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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20199K8331997-11-21021 November 1997 Ro:On 960528,detected Abnormal Metallic Impact Sounds.Caused by Confirmed Loose Part in Sg.Removed SG 4 Hot Leg Manway & Found Loose Metal Object Inside,Performed Engineering Evaluation & Performed Insp of Guide Tube Support Pins ML20148F0901997-05-29029 May 1997 Special Rept:On 970513,CR Personnel Began Receiving Intermittent Alarms from Digital Metal Impact Monitoring Sys Annunciator.Monitoring of Impact Continuing & Search for Object & Insp for Damage Will Be Performed at Next Outage ML20128P2151996-10-10010 October 1996 Special Rept 2-96-2:on 960921,start Attempt of Maint Run of DG2A Was Made But Engine Did Not Start.Caused by Loose Voltage Regulator Integrated Circuit Boards.Loose Boards Were Removed,Contacts Adjusted & Returned to Sockets ML20129F8731996-10-0101 October 1996 Special Rept 2-96-1:on 960908,DG 2A Started But Tripped. Investigation Found Six Main Bearing Temp Sensor Venting Pressure.Defective Main Bearing Sensor Replaced ML20112H0071996-06-10010 June 1996 Ro:On 960528,detected Abnormal Metallic Impact Sounds. Caused by Confirmed Loose Part in Steam Generator. Engineering Evaluation Performed & Repairs & Modifications Scheduled for Next Refueling Outage ML20101N0491996-04-0202 April 1996 Special Rept 1-96-2:on 960310 & 23,non-valid DG Failures Occurred.Rocker Arm Clearances Adjusted & DGs Restarted & Operated Successfully ML20092B6281995-09-0707 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950816,non-valid DG Failure Occurred Due to Circuits Not Properly set.Post-maint Surveillance Testing Discovered Problem Prior to DG Return to Svc ML20087D6211995-08-0707 August 1995 Special Rept:On 950720,total of 33 3/4 Gallons of Grease Had Been Lost from Tendon.Horizontal Tendon H120 Was Detensioned & Strand Was Removed for Visual Exam & Tensile Testing ML20086S2641995-07-26026 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950628,generator Output Voltage Dropped Below Normal Rated Value.Caused by Malfunctioning Transformer T3.Voltage Regulator 2 Replaced,Tested & Returned to Svc on 950629 ML20086L9481995-07-14014 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950517,operators Experienced Difficulties W/Excitation of Generator in Form of Voltage Swings When Utilizing Each of Two Voltage Regulators ML20086B8921995-06-29029 June 1995 Special Rept 2-95-3:on 950607,three non-valid DG2A Failures Occurred Due to Malfunctioning Automatic Min Excitation Limiter.Malfunctioning Automatic Min Excitation Limiter Removed from Service ML20086H1311995-06-16016 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950517,operators Experienced Difficulties W/Excitation of Generator in Form of Voltage Swings When Utilizing Each of Two Voltage Regulators ML20084M7171995-06-0202 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950517,operators Experienced Difficulties W/Excitation of Generator in Form of Voltage Swings When Utilizing Each of Two Voltage Regulators.Caused by Oxidation of Potentiometer Contact Surface.Surface Wiped Clear ML20082F0281995-03-0404 March 1995 Special Rept 2-95-1 Re Invalid DG Failures.Test Frequency for DGs Remains at Once,Per 31 Days,W/Requirements of TS Table 4.8-1 ML20149G1221994-09-23023 September 1994 Special Rept 1-94-2:on 940918,discovered That Seismic Monitor Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Seismic Switch Removed & Seismic Trigger Installed on 940918 & Seismic Monitor Returned to Svc ML20065J5871994-04-11011 April 1994 Special Rept 1-94-1:on 940202,pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Swung on Mounting Bolt & Touched Handle of Isolation Valve for Sensing Line,Causing Valve to Open Momentarily.Valve Was Closed & Unit Stabilized ML20059B8321993-10-25025 October 1993 Special Rept 2-93-3:on 931001,DG 2B Invalid Failure Occurred When DG Failed to Attain Rated Voltage & Frequency in Required Time & on 931002,DG 2A Invalid Failure Occurred When DG Tripped on Overspeed ML20057F5481993-10-11011 October 1993 Special Rept:On 930917,invalid Failure of DG 2A Occurred. Investigation of Leak Revealed Blown Gasket.Gasket Replaced & Engine Restarted ELV-03986, Special Rept:On 920819,discovered That Voltage Meter Did Not Respond Until 28 After Being Tapped Several Times. Caused by Erratic Meter Indications.Operators Advised of Proper Timing Method & Voltage Meter Replaced1992-08-28028 August 1992 Special Rept:On 920819,discovered That Voltage Meter Did Not Respond Until 28 After Being Tapped Several Times. Caused by Erratic Meter Indications.Operators