IR 05000397/2023001
| ML23122A076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/2023 |
| From: | Patricia Vossmar NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBA |
| To: | Schuetz R Energy Northwest |
| References | |
| IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23122A076 (19) | |
Text
May 05, 2023
SUBJECT:
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2023001
Dear Robert Schuetz:
On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Columbia Generating Station. On April 13, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Dave Brown, Vice President of Operations, and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000397 License No. NPF-21
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000397
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-001-0002
Licensee:
Energy Northwest
Facility:
Columbia Generating Station
Location:
Richland, WA
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2023, to March 31, 2023
Inspectors:
P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Donley, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Lichvar, Resident Inspector
H. Strittmatter, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved By:
Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch A
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Columbia Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Implement a Station Procedure Resulted in a Challenge to Primary Containment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000397/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71152A The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to establish, implement, and maintain procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2.
Specifically, the licensee failed to establish and monitor wetwell (WW) pressure as a key parameter while preforming OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, RHR Loop A Operability Test, with suppression pool spray in service, in accordance with licensee procedure OI-09, Operations Standard and Expectations. This resulted in a momentary loss and challenge to primary containment integrity when WW to reactor building vacuum breakers CSP-V-9 and CSP-V-10 opened in response to lowering WW pressure.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Columbia began the inspection period at rated thermal power (RTP). On January 11 and 12, 2023, the unit was down powered to approximately 46 percent for reactor recirculation pump adjustable speed drive (ASD) glycol coolant leak repairs. Following repairs and restoration of the ASD drive, the unit was returned to full RTP on January 14, 2023. On February 26, 2023, the 1A2 channel of ASD system experienced a failure which resulted in a down power to 93 percent once the recirculation loop flows were matched. On February 28, 2023, Columbia lowered power to 74 percent to recover the 1A2 channel following repairs and achieved 100 percent power later that day. On March 26, the station experienced a loss of the ASD channel 1A2 which ultimately resulted in a power reduction to approximately 90 percent RTP once the recirculation loop flows were matched. On March 27, 2023, following repairs to the 1A2 ASD channel, the station lowered power to approximately 73 percent to recover/repower the 1A2 ASD channel. Power was restored to approximately 100 percent on March 28, 2023. Later on March 28, 2023, the station identified issues with the ASD 1A2 channel and reduced power to approximately 89 percent RTP. On March 29, 2023, the station reduced power to approximately 83 percent RTP to take the 1A2 channel out of service. Once the station determined that the 1A1 channel could support higher flows/power, the station raised power to 89 percent RTP. Power remained at approximately 89 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)control room air conditioning system B while system A was out of service for maintenance on January 11, 2023 (2)control room air conditioning system A while system B was out of service for maintenance on January 24, 2023 (3)reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system while the high-pressure core spray diesel generator was out of service for maintenance on February 27-28, 2023 (4)diesel generator (DG) system A while DG system B was out of service for maintenance on March 21-22, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Area RC-12/1, HVAC equipment room B division 2, on January 11, 2023
- (2) Fire Area DG-1/1, HPCS diesel generator room, on January 27, 2023
- (3) Fire Area RC-11/1, HVAC equipment room A division 1, on March 9, 2023
- (4) Fire Area DG-3/2, DG-2 diesel generator room, on March 12, 2023
- (5) Fire Area TG-1/2, turbine generator 471, NW general area, on March 13, 2023
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the reactor building 471-foot elevation.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power maneuvering for planned adjustable speed drive maintenance on January 12, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification evaluated scenario on March 6, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) RCIC-P-3, reactor core isolation cooling water leg (keep fill) pump
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)elevated risk for planned maintenance associated with a cooling coil replacement in WMA-AH-51A, control room air handling unit, on January 10, 2023 (2)yellow risk during the performance of ICP-CSP-X301, reactor building vacuum breaker actuation instrumentation channel calibration, on January 23 and 24, 2023 (3)yellow risk during replacement of a digital electro-hydraulic control system filter on February 9, 2023 (4)yellow risk during a planned maintenance outage of diesel generator 3 on February 27, 2023 (5)elevated/yellow risk during main turbine quadvoter valve solenoid replacement on March 16, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) CR 440991, CSP-DPT-6 (containment supply purge differential pressure transmitter)found low out of tolerance during surveillance testing on January 24, 2023
