IR 05000483/1987002

Safety Insp Rept 50-483/87-02 on 861201-870207.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Lers,Meeting W/Local Officials,Corrective Action Program & Training & Qualification Effectiveness

ML20211M828
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	02/18/1987
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211M778	List: IR 05000483/1987002 ML20211M773
References
50-483-87-02, 50-483-87-2, NUDOCS 8702270370
Download: ML20211M828 (11)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

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Report No. 50-483/87002(DRP)

. Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, M0 63166

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Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, M0 Inspection Conducted: December 1,1986 through February 7,1987 Inspectors: B. H. Little

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C. H. Brown (O h L

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Approved By: W. L. Forney*,

Reactor Projects Section 1A ef '"//r/P7 Dats Inspection Summary Inspection on December 1, 1986 through February 7, 1987 (Report No. 50-483/87002(DRP))

-Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, Licensee Event Reports, meeting with local officials, corrective action program, NRC Region III and Region IV management site visit, regional requests, training and qualification effectiveness, operational safety, surveillance, maintenance, and ESF system walkdow Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspectio %$227ho O

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DETAILS Persons Contacted D. F. Schnell, Vice President, Nuclear S. E. Miltenberger, General Manager, Nuclear Operations

• G. L. Randolph, Manager, Callaway Plant C. D. Naslund, Manager, Operatians Support A. P. Neuhalfen, Manager, Quality Assurance

• J. D. Blosser, Assistant Manager, Operations & Maintenance J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Technical Services P. T. Appleby, Assistant Manager, Support Services W. F. Powell, Assistant Manager, Materials M. E. Taylor, Superintendent, Operations D. E. Young, Superintendent, Maintenance

• W. R. Robinson, Superintendent, I&C R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Health Physics V. J. Shanks, Superintendent, Chemistry J. A. Ridgel, Superintendent, Radwaste G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Planning & Scheduling W. H. Sheppard, Superintendent, Outages J. M. Price, Superintendent, Training G. R. Pendegraff, Superintendent, Security J. E. Davis, Superintendent, Compliance D. W. Capone, Manager, Nuclear Engineering W. R. Campbell, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Engineering A. C. Passwater, Superintendent, Licensing T. H. McFarland, Superintendent, Design Control R. D. Affolter, Superintendent, Systems Engineering

J. V. Laux, Superintendent, Technical Support G. A. Hughes, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineer Group

• J. C. Gerhart, Superintendent, QA Operations Support

• T. P. Sharkey, Supervisor, Compliance

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• B. K. Stanfield, Quality Assurance Engineer

• Denotes-those present at one or more exit interview In addition, a number of Equipment Operators, Reactor Operators, Senior Reactor Operators, and other members of the Quality Control, Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Engineering Staffs were contacte . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Unresolved Item (483/85022-01(DRS)): Frequency of Maintenance Related Incidents. This matter related to the frequency of maintenance related Incident Reports (irs) and resulting Licensee Event Reports (LERs). The inspector reviewed LERs and Incident Reports issued in 1986. The inspector also interviewed personnel of the following licensee departments; Quality Assurance (QA), Quality Control (QC), Compliance, and Maintenanc , . _ .. - - . .

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Of the 23 LERs issued during the first six months, four are attributed to maintenance errors (two resulted in reactor trips, and two resulted in containment / control room ventilation isolation actuations. There were no recurrence of these events, resulting from maintenance errors, during the last seven month Maintenance related irs have decreased significantly, from approximately 40 during the first six months to 12 during the last six month The licensee has been responsive in the implementation of reactor trip and incident reduction programs. These programs have effectively reduced maintenance related incidents and event This item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (483/85022-02(DRS)): Documenting " Apparent Cause" on Work Requests (WRs). An NRC inspection found that corrective maintenance Work Requests frequently lacked a statement of "cause of failure." This deficiency was also identified by the licensee as documented in Quality Assurance Request for Corrective Action (RCA) No. P8505-070.

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The inspector reviewed licensee corrective action in this matter, response to QA's RCA P8505-070 and performed a sample review of work requests completed in 198 Licensee's corrective action included the formal training of maintenance, I&E, and Planning and Scheduling personnel. The RCA was closed by QA on July 30, 1986, following QA's evaluation and verification of corrective actio The inspector determined that licensee's corrective action has been effective. The "cause of failures" are being documented on work requests, in addition, WRs provide cause category, and failure modes which are included in licensee trending program. This item is considered close (Closed) Violation (483/86019-01(DRP)): Failure to Establish a Continuous Fire Watch. This matter relates to licensee's failure to establish a required continuous fire watch for an inoperable pre-action sprinkler system. Licensee's response included counseling of responsible personnel, issuing a letter to operating crews, and revising the alarm response procedure OTA-KC-00008.