Advised of Proper Timing Method & Voltage Meter Replaced ELV-03929, Special Rept 2-92-5:on 920709-12,temp in Room 122 of Equipment Bldg Exceeded Max Normal Temp of 115 F for More than 8 H.Periods of Plant Operation W/Higher than Normal Temps Had No Effect on Continued Operability of Equipment1992-07-31031 July 1992 Special Rept 2-92-5:on 920709-12,temp in Room 122 of Equipment Bldg Exceeded Max Normal Temp of 115 F for More than 8 H.Periods of Plant Operation W/Higher than Normal Temps Had No Effect on Continued Operability of Equipment ELV-03825, Rev 1 to Special Rept 2-92-1,reclassifying 920205 DG Failure from Valid to Nonvalid.Area Exists within Kvar Range in Which Voltage Regulator Will Not Function Due to Power Transformers.Operation of Generator in Range Limited1992-06-25025 June 1992 Rev 1 to Special Rept 2-92-1,reclassifying 920205 DG Failure from Valid to Nonvalid.Area Exists within Kvar Range in Which Voltage Regulator Will Not Function Due to Power Transformers.Operation of Generator in Range Limited ELV-03601, Rev 1 to Special Rept 2-91-1:on 910521,mechanical Governor Oil Level Appeared Low After Dropping to Bottom of Sight Glass Due to Small Span of Governor Oil Level Sight Glass. Change Made to DG Standby Status Mode Checklist1992-05-11011 May 1992 Rev 1 to Special Rept 2-91-1:on 910521,mechanical Governor Oil Level Appeared Low After Dropping to Bottom of Sight Glass Due to Small Span of Governor Oil Level Sight Glass. Change Made to DG Standby Status Mode Checklist ELV-03687, Special Rept:On 920331,K1 Relay to Latch in Closed Position & Short Generator Field.Caused by Spring Load Collar Not Fully Returning to Normal Position.Appropriate Procedures Will Be Changed by 920615 to Ensure Collar Is Checked1992-04-27027 April 1992 Special Rept:On 920331,K1 Relay to Latch in Closed Position & Short Generator Field.Caused by Spring Load Collar Not Fully Returning to Normal Position.Appropriate Procedures Will Be Changed by 920615 to Ensure Collar Is Checked ELV-03632, Special Rept 2-92-2:on 920317,dust & Debris Observed Settling in Vicinity of Generator End of Diesel.Caused by Large Piece of Fireproofing Insulation Falling Into Lead Termination Box.Power Termination Box Repaired1992-04-0909 April 1992 Special Rept 2-92-2:on 920317,dust & Debris Observed Settling in Vicinity of Generator End of Diesel.Caused by Large Piece of Fireproofing Insulation Falling Into Lead Termination Box.Power Termination Box Repaired ELV-03627, Special Rept:On 920320 & 21,invalid Failures of DG 2A Occurred Due to Inadequate Fuel in Supply Lines & Governor Speed Increased Too Slowly.On 920322,DG High Vibration Trip Occurred Due to Defective Sensor.Sensor Replaced1992-04-0909 April 1992 Special Rept:On 920320 & 21,invalid Failures of DG 2A Occurred Due to Inadequate Fuel in Supply Lines & Governor Speed Increased Too Slowly.On 920322,DG High Vibration Trip Occurred Due to Defective Sensor.Sensor Replaced ELV-03602, Special Rept:On 920219,revealed That Microchip Failed on Circuit Card Resulting in Channels in Upper Reactor Vessel Being Declared Inoperable.Installation Will Be Completed & Inoperable Channels Will Be Restored to Svc by 9204151992-03-26026 March 1992 Special Rept:On 920219,revealed That Microchip Failed on Circuit Card Resulting in Channels in Upper Reactor Vessel Being Declared Inoperable.Installation Will Be Completed & Inoperable Channels Will Be Restored to Svc by 920415 ELV-03478, Special Rept 2-92-1:on 920205,DG 2B Declared Inoperable Due to Negative Reactive Power.Cause Undetermined.Engine Being Tested Each Wk While Monitoring Equipment Connected to Capture Any Info Useful in Investigation of Cause1992-03-0202 March 1992 Special Rept 2-92-1:on 920205,DG 2B Declared Inoperable Due to Negative Reactive Power.Cause Undetermined.Engine Being Tested Each Wk While Monitoring Equipment Connected to Capture Any Info Useful in Investigation of Cause ELV-03217, TS Special Rept 1-91-6:on 911019 & 20,maint Start of Diesel Generator 1A Made for Functional Testing Purposes.Caused by Engine Speed Dropping Too Low & Low Turbocharger Lube Oil Pressure.Exhaust Gasket for Cylinder Head Replaced1991-11-12012 November 1991 TS Special Rept 1-91-6:on 911019 & 20,maint Start of Diesel Generator 1A Made for Functional Testing Purposes.Caused by Engine Speed Dropping Too Low & Low Turbocharger Lube Oil Pressure.Exhaust Gasket for Cylinder Head Replaced ELV-03200, Special Rept 1-91-5:on 911008,discovered That Amount of Grease Injected Into Vertical Tendon V10-102 Significantly Larger than Amount of Grease Removed from Tendon.Caused by Voids in Tendons.Tendon Retensioned1991-11-0707 