IR 05000397/2018001

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000397/2018001

ML18116A407
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/25/2018
From:	Mark Haire NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	Sawatzke B Energy Northwest
Mark Haire
References
IR 2018001
Download: ML18116A407 (21)

Text

April 25, 2018

SUBJECT:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2018001

Dear Mr. Sawatzke:

On March 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Columbia Generating Station. On April 19, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President for Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Columbia Generating Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Columbia Generating Station.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

1600 E. LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark Haire, Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21 Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000397/2018001 w/ Attachment: Documents Reviewed

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Columbia Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Procedure Leads to Loss of Secondary Containment Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000397/2018001-01 Closed H.5 - Work Management 71153 -

Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to perform maintenance in accordance with documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, on September 12, 2017, the failure to verify power sources per Work Order 02072924 caused an electrical transient that caused the reactor building exhaust valve and supply valve to lose power and close, resulting in a loss of secondary containment.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000397/2017003-00 Momentary Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Weather 71153 Closed LER 05000397/2017005-00 Valve Closure Results in Momentary Increase in Secondary Containment Pressure 71153 Closed LER 05000397/2017006-00 Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Incomplete Action Statement 71153 Closed

PLANT STATUS

The plant began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power. On January 6, 2018, the unit was down-powered to 72 percent for turbine valve testing and a control rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to 100 percent rated thermal power on January 6, 2018. On March 31, 2018, the unit was down-powered to 70 percent for turbine valve testing and a control rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to 100 percent rated thermal power on March 31,

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection period unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.

Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions associated with high winds on February 17, 2018.

External Flooding (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding on January 12, 2018.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial systems/trains walkdowns:

(1) diesel generator 1 starting air on February 6, 2018

(2) diesel generator 2 starting air on February 22, 2018

(3) diesel generator 3 starting air on February 26, 2018

(4) diesel generator 3 governor on March 12, 2018

(5) diesel generator 2 governor on March 29, 2018

Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated standby service water loop A system configurations during a complete walkdown on January 12, 2018

71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Quarterly Inspection (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Fire Area R-6/2: RCIC Pump Room on January 8, 2018

(2) Fire Area R-7/1: RHR-C Pump Room on January 9, 2018

(3) Fire Area R-8/1: LPCS Pump Room on January 10, 2018

(4) Fire Area RC-13/2: Chiller, Communications, I & C Area on January 26, 2018

(5) Fire Area RC-11/1: HVAC Equipment Room A Division 1 on January 26, 2018

(6) Fire Area RC-12/2: HVAC Equipment Room B Division 2 on January 26, 2018

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Internal Flooding (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections:

(1) Reactor Building 422 level on February 14, 2018

Cables (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection:

(1) Manhole E-MH-E8 on February 22, 2018

(2) Manhole E-MH-01B, 10, 11, 13, 15 on February 28, 2018

71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Operator Requalification (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew during a simulator evaluated scenario for licensed operator requalification training on January 22, 2018.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during the following activities:

(1) maintenance on main generator seal oil pressure regulator on January 9, 2018

(2) diesel generator 3 testing on January 24, 2018

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) fire pump 110 starting issue on January 10, 2018

(2) standby service water loop B planned maintenance, week of January 15, 2018

(3) diesel generator 3 annual preventive maintenance, week of January 22, 2018

(4) SM4 relay testing on February 27, 2018

(5) diesel generator 2 12-year maintenance, March 19-30, 2018

Quality Control (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance issues:

(1) main control room emergency chiller B maintenance, week of February 19, 2018

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) yellow risk due to standby service water system A maintenance, week of January 1, 2018

(2) yellow risk due to maintenance on main generator seal oil pressure regulator on January 9, 2018

(3) yellow risk for diesel generator 3 maintenance on January 22, 2018

(4) yellow risk for circuit breaker S/2 maintenance on January 24, 2018

(5) yellow risk for maintenance on backup transformer, February 16-17, 2018

(6) yellow risk for standby gas treatment B and SM4 relay testing, February 26-28, 2018

(7) yellow risk for diesel generator 3 24-hour load test and loss of coolant accident test, March 1-3, 2018

(8) yellow risk for diesel generator 2 12-year maintenance, March 19-30, 2018

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) diesel generator 3 diesel oil valve DO-V-14 on January 22, 2018

(2) diesel generator 3 exhaust thermocouple on January 24, 2018

(3) diesel generator 3 temperature test switch on January 25, 2018

(4) main control room emergency chiller B unexpected start during tagout on February 18, 2018

