IR 05000397/2020002

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Integrated Inspection Report 05000397/2020002
ML20210M406
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/2020
From: Jeffrey Josey
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To: Sawatzke B
Energy Northwest
References
IR 2020002
Preceding documents:
Download: ML20210M406 (22)


Text

July 29, 2020

SUBJECT:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2020002

Dear Mr. Sawatzke:

On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Columbia Generating Station. On July 9, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. W. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer/Vice President Nuclear Generation, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000397 License No. NPF-21

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000397

License Number:

NPF-21

Report Number:

05000397/2020002

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0011

Licensee:

Energy Northwest

Facility:

Columbia Generating Station

Location:

Richland, WA

Inspection Dates:

April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020

Inspectors:

G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector

L. Merker, Acting Senior Resident Inspector

C. Roettgen, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector

W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector

N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector

Approved By:

Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch A

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Columbia Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedure in 2008 Leads to Recirculation Pump Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000397/2020002-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71152 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, finding for the licensees failure to follow plant Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, that describes the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence. Specifically, in 2008, the licensee had a corrective action to perform a causal evaluation to understand the obsolescence of the adjustable speed drive (ASD) system gate turn-off thyristors (GTOs), but did not have a follow-on corrective action to address the noted increase in failure rates of the ASD system GTOs. This resulted in several ASD channel failures since 2008, and a recirculation pump trip and reactor transient on February 14, 2020.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

The reactor unit began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 19, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 65 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On May 21, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 60 percent to recover an adjustable speed drive channel following maintenance and returned to 65 percent. The unit returned to rated thermal power on May 25, 2020. On May 30, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 65 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On June 1, 2020, the reactor unit returned to 85 percent and then down powered to 65 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On June 5, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 60 percent for control rod scram time testing and sequence exchange, and maintenance on circulating water valve 2C, and returned to 65 percent. On June 6, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 25 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration. On June 9, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 15 percent for the licensee to remove the main turbine generator from the grid and balance the turbine. On June 10, 2020, the main turbine generator was synchronized to the grid. On June 11, 2020, the reactor unit returned to 40 percent. On June 12, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 25 percent due to high vibrations on the turbine. On June 13, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 15 percent to remove the main turbine generator from the grid and to rebalance the turbine. On June 14, 2020, the main turbine generator was synchronized to the grid and the reactor unit returned to 40 percent. On June 15, 2020, the reactor unit down powered to 25 percent to close an open bleed steam valve and returned to 65 percent. On June 21, 2020, the reactor unit returned to 85 percent. The unit returned to rated thermal power on June 22, 2020. On June 26, 2020, the reactor unit was down powered to 40 percent for economic dispatch from Bonneville Power Administration, where it remained for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal high temperatures for the following systems on June 26, 2020:

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding for the standby service water systems A and B pump rooms on May 28, 2020.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1)low pressure core spray system following annual maintenance on May 7, 2020 (2)standby gas treatment system A following annual maintenance on May 21, 2020 (3)residual heat removal system C on June 19, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Area RC-19/2, vital island corridor, on April 17, 2020
(2) Fire Area RC-2/1, cable spreading room, on April 23, 2020
(3) Fire Area R-8/1, low pressure core spray system pump room, on May 5, 2020
(4) Fire Areas RC-14/1 and RC-8/2, division 1 and 2 switchgear rooms, on June 5, 2020
(5) Fire Areas RC-5/1 and RC-6/2, division 1 battery and security equipment room and division 2 battery room, on June 5, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the division 1 and 2 electrical switchgear rooms on June 16, 2020.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a reactor downpower for economic dispatch, May 19-20, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification training drill (Crew C) on June 1, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of low pressure core spray system maintenance to ensure the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remained capable of performing their intended function on May 5, 2020.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1)yellow risk for reactor core isolation cooling planned maintenance on April 13, 2020 (2)high risk for recirculation pump A relay maintenance on breaker S5 on April 15, 2020 (3)high risk for adjustable speed drive system maintenance on May 21, 2020 (4)yellow risk for diesel generator 3 pre-start checks (bar over) and load testing on May 29, 2020 (5)emergent, high risk work on circulating water valve 2C during economic dispatch and station yellow risk on June 5, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with operability determinations and functionality assessments of degraded bolting on electrical manholes E-MH-E10, E-MH-E11, and E-MH-E15 on May 14, 2020.

