakers
017
10.25.74
Testing Motor Operated Valve Motors and Controls
033
18.1.12
HPCS-P-2 Preservice Test
004
ESP-EPA3E3F-
S901
Electrical Protection Assemblies RPS-EPA-3E and RPS-
EPA-3F-CFT/CC
2, 013
EWD-7E-016A
Electrical Wiring Diagram High Pressure Core Spray System
Reactor Pressure Vessel Injection MOV HPCS-V-4 (E22-
F004)
003
OSP-HPCS/IST-
Q701
HPCS System Operability Test
060
HPCS Service Water Valve Position Verification
29
Procedures
SWP-TST-01
Post Maintenance Testing Program
018
2153007, 02153008, 02152934, 02188944, 02190770,
2169291, 02164033, 02160380, 02153591, 02187776,
2176024, 02169143
Work Orders
Work Requests
29166678, 29166729, 29166828
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
434741
Procedures
MSIV Isolation Logic Actuation on Reactor Level 1 Channels
A & C - RTT
008
Work Orders
2092462, 02134999
Miscellaneous
Columbia Generating Station Classification Notification
Forms (CNF) 1 through 8
09/13/2022
13.2.2
Determining Protective Action Recommendations
20
Procedures
13.4.1
Emergency Notifications
044
Miscellaneous
Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Plume
Phase Exercise, October 25, 2022
08/17/2022
13.1.1A
Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases
(Minor
2)
13.2.2
Determining Protective Action Recommendations
(Minor
2)
Procedures
13.4.1
Emergency Notifications
(Minor
01)
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
29109, 424457, 426619, 428937, 422792
Engineering
Changes
Documentation of MPR report for DG-GEN-DG2 elevated
voltage
MSPI Emergency AC Power System Derivation Reports
07/11/2022
MSPI High Pressure Injection System Derivation Reports
07/11/2022
MSPI Heat Removal Systems Derivation Reports
07/11/2022
MSPI Residual Heat Removal Systems Derivation Reports
07/11/2022
MSPI Cooling Water Systems Derivation Reports
07/11/2022
Control Room Operator Logs
7/1/2021 to
6/30/2022
0192-0077-RPT-
001
Columbia EDG Blown Fuse Evaluation - Phase 2,
Evaluation of EDG High Voltage Impact on Equipment
000
71151
Miscellaneous
TM-2150
Mission Time of Emergency Safety Features
000
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
434636, 435004, 435001, 435516
Columbia Generating Station
067
Miscellaneous
PER 292-0961
Problem Evaluation Request
08/06/1992
1.3.1
Operating Policies, Programs, and Practices
134
OI-09
Operations Standards and Expectation
078
Procedures
SWP-FFD-04
Work Hour Controls
004
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
435640, 432980, 425605, 393944, 421357, 425900, 427657
264
Engineering
Changes
19403
IST-4
Inservice Testing Program Plan Fourth Ten-Year Inspection
Interval
006
LLRT-01
Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program Plan
009, 010
TSP-CONT-R801
Containment Isolation Valve and Penetration Leak Test
Program
018, 019
TSP-RHR/X25B-
C801
LLRT of RHR-V-27B
003, 004
Procedures
TSP-RHR/X25B-
C802
LLRT of RHR-V-27B
000
2109072, 02114538, 02164911, 02164912, 02154645
Work Orders
Work Requests
29165893, 29160597