IR 05000498/1986013

Insp Repts 50-498/86-13 & 50-499/86-13 on 860405-0630.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Site Tours,Licensee Action on Previous Findings,Allegations & Receipt,Storage & Handling of Equipment at Plant Warehouse

ML20215F370
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	09/26/1986
From:	Breslau B, Bundy H, Carpenter D, Constable G, Renee Taylor NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215F341	List: IR 05000498/1986013 ML20215F338
References
50-498-86-13, 50-499-86-13, NUDOCS 8610160176
Download: ML20215F370 (17)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/86-13 Construction Permits: CPPR-128 50-499/86-13 CPPR-129 Dockets: 50-498 Expiration Dates: December 1987 and 50-499 December 1989 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: April 5 through June 30, 1986 Inspectors: - # 7 E $~[

D.'R; Cafpenter, Senior Resident Inspector Date'

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Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch V#

It TNUau, Project Inspector, Project Da'te '

Section C, Reactor Projects Branch Y

H. F. Bundy, Project Inspector, Project T/W/2&

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Section C, Reactor Projects Branch v 4l2fB R~G.Taylfr,ProjectInspector, Project

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Section C, Reactor Projects Branch Approved: r

'GLL. C6ng.ableMef, Project Section C

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Reactor Projects Branch

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8610160176 861008 8 DR ADOCK 0500

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' Inspection'Summsry' -

Inspectiori C6n'd'ucted pril'5 through June'30, 1986 (Report 50-498/86-13; 50-499/86-13)-

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection included site tours, licensee t . action.on previous inspection.' findings, allegations, receipt, storage and handling of equipment and material at permanent plant warehouse, plant procedures, emergency procedures, preoperational test procedure review, licensee program for review of NRC IE bulletins, notices and generic letters,.

operational staffing, preoperational test witnessing, biofouling of cooling water heat exchangers and preoperational test _results revie Results: Within the scope of this inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.

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-3-DETAILS

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Principal Licensee Employees

• A. C. Arthurs, Project QA General Supervisor

• D. J. Cody, Manager, NTD

• R. Daly, Startup Manager

• S. Dew, Deputy Project Manager W. P. Evans, Project Compliance Engineer

• S. Head, Lead Project Compliance Engineer

• J. Hughes, Startup

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• T. J. Jordan, Project QA Manager

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• D. R. Keating, Operations QA General Supervisor

• W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager

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• A. C. McIntyre, Principal Engineer

• E. B. Miller, Deputy Project QA Manager

• K. M. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer

• A. J. Peterson, Startup

• G. B. Rogers, Construction Manager-M. T. Sweigart, Operation QA Supervisor

• J. T. Westermeier,-Project Manager M..R." Wisenburg, Manager, Nuclear Licenseing

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Other Personnel Bechtel' Power Corporation (Bechtel)

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• L. E.'Davi',s Construction Manager

. ,;*L.'Hurst', Project QA Manager

• J. B. Gatewood, Project QA Manager

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• R. H.'Medina, Lead QA Engineer

• R. W.' Miller,' Deputy Project QA Manager

• A. Zacceria, Project. Manager

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LEbasco eS'rvices, Inc. (Ebasco)

• A. M. Cutrona, QA Manager

. *J.' R. Narron, QA Site Supervisor

• R. G. Peck, Deputy QA Manager

• J. Taylor, Assistant Construction Manager J. A. Thompson, Deputy Construction Manager R. M. Zaist, Construction Manager

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Westinghouse A. Hograth, Site Manager