71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from April 13-17, 2020:

(1)5059EVAL-17-0003, Approve Use of GOTHIC for Analysis of Certain High Energy Line Breaks, Revision 0 (2)5059EVAL-18-0001, Changing Methodology to GOTHIC 8.1 for RWCU HELB Analysis, Revision 0 (3)5059SCREEN-16-0012, Main Steam Line Flow Restrictor Chocked Flow, Revision 0 (4)5059SCREEN-17-0034, RWCU-MO-1 & 4 Modifications (Actuator Replacements),

Revision 0 (5)5059SCREEN-19-0106, RHR-MO-4A Gear Change for RHR-V-4A, Revision 0 (6)5059SCREEN-19-0110, Major Leak from Turbine Building Oil System, Revision 0 (7)5059SCREEN-19-0118, ABN-FLOODING, Revision 0 (8)5059SCREEN-19-0130, EC 16816, Replace the Valve Wedge and Change the Gear Ratio in RHR-V-8, Revision 0 (9)5059SCREEN-19-0135, LDCN-19-045, Revision 0 (10)5059SCREEN-17-0145, Backseat HV-V-31B by its Electrical Motor, Revision 0 (11)5059SCREEN-17-0146, Installation of Protective Plate on Reactor Building ECCS Room Water Tight Doors, Revision 0 (12)5059SCREEN-17-0150, PPM ABN-FAZ Procedure Revision to Make the Procedure More Efficient, Revision 0 (13)5059SCREEN-17-0167, Temporary Modification EC 16899 Will Use Nitrogen to Maintain BS-RV-26A in the closed position, Revision 0 (14)5059SCREEN-18-0030, Keep Mechanical Gag on AR-AO-1 to Permanently Keep AR-V-1 Open, Revision 0 (15)5059SCREEN-19-0017, Add Sentence to FSAR Section 11.4.2.4 for the Radwaste Disposal System for Fuel Pool, Floor Drain, and Waste Collector Filter Resin, Revision 0 (16)5059SCREEN-16-0076, Replaces Existing GE NGV 125 VDC Battery Ground Detection Relays E-RLY-4PG/B5, and -64PG/B6 With an ABB 27B Model. EC

===15414, Revision 0 (17)5059SCREEN-16-0148, Replace Existing E-EF-IN4/ACIN With a New AC Filter, Revision 0 (18)5059SCREEN-17-0161, Level 8 Setpoint Setdown Software Changes, Revision 0 (19)5059SCREEN-18-0003, FSAR Revision For Use of GOTHIC in Safety Analysis (LDCN-18-002), Revision 0 (20)5059SCREEN-18-0014, Replace ITE Safety Related E-CB-8A4A MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8A4A, Revision 0 (21)5059SCREEN-18-0015, Replace ITE Augmented Quality E-CB-8C1C MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8C1C, Revision 0 (22)5059SCREEN-18-0015, Replace ITE Augmented Quality E-CB-8C4A MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8C4A, Revision 0 (23)5059SCREEN-18-0016, Replace ITE Augmented Quality E-CB-8C4A MCCB With Fused Disconnect E-DISC-8C4A, Revision 0 (24)5059SCREEN-19-0064, Install CCTV for the Main Transformers, Revision 0 (25)5059SCREEN-19-0120, Replace Existing ITE Molded Case Circuit Breakers E-CB-8B2D, E-CB-2C1D, and WCH-CB-8E1E With Fused Disconnects, Revision 0

(26) Applicability Determination LS-19-0233, Procedure 5.6.1, SBO/ELAP, Revision 030, Revision 0
(27) Applicability Determination LS-20-0074, Procedure 5.6.2, Station Blackout (SBO)and Extended Loss of AC Power ELAP Attachments, Revision 015, Revision 0

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

=

(1) The inspectors evaluated the temporary modification of concrete block placement on manhole covers E-MH-E11 and E-MH-E15 on April 30, 2020.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1)eight-hour report 54466, loss of seismic assessment instrumentation, on April 2, 2020 (2)replacement of fire pump 110 batteries, week of April 16, 2020 (3)reactor water cleanup system pump 3A maintenance on April 20, 2020 (4)low pressure core spray system annual maintenance on May 6, 2020 (5)standby gas treatment system A on May 20, 2020 (6)fire protection pump 2B on June 24, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) OSP-CRD-W101, control rod SCRAM accumulator verification, on April 15, 2020
(2) OSP-CRD-M101, SCRAM discharge volume vent and drain valve monthly operability, on April 16, 2020
(3) ESP-BAT-W101, weekly battery test, on April 14, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) OSP-CCH/IST-M702, control room emergency chiller system B operability, on April 29,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===

