ML20095D553
ML20095D553 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Fermi |
Issue date: | 08/04/1984 |
From: | DETROIT EDISON CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20095D546 | List: |
References | |
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 EF2-72747, PROC-840804, NUDOCS 8408230391 | |
Download: ML20095D553 (48) | |
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-. p 4 E 'J CONTRO$ ROOM DESIGN REV'IEW 9 . .~-1 PROGRAM PLAN FOR 4
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P' 3, TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
. . . . . . . . .. .:. . . . .. . 1 2.0 - OVERVIEW . . ... . . . ' . . . .. . . . .. .. . 2 2.1 Purpose . . . . . .. . . . . . . ... . . . 2
'2.2, Objectives. . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . 2 2.3 Description of CRDR Activities. . . .. . . 2
'2.3.1 Planning Phase. .. . . . . ... 3 2.3.2 Review Phase. . . . . .. . .. . 3 2.3.3 Assessment Phase. . . .. . . . . 3 2.3.4 Reporting Phase . . . . . . .. . 4
-2.3.5 Implementation Phase. . . . . . . -4 3.0 DEFINITIONS. . . . . . . . . .. . . ' . . . . . ... 6 4.0 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING. . . .. . . . . 8 4.1 Review Team Structure . .. . . ... . . . . 8 4.1.1_ Review Team Leader. . . ' . . . . . 8 4.1.2 Human Factors Specialist (HFS). . 9 4.1.3 Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) . . 9 4.1.4 System Engineer . . . . . . . . . 9
.4.1.5 Operations Supervisor . '. . 1. . 9' 4.1.6 Supporting Personnel. . . . . . . 10 4.1.6.1 Administration and Documentation Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1.6.2 Systems Integration Engineer... . 10 4.1.6.3 Instrumentation and Controls Engineer. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4 .1. 6 . 4 Safety and Licensing Engineer . . 10 4.2 Review Team Activities. . . . . .. .. . . 10 4.3 Review Team Orientation .' . . . . . . .. . 11
.5.0 CRDR METHODOLOGY AND DOCUMENT CONTROL. . . . .. 12 5.1 CRDR He chodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1.1 Operator Interviews and 12 Historical Events Report Review. . . . .. . . . . . . . . 12
.5.1.1.1 Operator Interviews . . . . . . . 12 5 1.1.2 Historical Events Report ,
Review. . ' . . . . -. . . . .. .. . 13 5.1.2 control Room Survey . . . . .;. . 13
- 5.1.2.1 The BWROC 1981 Survey . . . . . . 14 5.1.2.2 The BWROC 1983 Survey Supplement. . . . . . ' . . .. .. . 15 l
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-y TABLF OF CONTENTS (cont'd)
Page 5.1.3 ' System Function and Task. ,
Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
15,
- 1. Systems Function.
Description. . . . . . . . . . 16 2.' Task Analysis. . . . . . . . 16 5.2 Document Control. . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 17 5.2.1 : Review Documentation. . .-.-. . .
. 17 5.2.2- Reference Documentation . . . . . 17 6.0 . ASSESSMENT:AND IMPLEMENTATION PHASES . . . . . .
19 6.1- Enhancements. . . .' . ; . . . . . . . . . . . 19 t 6.2 Prioritization of HEDs. . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.2.1 20 Prioritization Criteria . . . . .
4 3 6 2'2.,. Priority Ranking. . . :. . . . . . . 20 6.3 Corrective Actions and Schedule for. Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.3.1 Schedule for Implementation . . . 21 6.4 Evaluation of Design Improvements . . . . . 22 m
7.0
SUMMARY
REPORT . . . . 26
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26 7.1'; Review Process. . -. . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2 Review Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7.3 Implementation. . ..... . . . - . . . . . . . . 27 8.0 SCHEDULE.. . . . . . . . .-. . . . . . . .' .. . . .
28 9.0.' REFERENCES . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 APPENDICES Appendix A -. Resumes.of. Original CRS Team Appendix B - Documentation Forms 4-
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
NUREG-0660 and 0737, Supplement 1 provide NRC recommendations for Control Room Design Reviews (CRDR) of. nuclear power-plants. The CRDR program is one of many modifications requested as an aftermath of
- Three Mile Island and is intended to identify human engineering-deficiencies.
D'etroit Edison h'as an established history of applying human factors engineering principles toLthe design of control rooms. ' Design and review -activities that have been undertaken for the Fermi 2 Control
-Room include:
- o -Application of human factors in original design with review of
- .3 control panel layout by a multidiscipline Control Room Task Force.
, -o Construction of a full scale control room mockup.
Participation in BWR Owner's Group (BWROG)-CRDR Program and
~
o completion of a control room survey.by the BWROC (Jan. 1981).
- o. NRC Human Factors Engineering Branch review (May,1981) of Fermi 2 control room with subsequent Detroit Edison assessment and implementation of improvements.
.o Installation of a full scale simulator at'the Fermi 2 site.
- This report constitutes the control Rota Design Review Program Plan as cpecified in item 5.2.A of NUREG-0737, Supplement'1, for updating /
, completion of the Fermi'2 CRDR. ,
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. 2.0 OVERVIEW' JD -
21 . Purpose , t:
The, purpose of the CRDR is to:
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- 1) Review and evaluate the' control room workspace and remote shutdown panel,. instrumentation, controls and other equip-ment from a. human factors engineering viewpoint, taking into account both systems demands and operator capabilities.
- 12) ~To. identify, assess and implement control room design c
enhancements and modifications to correct items which are determined safety related or otherwise substantially impact the' potential for operator error, particularly in preventing-
> or coping with emergency situations.
2.2iobjectives The' objectives of the CRDR'are:
1)' To' identify. improvements in the control room / operator interface which have the potential to reduce.the probability L .of error,- particularly with regard to preventing or coping with accident situations.
- 2) To evaluate any-identified problems, establish relative
' priorities and corrective actions plans according.to specific evaluation criteria.
- 3) To verify that each selected design improvement will' pro-
' vide the necessary correction and can be introduced in~the-
._ Econtrol room without creating any unacceptable human.
engineering discrepancies because of significant contribu-tion-to increased risk,^unreviewed safety questions or situations in which a temporary reduction in safety could occur.
- 4) To coordinate improvements with changes resulting from other human factors / emergency response improvements.
L2.3 Description of CRDR Activities a
To achieve the objectives of the CRDR, a number of activities
.have been and will be completed. A flowchart showing'the
. _~ interrelationships of the CRDR activities is presented in
^
Figure 1.
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The CRDR has'been: split into five phases:
o Planning
-o: Review-100/NE45/8.4 "080484; g =; w -
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o" Assessment o Reporting o . Implementation' A brief synopsis of these activities follows:
. .' 2.3.1- P,lanning Phase The planning phase commenced with-the establishment of ,
the BWROG Control Room, Improvements Committee in
, January 1980. The planning phase was described in detail in' Reference 1.