(5) high pressure core spray motor oil on March 8, 2018

(6) diesel generator 2 engine governor on March 28, 2018

(7) diesel generator 2 fuel oil pump on March 29, 2018

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 14954, CCH Bypass Line, Emergency Chilled Water, on January 24, 2018

(2) Temporary Modification (TM) 16326, adjust setpoint of containment instrument air pressure control valve on February 2, 2018

(3) EC 16860 setpoint change on DG air start reducing valve pressure on February 9, 2018

(4) TM 16170 main control room chiller B bearing high temp switch on February 16, 2018

(5) EC 16066 vital island fire protection installation on March 31, 2018

71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) fire pump 110 maintenance on January 10, 2018

(2) standby service water loop B maintenance on January 16, 2018

(3) diesel generator 3 maintenance on January 25, 2018

(4) TR-B backup transformer maintenance on February 17, 2018

(5) tower make-up pump C maintenance on February 21, 2018

(6) fuel pool cooling pump B maintenance on February 23, 2018

(7) RHR-V-68B standby service water supply isolation to residual heat removal heat exchanger 1B maintenance on February 26, 2018

(8) RHR-V-116 cross tie connection from standby service water maintenance on March 1, 2018

(9) diesel generator 2 12-year outage on March 29, 2018

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Routine

(1) service water spray pond quarterly surveillance test per OSP-SW-Q101, on January 4, 2018

(2) main steam isolation valve SCRAM closure test per OSP-RPS-S402, on January 7, 2018

(3) diesel generator 3 load testing per TSP-DG3-B502, on March 2, 2018

(4) diesel generator 3 loss of coolant accident test per TSP-DG3/LOCA-B501, on March 3, 2018

(5) main turbine bypass valve testing per OSP-MS-Q702, on March 31, 2018

In-service (1 Sample)

(1) residual heat removal loop A operability test per OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, on February 7, 2018

71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation

The inspectors evaluated the licensees biennial emergency plan exercise and subsequent identification of performance weaknesses. The exercise scenario simulated the following on March 27, 2018:

(1) a loss of feedwater heating causing a power excursion which required the reactor be shut down

(2) a problem with the reactor protection system which failed to shut down the reactor

(3) a failure of some control rods to insert into the reactor

(4) an unisolable pipe break on the reactor water clean-up system outside of containment

(5) an unfiltered and monitored radioactive release from the radioactive waste building through the plant vent which increased in activity over time

(6) emergency depressurization of the reactor

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

The inspectors evaluated submitted Emergency Action Level changes in-office on January 30, 2018. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) a general emergency scenario drill on February 27, 2018

71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review

The inspectors conducted an in-office review of the proposed biennial emergency plan exercise scenario between January 16 and February 22, 2018. The inspectors also discussed the proposed scenario with staff at FEMA Region X.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

(1) IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (01/01/2017 - 12/31/2017)

(2) IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (01/01/2017 - 12/31/2017)

(3) IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (01/01/2017 - 12/31/2017)

(4) EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (01/01/2017 - 12/31/2017)

(5) EP02: Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (01/01/2017 - 12/31/2017)

(6) EP03: Alert and Notification System Reliability (01/01/2017 - 12/31/2017)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) required test for Westinghouse 480v ac circuit breaker on February 20, 2018

(2) licensees corrective action for abnormal procedure ABN-ASH on March 31, 2018

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Licensee Event Reports

The inspectors evaluated the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:

(1) LER 05000397/2017-003-00, Momentary Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Weather on June 26, 2017

(2) LER 05000397/2017-005-00, Valve Closure Results in Momentary Increase in Secondary Containment Pressure on September 12, 2017

(3) LER 05000397/2017-006-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Incomplete Action Statement on September 21,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Minor Performance Deficiency 71153 Minor Performance Deficiency: The inspectors reviewed LER 2017-006-00 and determined the failure to follow Procedure OSP-ELEC-W101, Offsite Station Power Alignment Check, Revision 30, was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The performance deficiency was minor because while it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, it did not adversely affect the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, when operations personnel performed the offsite station power alignment check in its entirety, all breakers were correctly aligned, and power was available for each offsite circuit.

Failure to Follow Procedure Leads to Loss of Secondary Containment Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000397/2018001-01 Closed H.5 - Work Management 71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion During their inspection of LER 2017-005-00, the inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to perform maintenance in accordance with documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances.

Specifically, on September 12, 2017, the failure to verify power sources per Work Order 02072924 caused an electrical transient that caused the reactor building exhaust valve and supply valve to lose power and close, resulting in a loss of secondary containment.