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t-4-In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various licensee, AE, Constructor, and other contractor personnel during this inspectio * Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on July 2, 198 . Site Tours The NRC inspectors conducted site tours both independently and accompanied by licensee and contractor personnel. These tours were made to assess the protection of inplace safety-related equipment, plant status and to observe construction, testing and maintenance activities. The areas toured included: Unit 1; Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building (MEAB), Fuel Handling Building (FHB), Diesel Generator Building, Reactor Containment Building (RCB), and safety-related equipment of the Turbine Generator Building, Unit 2; MEAB, FHB, and RCB, Balance of Plant (B0P), Emergency Cooling Pond and Pump House, warehouse and equipment laydown areas, Reactor Operations Training Simulator facility and various nonsafety support facilitie No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Anchor Bolts and Embedded Rods The licensee, by a letter dated May 8, 1985, transmitted to the NRC Region IV office a report titled, " Technical Evaluation of Anchor Bolts and Embedded Rods," Revision 1. The report covers an extensive investigation of two primary problems involving anchor bolts and embedded rods that first became evident in 1978 and 1979 when the original site constructor, Brown & Root, discovered that they had lost control of the basic materials used in on site fabrication of components and had fabricated some components with screw threads not within the dimensional tolerances specified. Each of these findings was the subject of a 10 CFR 50.55(e)

report initially filed in October 1978, and February 1979. The licensee filed various documents with the NRC aimed at resolution of these deficiencies during the 1979 to 1981 time period. The NRC Region IV staff initiated a series of inspections in early 1982 which continued through early 1984 for the purpose of evaluating the thoroughness and effectiveness of the corrective actions implemented to resolve the reported deficiencies. During the eight separate inspections of these matters, a substantial number of anomalies were identified in the program which resulted in four Notices of Violation, one Notice of Deviation and 16 unresolved items. In response to the concerns raised by the NRC, the licensee directed the current AE, Bechtel Engineering Corporation, to revaluate the corrective actions taken earlier as documented in the correspondence sent to the NRC, in 1979 to 1981. The Bechtel reevaluation culminated in the report previously identified that specifically addressed all of the items. NRC inspectors have evaluated each of the items

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l-5-discussed in the report and'have reviewed supporting documentations related to each item. Below is a tabulation of all items involved in this review. Many, as noted, have been previously reviewed and closed. Those closed by this report were reviewed as described above and the report furnishes sufficient detail to adequately define the results. Except as noted, all were unresolved items related to anomalies identified during review of the 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports earlier discusse Originating Closed by NRC Report N Technical Rp NRC Report N ;50-499 Item Iden Paragraph 50-498;50-499 82-18 02 4.1.1 to 4. . . This Report 83-01 02 4. . (Violation) 01 4. .3.2 to 4.3.38 86-06 83-08 01 4.4.1 to 4.4.19 This Report 83-08- 02 4.4.20 to 4.4.21 This Report 83-13 01 4.5.1 to 4. This Report 83-20 (Violation) 01 4. (Deviation) 02 4. . . . . (Violation) 01 4. ,

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-6-83-22(Violation) 02 4. .7.3 and 4.8.1* This Report 83-22 04 4. . * The discussion in technical report paragraph 4.8.1 and captioned as NRC Inspection Report 84-03 pertains to a discussion in that report which in turn pertained to item 83-22-04 captioned in NRC Inspection Report 83-2 Unfortunately, the caption 83-22-04 is also wrong and should have read 83-22-03 based on the subject discussed in 84-0 The NRC inspectors ongoing review of issues involved with anchor bolts and embedded rods as discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 86-06, 86-10, and this report indicates that the Bechtel Power Corporation has through its evaluations and reinspections, provided reasonable assurance that all deficient installations resulting from B&R's inadequate control in 1978 and 1979 have been identified and corrected. The NRC inspectors concerns with B&R's attempts to resolve the problems in 1979 and 1980 as expressed in the above listed inspection reports appear to have been well founded but now adequately resolved. Certain of the unresolved items such as that discussed in 83-01-01 were apparently violations at the time of identiff-cation, however, no notice of violation will be issued since the QA programatic and physical deficiencies existed in an earlier period during the transition from B&R to Bechtel/Ebasco as engineer / constructor anc new appear to have been correcte (Closed) Unresolved Item 8210-01 This item involved the tightening of anchor bolts and the calibration of wrenches. The tightening requirements and calibration frequencies were found to be satisfactory.

(Closed) IE Notice 85-45 This notice! concerned a potentially generic problem involving seismic interactions within the moveable flux ma) ping system. Potential interactions exist because portions of t1e flux mapping system are located directly above the incore instrumentation tubing / seal table. The licensee has evaluated this concern and has determined that it is not applicable to

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STP. This IE Notice is considered closed.