(1)

(April 1, 2019-April 30, 2020)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensee's ability to identify when prohibited items are brought onsite, evaluate each occurrence, and implement corrective actions; and documented one observation on June 30, 2020.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1)evaluation of the February 14, 2020, trip of recirculation pump 1A on June 3, 2020 (2)evaluation of the January 15, 2020, loss of adjustable speed drive channel 1A/2 on June 15, 2020

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Reporting (IP Section 03.05)

(1) The inspectors evaluated a June 2, 2020, inadvertent emergency response organization callout and the licensee's response on June 4,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedure in 2008 Leads to Recirculation Pump Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events

Green FIN 05000397/2020002-01 Open/Closed

None (NPP)71152 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, finding for the licensees failure to follow plant Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, that describes the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence. Specifically, in 2008, the licensee had a corrective action to perform a causal evaluation to understand the obsolescence of the adjustable speed drive (ASD) system gate turn-off thyristors (GTOs), but did not have a follow-on corrective action to address the noted increase in failure rates of the ASD system GTOs. This resulted in several ASD channel failures since 2008 and a recirculation pump trip and reactor transient on February 14, 2020.

Description:

On February 14, 2020, recirculation pump 1A tripped off when both ASD channels 1A/1 and 1A/2 tripped due to internal faults. The reactor recirculation system is designed to provide forced coolant flow through the reactor core and consists of two loops, each with a recirculation pump. The ASD system controls recirculation pump flow by varying the frequency of the electrical power supplied to the pump motor. Each recirculation pump is controlled by two ASD channels. Both channels are required for the recirculation pump to operate at full speed. A recirculation pump can be operated with only one ASD channel in service at a reduced speed.

In 2008, the licensee initiated action request (AR) 186054 that identified the ASD system GTOs failure rate was increasing. The AR also stated the cards were greater than 12 years old and may be nearing end of life. The licensee performed a causal evaluation that restated the GTO failure rate was increasing after 10-12 years of service. However, no corrective action assignment was initiated to address the increased failure rate of the GTO cards. This AR was cross referenced to engineering technical evaluation (AR-EVAL) 178017 that documented the obsolescence of the ASD system.

Engineering technical evaluation AR-EVAL 178017 had three assignments. The first assignment was to find a replacement part for the obsolete GTO; this assignment was closed out stating a replacement did not exist and that the ASD system would need to be replaced. The second assignment was to evaluate a new ASD system since the GTOs were obsolete with no repair or replacement available; this assignment was closed out with no action recommended as the licensee had enough spare GTOs available to last approximately 10 years. The third assignment was to review the evaluation and either take appropriate action or recommend AR closure; this assignment recommended the AR to be closed since the licensee had spare parts available for 10 years. Again, no corrective action assignment was initiated to address the increased failure rate of the GTO cards. The ASD obsolescence issue was then put on the licensee's 2009 long-range plan. In 2014, the ASD obsolescence issue was removed from the long-range plan and AR-EVAL 316044 was initiated to track resolution of the obsolescence of the ASD system.

The inspectors noted the purpose of Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, is to describe the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence. Step 4.11.1j states, in part, that corrective actions that require preliminary evaluation to understand the problem should have a separate corrective action for the preliminary activity and a follow on corrective action for implementation. In 2008, the licensee performed a causal evaluation that stated the GTO failure rate was increasing after 10-12 years of service. However, no corrective action assignment was initiated to address the increased failure rate of the GTO cards. This resulted in the GTO cards being replaced with spare parts after experiencing failure. The most recent GTO card failure resulted in the February 14, 2020, recirculation pump trip and reactor transient.

Corrective Actions: The licensee's corrective actions included replacing one GTO card in the 1A/1 channel and six GTO cards and a power supply in the 1A/2 channel, restoring both channels to service, and restarting the recirculation pump. The licensee also entered the issue into the corrective action program and completed an event investigation.