Description:

On September 12, 2017, electricians performed planned maintenance per Work Order 02072924 to replace the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system direct current (DC) motor control center (MCC) buckets. As part of the work, electricians conducted live-dead-live checks of wiring in the cubicle to check for DC voltage. The workers found DC voltage as expected and lifted the terminals, per instructions. Another live-dead-live test for DC power was conducted which showed no voltage. While lifting a control wire, a maintenance worker believed they saw faint evidence of arcing. Another live-dead-live test was conducted which showed no evidence of DC voltage. However, when electricians lifted the wire, it shorted out against the bucket chassis and caused a reactor building exhaust inboard isolation valve to lose power and close, resulting in a loss of secondary containment.

The wire shorted because alternating current (AC) voltage was present on the control wire and the DC voltage checks were not adequate to identify the presence of AC voltage.

Operations personnel responded to the incident and restored secondary containment to operable status within approximately 1 minute.

The inspectors noted Work Order 02072924 Precaution and Limitations Step 2.5 states that electrical energy may be present, follow the requirements of ISPM-7 & ISPM-20. Step 2.6 states, in part, to as needed, check all control wiring terminals in the cubicle for voltage prior to working in the cubicle.

ISPM-20, Electrical Arc Protection Work Practices and PPE Requirements, Revision 14, Step 3.1.2 states that electrical equipment and lines shall be considered energized until verified de-energized by a live-dead-live check. ISPM-7, Electrical Safety, Revision 17, Step 3.1.10 states that all circuits shall be tested utilizing a live-dead-live method to verify that it is de-energized prior to commencing work, unless the circuit is planned to be worked live.

In both procedures, two notes precede these steps. The first note states,

NOTE: Live-Dead-Live Check - Ensure test equipment is rated for and set to the correct voltage source (AC/DC) range prior to use. Test the meter on a known live source, perform necessary checks, then test the meter on a known live source. The live source must be the same voltage type as the circuit to be worked. (AC/DC)

The second note states,

NOTE: Pre and post voltage verification is required when performing determinations/re-terminations on a known live circuit. A Live Dead Live does not apply in this situation. When working on known live voltage sources per approved work documents, voltage verification is not required. (e.g. Battery surveillances)

Work Order 02072924 Step 4.6 states, in part,

Disconnect all external wiring at the bucket, using the attached de-term/re-term data sheet, [Motor Control Center] as-found diagram and/or cable termination instruction (CTI) as appropriate.

A warning note immediately prior to this step states,

Control circuits will be energized. Refer to drawing EWD-6E-007. Ensure all wire terminals are checked for voltage, prior to disconnecting. Note any discrepancies.

Maintenance personnel only performed a live-dead-live check for DC voltage because the workers erroneously believed only DC voltage was present in the cubicle. The inspectors noted that drawing EWD-6E-007, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Pump RCIC-P-2 (E51-C002) Revision 13, clearly shows AC voltage sources also located in the same cubicle.

The inspectors determined the maintenance personnel failed to conduct a proper live-dead-live check because the workers did not follow the warning note in Work Order 02072924 and refer to drawing EWD-6E-007.

Corrective Actions: The licensees corrective actions included immediately restoring secondary containment to operable status and conducting a work stand down with all electricians to review requirements of Procedures ISPM-20 and ISPM-7 and reinforce the expectation that drawings will be posted at the job site at all times.

Corrective Action Reference: Action Request 371264

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to perform maintenance in accordance with documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.

Specifically, the failure to verify power sources per Work Order 02072924 caused an electrical transient that caused the reactor building exhaust valve and supply valve to lose power and close, resulting in a loss of secondary containment.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, spent fuel pool, or standby gas treatment system.

Cross-cutting Aspect: This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work management, in that the licensee failed to plan and execute the work activity adequately. Specifically, electricians performed an inadequate live-dead-live check for the presence of only DC voltage when 120V AC voltage was present as reflected in the drawing [H.5].

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Section 9.a of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be performed in accordance with documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances. The licensee established Work Order 02072924 to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement. The warning note preceding Step 4.6 of Work Order 02072924 requires the electricians Refer to drawing EWD-6E-007. Ensure all wire terminals are checked for voltage, prior to disconnecting.

Contrary to the above, on September 12, 2017, the licensee did not refer to drawing EWD-6E-007 and ensure all wire terminals are checked for voltage, prior to disconnecting.

Specifically, the licensee should have identified there was live AC voltage present in the cubicle per drawing EWD-6E-007 and properly checked for AC voltage prior to disconnecting the wires. As a result, on September 12, 2017, the failure to verify power sources per Work Order 02072924 caused an electrical transient that caused the reactor building exhaust valve and supply valve to lose power and close, resulting in a loss of secondary containment.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

Unless otherwise noted, the inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On February 20, 2018, the inspectors discussed the proposed exercise scenario with Mr. W. Webb, Branch Chief, Technological Hazards, FEMA Region X.

