IR 05000397/2016001
| ML16120A017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/2016 |
| From: | Gregory Kolcum NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A |
| To: | Reddemann M Energy Northwest |
| Groom J | |
| References | |
| IR 2016001 | |
| Download: ML16120A017 (40) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ril 28, 2016
SUBJECT:
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2016001
Dear Mr. Reddemann:
On March 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Columbia Generating Station. On March 31, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Columbia Generating Station.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jeremy R. Groom, Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000397/2016001 w/ Attachment:
Supplemental Information RFI for O
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000397 License: NPF-21 Report: 05000397/2016001 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station Location: North Power Plant Loop Richland, WA 99354 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2016 Inspectors: D. Bradley, Resident Inspector N. Greene, PhD, Health Physicist S. Hedger, Operations Engineer G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector J. ODonnell, CHP, Health Physicist D. Stearns, Health Physicist D. You, Resident Inspector Approved Jeremy Groom, Chief By: Projects Branch A Division of Reactor Projects-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000397/2016001; 01/01/2016 - 03/31/2016; Columbia Generating Station; integrated inspection report.
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2016, by the resident inspectors at Columbia Generating Station and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. NRC inspectors documented in this report one licensee-identified violation of very low safety significance. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas.
Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and associated corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
PLANT STATUS
The plant began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 16, 2016, the plant reduced power to approximately 92 percent to test main steam bypass valves. The plant returned to 100 percent power on January 17, 2016. On February 9, 2016, the plant reduced power to approximately 90 percent to support control rod maintenance. The plant returned to 100 percent power on February 10, 2016. On February 13, 2016, the plant reduced reactor power to 75 percent for rod sequence exchange. The plant returned to 100 percent reactor power on February 14, 2016. On March 18, 2016, the plant reduced reactor power to approximately 67 percent for power suppression testing. The plant returned to 100 percent reactor power on March 21, 2016. On March 28, 2016, the plant was manually scrammed due to a loss of reactor closed cooling water. The plant restarted on March 30, 2016 and returned to 70 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walk-down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:
- January 5, 2016, control rod drive and hydraulic control units
- January 6, 2016, standby gas treatment
- February 25, 2016, 125 VDC and 250 VDC battery
- March 25, 2016, emergency diesel generator 2 starting air The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted four partial system walk-down samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Complete Walk-down
a. Inspection Scope
On February 29, 2016, the inspectors performed a complete system walk-down inspection of the seismic monitoring system. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, open condition reports, in-process design changes, temporary modifications, and other open items tracked by the licensees operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted one complete system walk-down sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety:
- February 11, 2016, Fire Areas RC-11/12/13, radioactive waste building 525 foot elevation
- February 23, 2016, Fire Areas SW-1/2, service water pump house A and B
- March 8, 2016, Fire Areas TG-1, turbine building 471 foot elevation
- March 27, 2016, Fire Area RC-10/U, main control room For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
On February 3, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected three underground bunkers that contained risk-significant or multiple-train cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:
- Electrical Manhole E-MH-E10, division 2 service water
- Electrical Manhole E-MH-E13, division 1 service water
- Electrical Manhole E-MH-E15, division 3 service water The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the bunkers and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.
These activities constituted completion of one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On February 3, 2016, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk due to maintenance activities. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:
- January 28, 2016, for post maintenance testing of emergency diesel generator 3
- February 1, 2016, for post maintenance testing of emergency diesel generator 1
- March 14, 2016, for reactor core isolation cooling surveillance testing
- March 18, 2016, for power suppression testing
- March 25, 2016, for post maintenance testing of emergency diesel generator 2 In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector conducted an in-office review of the annual requalification training program to determine the results of this program.
On January 31, 2016, the licensee informed the inspector of the following Columbia Generating Station operating test results:
- 7 of 7 crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test
- 59 of 59 licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test
- 59 of 59 licensed operators passed the job performance measure portion of the operating test There was no remediation performed for the licensed operators that took the operating test.
The inspector completed one inspection sample of the annual licensed operator requalification program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs):
- January 28, 2016, emergency diesel generator 3, two and four year preventive maintenance
- February 1, 2016, radioactive floor drains including maintenance history
- March 31, 2016, emergency diesel generator 2, frequency fluctuation and magnetic pickup maintenance
- March 31, 2016, emergency diesel generator 2, two and four year preventive maintenance The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
These activities constituted completion of four maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
- January 22, 2016, green risk during work on circuit breaker E-CB-8/85/1
- February 22, 2016, yellow risk during work on alternate rod insertion system
- March 9, 2016, green risk for service water pipe flushing
- March 18, 2016, green risk during power reduction for power suppression testing
- March 24, 2016, yellow risk for work week activities with emergency diesel generator 2 inoperable for maintenance The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
These activities constituted completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations and functionality assessments that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:
- January 4, 2016, operability determination of a speed sensor failure on emergency diesel generator 1 under Action Request (AR) 341324
- January 4, 2016, operability determination of relay RPS-RLY-K3E failure on reactor protection system under AR 341869341869* January 9, 2016, operability determination of valve leakage for a loose cap on RHR-V-162B under AR 343278343278* January 21, 2016, operability determination of broken control power light socket on SM-8 under AR 343778343778* February 11, 2016, operability determination of valve leakage past CRD-V-107 on the hydraulic control unit for control rod 18-43 under AR 342564342564* March 2, 2016, operability determination of degraded motor operator torque on shutdown cooling isolation valves RHR-V-8 and RHR-V-9 under AR 341251341251The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded SSC.