The inspector determined that the licensee has taken appropriate action and there has been no similar recurrence. This item is considered close (0 pen) Open Item (483/86020-01(DRP): Thermal Hydraulic Anomal On November 18, 1986, the licensee determined the existence of a

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thermal hydraulic anomaly at Callaway. The anomaly is indicated by small variations of core power, temperature, delta pressure, and flow. Safety evaluations performed by the licensee and Westinghouse concluded that the anomaly presented no impact on plant safety.

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To assess generic aspects, eight Westinghouse four loop plants have looked for the ancmaly and four have found it to be present in their plants. Those plants that observed the anomaly are Callaway, Wolf Creek, and Catawba 1 and Westinghouse is continuing its evaluation and survey of other plant The thermal hydraulic anomaly was discussed with NRC Staff during a meeting on January 16, 1987. The anomaly is thought to be flow induced; however, the actual cause was not identified. Subsequent to the meeting, the licensee discontinued stripchart recording of core parameters, but is continuing to monitor core parameters at a reduced frequency using the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS). This system allows CRT display, trend, and print-out of key plant parameters via inputs from the balance-of-plant computer. A copy of these print-outs are provided to the NRC resident inspector The inspector ha's maintained overview of the anomaly, and of licensee's response in this matter. The inspector performed frequent observations of plant instrumentation, stripchart recordings and ERFIS print-outs of selected parameters, and verified that the variations were not divergent in nature and were within the limits of T/S. This item remains open pending further NRC revie No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)

An inspection of LERs was performed to determine that the reporting requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that events were evaluated for root cause and received appropriate corrective action to prevent recurrence. In addition, each event was evaluated for previous events and generic applicability. The inspection included an in-office review, direct observations, the review of plant records and interviews with licensee personne (Closed) LERs 483/85-051, 483/86-001, 483/86-007-01, 483/86-010-01, 483/86-024-01, 483/86-027, 483/86-029, and 483/86-03 LER N . Title L 483/85-051 Hi Negative Flux Rate Trip 483/86-001 Inadvertent Engineered Safety Actuation 483/86-007-01 Missing Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 483/86-010-01 Reactor Trip Power Range Hi Flux Signal 483/86-024-01 T/S 3.0.3 Entered Due To a Rod Control Card Failure 483/86-027 Reactor Trip Turbine Control Malfunction

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483/86-029 Manual Reactor Trip (Rod Control Card Failure)

483/86-030 Reactor Trip (RCS Flow Bypass Valve Failure)

(Closed)LER 86-017-00*: Reactor Protection System Logic Actuation Due to Personnel Error. The reactor was shutdown and in Mode 4 with the Reactor Trip Breakers open when an inadvertent Reactor Protection System Logic Actuation occurred on May 21, 1986. The actuation was from a Source Range Hi Flux Reactor Trip signal which was caused by personrel errors. Operations personnel had not placed the channel in bypass per procedures, when the Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) personnel inadvertently shorted the low voltage power supply causing a trip signa The cperating crews were notified of the event and the I&C personnel were counsele (Closed) LER 86-019-00*: Low Pressurizer Pressure Reactor Trip. On June 6, 1986, a reactor trip from 100% power occurred due to a low pressurizer pressure signal. The I&C technicians had calibrated one of the pressurizer pressure transmitters and during the return of the transmitter to service, a low pressure spike was sensed by the two transmitters on the common sensing line. This satisfied the 2-out-of-4 low pressure logic and a reactor trip si The technician had not followed proceduresseveral (gnal was stepsgenerate were performed out of order) when returning the instrument to service. The guidelines were developed for when procedures are to be "in hand" and a leak check added to the procedur (Closed) LER 86-040-00*: Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

Actuation Due to Inappropriata Human Performance. On December 23, 1986, I&C technicians were installing test equipment when a relay

terminal was inadvertently shorted causing a steam generator blowdown isolation (SGBDI). In the process of restoring the SGBDI, the operator inadvertently pushed the " actuate" part of the AFW actuation / reset l button causing AFW pump to start and making the event reportable.

l The pump was quickly secured and the normal lineup completed. This

! event was discussed with operators and I&C technicians to highlight the j need for careful deliberate action The inspector determined that the above LER events received a high level of management attention, and were thoroughly evaluated for cause and corrective action within licensee's Event and Trip Reduction Progra The licensee's performance shows that a favorable trend has been achieved in the frequency of both reportable events and trips. The above LERs are considered close *

