ML20207K382

Notice of Violation from Insp on 860411-0510 & 0603

ML20207K382
Person / Time
Site:	Farley, 05003488
Issue date:	07/17/1986
From:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207K319	List: ML20207K314 ML20207K382 ML20207K403
References
50-348-86-10, 50-364-86-10, EA-86-111, NUDOCS 8607290413
Download: ML20207K382 (2)

Text

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION Alabama Power Company Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 Farley License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 Units 1 and 2 EA 86-111 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on April 11 -

May 10 and June 3, 1986, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the violations are listed below:

I.A. TS 3.5.2.d requires in Modes 1, 2, and 3 two operable independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems with each subsystem having capability to transfer suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation. It further requires that with one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, from 10:00 a.m. on April 25, 1986 to 9:45 a.m. on April 29, 1986, a period of approximately 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />, with the plant in Mode 1, Unit 1 ECCS subsystem "B" Train RHR pump suction was not capable of being transferred to the containment sump. The inoperable subsystem was not restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and the unit was not placed in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

B. TS 6.8.1 requires that applicable written procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2,1978 shall be established, implemented, and maintained. RG 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9.2, requires that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.

Administrative Procedure (AP) 14, " Safety Clearance and Tagging,"

Section 6.1.2.3 requires that the Unit Shift Supervisor review tagging orders and signify his review and approval. These orders shall be executed by the Designated Operator in accordance with AP-14, Section 6.1.3.2.

AP-16, " Conduct of Operations - Operations Group," Section 4.2 states that a proper shift relief includes informing control room personnel of the status of the plant. AP-16, Appendix B, requires that annunciators, indicators, switch positions, and position indicator lamps shall be observed for correctness and off-normal conditions and shall be discussed with the off going operator.

Contrary to the above, on April 25, 1986, a Shift Foreman Inspector (SFI) who was not the Designated Operator attempted to rehang a tag on Unit 2's motor operated valve (MOV) 8811-B's breaker FV-85. The SFI mistakenly hung the tag on the Unit 1 MOV 8811-B's breaker FV-B5, noticed the breaker was not open as the tag indicated, opened the breaker without proper tagging 8607290413 860717 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G PDR

Notice of Violation orders, and rendered certain functions of the Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling System's (ECCS) subsystem inoperable.. In addition, from April 25, 1986 at 10 a.m. until April 29, 1986 at 9:45 a.m., during which time 12 shift reliefs occurred, Unit 1 control room personnel did not observe the absence of indicating lights for MOV 8811-B during shift change walkdowns.

This is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).

II. TS 3.7.12 requires that all fire barrier penetrations in the fire zone

, boundaries protecting safety-related areas shall be functional. With one or more fire barriers inoperable, a continuous fire watch shall be established or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the barrier shall be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol initiated.

Contrary to the above, on April 29, 1986, at 9:30 a.m., fire door No. 2406, the Hot Machine Shop entrance to Unit 2, was found blocked open by a rubber hose without a continuous fire watch posted nor was the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the door verified operable or an hourly fire watch patrol initiated.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within 30 days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violations, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance ...

will be achieved.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CdF43I signed by

, J.1:el5Cn Grace J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator

! Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 17 day of July 1986 h