- (2) CR 441013, locked in low air pressure alarm following emergency diesel generator 3 bar over, on January 26, 2023
- (3) CR 441445, LPCS-FIS-4 flexible conduit detached from flow instrument on February 7, 2023
- (4) CR 442498, reactor core isolation cooling system leakage beneath RCIC-DT-1 on March 13, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) OSP-CCH/IST-M702, Control Room Emergency Chiller System B Operability, on January 6, 2023
- (2) OSP-ELEC-M703, HPCS Diesel Generator Monthly Operability Test, on February 28, 2023
- (3) OSP-MT-W701, Quad Voter Solenoid Valve Test following replacement of a main turbine quadvoter solenoid pilot valve with work order (WO) 02205059, on March 16, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) OSP-ELEC-M701, Diesel Generator 1 - Monthly Operability Test, on January 5, 2023
- (2) WO 02195089, monthly diesel generator 2 operability surveillance, on January 20, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) OSP-RHR/IST-Q704, RHR Loop C Operability Test, on January 20, 2023
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system between November 1, 2020, and January 31, 2023.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization between November 1, 2020, and January 31, 2023. Inspectors also evaluated the licensee's ability to staff their emergency response facilities in accordance with emergency plan commitments.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the 10 CFR 50.54(q) emergency plan change process and practices between November 1, 2020, and January 31, 2023. The evaluation reviewed screenings and evaluations documenting implementation of the process. In addition, the inspectors evaluated:
Emergency Plan, revision 68, effective January 26, 2023 PPM 13.14.4, Emergency Equipment Maintenance and Testing, revision 57, effective June 16, 2022 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program between November 1, 2020, and January 31, 2023. The evaluation reviewed evidence of completing various emergency plan commitments, the conduct of drills and exercises, licensee audits and assessments, and the maintenance of equipment important to emergency preparedness.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill on February 14,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022 IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022 EP03: Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following:
- (1) CR 441418, CSP-V-9 and CSP-V-10 opened during OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, on February 6, 2023
- (2) CR 442428, required element missed in simulator evaluation, on March 9,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Implement a Station Procedure Resulted in a Challenge to Primary Containment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000397/2023001-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71152A The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to establish, implement, and maintain procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2.
Specifically, the licensee failed to establish and monitor wetwell (WW) pressure as a key parameter while preforming OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, RHR Loop A Operability Test, with suppression pool spray in service, in accordance with licensee procedure OI-09, Operations Standard and Expectations. This resulted in a momentary loss and challenge to primary containment integrity when WW to reactor building vacuum breakers CSP-V-9 and CSP-V-10 opened in response to lowering WW pressure.
Description:
On February 6, 2023, during performance of licensee surveillance procedure OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, RHR Loop A Operability Test, WW pressure lowered as expected with suppression pool sprays in service. The associated pressure changes were neither monitored adequately nor established as a key parameter. The unmonitored pressure drop led to cycling of the reactor building (RB) to WW vacuum breakers CSP-V-9 and CSP-V-10, representing a momentary loss and challenge to primary containment integrity.
The inspectors noted that during the performance of procedure OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, RHR Loop A Operability Test, the crew did not closely monitor WW pressure as it trended downward, which contributed to the opening of the WW to RB vacuum breakers. When CSP-V-9 and CSP-V-10 opened, a momentary loss and challenge to primary containment integrity occurred. Following this, one of the vacuum breaker valves (CSP-V-10) did not indicate closed in the control room, so the licensee entered Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.1.6.A, and sent an equipment operator to the valve to verify it was closed locally.
The inspectors also noted that procedure OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, RHR Loop A Operability Test, contains a caution statement that states operation of the suppression pool sprays may cause WW pressure to drop and cycling of RB and WW vacuum breakers.
Considering all of the above, the inspectors concluded that during the RHR Loop A Operability Test, the control room failed to establish and assign WW pressure as a key parameter and monitor it adequately.
The inspectors confirmed that although CSP-V-9 and CSP-V-10 opened unintentionally, the system performed as designed and cycled the vacuum breakers closed, representing only a momentary loss of primary containment integrity.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 441418 and performed a critique to evaluate their response and lessons learned.