Violations are identified in the above LERs annotated by (*) which

! meet the criteria for 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C for which a notice

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of violation will not generally be issued. These violations are of lesser severity which were identified, reported, and satisfactorily corrected by the licensee, and are not violations that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation. Therefore, no notice of violation is being issued and these LERs are considered close _, . - ___

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. Information Meeting With Local Officials (94600)

On January 14, 1987, the Resident Inspectors met with local public officials in Fulton, Missouri. The meeting was held to introduce the local officials to the resioent staff and to discuss NRC functions and matters relating to the Callaway Nuclear Plant. The public officials were provided NRC organization charts and NRC contacts and phone numbers for sources of additional informatio The inspectors met with the following official Mr. R. Garnett Presiding Judge Mr. P. Willett County Judge - Western District Mr. W. Morgan Mayor, Fulton City Ms. Y. Thayer Assistant Mayor, Fulton City Mr. H. Lee Sheriff, Callaway County Those attending the meeting expressed a general interest in the plant activities and specific interest in the Radiological Emergency Response Exercises (RERE). Attendees also expressed overall satisfaction with the utilization and performance of off-site agencies during the latest RERE. The public officials believed that the Callaway Plant was well accepted by the area residents and that the utility's management was forthright and responsive to local interes No violations or deviations were identifie . Corrective Action Program (92720)

An inspection in this area was performed to assess licensee's overall management controls, programs, and administrative procedures to identify, follow, and correct safety-related problems. The inspection incluced interviews with licensee personnel and a review of the following:

l Licensee's administrative procedures for identifying, tracking and resolving problems I

Quality Assurance (QA) Audits and Surveillance Reports Licensee Event and Incident Reports NRC inspection findings Special Reports by internal and external organization The following administrative procedures provide the basis for the I licensee's corrective action programs which include the documenting, i reporting, tracking, and correcting of deficiencies.

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APA-ZZ-00320 " Initiating and Processing Work Request"

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i; APA-ZZ-00500 " Nonconforming Operations Reporting and Corrective Actions"

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.APA-ZZ-00510 "Nonconformance Control and Reporting" Department procedures (Engineering, Operations, and Quality Assurance)

provide further program controls and requirements. Licensee's programs provide for trending of deficiencies, incidents, and work request.

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The inspector determined that the licensee has implemented adequate management controls to carryout an effective corrective action program.

The inspector reviewed 20 Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and 54 Incident-Reports (irs) documented in 1986. The LERs were well documented, provided thorough description of the event, cause and corrective actio The irs were generally thorough and indicative of licensee's low reporting threshold. Five irs contained " conditions" or vague descriptions of cause. .The documentation discrepancies-have been

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I b discussed with the license ,

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The inspector interviewed members of licensee's QA department, reviewed QA Audit Report No. 8608A (Corrective Action and Nonconforming Item

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Control Programs), Surveillance Reports, and associated Requests for

Corrective Action (RCA). The inspector determined that QA has provided l a thorough, objective overview in this area and deficiencies identified

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are receiving appropriate licensee response.

The-inspector reviewed internal and external reports which included QA, Compliance and Independent Safety Review Group tracking and trending reports, and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INP0) " Operating" Evaluation Report-(August 1986).

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The inspector determined that the licensee has implemented a L ' comprehensive Corrective Action Program. The licensee has effective-i programs to identify, track, and trend deficiencies, and is responsive in taking corrective action.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . NRC Region III and Region IV Management Site Visit On January 22-23, 1987, the resident inspectors accompanied i Mr. W. L. Forney, NRC Region III Management, during a site visit.

l' Messrs. J. Gagliardo and D. Hunter, NRC Region IV Management, and

! Mr. J. Cummings, Senior Resident Inspector at Wolf Creek accompanied Region III personnel during portions of the visit. The site visit

included an in-plant tour and interviews with licensee management and staf t

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Material condition of the plant was detennined to be very good. Control Room personnel were attentive and activities were being performed in a business-like marne Discussions during the exit meeting focused on licensee performance trends and areas where continued improvement is warranted. The licensee's performance in most areas is considered to be very good, showing favorable performance trends. Also discussed were NRC planned resident inspector support inspections. This would include annual plant drills and emergency backup support inspections by resident inspectors assigned to the Callaway and Wolf Creek plant No violations or deviations were identifie . Response to NRC/ Regional Requests (92701, 25016 and 25582) Thinning of Secondary Piping; National Survey on Licensee's Actions Regarding Thinning of Secondary Pi)ing; IE Information Notice (IEIN)86-106 "Feedwater Line Brea("