2.3.2' -Review Phase The review phase consists of a control room survey conducted by a multidisciplinary team to compare the-characteristics of the control room with appropriate -
~
human engineering design guidelines,:an operating ~
- ' experience review (including documentation and operator interviews) and function / task analysis for e emergency 1" operating procedures. The' review phase'and'the CRDR for Fermi 2-are being performed :in accordance with -the' BWROG methodology. The original survey described above
.was performed in January 1981.-
The remaining activiEies in this' review phase cons'ist of updating the 1981 survey for significant changes since that survey,' completing the BWROG~ checklist
- supplement, ~ updating the operating l experience" review .
and. performing function and task anri fsis for the~
emergency operating procedures. .The results of the task analysis will be' compare'd with'the.in-place
' inventory of controls and displays'in the control room
' , to-assure that the-control room supports the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) or identify missing displays or controls.'
2.3.3 ~ Assessment Phase.
During the assessment phase, identified discrepancies-will be evaluated with regard to their probability for causing: operator error and the potential impact of the error on safe plant operation. A categorization' according to priority category will be performed.
Corrective action plans will be established for all significant discrepancies. .. Consideration will be given to correction by enhancement, design modifications, ,
procedure and training improvements and the'capabil- ,
+ - ' ities of-other emergency response improvement, e.g.,
, . Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).
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integrated and. correlated with the other NUREG-0737,.
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- Supplement'1 emergency res'ponse improvement actions.
.During this assessment. phase, major design improvements
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-will'be evaluated to assure that the corre.tive-action
. plans can be accomplished without creating other__
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problems and'thatcthe functions allocated to the control room. operators can be effectively accomplished.
2.3.4 Reporting Phase ,
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After complecing the' review and assessment phases,
' .+ a summary report of the~CRDR will be prepared and submitted to the NRC. The summary report will include a discussion of any' changes made in the program execu--
tion, if.any,- from the. program plan, summarize the.
human. engineering' discrepancies identified, outline prep; sed control room changes and present the schedule for-implementation. The report will also provide a-summary justification for human engineering discrep--
ancies with' safety significance > if lef t uncorrected or partially corrected.
'". 2.3.5 Implementation Phase t
The implementation phase will be the actual accom-plishment of the control room improvements with I continuingLattention'given to' human factors engineer, procedures or instrumentation modifications..
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FIGURE 1 CRDR ACTIVITIES
- 1. PLANNING DEVELOPMENT OF BWROG PHASE CONTROL ROOM SURVEY NRC REVIEW AND APPROVAL BWROG PLAN GENERIC LETTER 83-18 PLANT SPECIFIC PROGRAM PLAN
- 2. REVIEW 1981 BWROG PHASE CRDR 1981 NRC HFEB CRDR PLANNED CRDR: COMPLETE SUPPLEMENTAL CHECKLi3T; UPDATE 1981 PANEL SURVEYS, OPERATING EXPERIENCE RE-VIEWS AND TASK.: ANALYSIS HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY (HED's)
- 3. ASSESSMENT ,
PHASE EVALUATE, PRIORITIZE 1 AND ESTABLISH CORRECTIVEACTIONPLANSl CONSIDER OTHER IMPROVE-ENSURE PROPOSED IM- MENT PROVEMENTS ARE EFFECTIVE ACTIONS AND WON'T CREATE NEW PROBLEMS
- 4. REPORTING
. PHASE ISSUE
SUMMARY
REPORT
- 5. IMPLEMENTATION PHASE ACCOMPLISH IMPROVEMENTS 100/NE45/8.7 080284
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" - 3.0 ' DEFINITIONS Emergenc'y Operation Procedures (EOPs)' - Plant procedures' directingi the operator actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients
- and' accidents that cause plant parameters to exceed' reactor protection 1 setpoints, engineered safety feature setpoints, or other appropriate
- technical limits.
4
.' Emergency Procedures Guidelines (EPGs) - Gu'idelines' developed from
- * ' system analysis of transients and accidents that provide sound
. ' tech'nical bases for plant-specific,EOP's.
- - Function'(Subfunction) - A kind of. activity (or a static role) performed by one or more system constituents -(people, mechanisms,
- 1 structures)- to contribute to a larger activity or goal state.
Function / Functional Analysis - The examination of system. goals to'
' determine what functions they require. Also, examination of the required functions with respect to available manpower,' technology and other resources, to determine how the functions may be. allocated and
- executed.
Function Allocation - The distribution of functions among the human and automated constituents of a system.
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) - The science of_ optimizing the
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, 3 ,,
4 performance of human beings, especially in industry. More narrowly,-
. the science of design of equipment for efficient use by human beings
. (also known as bioengineering, biotechnology, engineering psychology, i: ergonomics, and human factors engineering).
U Human Engineering Concern (HEC) - An item designated by a CRDR team
. member.as a potential HED.
p ' Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) - A characteristic of the existing control room that does not comply with the human-engineering criteria used.in.the control room survey.
System-(Subsystem) -.An organization of_ interdependent human-equipment constituents that work together in a-patterned' manner to accomplish some purpose. . .
System Function Analysis - The determination'of system. functions
- required to meet system goals.
Task'(Subtask) - A specific action, performed by a single system constituent,. person or equipment,-that contributes'to the_
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- 1 ' Task Analysis -'The systematic-process of identifying and examining _
operator _ tasks in order to identify conditions, information, instru-mentation and control requirements associated with the performance of
~a task. In the CRDR context,; task analysis is used to verify and validate the match of information available.in the control room to the-
~
information requirements of the emergency ~ operating tasks.
- = Validation - The' process._of determining whetherothe control room operating crew canLeffectively perform their functions given the-control. room instrumentation.and controls, procedures, and training.. 1 In the CRDR context, validation implies a dynamic performance evaluation..
Ver'ification - The process of determining whether instrumentation,.
controls, and other equipment are availableLto meet the specific requirements of the emergency-tasks performed by. operators. . The
. control room survey and-task analysis are verification activities,
. : checking the control room match to the human operator.
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7 (4.0 -PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING t
The ultimate responsibility Lfor the Fermi. 2 CRDR will reside with the Manager,-Nuclear Operations. . The day-to-day conduct of the review
^
'will be -the responsibility of the CRDR review team.- "The original .
' control . room' survey was conducted by 3the BWROG Control Room survey team. ' Remaining CRDR activities will .be managed by the . review team
. leader.. The review team leader will report progress on the CRDR to the Manager, Nuclear Operations. This will provide the necessary -
management attention = to ensure that .the CRDR objectives' are met and '
^
that .the efforts are integrated with overall_ emergency response fimprovements'. LThe CRDR team will require interaction with 'other organizations f within Detroit Edison.- (The review team leader will have t .the authority to. assure freedom of the CRDR team operation. Areas
- which will be' included are:
-o - Access'to-information (records, documents, plans, procedures, drawings, etc.).
, o. - Access tolall required facilities.
o- - Access to_a'ny personnel'with u'seful or necessary information.--
.o Access to ' support services.
o Freedom to document dissenting opinions.
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4.1 Review Team Structure e
' The review team is t a' multidisciplined team of individuals with the' wide range of skills necessary to perform the design review and will include the following personnel:
~
o Rhview . Team Leader
- 4 o Human-Factors Specialist-o? Senior Reactor Operator o: System Engineer i-
^~ -o . Operations Engineer..