Corrective Action References: Action Request 404225

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to follow plant Procedure SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program, Revision 16, that describes the corrective action process beginning with the identification of an issue or condition through implementing actions to correct the condition and/or preclude its recurrence was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, in 2008, the licensee had a corrective action to perform a causal evaluation to understand the obsolescence of the ASD system GTOs, but did not have a follow on corrective action to address the noted increase in failure rates. This resulted in several ASD channel failures since 2008 and a recirculation pump trip and reactor transient on February 14, 2020.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using the questions in Exhibit 1, initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Observation: Increase in Prohibited Items Identified 71152 The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions related to a potential trend increase of prohibited items identified at the security checkpoint. From January 1, 2020, to June 30, 2020, the licensee initiated 12 action requests (ARs) related to prohibited items declared at the security checkpoint. The inspectors noted that 8 of the ARs were initiated in the second quarter, between April 1, 2020, to June 30, 2020, during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic when less individuals than normal accessed the site. Conversely, from January 1, 2019, to June 30, 2019, the licensee initiated 9 similar ARs with 6 initiated in the second quarter, between April 1, 2019, to June 30, 2019, during a quarter that included Refueling Outage R24 when more individuals than normal accessed the site. The inspectors noted that the overwhelming majority of individuals with prohibited items in their possession were either contractors or delivery personnel and not licensee employees. The inspectors verified no prohibited items entered the protected area.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, evaluations, and corrective actions related to these ARs. In each instance, the licensee adequately followed site procedures to identify, evaluate, and correct the issue. The inspectors identified that the licensee was aware of the increasing trend of prohibited items identified at the security checkpoint and took corrective actions, but had not initiated an AR to document the trend. The inspectors also noted that the licensee's use of trend codes was inconsistently applied to ARs documenting prohibited items brought onsite. The licensee initiated AR 408442408442to document the concern.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On April 16, 2020, the inspectors presented the Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inspection exit meeting inspection results to Mr. W. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer/Vice President Nuclear Generation, and other members of the licensee staff.
  • On July 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. W. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer/Vice President Nuclear Generation, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.01