November 1991 Special Rept 1-91-5:on 911008,discovered That Amount of Grease Injected Into Vertical Tendon V10-102 Significantly Larger than Amount of Grease Removed from Tendon.Caused by Voids in Tendons.Tendon Retensioned ELV-03184, Special Rept 1-91-4:on 911001,DG 1B Was Shut Down Due to Oil Leak from Supply Line to Rocker Arms.Caused by Connection Not Being Sufficiently Retightened.Tap Setting Change Made for Unit 1 a Rat.Wiring Discrepancy for 140 Relay Corrected1991-10-30030 October 1991 Special Rept 1-91-4:on 911001,DG 1B Was Shut Down Due to Oil Leak from Supply Line to Rocker Arms.Caused by Connection Not Being Sufficiently Retightened.Tap Setting Change Made for Unit 1 a Rat.Wiring Discrepancy for 140 Relay Corrected ELV-03155, Special Rept 50-425/1991-003:on 910912,vent Valve on Grease Can for Horizontal Tendon H-96 at Butress 2 Found Broken Off & Grease Leaked from 15 Locations on Exterior Surface. No Degradation Occurred in Tendons or Containment1991-10-0808 October 1991 Special Rept 50-425/1991-003:on 910912,vent Valve on Grease Can for Horizontal Tendon H-96 at Butress 2 Found Broken Off & Grease Leaked from 15 Locations on Exterior Surface. No Degradation Occurred in Tendons or Containment ELV-03109, Special Rept:On 910821,valid Diesel Generator Failure of DG 2B Occurred,Troubleshooting Revealed K-1 Exciter Shutdown Relay Was Latched in Shutdown Position W/Reset.Caused by Component Failure1991-09-20020 September 1991 Special Rept:On 910821,valid Diesel Generator Failure of DG 2B Occurred,Troubleshooting Revealed K-1 Exciter Shutdown Relay Was Latched in Shutdown Position W/Reset.Caused by Component Failure ELV-03009, Special Rept:On 910708,invalid Diesel Generator Failure Occurred During Maint Run to Verify Balance of Silicon Control Rectifier Firing Waveforms.Provisions Implemented to Require Review Determining Need for Isolation Transformers1991-07-31031 July 1991 Special Rept:On 910708,invalid Diesel Generator Failure Occurred During Maint Run to Verify Balance of Silicon Control Rectifier Firing Waveforms.Provisions Implemented to Require Review Determining Need for Isolation Transformers ELV-02901, Special Rept 1-91-2:on 910522,operator at Diesel Generator Panel Observed Fluctuation in Field Voltage.On 910524,when Diesel Generator Tied to Grid,Field Voltage & Amps Spiked. Caused by Failure of Voltage Regulator.Regulator Replaced1991-06-17017 June 1991 Special Rept 1-91-2:on 910522,operator at Diesel Generator Panel Observed Fluctuation in Field Voltage.On 910524,when Diesel Generator Tied to Grid,Field Voltage & Amps Spiked. Caused by Failure of Voltage Regulator.Regulator Replaced ELV-02900, Special Rept 2-91-1:on 910521,operator Noticed Mechanical Governor Oil Level Low When Level Dropped to Bottom of Sight Glass.Caused by Small Span of Governor Oil Level Sight Glass.Governor Drain Connection Tightened1991-06-17017 June 1991 Special Rept 2-91-1:on 910521,operator Noticed Mechanical Governor Oil Level Low When Level Dropped to Bottom of Sight Glass.Caused by Small Span of Governor Oil Level Sight Glass.Governor Drain Connection Tightened ELV-02753, Special Rept Re Listed Invalid Diesel Generator Failures. Causes & Corrective Actions Listed1991-06-0404 June 1991 Special Rept Re Listed Invalid Diesel Generator Failures. Causes & Corrective Actions Listed ELV-02255, Special Rept 1-90-7 Re Invalid Diesel Generator Failure on 901025.Caused by Operator Using Improper Timing Method to Time Event.Diesel Generator 1B Restarted Using Proper Timing Method & Required Frequency Range Reached within Time Limit1990-11-15015 November 1990 Special Rept 1-90-7 Re Invalid Diesel Generator Failure on 901025.Caused by Operator Using Improper Timing Method to Time Event.Diesel Generator 1B Restarted Using Proper Timing Method & Required Frequency Range Reached within Time Limit ELV-02215, Special Rept 2-90-04:on 901009,invalid Diesel Generator Failure Occurred1990-11-0808 November 1990 Special Rept 2-90-04:on 901009,invalid Diesel Generator Failure Occurred ELV-02165, Special Rept 2-90-03:on 900914,invalid Diesel Generator Failure Occurred Due to Crack in Fuel Line Tubing.New Tubing Installed & Bent Appropriately1990-10-15015 October 1990 Special Rept 2-90-03:on 900914,invalid Diesel Generator Failure Occurred Due to Crack in Fuel Line Tubing.New Tubing Installed & Bent Appropriately ELV-02112, RO 1-90-06:on 900829,valid Diesel Generator (DG) Failure Occurred.Investigation Begun & Troubleshooting DG Run Made1990-09-24024 September 1990 RO 1-90-06:on 900829,valid Diesel Generator (DG) Failure Occurred.Investigation Begun & Troubleshooting DG Run