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Insp Repts 50-338/86-17 & 50-339/86-17 on 860602-0706. Violations Noted:Failure to Require Review of Design Change Acceptance Tests for Tech Spec Requirements & to Perform Written Safety Evaluation
	ML20205D726
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	07/25/1986
From:	Caldwell J, Ignatonis A, King L; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20205D710	List: ML20205D708; ML20205D713; ML20205D726;
References
	50-338-86-17, 50-339-86-17, NUDOCS 8608180161
	Download: ML20205D726 (8)
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- * ti UNITEO STATES

o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ -

n REGION 18

g. j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

~* ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

%***.*$ .

Report,Nos: 50-338/86-17 and 50-339/86-17

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Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company

Richmond, VA 23261

Docket Nos: 50-338 and 50-339

Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2

. Inspection Conducted: June 2 - July 6, 1986

Inspectors: N h c mMd 7/AF[86

'Date Signed

. L. CaldW11, Sepor Resident Inspector.

6 0 cA k

.P. King,0rasidentgnspector

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ofte Sfgned

Approved by: 8. d . -

A. J. Ignat6 fis,~ Secfion

d44,

Chief

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D He Signed

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Division of Reactor Projects '

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SUMMARY .

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Scope: Thisroutineinspectionbytheresidentinspectorsinvol[vedthefollowing

areas: Plant Status, Inspector Follow-up and Unresolved , Items, Licensee Event

Report (LER) Followup, Routine Inspection, Monthly. Maintenance Observation,

Monthly Surveillance Observation, ESF System Walkdown, and Potential Generic

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Items.

Results: Two violations were identified - failure to require a review of Design

Change Acceptance Tests for Technical Specification requirements and failure to

perform a written safety evaluation. Ses paragraphs 5 and 7 respectively for

details.

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8608190161 860729

PDR ADOCK 05000338

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REPORT DETAIi S

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

E. W. Harrell, Station Manager

R. C. Driscoll, Quality Control (QC) Manager

G. E. nane, Assistant Station Manager

E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager

R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations

M. R. Kansler, Superintendent, Maintenance

A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics

J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services

J. L. Downs, Supervisor, Administrative Services

J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator

D. A. Heacock, Engineering Supervisor

D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor

R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor

F. T. Terminella, QA Supervisor

R. S. Thomas, Supervisor Engineering

G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist

J. H. Leberstein, Licensing Coordinator

SV. C. West, Supervisor of Planning and Support Ser, vices

G. D. Gordon, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance

M. G. Pinion, Supervisor, Plant Engineering

T. Johnson, Supervisor, Quality Assurance

Other licensee employees contacted include technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force membirs, and office personnel.

Attended exit interview

l 2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 8,1986, with

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those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the

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inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the

i material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

(0 pen) Violation 338,339/86-17-01: Failure to have a program requiring a

review of Design Change Acceptance Test for Technical Specification

l requirements. See paragraph 5 for details.

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l (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 338/86-17-02: Request for design information

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on sola transformers. See paragraph 6 for details.

(0 pen) Violation 338/86-17-03: Failure to perform a written safety

l evaluation. See paragraph 7 for details.

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3. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

4. Plant Status (93702)

Unit 1

Unit 1 was in startup from a previous trip during the first couple of days

of this inspection period. The rest of the period, Unit 1 was at or near

100% power.

Unit 2

On Sunday, June 29,1986, at 12:17 a.m. , Unit 2 tripped from a feed flow,

steam flow mismatch coincident with a low "C" steam generator water level.

The cause of this event was a fault in the 230kv line feeding the #2 main

(500kv) bus. This resulted in the loss of all loads on the 500kv bus #2

which included A and B reserve station transformers and the associated 4160

volt emergency buses 1J and 2H. The loss of voltage on 2H emergercy bus

resulted in the Unit 2 main feed pump recirculation valves and the feedwater

heater dump valves to fail full open. This resulted in the trip of A main

feed pump and the 8 main feed pump after it had started. Both feed pump

trips were due to low suction pressure. The Unit 2 operators were unable to

restart A or B feed pump or reduce power ia time to prevent the plant from

tripping. All safety systems operated as required with the exception of the

Unit 2 B charging pump which had started due to low voltage on' the 2H

emergency bus, but after approximately 18 minutes of operation, the B

charging pump tripped due to a ground in the motor. The C charging pump

continued to operate after the emergency diesel started and supplied the 2H

bus and the A charging pump was available for operation. Unit 2 has

restarted and was critical at 7:41 p.m. on June 29, 1986, and the generator

was placed on line at approximately 1:46 a.m. on June 30, 1986.