- 4.151 Review Team Le'ader-The review team has the review team leader as its key
< person. This individual provides the administrative and technical direction for.the project and has responsibility for.the project. sAccess to information, facilities and individuals providing useful or necessary input to the team
, is coordinated by ' the review team leader. Because of the' detailed knowledge of Fermi 2 systems and CRDR methods, this im
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' Edison personnel and . vendor, organizations involved with this project. : Plant s operations ' personnel' provide input to ' the review team through; daily' contact with:the review team-leader.
- It will. be the ' responsibility of. the review team leader to -
resolve, differences in. human factors opinions on nethod-
. ology, technique, review findings, assessment, and HED
- corrective actions that dissent with the majority opinion of .
the CRDR Review-Team. ' The - review team leader will be assisted in'the performance of his! function by the other team members and supporting personne L.
4.1.2 Human Factors Specialist (HFS)
The human factors specialist will work closely with the '
- nreview team throughout each phase of the control room review and share with the team the' human factors technical leader-ship of the entire CRDR project. . The human factors- '
specialist.will coordinate all. activities from a human _
factors perspective and verify-that' task performance quality -
is maintained at a level necessary for a valid'and comprehensive review.-
4.1.3- Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)'
. At least.one SRO from Fermi 2 will-serve as a memberaof the core review team. The SRO will assist in identifying operator tasks and will serve' as the review team expert on the operational constraints for manipulations of plant systems.
4.1.4 System Engineer The system engineer will assist in the identification of
_ plant system design. goals and functions and will serve as the review team expert on the factors affecting the design decisions at the plant. The system engineer will provide input to the review team during the analysis of functions and tasks for>any plant-systems and during the assessment,.
implementation, and effectiveness phases of the CRDR. The system engineer _ also will assist in _ completing the checklist-supplement and performing the task analysis of emergency operating procedures..
4.1.5 Operations Engineer The Operations Engineer will serve as a member. of the~ review team providing assistance to the Review Team Leader in-coordinating activities with Fermi 2 operations personnel, procedures and facilities. He also will ' provide input based upon his own operational experience.-
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4'.1.6 Supporting Personnel 1 e l 2 x
~~ In addition to the personnel described in' articles !
4.1.1.-4.1.5,: the' support of additional personnel shall be utilized as necessary. The support will include the following-personnel.
- 1. Administration and Documentation Coordinator 4
This coordinator provides documentation and administrative support to the team leader. He
-provides administrative direction to the engineers, . operators, and Human Factors ' personnel assigned to the task and coordinates the
. assignment of other resources as required.
2.- Systems Integration Engineer The systems ' integration engineer will review the -
, CRDR ' findings 'and provide advice to the team on systems. engineering issues and the resolution of HEDs from the standpoint of integration with other emergency response improvements.
- 3. Instrumentation and Controls Engineer Th'e,I&C engineer will provide-advice to the team on I&C issues during the assessment of HEDs and
'the development of design improvement plans.
'4. Licensing Engineer V .v The licensing engineer will provide advice to the team on safety / licensing is' sues throughout the process. This includes review and concurrence with the Program Plan and Summary.
4.2 = Review Team Activities
'_ . The initial _ development of methodology for the review ~was b '
performed _under the BWR Owners Group as discussed in Reference l.
The review team participated.with Fermi 2 management in establishing the overall plan and schedule for the CRDR. The review team will perform the outstanding activities and integrate all action items as. detailed in Section 5.1 of this -. report. The
'-' . review team will'be responsible for the preparation of 'all
-reports related.to;the'CRDR and ensure that appropriate reports
- are ' submitted to Fermi 2 management for review and approval.
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's - 4;3- Review Team Orientation
' The initial BWROG review ' team received their orientation by
-attending a BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey Workshop on October 8-15, 1980. . Topics covered included control. room design review objectives, human factor principles, BWROG. checklist, operating experience' review, task analysis and simulator survey; ,
performance exercises.- A familiarization with the-control room
- panels was performed when the survey commenced. . A second BWR Towners Group-Control Room Survey Workshop was held on October 18-20,H1983. Topics. covered included
- human factors principles, t ' NUREG 0737-Supplement 1,' NRC Generic Letter 83-18, BWROG Control
. Room Survey development and methodology, checklist supplement,-
toperating procedures and simulator performance. exercises on the checklist supplement and task analysis.
Detroit Edison personnel and members of the review team attended'
'both.of these workshops. A brief orientation with the plant will-be held when the performance of this checklist supplement
- ' commences. The close coordination between the Fermi 2 and
, _ consultant personnel;on the team will allow ary additional' .
orientation needs; which.may.arise, to be met on an as-needed basis.
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5.0 CRDR METHODOLOGY AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 5.1 CRDR Methodology
-The methodology which is being used for the Fermi 2.CRDR is primarily based on the BWROG control room design review program, submitted to the NRC by Reference,1, and approved by the NRC in Reference 2. The BWROG, Survey. Program addresses only the
-planning and review phases,1while,this report describes the outstahding activities, assessment, implementation and reporting phases. chat are planned for the Fermi 2 CRDR.
,The Fermi 2 CRDR program addresses specifically the following objectives:
1 To determine the control room inventory in terms of plant system information, system controls and feedback necessary to aid plant operators in accomplishing their tasks effectively.
- 2. To identify the performance capabilities and limitations of the existing control room inventory that could impact operator effectiveness, and to survey this equipment for compatability with human factor standards.
Three major processes are used'to accomplish the above objectives and to identify the human engineering discrepancies.
- 1. J Operator' Interviews and Historical Events Report Review
- 2. Control Room Survey
- 3. System Function and Task Analysis Details of the methods to be used in each of the three processes are given below.
5.1.1 Operator Interviews and Historical Events Report Review
- 1. ' Operator Interviews The purpose of the operator interview is to obtain direct operator input to aid in identifying L ' potential or actual deficiencies in the control room layout or design or in operating procedures that result in confusion (mental activities),
difficulty (manual activitten) or distraction (the environment) .
Using the questionnaire in Appendix B, operators will be asked to respond in writing based on their
-operational experience and knowledge of the
! control room. Copies of the written responses 100/NE45/8.14 080484 ,
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.' 'will be sent to,the survey'teamifor a preliminary-review.' . Interviewee's'will retain their copies and
. review them with a. survey team member during'a
'.g later oral interview. If~ additional' space is
. ';,-' needed,. the -attached Comment Form is to _be used.
A representative group of approximately 12 operators, covering a range of experience,.
. education, ability and. physical size will be'
_ -interviewed..
The interviews will be' conducted.by members.of the CRDR -team' with background or experience in
, . operations and-engineering or. design within a
' ~ .-setting conducive to a free: flow of.information.
It 'is expected. that the oral interview will take
.. one to two hours for each. ope'rator.
Following'the. interviews, the survey 1t eam will' consolidate the information obtained and analyre
'it to help identify specific areas of concern for.
detailed analysis.during the CRDR assessment phase..