• On February 22, 2018, the inspectors discussed the results of the in-office review of the licensees preliminary exercise scenario with Mr. S. Clizbe, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On March 30, 2018, the inspectors presented the results of the on-site inspection of the licensees biennial emergency preparedness exercise and subsequent determination of performance weaknesses to Mr. R. Schuetz, Plant General Manager, Acting Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors also discussed exercise performance with Mr. W. Webb, Branch Chief, Technological Hazards, FEMA Region X.

• On April 19, 2018, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results for the quarter to Mr. G. Hettel, Vice President for Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision/

Date

71111.01

Procedures

ABN-

FLOODING

Flooding

019

1.3.76

Integrated Risk Management

049

ABN-WIND

Tornado/High Winds

29

71111.04

Procedures

3.1.6J

Instrument Rack Valve Line up

Service BLDG, DG BLDG, SW

PPHSE, CWPH, & TMU

PPHSE

004

SOP-DG1-LU

Emergency Diesel Generator

(Div 1) Valve and Power

Supply Lineup

005

SOP-DG2-LU

Emergency Diesel Generator

(Div 2) ) Valve and Power

Supply Lineup

005

SOP-DG3-LU

High Pressure Core Spray

Diesel Generator Valve and

Power Supply Lineup

007

SOP-DG-DSA Diesel Starting Air Operations

014

OSP-SW-

M101

Standby Service Water Loop A

Valve Position Verification

037

71111.05

Procedures

1.3.10B

Active Fire System Operability

and Impairment Control

015

1.3.10C

Control of Transient

Combustibles

20

SOP-FP-

DRAIN

Fire Protection System Drain

001

SOP-FP-FILL

Fire Protection System Fill

003

SOP-FP-LU

Fire Protection System Valve

and Breaker Lineup

009

MWP-1

Maintenance Welding

Operating Procedure

20

PFP-RW-525

Radwaste 525

005

10.2.222

Seismic Storage

Requirements for Transient

Equipment

001

Miscellaneous ISP 17-0124

Ignition Source Permit:

CCH-CR-1A, Control Room

Emergency Chiller

01/02/2018

Action

Requests

375440

376161

377528

378082

377895

377052

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision/

Date

71111.06

Procedures

1.3.57

Barrier Impairment

036

ME-02-02-02

Calculation for Reactor Building

Flooding Analysis

2

Work Orders

2100891

2116122

71111.11

Procedures

OI-09

Operations Standards and

Expectation

068

13.1.1A

Classify the Emergency -

Technical Bases

033

13.1.1

Classifying the Emergency

049

Miscellaneous

Energy Northwest 4.0 Critique

Summary for Crew F Evaluated

Scenario Cycle 18-1

01/22/2018

71111.12

Procedure

1.5.11

Maintenance Rule Program

015

Work Orders

2046756

2061863

2080115

2100745

2110118

2113431

2123160

Action

Requests

373929

373936

375680

375996

376135

376155

71111.13

Procedures

1.3.76

Integrated Risk Management

049

26871

High Risk Work Plan

013

1.3.83

Protected Equipment Program

26

Miscellaneous

High Risk Work Plan for MCR

Chiller A Outlet Line

2/20/2017

71111.15

Procedure

1.3.66

Operability and Functionality

Evaluation

034

Action

Requests

375995

375997

375998

376135

376155

377143

377670

378475

378407

378408

71111.18

Procedure

EC 14954

CCH Bypass Line

000 - 004

Work Order 2085978

Action

Request

376012

71111.19

Procedures

OSP-ELEC-

S703

HPCS Diesel Generator

Semi-Annual Operability Test

060

TSP-DG2-

B502

Standby Diesel Generator DG2

Load Testing

24

OSP-ELEC-

M702

Diesel Generator 2 - Monthly

Operability Test

2

OSP-ELEC-

W101

Offsite Station Power Alignment

Check

031

15.1.4

FP-P-110 Operability Test

038

SOP-TMU-

START

Tower Makeup Water System

Start

013

SOP-TMU-

OPS

Tower Makeup Water

Operation

011

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision/

Date

71111.19

Procedures

OSP-

FPC/IST-

Q701

Fuel Pool Cooling System

Operability Surveillance

037

OSP-

SW/IST-

Q702

Standby service Water Loop B

Operability

2

8.3.447

Testing RHR-V-89, RHR-V-115,

and RHR-V-116

001

OSP-SW-

M102

Standby Service Water Loop B

Valve Position Verification

038

Work Orders

2096335

2120536

2123160

2090131

Action

Requests

373929

373936

375680

71111.22

Procedures

SYS-2-27

Sonar Inspection - Service

Water Spray Pond Sediment

Measurements

000

Calculations

ME-02-83-21

Calculation for Spray Pond

Water Level Change

2

ME-02-92-41

Calculation for Ultimate Heat

Sink Analysis

007

Work Orders

2090434

2092445

2097247

71114.01

Procedures

and

Documents

EPIP 13.1.1

Classifying the Emergency

EPIP

13.1.1A

Classifying the Emergency,

Technical Bases,

January 17, 2018

033

EPIP 13.2.1

Emergency Exposure

Levels/Protective Action

Guides, December 21, 2017

2

EPIP 13.2.2

Determining Protective Action

Recommendations,

December 21, 2017

20

EPIP 13.4.1

Emergency Notifications,

August 29, 2017

043

EPIP 13.5.1

Local, Protected Area or Site

Evacuation, March 8, 2017

29

EPIP 13.8.1

Emergency Dose Projection

System Operations

038

EPIP 13.10.1 Control Room Operations and

Shift Manager Duties, February

14, 2017

035

EPIP 13.10.2 TSC Manager Duties, February

14, 2017

035

EPIP 13.10.9 Operations Support Center

Manager and Staff Duties,

January 24, 2017

049

EPIP 13.11.1 EOF Manager Duties,

October 4, 2017

044

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision/

Date

71114.01

Procedures

and

Documents

EPIP

13.14.11

EP Equipment

013

EPIP 13.14.8 Drill and Exercise Program,

June 29, 2016

018

EPI-13

Emergency Notification System,

August 29, 2017

008

EPI-17

After Action Report,

Improvement Plan, Formatting,

Distribution, and Retention,

December 9, 2013

008

EPI-21

Drill and Exercise Development

and Implementation, June 22,

2017

018

5.2.1

Primary Containment Control

27

5.8.1

Post-LOCA Hydrogen/Oxygen

Monitoring

2

2.5.33

Reactor Coolant Sampling

004.001

2.17.1

EOP Reactor Water Sampling

2/21/2017

DWG M528-

Flow Diagram Control Rod

Drive System

009

RWP

30004172

2018 Emergency Drill

Response Activities

2/21/2017

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team B Drill Report,

January 12, 2016, After Action

Report/Improvement Plan

2/11/2016

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team B Dress

Rehearsal Drill Report,

February 23, 2016, After Action

Report/Improvement Plan

04/23/2016

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team B Exercise Drill

Report, March 29, 2016, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

04/29/2016

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision/

Date

71114.01

Documents

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team B Exercise Drill

Report, March 29, 2016, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

04/29/2016

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team D Drill, Drill

Report, May 3, 2016, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

06/03/2016

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team A Drill, Drill

Report, August 30, 2016, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

09/22/2016

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team C Drill, Drill

Report, October 25, 2016, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

11/22/2016

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team B Drill, Drill

Report, January 10, 2017, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

2/07/2017

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team D Drill, Drill

Report, March 14, 2017, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

04/24/2017

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team A Drill, Drill

Report, July 18, 2017, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

08/15/2017

Columbia Generating Station

ERO Team C Drill, Drill

Report, October 31, 2017, After

Action Report/Improvement

Plan

11/31/2017

Fire Brigade/First Responder

Drill 2016,

Contaminated/Injured Man

11/03/2016

Fire Brigade/First Responder

Drill 2017,

Contaminated/Injured Man

11/28/2017

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision/

Date

71114.01

Documents

Apparent Cause Evaluation,

Violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2)

for Failure to Conduct Medical

Emergency Drill in 2015

04/11/2016

Action

Requests

347032

347050

347265

347490

348108

350241

353342

354107

356181

356227

356618

356826

357471

360335

360547

361134

361195

363014

366567

366884

366958

368177

368192

369531

369776

371856

373325

373732

374110

374115

374117

2561

375641

377563

378325

378339

378341

378394

378441

378471

378644

71114.04

Procedures

and

Documents

Columbia Generating Station

Emergency Plan

065

EPIP

13.1.1A

Classifying the Emergency,

Technical Bases

033

EPI-16

50.54(Q) Change Evaluation,

July 19, 2017

015

71151

Procedures

EPI-18

Emergency Preparedness

Performance Indicators,

May 31, 2017

25

Action

Requests

358298

360339

361467

366785

368711

369130

369725

2372

373237

373325

71152

Action

Requests

346054

376191

377044

71153

Action

Requests

371646

371777

376985