Calculations

CE-02-13-18

Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) Analysis for Columbia

Generating Station

000

CE-02-13-22

Effects of Local Intense Probable Maximum Precipitation

Analysis for Columbia Generating Station

000

ME-02-92-41

Calculation for Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis

007

ME-02-92-43

Room Temperature Calculation for DG Building, Reactor

Building, Radwaste Building and Service Water

013

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

396990, 407275, 393438, 393813, 398976, 400018, 402976,

403992, 406096, 406680, 406733, 406737, 406949, 407290

Engineering

Changes

18010

Provide Power to E-TR-M2 Cooler Group 2 Cooler 2 Oil

Pump

001

Miscellaneous

GO2-16-143

Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50-397 Flooding

Hazard Reevaluation Report, Response to NRC Request for

Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding

Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-term Task Force Review of

Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

10/06/2016

Procedures

4.840.A5; 840.A5

Annunciator Panel Alarms

28

ABN-FLOODING

Flooding

2

SOP-

COLDWEATHER-

OPS

Cold Weather Operations

034

SOP-

HOTWEATHER-

OPS

Hot Weather Operations

006

SOP-

WARMWEATHER-

OPS

Warm Weather Operations

016

Work Orders

2126293, 02126294, 02129776, 29154662, 29154977

71111.04

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

2800, 396502, 407980, 407981

Drawings

M520

Flow Diagram HPCS and LPCS Systems

105

M521-3

Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal Loop C

2

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

M544

Flow Diagram HVAC-Standby Gas Treatment

076

Miscellaneous

Instrument Master Data Sheet for SGT-FR-2A2

009

Instrument Master Data Sheet for SGT-FT-1A2

009

Procedures

1.3.29

Locked Valve Checklist

085

ABN-SGT-

TEMP/RAD

Standby Gas Treatment Charcoal High

Temperature/Radiation

006

SOP-LPCS-LU

LPCS Valve and Breaker Lineup

003

SOP-LPCS-STBY

Placing LPCS in Standby Status

2

SOP-RHR-LU

RHR System Valve and Breaker Lineup

008

SOP-RHR-STBY

Placing RHR in Standby Status

005

SOP-SGT-LU

Standby Gas Treatment System Lineup

000

SOP-SGT-STBY

Placing Standby Gas Treatment In Standby Status

2

Work Orders

29153347

71111.05

Calculations

FP-02-85-03

Combustible Loading Calculation

010

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

406072, 406195

Miscellaneous

BIP 20-0062

Transient Combustible Permit for Vital Island - General Area

04/08/2020

BIP 20-0160

Barrier Impairment Permit: Electrical Access Area, Door

C218

04/29/2020

BIP 20-0161

Barrier Impairment Permit: Electrical Access Area, Door

C218

06/01/2020

BIP 20-0178

Barrier Impairment Permit: Vital Island Door C216

04/27/2020

BIP 20-0244

Barrier Impairment Permit: Battery Room #1, Door C219

04/29/2020

BIP 20-0245

Barrier Impairment Permit: Battery Room #1, Door C219

06/01/2020

TCP 20-0014

Transient Combustible Permit: Cable Path TG501, TG471,

RW467, RW487

05/04/2020

TCP 20-0046

Transient Combustible Permit for Vital Island Div 1 Battery

Room C210, Inside Door

04/07/2020,

06/04/2020

TCP 20-0048

Transient Combustible Permit: Vital Island - General Area

05/26/2020

TCP 20-0053

Transient Combustible Permit for Vital Island - General Area

04/06/2020

TCP 20-0085

Transient Combustible Permit: RW 467 - In Front of Tool Crib

General Area

05/18/2020

Procedures

1.3.10C

Control of Combustibles

21

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

1.3.57

Barrier Impairment

038

ABN-FIRE

Fire

041

PFP-RB-422

Reactor 422

006

PFP-RW-467

Radwaste 467

005

PFP-RW-484-487

Radwaste 484-487

005

Work Orders

2115649, 02128947

71111.06

Calculations

ME-02-02-23

PFSS Flooding Analysis - Radwaste Building

001

ME-02-03-04

Radwaste Building Flooding Analysis

001

ME-02-11-12

Concrete Floor Flood Barrier Analysis

000

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

398295, 400176, 400183, 403999, 404242, 407275

Miscellaneous

BIP 20-0124

Barrier Impairment Permit: R548 L7/8.3 at FPC Pump/HX

Room

03/18/2020

FPF 1.1-40

Fire Rated Penetration Seals

2

PSA-1-SM-0001

CGS PSA Internal Event Summary

008

PSA-2-FL-0002

Probabilistic Safety Assessment Model Notebook: Internal

Flooding Propagation, Screening, and Accident Scenario

Development Report

003

PSA-2-FL-0003

Probabilistic Safety Assessment Model Notebook: Internal

Flooding Initiating Events Frequency Development Report

2

Procedures

1.3.57

Barrier Impairment

038

15.4.6

Essential Fire Rated Penetration Seal and Essential Fire and

Flood Barrier Operability Inspection

011

4.FCP.3

FCP.3 Annunciator Panel Alarms

24

ABN-FLOODING