- 2. ' Historical Events Report Review Review of LERs and scram reports of operating plants has resulted in identifying possible human c
factor design considerations.that may have, contributed to operator: errors. .The~BWROC CRDR survey. program recommends review of LERs during, Lthe last'two years of plant operation,- for use as a source in-identifying the human. engineering-discrepancies.
Because Fermi 2. is a' near term operating -licensee without plant specific.LERs, a procedure will be followed to extract the necessary ~information from plants that are similarlin design and in control room arrangement to Fermi 2. The identified HEDs cfar the. plants will.be checked against the Fermi 2 control room inventory, and later analyzed in the c
i CRDR ass'essment phase.
L -5 1.2 control Room Survey The purpose ofl the Control Room Survey is to identify 1 ^
the characteristics of important controls and. displays,.
~ the usefulness of audio and visual alarm systems,' plant
[- status information provided, the control room layout-i.
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and-environment, and~other areas of human factor
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engineering that potentially. impacts operator
- effectiveness. .This is . accomplished by conducting a oc systematic comparison .of' existing control room inventory against human engineering guidelines. The ultimate! objective is to identify potential modifications of the operator / control room interface
- which will reduce the potential for human error.
The 'WROG 1981-Survey
~
1.' B 1The procedures used in conducting the Fermi 2 CRDR y, survey followed the BWROG control room guidelines of Reference 1. The survey was conducted by the review team using checklists developed by the
< .BWROG. - A supplemental checklist was provided in the latest'BWROG workshop'to give additional guidance:to the review team members in completing survey items recommended in NUREC 0700 but not incorporated in the original BWROG checklist.
The 1981: CRDR Survey for Fermi'2 covered the
~
'following areas include'd in the BWROG checklist, o Panel Layout and. Design o Instrumentation and Hardware o Annunciators-o Computers o Procedures
-o- Control' Room Environment o . Maintenance and Surveillance Procedures.
o Training and Manning (Received only limited
- review during the 1981 survey)
Each-of these control room survey areas and the general recommendations for enhancement are listed i in the Fermi 2. Control Room Survey Summary Report, Reference 4. This report was submitted to the.
NRC-HFEB prior to'their completing an onsite review of the Fermi 2 Control Room. The NRC reviewed the BWROG finding, identified additional HEDs and evaluated the suitability of proposed
. corrective actions.
The NRC's review of the control room,
Reference:
.10, is -reported in the Fermi 2 SER and includes HEDs identified as priority rating 1 and 2 which were required to be completed prior to fuel. load.
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- 1Mue implementation status of ,these priority 1 and -
2 items is contained.in a:recent letter to the NRC, . Reference 11.: .This letter documented an NRC' confirmatory audit of the control room completed in' No vember, 1983. [ Review and resolution of the priority 3 items will be include'd.in the assesment and implementation phase describ'ed'id Section 6.0.]
. . . l
- 2. The BWROG 1983 Survey Supplement- i l
This supplement is intended -to augment Revision 1 of the BWR Owners Group Control' Room Survey (CRS) .
Program dated 1/1/81. It.is to'be included as part of the Control Room Review Checklists to further document proposed ~ control room 4 enhancements. The additional items listed in the supplement have. been drawn from human engineering guidelines recommended in NUREG-0700 (Reference 5) and verified through considerable experience of Owners Group Survey teams.
Major sections of the supplement checklists are identified by letters corresponding to section.
designations used in the original checklists. l[n
^' order to differentiate between the two numbering
. systems, an "S" prefix has been assigned to each I supplement item. The supplement. checklist sections are:
SA - Panel Layout and Design :
SB - Instrumentation and Hardware -
i SC - Annunciators ,
~
SF - Control Room Environment SG - Maintenance and Surveillance This checklist supplement will he performed during the planned CRDR activities. 'The results of 1983 Supplement Survey will' be compiled on HED forms
- described in Section 5.2, Document Control.
i 5.1.3 System Function and Task Analysis-l The purpose of the systems function and task analysis portion of the CRDR is to identify control room operator tasks and correaponding instrumentation and-contro1' requirements during emergency operations. Task analysis is used to verify the match of the information available for the control room to -the information requirements of the Fermi 2 specific Emergency ,
Operating Procedures.
100/NE45/8.17 .081584
" ' ~
1.
~
Systems Function Description
- ', Plant systems and subsystems;in the. control room are specified in the Fermi 2 FSAR.1- Major. systems-include reactor. controls and instrumentation, feedwater and recirculation systems,' safety
, systems, power. generation and power distribution systems. The functions of.these systems are. ,
f identified in the FSAR.- Systems identified as
. safety related are used to control and mitigate abnormal events during plant emergencies.
n _ - ,
In the context of CRDR task analysis, systems identification and system functions used'during emergencies are provided in the Fermi 2 E0Ps.
These systems serve to control the reactor primary and-secondary. containments, and,the offsite radiation release ~(Reference 6) .
- 2. Task Analysis Using the Fermi 2-specific EOPs as a basis, the ,
. task analysis will~ identify and document the
' discrete tasks that the operators must perform
'during emergency operations. .The' specific instrumentation, controls and equipment that are
. required.to alert the operator to emergency.
conditions, and to~successfully perform the1 emergency. operations will be identified and documented. The characteristic of the controls
^'
Land information requirements ;in terms ofirange, . .,
' accuracy, setpoints and; function allocation will' also/be included-in the task analysis form (see
- Appendix B) .
The controls and info'rmation systems available to the operator for each.of'the specific tasks of the EOPs will be identified and documented on the task analysis form. The human engineeringisuitability of available' inventory against the control and-information needs/ characteristics will be
, examined, and the results. of this examination will l
be noted in the task analysis form. _ In case the -
available controls and information do not meet the requirements, the suitability. column in the task
- analysis form will be checked "No". This-type of occurrence will be defined as an HED and documented accordingly on-an HED form.
l 1
100/NE45/8.18 *
- 080484 y .
-- .-. _ -- - _ . - . .__,_ _ _ _ _ . - , ~ . . - , , . . . _ . . . _ , , _ _ . , . - . _ . . _ . - - . . . - . . , _ _ _
5 --
'3 J 4 j m
]^ 5.2 : Document Control ~
5.2.1. Review Documentation
~ Throughout' the review' process, documents will be processed to record data,~ analyses and findings..
WheneverTpractical and appropriate, standard forms will -
be developed and used. The bulk of the documentation generated by the review process will be necessary to do
~
the-following:
~
o Document the criteria used for each review activity. .
- o. - Record the' results of the survey, operating experience review and systems review o ' Compile HEDs and associated data for review and assessment In order to facilitate, systematizing and recording
~
control' room design. review activities, several standard forms have been. developed. These forms, which appear las samples in Appendix B, are:
o; Operator InterviewI Form ,
o Human Engineering Discrepancy- '
o Task Analysis Data Sheet jo- Memo of. Consultation.-
Any. or= all of these forms may be revised based on -the
' experience gained during the CRDR.