Made ELV-01995, Special Rept 1-90-05:on 900711,valid Diesel Generator Failures Occurred.Caused by Initial Mfg Process.Starting Air Valves on Each of Four Diesel Generators Tested & Polished to Provide Adequate Clearance Between Pistons & Caps1990-08-0707 August 1990 Special Rept 1-90-05:on 900711,valid Diesel Generator Failures Occurred.Caused by Initial Mfg Process.Starting Air Valves on Each of Four Diesel Generators Tested & Polished to Provide Adequate Clearance Between Pistons & Caps ELV-00929, Special Rept:On 890902,area Max Normal Temp Limit Exceeded for More than 8 H.Caused by Erroneous Reading Taken by Plant Equipment Operator.Temp Excursion Had No Adverse Effect on Qualified Life of safety-related Equipment in Room1989-10-0303 October 1989 Special Rept:On 890902,area Max Normal Temp Limit Exceeded for More than 8 H.Caused by Erroneous Reading Taken by Plant Equipment Operator.Temp Excursion Had No Adverse Effect on Qualified Life of safety-related Equipment in Room ELV-00909, Revised Special Rept Re Valid Diesel Generator Failure on 890719.Caused by Remote Gate Firing Module on Bridge Circuit 1.Rework on Module Completed & Circuit Returned to Svc1989-09-25025 September 1989 Revised Special Rept Re Valid Diesel Generator Failure on 890719.Caused by Remote Gate Firing Module on Bridge Circuit 1.Rework on Module Completed & Circuit Returned to Svc ELV-00790, Special Rept 1-89-02:on 890717,observed Valid Diesel Generator Failure.Caused by Remote Gate Firing Module on Bridge Circuit 1.Rework in Progress & Scheduled for Completion by 8908141989-08-14014 August 1989 Special Rept 1-89-02:on 890717,observed Valid Diesel Generator Failure.Caused by Remote Gate Firing Module on Bridge Circuit 1.Rework in Progress & Scheduled for Completion by 890814 ELV-00562, Special Rept 89-002:on 890318,while Performing Procedure Re Unit Heatup to Normal Operating Temp & Pressure,Handswitches Opened & Safety Injection Occurred.Approx 2,900 Gallons of Water Injected Into Rcs.Safety Injection Signal Reset1989-05-30030 May 1989 Special Rept 89-002:on 890318,while Performing Procedure Re Unit Heatup to Normal Operating Temp & Pressure,Handswitches Opened & Safety Injection Occurred.Approx 2,900 Gallons of Water Injected Into Rcs.Safety Injection Signal Reset ELV-00431, Special Rept 89-001 Re Positive Moderator Temp Coefficient Measured During Low Power Physics Testing.Calculations Performed to Determine Control Rod Withdrawal Limits & Duration of Effect Time1989-04-0606 April 1989 Special Rept 89-001 Re Positive Moderator Temp Coefficient Measured During Low Power Physics Testing.Calculations Performed to Determine Control Rod Withdrawal Limits & Duration of Effect Time ELV-00028, Special Rept 88-008:on 881026,diesel Generator Train B Did Not Reach Rated Voltage & Frquency within Required Time,Per Reg Guide 1.108,Section C.2.E.2.Caused by Lack of Fuel in Line Upon Diesel Start Due to Personnel Error1988-11-23023 November 1988 Special Rept 88-008:on 881026,diesel Generator Train B Did Not Reach Rated Voltage & Frquency within Required Time,Per Reg Guide 1.108,Section C.2.E.2.Caused by Lack of Fuel in Line Upon Diesel Start Due to Personnel Error ML20206E8231988-11-14014 November 1988 Special Rept:On 881013,during Troubleshooting of Diesel Generator Train A,Mvar Meter Was Reading Offscale High. Investigation Showed That Rewiring Led to Meter Malfunction. Wiring Corrected ML20206B5631988-11-0707 November 1988 Special Rept 88-007:on 881022,following Inservice Insp, Completed on 881022,one Tube in Steam Generator 1 Plugged ML20205G6721988-10-24024 October 1988 Special Rept 88-005:on 880923,high Lube Oil Temp Trip Occurred When Start 1-88-0076,diesel Generator Train B Being Run to Prove Operability Following Routine Maint.Diesel Restarted to Verify High Lube Oil Temp 1997-05-29
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K4591999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20217K8041999-09-30030 September 1999 Rev 1 to Vegp,Unit 2 Cycle 7 Colr ML20217K7741999-09-30030 September 1999 Rev 1 to Vegp,Unit 1 Cycle 9 Colr ML20216E5061999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Vegp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20210P9841999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20209H1211999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196F9711999-05-31031 May 1999 Owner Rept for ISI for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 Eighth Maint/Refueling Outage ML20195G1731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for VEGP Units 1 & 2. with ML20206N2141999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206A6561999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Re