Flooding

2

SOP-

DOOR/HATCH-

OPS

Reactor Building, Turbine Building, Radwaste Building and

Containment, Personnel, Equipment Access Area Doors, and

Hatches

017

Work Orders

2138317, 02138318, 02138319, 02138320, 02138321

71111.11Q Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

389186, 402277, 406797, 407009, 407012, 407013, 404679,

407204

Miscellaneous

Reactivity Control Plan Economic Dispatch to 65% CTP May

20

05/19/2020

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

LR002488

Columbia Generating Station Simulator Scenario 20-3

Evaluated Scenario

000

Procedures

3.3.1

REACTOR Scram

066

5.1.1

RPV Control

2

5.2.1

Primary Containment Control

28

ABN-CORE

Unplanned Core Operating Conditions

017

ABN-POWER

Unplanned Reactor Power Change

016

OI-07

Training Expectations

015

OI-09

Operations Standards and Expectations

077

SOP-CR-

MOVEMENT

Control Rod Movement

003

SOP-FWH-

SHUTDOWN

Extraction Steam and Heater Vents/Drains System Shutdown

004

SOP-RRC-FLOW-

QC

Reactor Power Change with RRC Flow Controllers - Quick

Card

005

TDI-06

Simulator Management

21

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

390944, 404026, 406546

Procedures

1.5.11

Maintenance Rule Program

016

OSP-LPCS/IST-

Q702

LPCS System Operability Test

044

SYS-4-22

Maintenance Rule Program

014

Work Orders

2117856, 02118311, 02118312, 02118313, 02117856,

2123922, 02131741, 02131742, 02131745, 02153301,

2153302

71111.13

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

406705, 406799, 407060, 393083, 398408, 407136, 407139,

407333, 407430, 407463, 407479, 407510, 407481

Drawings

M507-1

Flow Diagram Circulating Water System Turbine Generator

BLDG & Yard

178

Miscellaneous

High Risk Work Plan to Install Gag Device on CW-V-2C

000

High Risk Work Plan for Work Orders 02112977, 02158041,

and 02161630

05/19/2020

Procedures

1.3.76

Integrated Risk Management

060

1.3.76

Integrated Risk Management

059

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

1.3.83

Protected Equipment Program

031

1.3.86

Online Fire Risk Management

005

ESP-RLYS5-B401

ISP-RCIC-Q907

RCIC Isolation on Low Steam Supply Pressure - Channels B

& D - CFT/CC

005

TSP-DG3-B502

HPCS Diesel Generator DG3 Load Testing

25

Work Orders

2126770, 02121810, 02112977, 02158041, 02161630,

2085269, 02120123, 02163244

71111.15

Calculations

6.08.01-SII-6

Calculation for Transformer Yard Electrical Manholes

001

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

304266, 304289, 381023, 405330, 406119

Miscellaneous

5059SCREEN-14-

0063

Screening for Temporary Concrete Deadmen Will be Placed

on Top of Class 1 Electrical Manholes E10, E11, and E15

03/12/2014

AD-14-0339

Applicability Determination for Missing Bolts on Outer Covers

for Class 1 Electrical Manholes E10, E11, and E15

000

GO2-14-077

Columbia Generating Station, docket No. 50-397 Licensee

Event Report No. 2014003-0

05/12/2014

Procedures

SWP-CAP-01

Corrective Action Program

041

Work Orders

2124766

71111.17T

Calculations

ME-02-08-10

Flow Restrictor Chocked Flow Calculation

2

Engineering

Changes

EC0000016355

RWCU-MO-1 & 4 Modifications (Actuator Replacements)

2

EC0000016816

Perform Repairs to RHR-V-8 Based on EN inspections and

Results of EPRI MOV PPM Calculations Which Predicted a

TYPE 1 Error

000

EC0000017929

RHR-MO-4A Gear Change for RHR-V-4A

000

LDCN-19045

Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Overpressure Analysis Basis at 25

%RTP

000

Miscellaneous

10.25.187A

Motor Control Center Starter Maintenance - NLI Starters

2

10.25.48

Testing Molded Case Circuit Breakers

016

50.59EVAL-18-

0001

Changing Methodology to GOTHIC 8.1 for RWCU HELB

Analysis

000

29SCREEN-19-

0106

RHR-MO-4A Gear Change for RHR-V-4A

000

5059EVAL-17-

Approve Use of GOTHIC for Analysis of Certain High Energy

000

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

0003

Line Breaks

5059SCREEN-16-

0012

Main Steam Line Flow Restrictor Chocked Flow

000

5059SCREEN-17-

0034

RWCU-MO-1 & 4 Modifications (Actuator Replacements)

000

5059SCREEN-19-

0110

Major Leak from Turbine Building Oil System

000

5059SCREEN-19-

0118

ABN-FLOODING

000

5059SCREEN-19-

0130

EC 16816, Replace the valve wedge and change the gear

ratio in RHR-V-8

000

5059SCREEN-19-

0135

LDCN-19-045

000

999-00,214

5600 Series Motor Control Center Cubicles Instruction

Manual

2

LS-19-0233

Procedure 5.6.1, SBO/ELAP, Revision 030

000

LS-20-0074

Procedure 5.6.2, Station Blackout (SBO) and Extended Loss

of AC Power ELAP Attachments, Revision 015

000

TAC NO. MB5096

(ML041410566)

River Bend Station, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment RE: High