-5 2.2 Reference Documentation The following documents have'been' identified as.
possible reference material.. As the review progresses,-
- additional references may be identified.-
o Fermi 2 Final Safety Analysis _ Report'-
o BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey Program o BWR Owners Group Emergency. Procedure Guidelines '
oi Fermi- 2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) o' .NRC Regulatory Guides (e.g., 1.97 and 1.47) o ' NRC. Cuidance Documents (e.g. , NUREG 0700) o Fermi 2. Training' Documents o ' Control Room Drawings
-o Plant System Design and Operation Descriptions o Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams r <
o- - Annunciator Arrangement Drawings and Annunciator ,
_ Procedures.
' o' . BWROG Control Room' Survey Summary Report o= Human Factors Design Information-2 o - BWR: 0wners Group Control Room Design Review Program' Summary Report 100/NE45/8.19 080484-
,..A
o Operator Training Manuals o Fermi 2 Administrative Procedures
- o Fermi 2 System Operating Proccdures e
loo /NE45/8.20 080484
6.0' ASSESSMENT AND' IMPLEMENTATION PHASES During the asessment phase, all the-identified HEDs, including priority 3 HEDs from Reference 10, will be analyzed as to their effects on operator performance and safe plant operation.
Discrepancies will be prioritized according to the combined criteria of the likelihood of operator error and the resulting safety consequences. Some HEDs will be selected for correction by enhancement, without undergoing prioritization. relative to their safety consequences. For all the HEDs recommended for modification, design corrections will be recommended, and schedules of' implementation will be developed based on the priorities and integration with other NUREG .0737 Supplement 1 emergency response improvement actions. Figure 2 shows the assessment process for the
'HEDs.
6.1 Enhancements Many identified HEDs resulted from minor deviations from human engineering principles and require simple corrections.- Examples of such corrections include panel labeling and swapping of like components, and component improvements to the panel controls and indicators. More specifically, enhancements involve a number of techniques that involve surface improvements such as demarcation lines, shading and mimics. Guidelines in selecting these HEDs for correction by enhancement will be derived from the review team's own experience, Fermi 2 control room standards, and information listed in References 5 and 7. Placing the HEDs in the category of " Enhancements" implies that corrective actions and implementaton will be prompt.
Those HEDs selected for enhancement do no; require prioritization relative to safety consequences. However, these enhancements will be considered in the overall program of HED' assessment, verification and schedule of implementation, and their effect on other control room corrections will be evaluated.
6.2 Prioritization of HEDs All.the HEDs identified for modification (all those not in the enhancement category) will be analyzed and ranked as to the degree of impact on plant safety and the likelihood of occurrence of such impact. The following factors constitute the basis for the prioritization of the HEDs:
o Impact on safe plant operation resulting from the degradation of operator performance due to the HED o Function and classification according to safety of the
~HED-related component / system o The _ potential for human error as influenced by the HED
-100/NE45/8.21 081684
g 6.2.1 Prioritization Criteria Considering the above factors, NUREC 0801 (Reference 8), and the CRDR evaluation methods developed by the BWROG (Reference 9), two critieria have been formulated to envelop the HEDs safety consequences and the likelihood of human error. The criteria are:
A. Safety Classification This criteria is a measure of the safety consequences of the HED. The impact of the HED on safe plant operation as influenced by operator-related actions during emergencies, is taken as the primary measure. Any HED which affects safe plant operation will be classified Safety Related as determined by the judgment of the review team.
For those HEDs where the impact on plant safety cannot be established, a secondary measure dealing with the examination of the HED-related system classification will be used.' An HED associated with a component belonging to a BWR safety-related system such as ECCS, etc.-will be ranked as Safety Related, independent of the analysis for the HED effect on safe-plant operation.
B.- Error Potential The likelihood for human error is' classified as
~
documented or having potential for occurrence.
Operator interviews will be used for input of error potential' as well as review team judgement.
In addition, the survey results of other BWR control room design reviews (Reference 9) will be reviewed to determine if~ documented HEDs are applicable to Fermi 2.
6.2.2 Priority' Ranking Based-on the above criteria, each HED will undergo a prioritization test according to _ the flow chart of Figure 3. -The resulting priority matrix is given in Figure 4, and a summary of the HEDs prioritization is given below.
l.
l Priority I -
Safety Related Documented and/or High Potential Error Priority II -
Safety Related Low Potential Error L
100/NE45/8.22 080484 i
L
n:- -~,
L _ ,
i t I
Y ,
1 Not Safety Rel'ated
~
s- _ PriorityIII~-
- Documented and/or High Potential Error Priority IV -
Not Safety Related Low Potential Error 4 The HEDs willibe further examined for their cumulative or interactive effects. If such effects-are found, they'will be upgraded accordingly.
6.3 ~ Corrective Actions and Schedule for Implementation Corrective actions will be developed to bring the HEDs into agreement with acceptable humanLfactors guidelines or to limit their effects. The specific corrective actions chosen may be enhancements, design modifications, improved trcining, revised 1 procedures, lor any combination of the above. The review team
- will develop the corrective actions. . References to be used will include NUREG 0700 (Reference 5), EPRI NP-2411 (Reference 7), and other Human Engineering guidelines. The-following factors will be used in.the assignment of the corrective actions.
o Priority rating o . Cost effectiveness o Extent of' correction: Enhancement vs. modification Operator performance / retraining
~
o
< o Potential for. creating new errors o IntegrationLwith other control room improvement programs:
SPDS, R.G. 1.97, E0Ps, etc.
Sufficient detail regarding-the corrective' action will be developed by the CRDR team to provide adequate' guidelines for its subsequent implementation action.
~
6.3.1 Schedule for Implementation An: implementation. schedule.shall be assigned to each HED corrective action according to the' classification
- b of the HEDs intoLenhancements or modifications and
. , according-to the prioritization of the modifications no et d in Section 6.2. - The corrective action assignments to be used are as follows:
Y .:
Schedule for HED'S Assignment ~ Implementation
- - Enhancements A' Prompt, 1st Refueling
& Priority-I
!: ; 4 Priority II B Near-term, 2nd Refueling L 100/NE45/8.23 '
080484 f + 4 -c -,,y-g-,vw,r.,..,, ,- ,,y- gm, , - .v-t- e ---7 * - - e w s,v---- e <w-,e--1 =--'w ---e e w-wir-,ee-* er e e- *-r
1
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Priority:III- C" Medium-ters,c2nd~
Refueling 33 . . Priority IV D Optional, Lef t to Utility 4 .
Any practical constraints on-scheduling of modifications _will be considered separately from the
- determination of the HEDs significance and priority.
- If such constraints as equipment availability or design
. lead time conflict with the assignment designation, that designation may be changed ,to the next appropriate one. Conversely, if the magnitude of the modification of a low level-priority HED isf relatively small^ such as !
the addition of demarcation . lines ' cur labels, the assignment of that HED may ;be upgraded. , zIn all such cases where a change in' assignment is made, the. change and the' reason for doing Lit and the evaluation of- the impact will .be documented o'n the.HED report form.'f
~ ~
Following the submittal of;the CRDR summary report, any change in schedule of implementation and the reasons for the change will be-documented. The NRC will be ~
provided periodic updates of HED corrective' action by.a letter of supplement to the Summary Report.
' 6.4 Evaluation of Design Improvements
.e The modified control room instrumentation and control design will be evaluated to assure that the selected design improvements,
.both' individually and collectively, adequately correct their respective discrepancies and do not create other, safety. problems.