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(Closed) Violation 498-8515-01/499-8514-01 - Failure to Maintain Pennanent Plant Equipment This violation concerns the failure of the licensee to maintain pennanent ~

plant safety-related equipment in proper condition per the Permanent Plant Maintenance (PPM) program. The scope of the violation was determined from inspections related'to NRC allegation 4-04-A-194 and Unresolved Item 498/499-8508-01. The PPM program was unacceptable. The licensee has redefined the PPM program (established new baselines) reassigned supervisory personnel, assigned additional personnel (staff and crafts),

revised procedures, provided training, verified each maintenance activity with vendor manual requirements, and with vendor representative support, disassembled, cleaned and refurbish all components identified as having a Maintenance Discrepancy (MD) during the licensee,100 percent PPM verification progra ,

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The NRC inspector witnessed the disassembly, inspection, and reassembly of five safety-related motors. The NRC inspector also attended selected craft training sessions and witnessed the PPM activities performed in the

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field. Selected samples of the documentations were reviewed and found to be complete and acceptable. The licerisee has conducted a thorough and apparently effective redirection of the PPM activities. The actions taken are acceptable and this violation is considered closed.

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(Closed) IE Circular 76-005

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Hydraulic shock and sway suppressors - maintenance of bleed and lockup j velocities on ITT Grinnell's snubbers. The licensee review of this item concludes that STP does not utilize this subject snubbers. Additionally,

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the licensee has placed this item on their restricted components list.

i Allegations

! (Closed) Allegation 4-86-A-048 Intimidation of Operations Quality Control Inspectors An unsigned letter was received by the NRC resident inspector alleging intimidation of Operations Quality Control (00C) inspectors by the 0QC i general supervisor. The alleged intimidation was the issuance of a licensee " Office Memorandum" from the 00C general supervisor to 0QC personnel that, discussed the problems of Nonconformance Reports (NCR's)

and NCR Hold Tags and ~ reiterated the company policy W disciplinary action l

for failure to follow procedures in those area ,

In the course of a meeting with Operations Quality Department supervision, the subject. of the office memorandum was oiscussed. All 0QC inspectors either' attended a one hour briefing on the purpose, meaning and intent of the policy statement or were briefed by the 0QC supervisor. The 0QC supervisor was aware of some discontent ylthin his group and was l

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attempting to handle the concerns on a one-on-one basis. The office -

memorandum was not a new policy, just a reiteration of existing policy to highlight the concern with and seriousness of NCR's and Hold Tag The NRC inspector has not observed any form of intimidation of 0QC

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inspectors during normal inspection activities. During conversations with five 0QC inspectors, the NRC inspector asked questions about possible intimidation and the recent written HL&P policy statement regarding DQC work practices. The OQC inspectors' stated that they did not feel intimidated but rather perceived the action as managements attempt to get the job done correctly. Since the allegation letter was unsigned no further investigation can be conducted without more specific

! information on alleged intimidating acts by OQC supervision. This allegation is considered close (Closed)' Allegation 4-84-A-194 Preventive Maintenance s

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This allegation concerns the implementation of the Permanent Plant Maintenance (PPM) program at STP, The alleger came to the NRC inspector

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with concerns about how the PPM program was being run in the field. His concerns _were dealing with improper supervision and direction, inability to get supplies and equipment, low priority and inattention to PPM activities and improper perforwunce of the required Maintenance Action

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Card (MAC) activities. The alleger, after talking to the NRC inspector indicated he had no't'given the licensee upper management an opportunity to i address his concerns and indicated a-willingness to do so. A meeting was

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held with the~ 11censee's site manager, the alleger and the NRC inspecto '

All. agreed to give the licensee an opportunity to address the discussed

concerns. The licensee completed his investigation and closed out the

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, concern.on July 10,1985! *The NRC inspector reviewed the allegation documentation and discussed it with the alleger who was satisfied with the

- results. Of the nine points made to the licensee, three were

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substantiated.' They were commingling of grease, inadequate lubrication

, storage area and' inadequate supervisor training. 'The remaining six could

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! This allegation was left open peading completion of corrective actions and closure of Violations' 498-8515-01/499-8514-01 (see paragraph 3 of the

- report) which dealt with 'the PPM program. The licensee has redirected and

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reeniphasized the importances of the PPM program in addition to refurbishing all improperly maintained components. The alleger is satisfied that his concerns have been adequately addressed. The NRC inspector, based on his nonitoring of the PPM corrective actions and documentation reviews, concludes that the licensee's actions are acceptable and the concerns of the alleger have been resolved.