In response to these requests, an inspection was made of the licensee's actions and evaluations of the feedwater line break event and IEIN 86-106. In discussions with licensee personnel and review of procedures, the inspector determined that the ifcensee has a program in place to monitor piping wall thickness from the condenser to the feedwater pumps. The monitor program uses an EPRI developed equation to calculate areas of piping walls that are subjected to turbulent caused erosion / corrosion. The piping areas identified by the equation are marked off in 2-inch by 2-inch grid. The wall thickness is measured in each square by a Level III inspector with a straight beam ultrasonic testing metho The measurements are presently scheduled on a monthly base The procedure EDP-ZZ-01015, " Inspection and Trending of Power Piping for Erosion / Corrosion," was originally issued in December 1985 and has been used to trend / replace piping / fittings in the following systems.

i Service water piping and components l Steam generator blowdown piping

Main steam and reheater drain tank drains Feedwater minimum flow piping Condensate to steam generator feed pumps piping Piping containing wet steam I

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The EPRI Research Project 2231-2 developed equation was for wet steam piping, but the licensee has shown good agreement between actual measurements and calculations made using the factor for subcooled wate IE Information Notice 85-45: Potential Seismic Interaction Involving the Movable In-Core Flux Mapping System Used in Westinghouse Designed Plant Bechtel made a evaluation of the seismic interaction between the equipment above the seal-table and the seal-table guide tubes for the SNUPPS in July 1985. The supports for equipment in this area are seismically designed II/I. Bechtel concluded in their letter of July 16, 1985, that this equipment should not prove a problem in the SNUPPS project This was also the subject of Temporary Instruction 2500/16 which is also considered complet IE Bulletin (IEB) 86-01: Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pump IEB 86-01 was sent to Callaway for information. The licensee reviewed the bulletin and determined that the minimum flow of emergency systems pumps would not be interrupted in this manne The inspector's review of the systems indicated no problems on this item. The IEB 86-01 was closed in Inspection Report No. 86020. This is considered to complete TI 2515/8 . Training and Qualification Effectiveness (41400 and 41701)

An evaluation of training and qualification effectiveness was made during the inspection period. The evaluation included discussicas with personnel, observations of plant evolutions in progress, and the review of personnel performance during plant event A maintenance training center has been established for craft personne The center contains various plant components, pumps, valves and piping systems. The facility is being effectively utilized for hands-on trainin Work groups, erecting scaffolding in a II/I seismic area were found to be knowledgeable of the requirement for scaffolding with seismic limitation On several occasions control room operations have been observed during unplanned cccurrences. Operating crews' performance during such events demcnstrated operators ability to promptly identify and correct off-normal conditions, and is indicative of effective trainin Events at the plant and applicable events occurring at other sites are factored into the requalification program. The operators appear to be knowledgeable of events in the industry and how they may be effecte No v.olations or deviations were identifie _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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- perational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators throughout the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected safety related systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor, auxiliary, and turbine buildings were conducted. During these tours, observations were made relative to plant equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological control and conditions, housekeeping, security, tagging of equipment, ongoing maintenance and surveillance, containment integrity, and availability of safety related equipmen No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors reviewed or observed selected portions of the Technical Specifications required surveillance testing during power operation Items which were considered during the inspection included whether adequate procedures were used to perform the testing, test instrumenta-tion was calibrated, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements, and the test was performed within the required time limits. The inspector determined that the test results were reviewed by someone other than the personnel involved with the performance of the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violation or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance (62703)

Selected portions of the plant maintenance activities on safety related systems and component were observed or reviewed to ascertain that the activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and that the performance of the activities conformed to the Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during these inspections: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrating were performed prior to returning the components or systems to service; parts and materials that were used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented as necessary; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work Request N Activity WR 65530 Modify ESFAS Logic Card WR 60799 Callaway Modification (CMP 860089)

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WR 42032 Corrosion Test Coupon Rack B Callaway Modification CMP 84-0018A WR 67197 Installation of Seismic II/I Scaffolding WR 67198 Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Repair No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The operability of selected engineered safety features (ESF) was confirmed by the inspectors during a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system. The following items were included: procedures match the plant drawings, equipment conditions, housekeeping, instrumentation and valve and electrical breaker lineup status (per procedure checklist);

locks, tags, jumper, etc. are properly attached and identifiable. The following systems were walked down during this inspection perio *

Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Component Cooling Water System Essential Service Water System Auxiliary Feedwater System Station Battery

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interviews (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensce representative acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify ar.y such documents / processes as proprietar