.The: evaluations will be accomplished by performing the following:
- 1. . Comparison of the modified control room deEign with'the control room human factors design conventions' document.
l '2.~ Comparison of the modified control room design ~with the.
' instrumentation'and controls requirements identified during the control room survey and: task analysis.'
- 3. Comparison of'the modified' control room design'with approved 1 project design criteria (e.g., electrical separation a criteria) .
bb .
L L100/NE45/824- '-
080484:
, . . - - . _. . -, _ .- ,__.,_.~ ~_.- ,- ....,__ ,
..m._ , . . . _ , . , , , , , . , , , _ , + , . - , . . . ~ , . , , . -_,,c_ ,,
l IDENTIFIED Prioritization of HED's HED 1r DOES IT NO OPERATOR AFFECT PLANT RELATED ACTIONS SAFE OPERATION?
. 1 1
IS IT
- NO ASSOCIATED WITH SAFETY-RELATED.
EQUIPMENT? YES g YES .
o ,,
NOT SAFETY SAFETY RELATED RELATED 1
i t
IS IT A IS IT A DOCUMENTED DOCUMENTED AND/OR AND/OR A HIGH POTENTIAL A HIGH POTENTIAL NO NO ERROR? ERROR?
o u
PRIORITY. PRIORITY II gy-YES YES . .
~
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Figure 4 o lied FRIORITIZATION MATRIX ERROR POTENTIAL DOCUMENTED & HIGH LOW POTENTIAL POTENTIAL ERROR . ERROR
>. S Ce y 55
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P Figure 2 HED'S ASSESSMENT
-IDENTIFIED HED'S r
ASSESSMENT' PHASE PANELS ENHANCEMENTS -- MODIFICATIONS CONTROLS
& PRIORITIZATION INDICATORS l
ESTABLISH CORRECTIVE l
- ACTIONS L
l
<r INTEGRATE WITH OTHER '
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS i
n .
W" I2' 1
',1 7.0.'
SUMMARY
REPORT ~ c,
. Following completion of the Review and Assessment Phase, a summary
~
it
, report of the results of the CRDR will be' prepared and submitted to the NRC. The report will summarize the review process, referencing this program- plan and provide . material which updates 'or revises the
~
plan.'
7.1 R'eview Process With regard to the actual accomplishment of the plan, the summary v report will include the following topics:
o Operating Experience Review j Types and time periods of records reviewed Operator survey procedures Summarize experience of operators interviewed '
Sample interview questionnaire o Control Room Survey Summarize survey procedures Provide sample survey-forms Assessment o System Function Review and Task Analysis t
Re'feren,ce the approved Emergency _ Procedure Guidelines
, which are the basis for the Emergency Operating Procedures used in the task. analysis 4 - Chart or list of major systems and subsystems referenced in the E0Ps and used.in task analysis.
- Identification of any instrumentation or controls shown needed to support operator functions _in the Emergency Operating Procedures which are not located in the control room.
7.2 Review Findings i
,' This section will be organized by the chapter heading in the BWROG checklist:
o Panel Layout and Design o Instrumentation and hardware o Annunciators '
o Computers o Procedures o Control Room Environment o Maintenance and Surveillance
- o. Training and Manning 100/NE45/8.28 080484 F
+ . . _ _ , ,.__m_, _ _ , -
4 s
- The.above: subject areas.directlyLaddress the BWROG Supplemental
-- o ,
Checklist.: ~ Additionally, special attention will be given to the-findings-from the task analvsis and operating experience, reviews..
Each reportisection will inclu'de a description of.all identified HEDs and the proposed (or Laplemented) corrective action. The Dassessment process used to-identify and select design solutions willL be summarized. 'Where necessary for interpretation of the L report ,1 appropriate, sketches or. photographs will'he'provided.
~
- For HED
- which are found to be-important to safety, solutions which.only; partially correct the problem or decisions not to correct ,the HEDs will .be. justified including the assessments
.providing the basis for such decicions.
7.3 'Implementa' tion -
This section will summarize;the; schedule for implementing the design ~ solutions'which were-described in the " Review Findings" section' of theTsummary report. As noted in 7.2, where corrective actions.have alrea'dy been completed, that will be noted under
" Findings"!and those solutions will.not be repeated in this-section. If there are areas which are not fully documented with
, regard to outstanding 1 actions, it is possible that an addendum to-the summary report may be issued.-
i .
I
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i 4
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- 100/NE45/8.29 080484
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- 8.0- SCHEDULE .,
, o - s, 4 b r}
The schedule for completing the CRDR Summary Report for Fermi 2 is.
September 1985-as.was- provided in a previous transmittal to the NRC
..(Reference 12). The status of implementatilin -for HEDs from the 1981
~
- survey was provided in. Reference 11.
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9.0 REFERENCES
- 2. NRC Generic Letter 83-18, NRC Staff Review of the BWR Owners' Group Control Room Survey Program, dated April 19, 1983.
- 3. NRC Generic Letter No. 82-33, Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability, December 17, 1982.
- 4. " Human Factors Design Review of Enrico Fermi 2 Control Room",
Summary Report, March 1981.
- 5. " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews", NUREG 0700, September 1981.
- 6. " Task Analysis Requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 - May 4,1984 Meeting with BWR Owners' Group Emergency Procedures Guidelines and Control Room Design Review Committees" NRC Letter from S. H. Weiss to W. A. Moore, May 14, 1984.
- 7. " Human Engineering Guide for Enhancing Nuclear Control Rooms",
EPRI Report No. NP-2411, May 1982.
- 8. " Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Review",
NUREG 0801, Draft Report, October 1981.
- 9. "BWR Owners Group Control Room Design Review Program, Summary Report", General Electric Report No. NEDC-30285, October .1983.
- 10. " Safety Evaluation Report on Control Room Design by the Human Factors Engineering Branch - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion", Appendix D of NUREG 0798, July 1981.
- 11. Letter from W. Jens to B. J. Youngblood, " Control Room Design Review Open Item Status", EF2-69137, doted July 25, 1984.
- 12. Letter from W. Jens to B. J. Youngblood, " Response to Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737", EF2-62262, dated April 15, 1983.
100/NE45/8.31 080484
Appendix A
' Resumes of; original BWRT, CRS Team:
J. Cebert, Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. (Team Leader)
._J. Tolson, Public Service Co. of Oklahoma K.' Ross, . General Electric Co.
P. Nicholson, Human Factors Consultant, MIT Group i:
~ R.. Flinn,- General Electric Co.
D. Lanning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology w
e 4
k g.
?