The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
These activities constituted completion of six operability and functionality review samples, which included one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two temporary plant modifications that affected risk-significant SSCs:
- February 10, 2016, modification to add drain hose to hydraulic control unit 1843 under Work Order 02082542 for valve CRD-V-107
- February 12, 2016, modification to emergency diesel generator 1 speed sensor circuit under engineering change 15085 The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed these temporary modifications in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that these modifications did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs. The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modifications to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.
These activities constituted completion of two samples of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:
- January 15, 2016, emergency diesel generator 3 after two and four year preventive maintenance
- February 9, 2016, for reactor protection system motor generator A maintenance
- February 10, 2016, work on hydraulic control unit drain valve CRD-V-107/1843
- February 22, 2016, for alternate rod insertion relay replacement
- March 24, 2016, emergency diesel generator 2 after two and four year preventive maintenance The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
These activities constituted completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the stations forced outage that occurred on March 28, 2016, the inspectors evaluated the licensees outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the forced outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:
- Monitoring of shut-down activities
- Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities
- Monitoring of heat-up and startup activities These activities constituted completion of one outage activities sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed five risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests:
- January 22, 2016, division 2 control room emergency chiller monthly surveillance including valve stroke data for service water isolation valves Other surveillance tests:
- January 21, 2016, emergency diesel generator 2 monthly surveillance test
- February 2, 2016, standby service water loop A surveillance test
- February 4, 2016, emergency diesel generator 1 monthly surveillance test
- February 25, 2016, emergency diesel generator 3 monthly surveillance test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constituted completion of five surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on January 12, 2016, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the simulator, emergency operations facility, and technical support center, and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Training Evolution Observation
a. Inspection Scope
On February 23, 2016, the inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification training that included implementation of the licensees emergency plan.
The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the evaluators and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constituted completion of one training observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees performance in assessing the radiological hazards in the workplace associated with licensed activities. The inspectors assessed the licensees implementation of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control measures for both individual and collective exposures. The inspectors walked down various portions of the plant and performed independent radiation dose rate measurements. The inspectors interviewed the radiation protection manager, radiation protection supervisors, and radiation workers. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
- The review of plant isotopic mix and percent abundance, including hard-to-detect radionuclides and potential alpha hazards
- The hazard assessment program, including a review of the licensees evaluations of changes in plant operations and radiological surveys to detect dose rates, airborne radioactivity monitoring, and surface contamination levels
- Instructions and notices to workers, including labeling or marking containers of radioactive material, radiation work permits, actions for electronic dosimeter alarms, and changes to radiological conditions
- Programs and processes for control of sealed sources and release of potentially contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area, including survey performance, instrument sensitivity, release criteria, procedural guidance, and sealed source accountability
- Radiological hazards control and work coverage, including the adequacy of surveys, radiation protection job coverage and contamination controls
- The use of electronic dosimeters in high noise areas, dosimetry placement, implementation of effective dose equivalent external (EDEX), and the application of dosimetry to effectively monitor exposure for work in areas with significant dose rate gradients
- Controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage pools
- Posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas
- Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance with respect to radiation protection work requirements
- Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls since the last inspection These activities constituted completion of radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS3 In-plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee controlled in-plant airborne radioactivity concentrations consistent with as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles and that the use of respiratory protection devices did not pose an undue risk to the wearer. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various portions of the plant, and reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
- The licensees use, when applicable, of installed ventilation systems as part of its engineering controls
- Utilization of temporary ventilation systems (e.g., high-efficiency particulate air units) to support work in contaminated areas and airborne monitoring protocols
- Evaluations for the use of respirators in lieu of engineering controls to maintain occupational doses ALARA
- The licensees respiratory protection program for use, storage, maintenance, and quality assurance of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certified equipment, qualification and training of personnel, and user performance
- Air quality and quantity for supplied air devices and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) air bottles
- The licensees capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency conditions, status of SCBA staged and ready for use in the plant and associated surveillance records, and personnel qualification and training
- Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to in-plant airborne radioactivity control and mitigation since the last inspection These activities constituted completion of in-plant airborne radioactivity control and mitigation as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.03.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2015. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that there were no unplanned exposures or losses of radiological control over locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas during the period of April 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015. The inspectors reviewed a sample of radiologically controlled area exit transactions showing exposures greater than 100 mrem. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the occupational exposure control effectiveness performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences (PR01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records for liquid or gaseous effluent releases that occurred between April 1, 2015, and December 31, 2015, and were reported to the NRC to verify the performance indicator data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the radiological effluent technical specifications (RETS)/offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM) radiological effluent occurrences performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected three issues for an in-depth follow-up:
- On January 4, 2016, degraded voltage on 125 VDC circuit E-DP-S1/2D circuit 6 under Action Request (AR) 340134.