This trip is similar to a Unit 2 trip in March 1985. The 1985 trip was

manually initiated by the operator but exhibited similar characteristics

just prior to the manual trip signal. The initiating event was a problem

with the 230kv Gordonsville line causing the loss of all the loads on the #2

500kv bus including the A and B reserve station transformers and the

associated 4160 volt emergency buses 1J and 2H. The March 1985 trip is

discussed in inspection report 85-05. The licensee is evaluating possible

solutions to prevent a fault on the Gordonsville line from causing plant

trips in the future.

5. Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items (92701)

(Closed) IFI 338,339/86-03-02: Emergency Work Request Log. The inspectors

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reviewed emergency work request log and found it to be satisfactory.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item 338,339/86-13-03. Station Battery Technical

Specification Requirements: When reviewing the unresolved item on the

design change for Unit 1 and Unit 2 station battery replacement, the

inspectors discovered that no formal program existed for reviewing design

change acceptance tests to ensure Technical Specification requirements were

being met. The inspectors had discussion with all the various licensee

departments which are' involved with the design change process and no one

felt that they had the responsibility for ensuring that all Technical

Specification requirements were met prior to declaring Technical Specifica-

tion controlled equipment operable. The licensee does, however, have

several other mechanisms, such as the LC0 action statement log, which will

ensure that most of the equipment controlled by Technical Specification have

met the Technical Specification requirements prior to being placed back in

operation. In most cases, however, these mechanisms are not procedurally

controlled and rely basically on the operator's understanding of how the

system is supposed to work. As in the case of the station batteries, these

mechanisms did not ensure that all Technical Specification requirements

(e.g. surveillance requirement correcting specific gravity for temperature

or electrolyte level effects) were met by the design change acceptance test

or the LCO action statement log prior to declaring the batteries operable.

The inspectors have been able to determine that the station batteries were

operable per Technical Specifications at the time the were placed back into

operation. This determination was made by a review of the performance tests

that were performed subsequent to the batteries being placed back into

operation. Since the violation for failure to follow procedures (issued in

inspection report 338,339/86-13) and the violation in this report (for

failing to have a program to ensure that Technical Specification require-

ments were met) are both related to Unresolved Item 338,339/86-13-03, this

item is considered closed.

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Section XI, Test Control, states in part that a test

program shall be established to assure that all testing required to

demonstrate that structures, system and components will perform satis-

l factorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written

test . procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits

contained in applicable design documents. Also, the test results shall be

documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been

satisfied.

! The failure of the licensee to have an established program to ensure that

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equipment under Technical Specification control which has been replaced or

modified meets all the Technical Specification requirements pric- to

declaring the equipment operable will be identified as a Violation

338,339/86-17-01. *

(0 pen) Unresolved Item 338/86-13-04: Charging Pump Repair. See paragraph 8

for details.

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6. Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-Up (90712 and 92700)

The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that

reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that

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corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had been

considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally, the

inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and

that violations of regulations or Technical Specification (TS) conditions

had been identified.

(Closed) LER 338/85-05 (Rev. 2) Surveillance not performed on seismic

monitoring instrumentation.

(Closed) LER 338/86-08, Reactor Trip - Steam Flow Feed Flow Mismatch

Coincident with Low Steam Generator Level.

(Closed) LER 339/86-05, Unit 2 Reactor Trip May 29, 1986.

(Closed) LER 338/86-09, Unit 1 Reactor Trip May 31, 1986. IFI 338/86-17-02

is opened as a result of inspector investigation on the reactor trip of

Unit 1, May 31, 1986, which pertained to the loss of a sola transformer

supplying power to Vital Bus 1-I (VB1-I). The licensee was requested to

provide design information to show that the sola transformer is designed to

provide alternate power for an extended time period. The Technical Speci-

fications do not address limitations on using an alternate power supply for

extended periods of time. On May 31, 1986, (reference Inspection Report

50/338,339/86-13) the sola transformer insulation melted. It had been

supplying power to VB-1-I since May 29, 1986.

7. Routine Inspection (71707)

By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that

the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the

inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system

status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift

personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.

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Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with

selected Technical Specifications and Limiting Conditions for Operations.

During the course of the inspection, observations relative to Protected and

Vital Area security were made, including access controls, boundary inte-

grity, search, escort and badging.

On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RW. ) were reviewed and the

specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being

conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were

periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency

was verified.

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The inspectors kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both

units and of any significant safety matters related to plant operations.

Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs and

data sheets were reviewed daily.

The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the

Control Room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress;

verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment;

confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator

alarms, and housekeeping.