4 t
t A
.10/
0 NE45/8.32 080484
- , . , - ~,n.. -
Resume of John H. Gebert PERSONAL INFORMATION Born: September 27, 1929
' Boone, Iowa EDUCATION Associate of Science Degree Boone Junior College Electricial Engineering International Correspondent School
-EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 3/49 - 1/57 Estimator and Construction Superintendent, Lippert Brothers Construction Company 1/57 - 8/63 Power Plant Employee, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company 8/63 - 5/69 Production and Substation Superintendent, Iowa Electric and Power Company 5/69 - 5/71 Engineering Department Iowa Electric Light a,'d Power Company 5/71 - 3/74 Electrical and Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor DAEC 3/74 - 9/80 Maintenance Superintendent DAEC 9/80 - Present Senior Electrical Engineer Iowa Electric Light and Power Company CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW
- BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey Workshop, Morris, IL
- Team Leader for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Duane Arnold Energy Center Nuclear Plant
- Team Leader for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the FERMI-2 Nuclear Power Plant T-* w - w - gy
6 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW (cont.)
- - Team Leader for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Cooper Nuclear ~ Power Plant
- Team Member for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Hatch Nuclear Power Plant
- Team Member for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Moticello Nuclear Power Plant
- Committee Member of INPO NUTAC Control Room Design Review Committee
s 4
BRIEF RESUME OF JAMES TOLSON SUPERVISOR, ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS TRANS0K INC.
Education BSEE, Le Tourneau College, Longview, Texas, 1976.
Courses taken since graduation include:
Human Factors Engineering in Power Plant Design, BRR Operation, BUR Plant Design and Fundamentals, and various' instrumentation and computer courses.
U.S. Navy - Electronics and Nuclear Power Schools.
Experience -
U.S. Navy (Six' Years)
Title:
Electronics Technician (ETI (SS))
. - Qualified Reactor Operator on nuclear submarine power plants. Performed various levels of operation, supervision, and maintenance during submarine
~
. operation and overhaul. Installed field changes to reactor panels to improve operator interface.
. Public Service Company or Oklahoma (Five One-Half Years)
Title:
Instrument and Control Engineer, Black Fox Project Responsibilities included specification review and design surveillance for several plant control and protection systems including the main control room (NUCLENET 1000).
Participated in control room reviews at Fermi II and Cooper Power Stations and the Black Fox Simulator te 'nsure an acceptable man machine interface was provided.
l t
Assisted in writing and reviewing NRC licensing submittals for several post TMI issues and participated in conceptual' design of an Emergency Response l Information System.
l-l l-i
~
i Brisf Razums of Jamas Tolson
. ~Page Two i
Transok, Inc.
Title:
Senior Engineer (One One-Half Years)
Worked as Design Engineer on a SCADA system used to control and collect data on a 2,500 mile natural gas transmission gathering system including installation of remote terminals and metering modifications. Also designed lighting systems, valve controls, compressor trip schemes and control panels.
Title:
Supervisor, Electronic Systems (Present Job - Six Months)
Supervise hardware, sof tware, and field maintenance on the above referenced SCADA system from the flow transmitters in the field to the master computers.
Revision of the CRT formats for impr'oved operator interface is in progress.
Also responsible for an 800 MHZ radio system used to communicate between the dispatch center and 130 field personnel.
Professional Organizations: IEEE, ISA, ENTELEC e
O G
e
- y.
)
RESUME Name: Kenneth C. Ross Position: Program Manager Company: General Electric Experience includes nine years in the nuclear industry-four years as an instructor in the U.S. Navy nuclear power program, two years as an instructor for General Electric Company, and three years as a program manager for General Electric Company.
SRO License. Certified by NRC to teach all phases of BWR operation.
General Electric program manager for BWROG Control Room Survey Program. Provided program management support for eighteen BWR control room design reviews. Principle author of nine control room design review sununary reports, co-author of additional seven. Developed, organized, and presented BWROG Control Room Survey Program Workshop. Attended MIT sumner seminar on human factors engineering and INPO workshop on j control room evaluations. Co-author of training appendices to BWROC EPG's.
i l
l l
l
r Short Rosuno Paul J. Nicholson Box 74 MIT Branch P.O.
Cambridge, Ma 02139 (617)253-3885 P. J. Nicholson is currently an independent consultant serving the nuclear power industry in the areas of instrumenta-tion and control and related topics. Twenty three years of professional experience include 12 years in the aerospace electronic industry and the remainder in nuclear research and advanced reactor instrumentation and dynamics. For the past four years, while principal scientist at the C.S. Draper Lab, he has been guest lecturer in the MIT Nuclear Engineering Department, associate lead investigator for the MIT Advanced Reactor Control Project, and supervisor for a number of nuclear engineering graduate thesis projects. He has been nominated for the position of Visiting Scientist at MIT for the 1980-81 academic year.
From 1958-65 he held positions of increasing responsibility at Raytheon Company, managing advanced aerospace electric pro-jacts in air defense, radar and signal processing. Granted academic leave during 1945-69 he joined an experinental high energy physics research group at the Rutherford Laboratory at Harwell, U.K., accepting responsiblity for all electric instrumentation for the H7 experinent, one of the first success-ful large scale computer controlled experiments. He was also responsible for control room design displays, data storage and retricial aspects. While in the U.K. he completed studies
- for a Ph.D. degree at the Imperial College in London and was appointed undergraduate physics tutor.
Returning to Raytheon he was named manager for Advanced Development, Aerospace Systems with responsibility for the USAF fault tolerant computer program and airborne multiplexing systems.
He was a member of the SAE-2K multiplexing committee. Later at GTE Sylvania hc was responsible for Air Force Satellite.communi-cations, the joint services computer controlled small switch board and DCA worldwide digital voice modem development.
- From 1974-1980 at C.S. Draper Lab, he was senior project scientist and principal investigator for advanced reactor instrumentation and control and reactor modeling studies for the DOE fusion program.and the EPRI Fusion-Fission Hybrid Einetics Study. He also collaborated with Combustion Engineering
- , ~ . - - - , -
J in the Disturbance Analysis System (DAS) Study and interacted
(' with the nuclear utilities, and industry and the NRC in areas of LWR power plant IEC. Recently he was invited to lecture in the MIT Summer Course on Man-Machine. Interfacing in Nuclear Power. !
He is a member of the AIAA Terrestrial Energy Technical Committee, served on the IEEE/NRC Smart Instrumentation panel, and is a consultant to the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation. He is author of several publications in the reactor IEC field.
Prior to his post graduate studies in the U.K., Mr. Nichol-son obtained a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from MIT and an M.A. in physics from Boston University.
4 k
i 1
Resume Name: Robert Flinn 1
Title:
Principal Engineer Component: Control Systems Engineering
- Nuclear Related Experience:
Naval SSW reactor operator and electronics technician 1%0 to 1%5. BSEE, Colorado State University,1968. Joined GE 1968 as Field Engineer, Marine Service. Transferred to Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose in 1970 as C&I Cost Estimator. Joined Nuclear Services Division in 1976 as Site Operations Engineer at Hatch Nuclear Plant. BWR Station Nuclear Engineering course completed in 1976, SRO Certification 1977. Member of Southern Services Task
- Force on Reactor Safety as BWR Consultant 1978. Member of Hatch Staff Committee for Capacity Factor Improvement 1979-80. Three years site experience in operations, outage planning, maintenance, core performance and radiation safety. Returned to San Jose as Principal Engineer in Nuclear Services
(
. Engineering. Attended Control Room Survey Workshop and participated in Control Room Survey at Fermi. Presently involved in Environmental Qualification of Control and Instrument components.