I This allegation is considered closed.

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5. Receipt, Storage and Handling of Equipment and Materials at Permanent Plant Warehouse The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain if the operations of the permanent plant warehouse (Warehouse 32) is in compliance with NRC regulations, licensee commitments and industry codes and standard Warehouse 32 is where the licensee stores safety and nonsafety related material and spare parts for systems and components turned over from construction. It is the plant permanent site warehouse and is staffed by HL&P employees. Their employees are not part of the licensee's nuclear group but are instead part of the corporate warehouse departmen Observations: The STPEGS Stores Procedures Manual was reviewed and determined to be acceptable. This manual is indexed and tabbed to follow the 18 points of ANSI N18.1, N45.2 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix However, 10 of these sections are not issued and are not scheduled to be. These sections should be removed or noted as "not applicable" for this application. Minor editorial comments were discussed with the warehouse superviso The warehouse was well organized and access controlle The retrieval system was checked by requesting four specific safety-related spare parts and checking the location and storage condition. The shelf life items were checked and a reorder system was in place to order replacements based on lead time. Expired shelf life items are pulled and disgarded or evaluated for shelf life extensio Housekeeping zones and quarantine zones were clearly marked and enforced. Parts identification and various tagging system were inplace and acceptable. One isolated case of commingling of nonsafety-related stainless steel rod and carbon steel uni-thread rod was identified on a cantilever storage rack. This condition was corrected. The warehousemen are qualified QC level I by the operation QC department. This is for unloading inspect. ions upon arriva Training records for the warehousemen were selectively reviewed and found to be cumbersome and not easy to evaluate. The licensee should consider using a system similar to that used by operation QC or the startup group to track and maintain the training record The licensee activities in this area are acceptabl No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Procedures The NRC inspector reviewed various licensee documents and interviewed cognizant personnel to ascertain compliance of the plant procedures system with federal regulations and industry standards committed to by the licensee. For the requirements examined, the licensee was observed to be in compliance. The following is a list of documents reviewed and observations made by the NRC inspecto .

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. FSAR, Section 13.5, Amendment 51, Plant Procedures

. FSAR, Section 17.2.5, Amendment 48, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings

. FSAR, Section 17.2.6, Amendment 48, Document Control

. . Project Quality Assurance Plan, Revision 8

. Operations QA Plan, Section 8.0, Revision 1, Control and Issuance of Documents

. Operations QA Plan, Section 14.0, Revision 1, Records Control

. OPGP03-ZA-0001, Revision 4, Plant Procedures Manual Description

. OPGP03-ZA-0002, Revision 3, Plant Procedures

. OPGP03-ZA-0003, Revision 4, License Compliance Review

. OPGP03-ZA-0007, Revision 1, Classification of Procedures

. OPGP03-ZA-0013, Revision 3 Maintenance and Distribution of Controlled Documents - Section 13.3 relating to vendor manuals states that one copy Control Center (0DCC) g remain at all times. in the Operations DocumentIt appears that have been used in lieu of "may".

. OPGP03-ZA-0039, Revision 2, Plant Procedures Writer's Guide -

Section 4.2.9 discusses the need for clarity in describing who perfonns procedural actions. Use of the play script format may be

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more practical.

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The NRC' inspector randomly selected 22 plant procedures and reviewed the master filr and copies 31 and 119 to ascertain adequate document control. The following minor discrepancies were observed:

! . There was no hard copy index for PCP 2 in the master file. However,

! it was accessible from the computer fil '

. The index erroneously listed OPG003-ZM-0010 as being currently

. Revision 10 instead of Revision 1.

l . -In copy 119, procedure OPGP03-ZA-0013 was found as Revision 2 except fer page 3 which was Revision 3. The NRC inspectors referred the

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t problen to 0DCC personnel who performed an audit of the complete volume.

l All of OPG003-ZA-0013, Revision 3, was located behind the tab.

l However, OPGP03-ZA-0017 was listed on the index but was not included in the volume.