The following comments were noted:

During a recent visit to the site by Region II licensee examiners for the

purpose of administering exams to licensed operator candidates, a question

was posed to the residents on the significance of a jumper installed to

remove from service the 1H diesel generator annunciator 1,n the control room.

During the review of the jumper installation, the inspectors discovered that

the jumper, which had already been removed, had not had a safety evaluation

performed for its installation as required by 10 CFR 50.59. Discussion

with plant personnel indicated that it has not been the practice to perform

safety evaluations on jumpers installed on non-safety related equipment.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's Administrative Procedure 14.1, Jumpers

(Temporary Modification), which details the requirements for installation of

jumpers. This procedure specifically requires written safety evaluations to

be performed for jumpers installed on equipment which is safety-related or

the system, component, or equipment (or its operational / functional capabi-

lity) is described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The

inspectors determined that the annunciator which was removed from service by

jumper N-1-1165 is described in the UFSAR, Section 8.3.

Administrative Procedure (AP) 14.1 is in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59 which

requires the licensee to maintain records which include written safety

evaluations providing the basis for the determination that a change to the

facility as described in the safety analysis report does not involve an

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unreviewed safety question. The failure of the licensee to perform a safety

I evaluation for jumper N-1-1165 installation per the requirement of AP 14.1

l will be identified as a violation 338/86-17-03, Failure to Follow Procedure

j for Jumper Installation.

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i 8. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting safety related systems and

i components were observed / reviewed, to ascertain that the activities were ,

l conducted ir. accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and 1

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industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifica- l

tions.

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During the closecut review of unresolved item 338/86-13-04, the inspectors

reviewed the past periodic tests, preventative maintenance performed and

corrective maintenance procedures. The 1-CH-P-1B charging pump had been in

an alert condition on outboard radial and thrust horizontal bearing

vibration several times since March 15, 1985. A search of the above work on

the pumps indicates that an oil sample was taken on April 19, 1986, on the

damaged bearing and two quarts of oil were replaced. The mechanical

maintenance procedure MMP-P-CH-1 indicated on April 18, 1986, in step 6.4

that the Operations Department was requested to run PT 14.2. This test was

not run until April 24, 1986. The shift supervisor's log (1-LOG -1)

indicated that the pump ran for three minutes and was secured for "a smoked

motor inboard bearing". The licensee is to meet with the inspectors to

explain the details of the failure of the pump. A review of the work

request performed after the failure of the pump gives no explanation of the

cause of failure. Pending the outcome of the meeting results and further

review, this unresolved item will remain open.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed / reviewed technical specification required testing

and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate proce-

dures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions

for operation (LCO) were met and that any deficiencies identified were

properly reviewed and resolved.

The following periodic tests (PT) were reviewed:

2-PT-14.1 - Unit 2 Charging Pump 1A performed June 5,1986.

1-PT-71.2 - Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3A which is in an alert

condition on Delta P. Engineering Work Request 86-193 will be used to

establish new reference Delta P and the PT will be revised with new

acceptance criteria.

2-PT-74.2A - Unit 2 Component Cooling Pump 1A.

2-PT-57.5A Leak Rate Test of 2-51-P-1A and associated piping. There was no

leakage detected.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The following selected ESF system was verified operable by performing a

walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems.

The inspectors performed ESF walkdown on Unit 2 Low Head Safety Injection

System (2-0P-7.1A)

No violations or deviations were identified.

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11. Potential Generic Item

Potential Generic Item (PGI) 86-04 was issued concerning a problem with the

field flash relay reset circuit on Morrison-Knudson Supplied Emergency

Diesel Generators (EDGs). The inspectors reviewed the PGI and determined

that it was not applicable to the North Anna Power Station.

The EDGs located at North Anna were suppliea by the Fairbanks Morris

Division of Colt Industries. A discussion witn licensee engineers and a

review of the Celt technical manual supplied by the licensee revealed that

the problem witi the field flash relay reset circuit did not occur at North

Anna. The fiel flash relay will deenergize only when the EDG stop switch

has been energized and will not normally reset, until the EDG has dropped

below 250 RPM. However, according to the licensee engineers and the

technical manual, if the EDG rece.ives an emergency start signal, the EDG

will come back up to speed and the field flash relay will reenergize

regardless whether the EDG had dropped below 250 RPM or not.

12. Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues (TI 2515/77)

The inspectors completed Attachment 2 of TI 2515/77 which pertained to

questions on selected safety issues. The issues were high head safety

injection and biofouling of cooling water heat exchangers. The service

water system is undergoing major maintenance to hydrolaze piping and replace

small bore piping with stainless steel piping. This is approximately a

two year effort that requires taking portions of the system out of service

for seventy two hours.

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ML20205D726

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