Rev 9 to First 10-year ISI Interval Program Plan & Associated Requests for Relief (RR) 65 from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206C2291999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20205Q8081999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Vegp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205A9581999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to VEGP Unit 1 Cycle 9 Colr ML20207K6051999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20209H3951999-02-15015 February 1999 Rev 2 to ISI Program Second 10-Year Interval Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4091999-02-15015 February 1999 Rev 1 to ISI Program Second 10-Year Interval Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 & 2 ML20202H9851999-01-29029 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Rev 8 to First 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program & Associated Requests for Relief for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Unit 1 ML20199F8041999-01-13013 January 1999 Corrected Pages to VEGP-2 ISI Summary Rept for Spring 1998 Maint/Refueling Outage ML20199E7561998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20198S1781998-12-31031 December 1998 SER Re Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan & Associated Requests for Relief for Southern Nuclear Operating Co,Inc Units 1 & 2 ML20196E5221998-12-0101 December 1998 Rev 8 to ISI-P-014, ISI Program for VEGP-2 ML20198B8571998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195H2131998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154L5681998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Vegp,Units 1 & 2 ML20151W3681998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 & 2.With ML20154L5721998-08-31031 August 1998 Corrected Page from MOR for Aug 1998 for Vegp,Unit 2 ML20237D2051998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 & 2 ML20236V3121998-07-29029 July 1998 Final Part 21 Rept Re Enterprise DSR-4 & DSRV-4 Edgs.Short Term Instability Was Found During post-installation Testing & Setup as Part of Design mod/post-work Testing Process. Different Methods Were Developed to Correct Problem ML20236P6991998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236Q3051998-06-30030 June 1998 Owner'S Rept for ISI for Sixth Maint/Refueling Outage of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Unit 2 ML20249A3911998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ML20248A1671998-05-22022 May 1998 Interim Part 21 Re Enterprise DSR-4 & DSRV-4 Emergency diesel.Post-installation Testing Revealed,High Em/Rfi Levels Affected New Controllers,Whereas Original Controllers Were unaffected.Follow-up Will Be Provided No Later than 980731 ML20249A3931998-04-30030 April 1998 Revised MOR for Apr 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 ML20247F3841998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20154Q9721998-04-20020 April 1998 10CFR50.59(B) Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H7181998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected Page 5 to 980324 SER Re Relief Requests Associated W/Second 10-year Interval Insp program.RR-21 in Error in That Component,Suction Damper Inadvertently Omitted. Corrected Page 7 of Technical Ltr Rept Also Encl ML20216D6141998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20217Q1301998-03-31031 March 1998 Rev 0 to Vepc Unit 2 Cycle 7,COLR ML20217B8831998-03-24024 March 1998 SER Accepting Relief Request RR-5,RR-19,RR-20,RR-21,RR-23 & RR-24 for Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan ML20216E2421998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20203H9551998-02-23023 February 1998 SER Denying Quality Assurance Program Description Change for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20203E4831998-02-11011 February 1998 Rev 1 to Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 Second Ten-Yr Interval Pump Inservice Test Program ML20198T1211998-01-31031 January 1998 Owners Rept for Inservice Inspection for Seventh Maintenance/Refueling Outage ML20202G5441998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E5431998-01-31031 January 1998 Rev 3 to WCAP-14720, Vogtle Units 1 & 2 Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis W/Credit for Soluble Boron ML20198L6471997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20203C2811997-12-0909 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request for Relief of Second 10 Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program ML20202B7881997-12-0101 December 1997 Rev 8 to ISI-P-006, ISI Program for Gpc Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 ML20203H0601997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Vegp,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-30