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-11-The NRC inspector observed that the, licensee's method of controlling temporary procedure changes could confuse the user. Temporary changes are not noted in the index and the only way a user can verify which temporary changes are in effect for a given procedure is to contact the ODCC. The ODCC clerk must search the master file (hard copy) to locate any temporary changes in effec No violations or deviations were observe . Emergency Procedures, The NRC inspector performed a partial review of the plant emergency procedure program to ascertain compliance with regulatory guides and industry standards committed to by the licensee. The following administrative procedures were reviewed:

. OPGP03-ZA-0027, Revision 0, Emergency Operating Procedures Preparation, Approval and Implementation

. OPGP01-ZA-0006, Revision 1, Emergency Procedures Writers Guide and Verification Also, the following draft emergency procedures were reviewed:

. 1 POP 05-E0-E000, Reactor Trip on Safety Injection

. 1P0P05-E0-E010, Loss of Reactor on Secondary Coolant

. 1 POP 05-E0-E020, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

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No procedural deficiencies were identified by the NRC inspecto In addition to the procedure review, the NRC inspector observed performance of a portion of the licensee's simulator validation program for emergency procedures including the following scenarios:

. Scenario 5 - 200 gpm tube leak plus after 1 minute a 500 gpm Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) inside containment

. Scenario 6 - LOCA accompanied by loss of auxiliary feedwater

. Scenario 7 - LOCA without high head safety injection (SI) followed by a return to criticality

. Scenario 10 - Main steam line break downstream of main steam isolation valves coincident with failed power operated relief valve (PORV)

. Scenario 11 - Steam line break with failed open PORV plus 500 gpm LOCA l

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-12-The validation program appeared to be successfu However, the NRC inspector had the following observations:

. Control panel numbers are used in the procedures. The current group of operators appeared to know where all control panels are located by panel number. For the benefit of future trainees, it would be helpful to affix the numbers to the front of corresponding panel . Some of the scenarios did not proceed as expected. Each emergency should be thoroughly evaluated to the extent to which it was utilized at the conclusion of the program and prepare additional scenarios, if necessary. If new scenarios are required, different validation teams would be appropriate to avoid confusing the results with previous validation experienc . Some of the procedures will have to be changed because of significant deficiencies exhibite New scenarios may need to be developed to validate those procedures requiring significant change . Some simulator instrumentation was unavailable. For diagnostic and evaluation purposes, it would have been very helpful to have an event recorder and several cathode ray tubes (CRTs) which were not yet installe No violations or deviations were observe . Preoperational Test Procedure Review During this inspection, the NRC inspectors reviewed the following preoperational test procedures:

1-CH-P-01 Essential Chilled water system 1-FC-P-01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 1-RH-P-01 Residual Heat Removal System Performance (Train A)

1-RH-P-02 Residual Heat Removal System Performance (Train B)

1-RH-P-03 Residual Heat Removal System Performance (Train C)

1-HZ-P-01 ECW Intake Structure HVAC System 1-AF-P-02 Auxiliary Feedwater System Preoperational Test Procedure 1-HC-P-02 Containment Purge Preoperational Test 1-FH-P-01 FHB Overhead Cranes 1-FH-P-02 Fuel Handling Equipment in the Fuel Handling Building 1-VA-P-01 120 VAC Class 1E Vital Power-Channel I 1-VA-P-02 120 VAC Class IE Vital Power-Channel II 1-VA-P-03 120 VAC Class 1E Vital Power-Channel III 1-VA-P-04 120 VAC Class 1E Vital Power-Channel IV 1-HG-P-01 Diesel Generator Building HVAC Systems 1-HB-P-01 Control Room HVAC System Preoperational Test 1-HE-P-01 Electrical Auxiliary Building HVAC System

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1-SI-P-04 SI Pump'. Verification Trains A, B, and C 1-AF-P-03 AFW Water Hammer Test .

1-HE-P-03: Electrical Penetration Space HVAC System.