Corrective Action References: 441418
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Failure to implement procedure OI-09, Operations Standard and Expectations, revision 084, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33 and TS 5.4.1.a was a performance deficiency. Specifically, Section 4.2.7 of OI-09 states that key parameters are established to allow precise control of critical parameters and safe operation of plant systems, but during an RHR Loop A Operability Test, the control room failed to establish and assign WW pressure as a key parameter.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, by not establishing a key parameter and adequately monitoring WW pressure with suppression pool spray in service, the licensee unintentionally caused a WW pressure drop that opened the RB to WW vacuum breakers (containment supply purge valves, CSP-V-9, and CSP-V-10) resulting in an unnecessary challenge to primary containment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because although this resulted in a momentary actual open pathway from the WW to the RB, it was controlled by an operable containment supply purge valve control system and the valves were verified to be closed after they actuated. Also, the finding did not involve an actual reduction in the function of hydrogen igniters in containment.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, individual contributors perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is performed rather than relying on past successes and assumed conditions.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2. Section 2.g of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 recommends power operation and process monitoring procedures. The licensee established procedure OI-09, Operations Standard and Expectations, as a power operation and process monitoring procedure. Procedure OI-09 requires, in part, that key parameters be established to allow precise control of critical parameters and safe operation of plant systems.
Contrary to the above, on February 6, 2023, the licensee failed to establish key parameters to allow precise control of critical parameters and safe operation of plant systems. Specifically, during performance of procedure OSP-RHR/IST-Q702, RHR Loop A Operability Test, the licensee did not establish WW pressure as a key parameter, which impacted precise control of containment integrity and resulted in a momentary loss and challenge to primary containment integrity when the WW to RB vacuum breakers, CSP-V-9 and CSP-V-10, opened in response to lowering WW pressure.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On February 9, 2023, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness biennial program inspection results to William G. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer/ VP Nuclear Generation, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 13, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Dave Brown, Vice President of Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS The inspectors reviewed the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)/Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) report that was issued during the inspection period.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Action Requests
2782
Drawings
M519
Flow Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
103
Drawings
M775
Flow Diagram Emergency Chilled Water Piping System
Control Room
031, 032
Procedures
SOP-DG1-LU
Emergency Diesel Generator (DIV 1) Valve and Power Supply
Lineup
009
Procedures
SOP-DG1-STBY
Emergency Diesel Generator (DIV 1) Standby Lineup
23
Procedures
SOP-HVAC/CR-
LU
Control, Cable, and Critical Switchgear Rooms HVAC Lineup
003
Procedures
SOP-HVAC/CR-
Control, Cable, and Critical Switchgear Rooms HVAC
Operations
030
Procedures
SOP-HVAC/CR-
STBY
Control, Cable, and Critical Switchgear Rooms HVAC in
Standby Status
2
Procedures
SOP-RCIC-LU
RCIC Valve and Breaker Lineup
004
Procedures
SOP-SW-LU
Standby Service Water System Valve & Breaker Lineup
016
Work Orders
2194139
Calculations
FP-02-85-03
Combustible Loading Calculation
011
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Action Requests
440618, 440575, 442335
Fire Plans