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George Poet Company 333 P4dmont Avenue {
Attanta, Georgta 30308
. Tdepnone 404 526-6526 -
Mahng Address' '
Post Of*co Box 4545 Ananta. Georg a 30302 Georgia Power L. T. Gucwa the southem electic system Manager Nuclear Safety and Lcensing SL-4343 0832m X7GJ17-V310 March 31, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 PLANT V0GTLE - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-424 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 SPECIAL REPORT ON PRESSURE LOCKING 0F MOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES Gentlemen:
Georgia Power Company (GPC) is submitting a special report concerning pressure locking of two motor operated gate valves in the Residual Heat Removal System. This information is being submitted as a followup to the notificalico made by Emergency Notification System on February 3,1988.
Sincerely, ;
b I- [4v- ;
L. T. Gucwa EMB/im Enclosure l c: Georgia Power Comoany l Mr. P. D. Rice Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
GO-NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission r Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. J. B. Hopkins, Licensing Project Manager, NRR (2 copies)
Mr. J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector-0perations, Vogtle
\ \
8804080012 880331 PDR m
ADOCK 05000424 FrcJa - . - . _ _ - _ . _ _ _ . - _ _
Georgia Powerkn ENCLOSURE PLANT V0GTLE - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-424 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 SPECIAL REPORT ON PRESSURE LOCKING OF MOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES f
SUMMARY
On January 28, 1988 Vogtle Unit 1 experienced failures of two motor operated gate valves within the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.
These valves,1HV-8716A and 8, are the RHR crosstie valves and were being opened to perform surveillance procedure 14805-1, "Residual Heat Removal Pump and Checkvalve Test." Both valves failed to open due to overheating of their motor operators. Investigation revealed that the valves failed due to a "pressure locking" phenomenon similar to that described in INP0 Significant Operating Experience Report 84-7, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves."
In conjunction with Westinghouse, Georgia Power Company (GPC) conducted an evaluation of active valves at Plant Vogtle that could potentially be susceptible to pressure locking. This review identified only the two RHR crosstie valves (lHV-8716A and B) as susceptible. On February 3, 1986 GPC informed the NRC of these findings via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).
A design change for these valves (e.g., drilling a small drain hole in the higher pressure side of the valve disc) was then implemented to preclude pressure locking in the future. Following the modification, the valves were tested using Motor Operated Valve Acceptance Testing System (MOVATS) which indicated that the modification was successful in reducing the required cpening ti rust.
EEOUENCE OF EVENTS On January 28, 1988 Plant Vogtle Unit 1 was operating in Mode 4 (hot shutdown), heating up in preparation for reactor startup. Surveillance procedure 14805-1, "Residual Heat Removal Pump and Check Valve Test", was in progress. At 2340 CST, the two RHR crosstie valves, which were in the closed position, were given open signals by a reactor operator. Neither valve responded and trouble alarms from the valve motor control centers were received. A plant equipment operator (PE0) was dispatched to investigate the cause of the alarms. At 2343 CST, fire alarms from both RHR pump rooms were received. The PE0 dispatched to the pump rooms reported smoke in both rooms, prompting the dispatch of the Fire Brigade. It was determined that no fire existed, but that the smoke alarm actuation was caused by the failure of the motors for the RHR crosstie valves (1HV-8716A and B).
0832m E-1 03/31/88 SL-4343
GeorgiaPower b ENCLOSURE (Continued)
SPECIAL REPORT ON PRESSURE LOCKING 0F HOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES An event critique team was convened the next morning to investigate the failure of the motors. This team reviewed valve specification data, previous H0 VATS test results. RHR system conditions, and surveillance procedures in use at the time of the event. A prevf ous failure of valve 1HV-8716B (in October 1987) was also reevaluated.