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1-FH-P-04 Fuel Pool, Indexing 1-FH-P-05 Reactor Cor'e'and-In-Containment Storage Area Index

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The listed preoperational test procedures were reviewed to determine if the contents were.in'accordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the licensee's administrative procedure Within-the areas examined, the NRC: inspectors found the' procedures acceptable except as discussed belo Procedures 1-FH-P-01 and 1-FH-P-02, as written',.may allow hardware damage l during the course of testing. Precautions / acceptance criteria or " notes"

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should be added to the procedures providing the test engineers with specific guidance for preventing damage'to component Examples are provided below:

Preoperational test procedure 1-FH-P-01, FHB overhead cranes, .

Section 7.1.15, requires lifting a 15 ton load, measuring and recording main hoist motor current while the load-is.in motion. This. step does not provide an acceptance criteria or notes / precautions to alert engineer of excessive current which indicate overheating or allowable differential between' phase-reading Section 7.1.53 requires moving the trolley, using fast speed, in reverse-m until the limit switch stops motio Tnis step does-not provide a note or caution to position someone who would have a clear view to ensure the

, trolley is not driven.into end stops should the limit switch not stop

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Preoperational test procedure 1-FH-P-02, Fuel handling equipment in the i fuel handling building, Section 7.1.25 requires measuring and recording-motor current and voltage while elevator is ascending. This step does not provide-an acceptance criteria or notes / precautions to alert engineer of i excessive current which may indicate overheating or allowable differential between phase readings.

l Section 7.2.13 requires forward travel of bridge until motion stops due to activation of forward limit switch. This step does not provide a note or caution to position someone who would have clear view to insure bridge 4 does not reach extreme limits of travel should the limit switch not'stop bridge trave The above test procedure inadequacies along with other similar problem within the test procedures were discussed with the the test engineer; the licensee committed to clarifying the procedural steps. This item is considered an open item (498/8613-01).

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I Preoperational test procedure '1-AF-P-03 step 4.17 states, "The following preoperational tests are complete to the extent necessary to perform this test."

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Preoperational test. procedure 1-FH-P-04 step 4.5 states, "Preoperational

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test 1-FH-P-03 is complete to the extent necessary to perform this test.

Preoperational test procedure 1-FH-P-05 step 4.9 states, "Preoperational test 1-FH-P-03 is complete to the extent necessary to perform this tes Further guidance is required to define what constitutes " extent _

' necessary." The specific test section should be listed to preclude compromising one/all tests due to an oversight in defining "--extent necessary- ." Thisisanopenitem(498/8613-02).

In preoperational test procedure 1-FH-P-04 the listed action steps in Section 7.1.9 do not specifically indicate these actions to be accomplished for each fuel pool index point listed in Data Sheet 9.1.

Whereas in test 1-FH-P-05, step 7.2.25 does specifically direct, "For each index point listed on Data Sheet 9.1, perform the following."

No violations or deviations were note . Licensee Program for Review of NRC IE Bulletins,-Notices, and Generic Letters

. During this inspection period, the NRC inspector reviewed project

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licensing procedures which describe the methodology for handling review of l NRC bulletins, notices and-generic letters. He also reviewed the training and qualifications of project licensing personnel and conducted interviews with assigned individuals. Additionally, as noted in prior NRC inspection reports, documentations of action taken by the licensee on the concerns of 20 bulletins and 92 notices have had adequate action taken.

r The licensee's. program for addressing the concerns noted in NRC bulletins, notices and generic letters appears to be adequate.

I No'~ violations or deviations were noted.

I 10. Operational Staffing L

An inspection of the organizational structure indicates the groups

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responsib1'e for improving / controlling operational plant safety will be the

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Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)

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. 'Plent Operations Review 40mmittee (PORC)

. Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB)

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-15-The functions, composition, responsibility and authority of these groups is outlined in the FSAR and the draft Technical Specification Discussions with the licensee indicated that the ISEG and NSRB staffing has been tentatively identified and the groups will become functional 6 months prior to fuel load. The PORC is fully staffed with the required qualified members. They are meeting on a daily basis and appear to be functioning as specified to the guidelines of Plant Procedure PGP03-ZA-000 No violations or deviations were note . Preoperational Test' Witnessing The NRC inspector witnessed the Essential Cooling Water System (Train 1A)