PFP-DG-
BUILDING
Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Plan
005
Fire Plans
Radwaste 525
008
Fire Plans
Turbine Generator 471 Pre-Fire Plan
006
Miscellaneous
A554
Door Schedule Sheet 2
033
Miscellaneous
FM892-3
Fire Barrier and Fire Boundary Plan Operating Floors at El
501-0, 507-0 and 525-0
007
Procedures
1.3.57
Barrier Impairment
046
Procedures
15.2.14
Function Check, Sensitivity Check and Cleaning of
Photoelectric Detectors
015
Procedures
ABN-FIRE
Fire
045
Work Orders
2066677, 02167597, 02195886
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Action Requests
441373
Engineering
Evaluations
ME-02-02-02
Reactor Building Flooding Analysis
004
Engineering
Evaluations
ME-02-02-32
Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSS) Flooding Analysis - Reactor
Building
000
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
2262
Miscellaneous
LR002579
Cycle 23-1 Evaluated Scenario
000
Procedures
3.2.6
Power Maneuvering
21
Procedures
A.603.A8
603.A8 Annunciator Panel Alarms
046
Procedures
SOP-COND-
SHUTDOWN
Main Condensate System Shutdown
26
Procedures
SOP-CW-
SHUTDOWN
Circulating Water and Cooling Towers Shutdown
008
Procedures
SOP-RFT-
SHUTDOWN
Reactor Feedwater Turbine Shutdown
016
Procedures
TDI-08
Licensed Operator Requalification Program
21
Procedures
TDI-23
LORQ Annual Exam Development and Administration
018
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
439058, 439205, 439395, 439427, 439491, 439967, 440884,
2278
Procedures
5.1.1
Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Flow Chart for RPV
(reactor pressure vessel) Control
23
Procedures
SYS-4-22
015
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Action Requests
2683
Miscellaneous
High risk work plan for WO 02194023
2/29/2022
Miscellaneous
High risk work plan for WO 02202434
01/10/2023
Procedures
1.3.76
Integrated Risk Management
064
Procedures
1.3.83
Protected Equipment Program
037
Procedures
1.5.14
Risk Assessment and Management for
Maintenance/Surveillance Activities
044
Work Orders
2194023, 02166978, 02205059
Calculations
E/I-02-91-1072
Setpoint determination for instrument loop CSP-DPT-6
000
Corrective Action
Documents
2498, 442876
Drawings
M512-1
Flow Diagram Diesel Oil and Miscellaneous Systems Diesel
Generator Building
048
Drawings
M543-3
Flow Diagram Reactor Building Primary Containment Cooling
and Purging System
004
Engineering
Evaluations
High Energy Line Break (HELB) evaluation
000
Operability
Evaluations
CMR-95-0228
Calculation Modification Record for E/I-02-91-1072
03/08/1995
Procedures
1.3.66
038
Procedures
4.DG3
DG3 Annunciator Panel Alarms
21
Procedures
ICP-CSP-X301
Vacuum Breaker Actuation Instrumentation - CC
006
Procedures
ISP-CSP/IST-
B101
RB-WW Vacuum Breaker Setpoint Verification, Visual
Inspection, Actuation and VPI-CC
003
Procedures
High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Standby Lineup
2
Procedures
HPCS Diesel Generator Semi-Annual Operability Test
068
Procedures
OSP-RCIC/IST-
Q701
RCIC Operability Test
Procedures
TSP-RCIC-B801
RCIC Leakage Surveillance
Work Orders
2174877, 02197701, 02197704, 02166978
Work Orders
Work Requests
29169313
Calculations
ME-02-05-01
Determination of acceptable oil leakage rates from pump
motors
001
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
440287, 441039, 442648
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Action Requests
440823
Procedures
DO-P-1B Operability
2
Procedures
DO-TK-3B Monthly Operability Test
006
Procedures
Diesel Generator 2 - Monthly Operability Test
069
Work Orders
2194600, 02194139, 02194971, 02193773, 02175153,
2192160, 02196497
Miscellaneous
CGS Alert and Notification System (ANS) Design Report
2
Miscellaneous
1st Quarter 2022 ERO Call-In Drill Report
03/15/2022
Procedures
TSI-6.2.22
EP Annual Emergency Response Siren System Activation
Test
09/27/2021
Procedures
TSI-6.2.22
EP Annual Emergency Response Siren System Activation
Test
10/03/2019
Procedures
TSI-6.2.32
003
Miscellaneous
4th Quarter 2021 ERO Call-In Drill Report
2/17/2021
Miscellaneous
2nd Quarter 2021 ERO Call-In Drill Report
06/22/2021
Miscellaneous
1st Quarter 2021 ERO Call-In Drill Report
03/17/2021
Miscellaneous
3rd Quarter 2021 ERO Call-In Drill Report
09/15/2021
Miscellaneous