Over the next several days, various failure mechanisms were identified and evaluated. Initially, the failures were considered to have been caused by high differential pressure across the valve discs. Dynamic MOVATS tests at increasing differential pressures were conducted. The test at high differential discounting pressure (515 psid) indicated no binding, the differential pressure failure mechanism. The investigation then centered on a pressure locking phenomenon.
On February 1,1988 a test was conducted in which the valves were shut cold and then heated to approximately 220 degrees F (body temperatur e).
This resulted in doubling of the thrust required to open the valves. The valves did open though, and on subsequent openings the measured thrust values were greatly reduced. These results indicated that pressure '
locking was occurring in the valves.
In conjunction with Westinghouse, GPC conducted an evaluation of active valves at Plant Vogtle that could potentially be susceptible to pressure locking. This review identified only the two RHR crosstie valves as susceptible.
GPC informed the NRC of the results of this evaluation and the H0 VATS testing on February 3, 1988 via the Emergency Notification System.
Both RHR crosstie valves were then modified by drilling a small drain hole into the disc facing the upstream (high pressure) side of each valve. This should preclude pressure locking by allowing any water trapped in the bonnet to drain back into the piping, thereby reducing the pressure buildup on the disc. Following modification, the valves were tested using H0 VATS. These actions were complete and the plant resumed power operation on February 8, 1988.
PRESSURE LOCKING PHENOMENON When a double disc gate valve is closed with the water system full, water can become trapped in the bonnet cavity and area between the discs, i Usually, the trapped water leaks past the valve seat and does not l significantly impact the operation of the valve. However, should the water remain trappsd, the potential for pressure buildup between the discs occurs, causing increased drag between the discs and their seats.
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GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE (Continued)
SPECIAL REPORT ON PRESSURE LOCKING OF MOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES The RHR crosstie valves (lHV-8716A and B) were initially closed on January 24, 1988 during plant cooldown. During the outage, the valves were cycled open/ closed for surveillance testing at approximately 110 degrees Fahrenheit (F). On January 28, 1988 in preparation for startup, the plant was heated to approximately 320 degrees F, and the attempt to open the valves was made. The valves failed at this time when the heating of the trapped water greatly increased the pressure on the valve discs and correspondingly increased the opening thrust required by the motor operators. Following replacement of the motor operators and prior to modification of the valve discs, dynamic MOVATS tests were conducted on the valves. The valves opened satisfactorily with up to 510 psid differential pressure at cold conditions (approximately 100 degrees F).
However, shutting the valves cold and then heating to ap9roximately 220 degrees F (valve body temperature) resulted in more than doubling the thrust required to open the valves. From this testing it was concluded i
that the pressure buildup at the RHR system temperature of 320 degrees F l resulted in the valve failures.
l IDENTIFICATION OF VALYES SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE LOCKIRG l
j In conjunction with Westinghouse, GPC conducted M evaluation of active valves at Plant Vogtle that could potentially be susceptible to pressure locking. While this phenomenon is generally associated with gate valves, all valves identified as having the potential for being closed in a cold condition, being heated, and then being r.?auired to open in order to perform a safety function were considered. Most of the valves identified were gate valves; however, a number of solenoid valves were also evaluated. Valves in the following systems were evaluated:
o Reactor Coolant System o Chemical and Volume Control System o Emergency Core Cooling System o Residual Heat Removal System o Containment Spray System o Steam Generator Blowdown Processing System o Liquid Haste Processing System Piping isometric drawings were then reviewed to determine proximity to and intensity of heat sources and the spatial relationship of the valves to those sources (e.g., locations above or below). Heating due to elevated containment temperatures in a post accident environment was also 0832m E-3 03/31/88 SL-4343 mm
GeorgiaPower A l
l ENCLOSURE (Continued)
SPECIAL REPORT ON PRESSURE LOCKING OF MOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES considered. From this evaluation, it was concluded that the RHR crosstie valves (1HV-8716A and B) are unique with respect to the combination of interrelated factors such that common mode failure of safety related valves in other applications is not expected to occur as a result of pressure locking.
Each RHR crosstie valve is in close proximity to its respective RHR heat exchanger outlet pipe (approximately five feet) and almost directly above it. Thus, the potential for heating the valve by convection exists.
This hypothesis is supported by the tests which were per formed at approximately 220 degrees F (valve body temperature) after heating from a cold condition. The tests indicated extremely high thrust for the first stroking. Repeated strokings measured normal thrust readings.