Preoperational Test (No. 1-EW-P-01) to ensure that the testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and to observe the test personnel's conduct of the tes Prior to witnessing the test, the NRC inspector reviewed the test procedure to verify that it adequately addressed licensee FSAR commitments and equipment performance requirement The inspector also verified the installation and calibration of all test equipment. Appropriate pretest briefings were held by the test engineer with control room operators and Quality Assurance personnel. The inspector further noted that the latest revision of the test procedures, with test change notices, were available and in use by the test personne During the course of the preoperational testing, the NRC inspector made several observations pertaining to the performance of the personnel conducting the test. The test engineer adhered to procedures for the continuation of an interrupted test. Reverification of breaker position and proper installation of test equipment was performed. The NRC inspector did, however, note one discrepancy in the conduct of the tes Test procedure step 7.6.43 requires the establishment of a flow for the ECW Screen Wash Booster Pump, the recording of-pump performance characteristics, and the recording of pump vibration readings. The appropriate flow was established and instrumentation readings required for the pump characteristic data sheets were taken and recorded. However, pump vibration readings required for a vibration data sheet were not take The test engineer proceeded to signoff step 7.6.43 as having recorded all the required information. This discrepancy was not discovered until after

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the preoperational test had been completed. Two days following this discovery, the test engineer noted the missing data and proceeded to secure the necessary systems to allow the recording of the pump vibration readings. This retested portion of the preoperational test was performed as required by the approved test and administrative procedure . - . , - ._- - . _ - . . .

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-16-Portions of the following preoperational tests were witnessed: Essential Cooling Water System (1-EW-P-02) ) Essential Cooling Water System (1-EW-P-03) Safety Injection Train A,.B, C and Common Logic (1-SI-P-01) Safety Injection Accumulators (1-SI-P-02) Safety Injection Check Valves /Acc Discharge (1-SI-P-03) Safety Injection Trains A, B and C Performance (1-SI-P-04) V DC Class 1E, channel 2 (1-DJ-P-02) V DC Class 1E, channel 3 (1-DJ-P-03) V DC Class 1E, channel 4 (1-DJ-P-04)

During the course of each preoperational test witnessed, the NRC inspector observed the conduct of the test by the test personnel. Discussions with the test personnel indicated that they were familiar with the system being tested. The inspector also noted that the latest revision of the test-procedure, along with appropriate test change notices, were available and in use by the test personnel. The portions of the test witnessed by the NRC inspector were performed as required by the approved test procedure No deviations or violations were identifie . Biofouling of Cooling Water Heat Exchangers The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee action on Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Operating Event Report (50ER).

Specifically, 50ER 84-1, dealing with cooling water system degradation due to aquatic lif The SOER package was located in the licensee Operating Experience Review system. This package was complete and contained letters to and from the Architect-Engineer (AE) and constructor discussing requirements and evaluations required by this 50ER. Also contained was the licensee internal review. All documentation was complete and displayed a thorough review of the problem and its application to this projec Instrumentation, currently in place, is adequate to monitor for heat exchanger degradation due to. aquatic fouling. Plant procedures were j reviewed and in some cases modified to specifically address detection of i heat exchanger fouling. This specific topic had already been addressed within the licensee system of operating experience review under INP0 Significant Event Report System (SERS) 69-81, 42-83, 47-83, and 16-84; NRC IE Bulletin 81-03, and NRC IE Notices 83-46 and 81-2 No violations sr deviations were identifie _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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-17-1 Preoperational Test Results Review The NRC_ inspector reviewed the following preoperational test results for technical content, compliance with the Safety Analysis Report, Regulatory Guide 1.68, and compliance to the licensee's administrative procedures:

1-RM-P-01, Reactor Makeup Water (RMW). System - The objectives of this preoperational test are to:

. Demonstrate that each RMW pump is capable of delivering design flow

. Verify automatic response of RMW non-essential services valves to safety injection signa The NRC inspector reviewed the test results documentation and from this review determined that this test met the above objective No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted on July 2, 1986, with those personnel denoted in paragraph 1 of this report. During the exit interview, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of this inspectio e