(
.m-------------
Brief Resume .
David D. Lanning (Ph.D.1963, M.I.T.)
( Professor Lanning's fields of interest are the areas of Applied Safety. Reactor Nuclear Engineering, Reactor Operation and He worked at the MIT Reactor in the areas of teaching, research, and reactor operation from 1957 to 1965, and returned to MIT in 1969.
At present, he is.the Graduate Admissions Offi-cer ing his teaching andEngineering for the Nuclear research. Department as well as continu-He was in charge of the, now completed, MIT Reactor. core modificati.on design and installation for the He also worked at the research laboratories in Richland, Washington from 1951 to 1957 and from 1965 to 1969.
In the latter period, he worked for Battelle-Northwest as a manager of the Reactor Neutronics Section which included the utilization and operation of the High Temperature Lattice Testing Reactor (HTLTR) and the utilization of the Physical Constants Testing Reactor (PCTR) . He curre
, course in " Reactor Operations" and a course,ntly teaches a in " Nuclear Power Reactors."
j His most recent sponsored research and consulting activities have been in the area of power reactor and research reactor and core safety design, transient analysis, control system studies assessments.
Recent Specific Consulting 1.
Member of the Safety Audit Committee for the Northern States Power Company Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (BWR) .
(
2.
Member Engineeringof certain Design Review Boards for the Stone G Webster Corporation.
3.
Consultant for Argonne National Laboratory working on utili-ation fuels.of low enriched uranium for research and test reactor
- 4. Review of Reactor Safety Related Information for the Boston Edison Company.
5.
Member of the General Public Utilities Ad Hoc Committee to review the Man-Machine Interface and Operator Training.
(TMI-2 Review)
O u _ .
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a-Appendix B Documentation forms:
o Operator Interview Form o Human Engineering Discrepancy I
o Task Analysis Data Sheet o Memo of Consultation
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I.0PERATOR INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION TO QUEST 10NAIRE Job Position Years of Experience Commericial Nuclear Fossil Navy Nuclear
.Date of First License R0 SR0 Education / Degrees Age Sex Height _ Weight In response to a post-TMI NRC requirement, your utility, along with other BWR owners, is conducting an updated control room review to identify and correct design deficiencies in the operator-control room interface to minimize the potential for human error. This review is performed by a survey team composed of utility representatives, human factor specialists, and General Electric engineers using checklists prepared by the Control Room Improvements Subgroup of the BWR Owners Group.
You are asked to complete the attached questionaire basing your responses on
~your operational experience and knowledge of your control room and interfacing systems. You may complete this questionaire in the control room if you desire but please do so without discussing your detailed responses with other operators completing this survey. If additional space is needed, the attached Comment Form is to be used.
Following completion, a survey team representative will review your responses with you. Upon completion of all interviews, the survey team will consolidate the information obtained and apply it in their evaluation of your control room for compliance with human factor engineering principles.
The biographical information requested above will be used in compiling statistics on operating personnel physical characteristics. Current recommendations for panel design are based largely on data obtained from measurements of military personnel; there are few statistics presently available on, for example, the average height and weight of operators.
This survey provides you with a valuable opportunity for applying your knowledge and experience toward improving operating conditions in both your control room and future control room designs. Your honest and forthright opinions are not only welcomed, but needed.
I. OPERATOR INTERVIET QUESTIONAIRE A. Won 1d yon recommend any changes la the followlag area:
Al training A2 color coding A3 control room access A4 control panel layont or access A5 commanication systems A6 heating or ventilation A7 lighting or noise levels A8 data recording and los entries A9 information flow I
A10 faraitare, ognipment or workspace l
All compaters l
A12 other?
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I. OPERATOR . INTERVIEW QUESTIONAIRE B Are any sentrols difficult to operate?
C Are any controls designed, positioned or labeled in a manner that causes risk of ima'dvertest operation?
D Are any recorders or indicators difficult or confasing to read?
E Are any important indicators located such takt they are difficult to see during moraal or emergency operation?
F Do you feel any control room displays are saaecessary, provide animportant information or needlessly clatter the control panels?
O Based on your operational experience, does you control room lack any controls or displays needed in your response to normal or emergency situations?
E Do you consider the amanacintor systen to be effective in conveying important information to you?
O
I. OPERATOE INTERVIET GUESTIONAIRE I Do you have any problems locating or using procedures or operational instraations?
J Eave you experienced any problems using or anderstanding your procesares?
E Is there a partricular panel which you consider more difficult or confaslag to operate than the others?
L General Comments:
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I OPERATOR INTERVIEW CD10ENT TORH This fors is for use by the operator or irterviewer for expanded response's to the Operator Interview questions . When used, each response will be identified by ites ntaber at this form and also so noted in the space following the applie ble question to assure proper cross-referencing.
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[ HED Rip'rt Sh'"t 2l VERIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION:
- 1. Addresses HED?
- 2. Meets hussa factors requirements?
- 3. Safety considerations (question not addressed in HED temporarv reduction in safety, increased risk of failure /misoperation):
4 Compounding effects (new KEDs, Adverse Combination with other resolutions):
- 5. Negative retraining?
IMPLEMENTATION FOR VALIDATION:
- 1. METHOD USED
- 2. SCMEDULE VALIDATION:
- 1. Method used (Walk / Talk through, checklist, etc.)
- 2. Validation checklist:
- a. Resolves HED?
- b. Meets human factors requirements?
- c. Safety considerations?
- d. Compounding effects?
- e. Megative retraining?
IMPLBetNTATION IN CONTROL ROOM:
- 1. Plan
- 2. Schedule
HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY lNEDReportSheet 1 l Date:
o Licensee:
Page___of,]
Plant:
Reviewer:
o Plant System: (Reactor Coolant, Reactivity Control Environment, etc.)
o Plant Subsystem: (Pumps, Valves, NVAC Controls, etc.)
o Equipment Item or Topic - Control Board Section (name/ number)
- Control Board Panel (panel identifier)
- Component or Topic Item (e.g., C/D layout, lighting, maintenance procedures, etc.)
o Human Performance Modality (vision, hearing, decision making, etc.)
e BWROG CRS ID (Applicable Section 6 Subsection)
HED DESCRIPTION:
HED SERIAL NUMBER: (If used)
'. 1. Description of HED:
PHOTO ID NUMBER:
- 2. This HED Relates to:
- a. Event:
- b. Function / Task:
- 3. Safety Consequences /Pricrity Rating:
4 Interaction of HED with other HEDs, systems, events, functions / tasks, etc.
ACTION PROPOSED TO CORRECT HED:
CORRECTION SCHEDULE COMMENTS: (This section contains other pertinent explanatory or supplementary information includin review) g, identification of HED with applicable steps or substeps of system l
, _ - - . _ . . --. . , _ _ _ _ ,n
l MEMO OF CONSULTATION SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION: __
RELATED HEDs: __
l NAME OF CONSULTANT:
DATE: _
DESCRIPTION:
I CONCLUSION:
INITIATED BY:
Signature Date ~
VERIFIED BY:
~ Signature Date E
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