ERO Call-Out Drill Team A
11/17/2021
Miscellaneous
ERO Call-Out Drill Team D
09/27/2022
Miscellaneous
4th Quarter 2022 ERO Call-In Drill Report
2/06/2022
Miscellaneous
ERO On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report
003
Procedures
PPM 13.4.1
Emergency Notifications
044
Miscellaneous
50.54(q) Screening for E-Plan Revision 68 Editorials
11/30/2022
Miscellaneous
50.54(q) Screening for E-Plan Revision 68
2/28/2022
Miscellaneous
50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation for PPM 13.14.4 Revision
04/04/2022
Miscellaneous
50.54(q) Screening for PPM 13.14.4 Revision 57
03/29/2022
Miscellaneous
50.54(q) Screening for SWP-EPP-01 Revision 24
11/22/2022
Miscellaneous
50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation for E-Plan Revision 68
2/28/2022
Procedures
EPI-16
50.54(q) Change Evaluation
01/11/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Action Requests
2865, 413338, 413822, 414008, 414139, 414414, 414993,
415144, 415590, 415859, 416009, 416084, 416383, 417096,
417389, 418058, 420879, 420927, 423847, 424824, 425263,
28926, 430259, 430989, 432074, 432157, 432295, 433116,
434313, 435460, 436001, 436644, 437044, 437077, 437081,
437119, 437918, 437980, 438355, 438513
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Action Requests
441467, 441556, 441557
Miscellaneous
Focused Self-Assessment Report, Emergency Preparedness
09/07/2021
Miscellaneous
Focused Self-Assessment Report, Emergency Preparedness
08/10/2022
Miscellaneous
Quality Services Evaluation Report 2022 EP Program 12-
Month Audit Frequency Evaluation
2/07/2022
Miscellaneous
EP Contaminated Injured Man Drill Report
11/04/2021
Miscellaneous
EP Contaminated Injured Man Drill Report
11/17/2022
Miscellaneous
Reactor Coolant Sampling Drill Report
11/30/2021
Miscellaneous
Reactor Coolant Sampling Drill Report
2/06/2022
Miscellaneous
AU-EP-21
Emergency Preparedness 24-Month Audit
03/18/2021
Procedures
067
Procedures
068
Procedures
PPM 13.14.4
Emergency Equipment Maintenance and Testing
057
Procedures
PPM 13.14.8
Drill and Exercise Program
018
Procedures
PPM 13.14.9
Emergency Program Maintenance
030
Procedures
SWP-EPP-01
Emergency Response Organization and Training
23
Procedures
TSI-6.2.19
EP Federal Telephone System Functional Phone Testing
2
Procedures
TSI-6.2.29
EP Emergency Response Facsimile Machine Functional Test
003
Procedures
TSI-6.2.30
EP Emergency Response Dial-up Extension Functional Test
001
Procedures
TSI-6.2.31
EP Emergency Response Crash Extension Functional Test
003
Procedures
TSI-6.2.6
EP Emergency Response Ringdown System Functional Test
001
Work Orders
Work Order Task
2173553-01
Work Orders
Work Request 29158281, 29163333, 29167996, 29166716
Miscellaneous
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Scenario,
Section 6 for EP drill on February 14, 2023
2/14/2023
Miscellaneous
Team D ERO Drill Summary
2/14/2023
Miscellaneous
EP Drill Classification Notification Forms (CNFs) for Alert, Site
Area Emergency and General Emergency
2/14/2023
Miscellaneous
Columbia Generating Station ERO Team "D" ERO Drill
February 14, 2023, After Action Report/Improvement Plan
03/13/2023
Procedures
13.14.8
Drill and Exercise Program
018
Procedures
EPI-21
Drill and Exercise Development and Implementation
019
71151
Miscellaneous
Monthly PI Summary Spreadsheets for 2022
71151
Miscellaneous
December 2022 Station Performance Spreadsheet
71151
Miscellaneous
Operations Logs
01/01/2022 -
2/31/2022
71151
Miscellaneous
ANS Test Results and PI Data 4th Quarter 2022
71151
Miscellaneous
ERO Participation PI Tracking Data 4th Quarter 2022
71151
Miscellaneous
DEP Opportunity PI Data 4th Quarter 2022
71151
Procedures
EPI-18
Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators
27
Miscellaneous
Form 26297
CRS/SM/STA/IA Evaluation Summary
003
Miscellaneous
Form 26299
CRO Evaluation Summary
003
Miscellaneous
Form 27035
Operator Fundamentals Evaluation, evaluated scenario on
March 9, 2023
006
Miscellaneous
LR000250
Operations Requalification Training, Cycle 22-2 Evaluated
Scenario
000
Procedures
SW-CAP-01
Corrective Action Program
045
Procedures
TDI-08
Licensed Operator Requalification Program
21
Procedures
TDI-23
LORQ Annual Exam Development and Administration
018