Energy Line Break Analysis

04/20/2004

Procedures

5.6.1

SBO/ELAP

030

5.6.2

Station Blackout (SBO) and Extended Loss of AC Power

ELAP Attachments

015

ABN-FLOODING

Flooding

2

ENG-DES-50

Interface Procedure for IP-ENG-001

2

IP-ENG-001

Standard Engineering Process

001

Major Leak from

Turbine Building

Oil Systems

000

PPM 1.3.76

Integrated Risk Management

049

PPM 3.2.1

Normal Plant Shutdown

088

SWP-LIC-02

Licensing Basis Impact Determinations

015

SWP-PRO-02

Preparation, Review, Approval and Distribution of Procedures 050

71111.18

Engineering

266

Alternate Hold Down Detail for Manholes E-MH-E10, E-MH-

001

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Changes

E11, and E-MH-E15

13650

Calc 6.08.01-SII-6 Rev 0 - Modification to Tornado Holddown

Bolting for E-MH-E10, E-MH-E11, and E-MH-E15 Manhole

Covers

000

212

TMOD for Placing Concrete Blocks on Manhole Covers E-

MH-E11/E-MH-E15

000

Procedures

SWP-CM-02

Temporary Configuration Changes

003

Work Orders

2124766, 02153631

71111.19

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

406566, 406584, 406795, 406900, 406969, 407121, 407133,

407258, 407544, 407555, 407962

Engineering

Changes

17870

FP-P-2B Replacement

000

Procedures

15.1.3

FP-P-110 Operability Test

009

15.1.6

FP-P-2B Operability Test

014

15.4.8

Fire Protection System Functional Test

24

ISP-SEIS-M202

Seismic System Channel Check

2

ISP-SEIS-S404

Seismic System Channel Functional Test

001

ISP-SEIS-X308

Seismic System Channel Calibration

2

OSP-LPCS-M101

LPCS Fill Verification

015

OSP-LPCS/IST-

Q702

LPCS System Operability Test

044

OSP-SGT-M701

Standby Gas Treatment System A Operability

018

OSP-SGT/IST-

Q701

SGT Valve Operability (System A)

010

SOP-OG-LU

Offgas System Lineup

001

SOP-RWCU-OPS

Reactor Water Cleanup System Operations

013

Work Orders

2159994, 02128013, 02128194, 02131742, 02131745,

2151690, 02153301, 02153302, 02131510, 02131511,

2131513, 02124025, 02146082, 02138843, 02107662,

2122123, 02046143, 02146952, 02160512

71111.22

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

403221, 405472, 406406

Miscellaneous

IST-4

Inservice Testing Program Plan Fourth Ten-year Inspection

Interval

003

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Procedures

1.5.1

Surveillance Testing Program

041

1.5.19

Surveillance Frequency Control Program

001

OSP-CCH/IST-

M702

Control Room Emergency Chiller System B Operability

044

OSP-CRD-W101

Control Rod SCRAM Accumulator Verification

008

SWP-IST-01

ASME Inservice Testing

003

Work Orders

2150623, 02131655, 02150840

71151

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

399463, 399557

Miscellaneous

Operations Logs April 1, 2019 - April 30, 2020

05/19/2020

GO2-19-158

Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50-397 Licensee

Event Report No. 2019-001-00

11/25/2019

71152

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

178017, 186054, 316044, 391432, 391991, 404225, 405176,

405183, 316044, 353763, 355428, 357897, 359747, 359748,

361492, 363946, 378928, 389577, 404225, 403173, 390327,

391189, 391430, 392724, 392965, 394214, 394942, 395529,

395904, 398063, 398301, 398350, 402101, 402572, 402886,

403574, 405059, 405297, 405723, 406670, 407030, 407276,

407805

Procedures

10.25.68

RRC-IMD-ASD1A/1 and RRC-IMD-ASD1A/2 Induction Motor

Drive Software Settings and Self-Test

000

DES-2-9

Technical Evaluations

039

GBP-CAP-03

Trending Program

001

SOP-RRC-START

Reactor Recirculation, System Start

21

SWP-CAP-01

Corrective Action Program

016, 041

SWP-SEC-03

Security Responsibilities of Site Personnel

030

SYS-2-18

Life Cycle Management

001, 005

TM-01

Trending Manual

003

Work Orders

2158380, 02158041, 02158042, 02161630, 29153498

71153

Corrective Action

Documents

Action Requests

(ARs)

407465

Procedures

OI-34

Notifications

039

OI-36

NRC Notifications

009