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate.
- On January 28, 2016, policies and use of training, self-assignment, and action request type condition reports in the corrective action program.
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate.
- On February 2, 2016, fuel defects and associated cause evaluation under AR 336352336352
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate.
These activities constituted completion of three annual follow-up samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
(Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000397/2015-007-00: Reactor Building Pressure Greater Than Technical Specifications Requirement
a. Inspection Scope
On November 9, 2015, the licensee exceeded the Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment, differential pressure value of 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. Specifically, a loose electrical lug connection caused a loss of power to a safety-related division 2 power supply, E-E/S-299, which affected non-safety reactor building exhaust air flow. The licensee restored secondary containment differential pressure using the division 1 train of the safety-related standby gas treatment system within seven minutes. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as AR 339549339549 repaired the loose lug connection, and performed an extent of condition review.
b. Findings
The inspectors identified a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with a safety-related power supply. Specifically, the licensee experienced an intermittent failure of non-safety reactor building ventilation on June 11, 2015. Since the condition resolved without any corrective action, the licensee concluded the cause of the failure was a spurious voltage spike and recalled the technicians assigned to diagnose the problem. The latent condition, loose connections on the power supply, then caused a similar failure of non-safety reactor building ventilation on November 9, 2015. The inspectors assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, issued September 7, 2012, and determined the issue was of minor safety significance since it did not adversely affect the mitigating systems cornerstone objective. Specifically, the loss of secondary containment differential pressure was of a short duration and readily restored using diverse, operable safety-related equipment. Further, any latent failure of E-E/S-299 may have caused a loss of non-safety reactor building ventilation and, by design, would have also caused the associated division 2 standby gas treatment fans to fail to maximum flow and provide sufficient differential pressure for the reactor building.
This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This licensee event report is closed.
These activities constituted completion of one event follow-up sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On February 23, 2016, the inspector communicated the results of the annual operating test results review to Mr. G. Wyatt, Supervisor, Simulator and Exam Group. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On March 3, 2016, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. R. E. Schuetz, Plant General Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On March 31, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to M. Reddemann, Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a non-cited violations.
- Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, prior to November 17, 2015, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, in October 2012, the licensee identified in AR 271801271801that the maintenance procedure for Square D QMB electrical disconnects, specified in procedure PPM 10.25.53, Inspection of Lighting Panels and Power Panels, Revision 10, did not include steps to clean and burnish contacts that are susceptible to corrosion that may yield a high-resistance connection.
However, the licensee failed to identify that several installed QMB disconnects may be vulnerable to failure since the previous maintenance performed did not include the steps to clean and burnish the contacts. Consequently, on November 17, 2015, the 125 VDC circuit (E-DP-S1/2D circuit 6) associated with under voltage trips of the division 2 vital bus failed a monthly surveillance test due to degraded voltage from high-resistance connections on corroded contacts. The licensee implemented corrective action by declaring affected components inoperable per technical specifications, identified high-resistance contacts as the cause, burnished the contacts to restore the circuit, and re-performed the surveillance to establish operability. The licensee also performed relay testing to demonstrate 125 VDC circuit availability at the observed, degraded voltages. The inspectors assessed the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012. Using Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of safety function, did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as AR 340134340134
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- S. Abney, Assistant Manager, Operations
- O. Brooks, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- D. Brown, Manager, System Engineering
- S. Cooper, Plant Fire Marshal
- S. Clizbe, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- D. Gregoire, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- G. Hettel, Vice President, Operations
- G. Higgs, Manager, Maintenance
- M. Hummer, Licensing Engineer
- A. Javorik, Vice President, Engineering
- C. Moon, Manager, Quality
- R. Prewett, Operations Manager
- G. Pierce, Manager, Training
- B. Schuetz, Plant General Manager
- D. Stevens, Assistant Manager, Operations
- D. Suarez, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
- K. Van Speybroek, EFIN Supervisor
- L. Williams, Licensing Supervisor
- D. Wolfgramm, Compliance Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs
- G. Wyatt, Supervisor, Simulator and Examination Group
- J. Zielinski, Cable Condition Monitoring Program Manager
NRC Personnel
- V. Gaddy, Branch Chief
- H. Gepford, PhD., CHP, Branch Chief
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000397/2015-007 LER Reactor Building Pressure Greater Than Technical Specifications Requirement (Section 4OA3)
Attachment 1