It is postulated that the first stroking allowed pressure equalization between the valve discs and body such that seating forces during later stroking were reduced. It must be emphasized that the valve did open at 220 degrees F with 90 damage to the motor during the first stroking.
CONSEOUENCES ANALYSIS Although the RHR crosstie valves have been subsequently modified to preclude pressure locking, the possibility was considered that similar pressure locking could have occurred during an accident situation (LOCA) bercre the modification was implemented.
These valves are normally open during the safety injection phase of system operation following a LOCA. Procedure 19013-1, "ES-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation," calls for both valves to be closed remotely from the control room during the switchover from cold leg injection to cold leg recirculation. Pressure locking for this phase of operation is not a concern since the valves are initially open. At least one of the valves must be closed during cold leg recirculation 'in order to prevent a passive failure from disabling both trains of low head safety injection (LHSI). Another important reason is that, with the crosstle header open, the stoppage of one LHSI pump could result in excessive runout of the remaining LHSI pump and possibly inadequate NPSH for the high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps and charging pumps. This concern exists because the remaining LHSI pump could be supplying four cold legs in addition to two HHSI pumps and two charging pumps. Cold leg recirculation can be initiated as early as 20 minutes into a major LOCA.
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A Georgia Power d I
l ENCLOSURE (Continued) j 1
SPECIAL REPORT ON PRESSURE LOCKING OF l HOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES ,
Due to the proximity of the crosstie valves to the RHR heat exchanger outlet lines, it appears that these valves could be heated from the cold condition to a hot condition during cold leg recirculation such that pressure locking could occur at 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> when a valve is re-opened for hot leg recirculation. However, the degree of heating is not a concern for the following reasons.
When cold leg recirculation is initiated, the sump water temperature could be as high as 250 degrees F. This temperature would be reduced to approximately 183 degrees F by cooling in the RHR heat exchanger. By 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />, the sump water temperature is reduced to approximately 150 degrees F. After cooling in the RHR heat exchanger, the fluid temperature would be further reduced to approximately 135 degrees F. Because of the long period between initiation of cold leg recirculation and hot leg recirculation (e.g. , 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> or longer), the valve body temperatures would be in the range of 135 degrees F to 150 degrees F.
These valves were successfully operated, as part of a test conducted in the investigation of this event, with a body temperature of approximately 220 degress F. Since this test temperature bounds the expected valve body temperature in the post LOCA e.1vironment described above, these test results support the postulation that the valves would not have failed to re-open as a result of pressure locking during the re-alignment for hot leg recirculation. This discussion notwithstanding, the necessity of this function is discussed below. .
At 16 hours, procedure 19014-1, "ES-1.4 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation," calls for one of the crosstie valves to be opened in order to switch to hot leg recirculation. Ideally, one LHSI pump should be able to deliver flow directly to two hot legs via its respective crosstie valves and valve 1HV-8840 if reactor coolant system pressure permits.
The switchover from cold leg recirculation to hot leg injection is made in order to ensure that boron does not conccntrate in the reactor vessel / core to unduly high levels and block passages in the fuel with precipitate. This could occur by boiling in the reactor vessel during cold leg recirculation for a cold leg break. Switching to hot leg recirculation will flush the high boron concentration liquid from the vessel / core via the ruptured cM J 1eg.
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GeorgiaPower A ENCLOSURE (Continued)
SPECIAL REPORT ON PRESSURE LOCKING OF MOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES The requirements for core cooling (i.e., make up for core boiloff) and prevention of boron precipitation are satisfied by one HHSI pump delivering to two hot legs, in conjunction with flow from one charging pump delivering to four cold legs. Direct injection to the hot legs through valve lHV-8840 from the LHSI pump is desired only to maximize the effectiveness of the emergency core cooling system for a large break LOCA.
Also considered has been the possibility of returning to cold leg recirculation approximately six hours after initiating hot leg
- recirculation. This requires closing either valve IHV-8840 or the open
- crosstie valve. In ei!.her case, the pressure locking phenomenon is not l postulated to occur when a valve is initially open because of the clearance between the wedge and the bonnet in the open position.
VALVE H0DIFICATIQH Both RHR crosstie valves have been modi fied to preclude pressure locking. A small drain hole was drilled into the disc facing ti e upstream (high pressure) side of each valve. This hole allows any water trapped in the bonnet and between the discs to drain back into the piping, thereby reducing the pressure buildup on the discs.
Following modi fication, both valves were statically tested and one dynamically tested using H0 VATS. Heasureinents taken following heating of the valves indicated that the modification was successful in reducing the required opening thrust.
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