ML20216F697

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs,Withdrawing Previously Submitted Response Time Testing Requirement Clarification Re Neutron Monitoring Sys
ML20216F697
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/09/1998
From:
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20216F695 List:
References
NUDOCS 9804170209
Download: ML20216F697 (9)


Text

.

u Enclosure to l

NRC-98-6037 1

l l

l l

ENCLOSURE FERMI 2 1

1 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-341 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-43 REQUEST TO REVISE TECilN! CAL SPECIFICATIONS 4

NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM: WITIIDRAWAL OF PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED RESPONSE TIME TESTING REQUIREMENT CLARIFICATION Attached is a mark-up of the existing Technical Specifications (TSs), indicating the proposed changes (Part 1) and a typed version of the TSs incorporating the proposed changes with a list of included pages (Part 2). The changes to the r:.ffected pages are cumulative changes for the Reference 2 and 3 letters as amended by this submittal; they supersede the corresponding TS pages provided in Reference 2.

l 4

9804170209 900409 DR ADOCK 0500 1

m j

Enclosure to NRC-98-0037

{

ENCLOSURE-PART1 PROPOSED TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION MARK-UP PAGES INCLUDED PAGE(S):

i 3/4 3-1a j

e e

B 3/4 3-1 Inserts A, B, C, & D - 2 sheets (associated with bases page B e

3/4 3 provided for completeness only. No changes to the inserts.)

o.

u 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protecti9n systra instrumentatio'n channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1, 4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months g

N 4.3.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip N.

functional unit

  • shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once lN per 18 month:. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing.

Each test'shall include at least one channel per trip system such -that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 montris where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip system.

u:ept Tu ole. 4.3. s.i-9 tem:, 2..a., 2.. b, 2.c, 2.4, and z. e. f'sc.D 2.

,1.

. u, a ns 1.s

s. ~, rep.c e e sosie sTh. ro.' findio.1 1. e, tests stuft I,e.prio.'med a f least onn.e. per 24 inonMs. rne wcasc sySTEA4 tw^st T.DNh 4 Te*T f*'

EMe lts.1 1.e Inc./ side,s.s' man Hn.j AfWM en> @nr/ thens est the APRM L.na nn el,'nf>s r.>

w Me, 2. pat or. 4 TYi? Voter chtnnel h cneA nl/

M M h ns0lbn3 of low," dropped ore p p> to the 2-cal o/* 4 Trir hfir~

19?c.h # + rte.r cunnels.

l

  • The sensor response time for Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-- High and Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - Level 3 need not be measured and may be I

' assumed to be the design sensor response time.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 3-la Amendment No. 7), Jpp, 111

]

o.

s 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The reactor protection system automatically initiates a reactor scram to:

a.

Preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding.

b.

Preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant system.

c.

Minimize the energy which must be adsorbed following a loss-of-coolant accident, and d.

Prevent inadvertent criticality.

This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation necessary to preu e the cbility of the system to perform its intended function even durine riods when instrument channels may be out of service because of main-tenanct When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conhet required surveillance.

g The reactor protection system is made up of two independent systems.

There are usually four channels to monitor each parameter with two channels in each trip system. The outeuts of the channels in a trip system are combined in a logic so that either channel will trip that trip system. Th_e trinpina of bath trip systems will produce a. reactor arram. fThe system mee the int nt

~

4xe of IE -279 nuc pow lant ection tems ase f

[n[ert C s.

Ing the ar

'scust n th s

fo ecification

.l.

The measurement of respcnse time at the specified frequencies provides

@#]f assurance that the protective functions associated with each channel are completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taker for those channels with response times indicated as not applicabley Response t me may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or i

total channel test measurement, provided such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) inplace, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

Ado 5"

APRM Jurwtaled 7nermal Pcwer Up:< stte 3 Cegepi [WesnQ Mwrror1 ;/sv. - Vjmate ir;> l' nchhns,

,)

u FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1

1 No aange,:, n mxA, --

~

Tro.'.da fo< cuenekness Insert "A" e pa9e a w 3 s martve.

The APRM System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels.

Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels.

The four 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels are divided into two groups each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system. The system is designed to allow one APRK channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed.

A trip from any one un-bypassed APRM will result in a " half-trip" in all four 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels, but no trip inputs i

to either RPS trip system.

Therefore, any APRM Function 2.a. 2.b, 2.c or 2.d j

trip from any two un-bypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each I

of the four voter cchannels, which in turn results in two trip inputs into l

each RPS trip system.

Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal The 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter includesseparate outputs to RPS fo The 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter function which is redundant (four total outputs).

2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality applicable for the Due to the independent voting of plant OPERATIONAL CONDITION is inoperable.

APRM trips and the redundancy of outputs, there may be conditions where the Trip Voter function 2.e is inoperable, but trip capability for one or more of This the other APRM functions through that Trip Voter is still naintained.

may be considered when determining the condition of the other APRM functions In resulting from partial inoperability of the Trip Voter function 2.e. a design bases for the APRM functions 2.a. 2.b, and 2.c, at lea which the LPRMs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel, insert 0 i

The system meets the intent of IEEE-279 for nuclear power plant protection systems. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance l

outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30815P-A, " Technical i

Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," and NEDC-32410P-A, " Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," and NEDC-32410P-A Supplement 1, "NUMAC PRNM Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function."

The bases for the trip settings of the RPS are discussed in the bases for Specification 2.2.1.

Insert "B" Fer the digital electronic portions of the APRM Simulated Therma'l Power -

Vascale and Neutron Flux - Upscale trip functions, performance characteristics that determine response time are checked by a combination of automatic self-test, calibration activities, and resconse time tests of the 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter.

o Insert C The APRM system is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels.

Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four 2-out-of 4 Trip Voter channels. The four 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system. The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channels, to be bypassed.

Note (k) to Table 3.3.1-1 states that the Minimum Operable channels in Table 3.3.1-1 for the APRM Functional Units (except the 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter Functional Unit) are the total number of APRM channels required and are not on a trip system basis.

The basis for the APRM Functional Unit 2.a. 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d actions is to assure trip capability within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore channel redundancy with 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

I l

  • 6

I o

Enclosure to NRC-98-0037 ENCLOSURE - PART 2 l

i i

PROPOSED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION REVISED PAGES INCLUDED PAGE(S):

3/4 3-la l

B 3/4 3-la 1

1 I

l i

I i

I i

i l

I

e 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) l SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1, 4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months, except Table 4.3.1.1-1, Items 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.e.

Functions 2.a. 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d do not require separate LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS.

For Function 2.e, tests shall be performed at least once per 24 months.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for Function 2.e includes simulating APRM trip conditions at the APRM channel inputs to the 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter channel to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter logic in the Voter channels.

l l

4.3.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSC <IME of each reactor trip l

functional unit

  • shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number l

of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip system.

1

  • The sensor response time for Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - Level 3 need not be measured and may be assumed to be the design sensor response time.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 3-la Amendment No. /jl, Jpp, JJJ, J

\\

l 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES l

l 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

I The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides l

assurance that the protective functions associated with each channel are completed within the time limit assumod in the safety analyses..

No credit was i

taken for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable l

except for APRM Simulated Thermal Power - Upscale and Neutron Flux - Upscale I

trip functions.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided such tests l

demonstrate the total channel res)onse time as defined.

Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated ay either (1) inplace, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

For the digital electronic portions of the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - Upscale and Neutron Flux - Upscale trip functions, performance characteristics that determine response time are checked by a combination of automatic self-test, calibration activities, and response time tests of the 2-out-of-4 Trip Voter.

l l

l l

l l

l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No.