ML20236W470

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs 3.5.1 & 3.5.2 Re Footnote for Limiting Condition for Operation
ML20236W470
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1998
From:
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236W464 List:
References
NUDOCS 9808050301
Download: ML20236W470 (5)
v • d • e


Text

. _ - __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ - ____ _ -_ - _

Enclosure to NRC-98-0125 Page1 1

i l

i l

l i

I ENCLOSURE FERMI 2 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-341 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-43 )

i REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION l REVISION TO THE BASES OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE SUBMITTED BY DETROIT EDISON LETTER NRC-98-0034 l Attached is a mark-up of TS Bases Page B 3/4 5-1 from Reference 2, Enclosure 3, indicating the proposed change (Part 1) and a typed version of the TS Bases page incorporating the proposed change (Part 2). ,

i l l

i

)

i l

i I

9808050301 980731 PDR

' l P ADOCK 05000341 i PDR l

!, Enclosure to NRC-98-0125 Page 2 l

ENCLOSURE-PART1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION MARKED UP PAGE (MARK-UP IS BASED ON THE TYPED VERSION OF THE PROPOSED TS CHANGE FROM DETROIT EDISON LETTER NRC-98-0034)

INCLUDED PAGE:

B 3/4 5-1

MDTE; THIS C.H A%E IS 6R3Eb ON THE TYPED VERSIDh1 OF THEPEDFDSEB T5 ENA/ME SUEF// / / EB 5p'

~

DETED IT E.D3DN LG77EE lo2C 9& OO34 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM  ;

BASES 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 FCCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN  ;

.The core spray system (CSS), together with the LPCI mode of the RHR system, is provided te assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accidu.t and provides acequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes up to and including the . double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the ADS.

The CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized and a source.for flooding of the core in case of W accidental draining.

b The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS

] will be OPEP.ABLE when required. Although all active components are testable I y and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during i reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The l pump discharge piping is maintainea full to prevent water hammer damage to N piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

PCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and ' i operati er decay heat removal when below the actual RHR cut in permissive I j pressure in RATIONAL _ CONDITIONS 3, 4, and 5, if capable of being manually I 1 realigned (remot 2 M c d) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. At I these low pressures and becay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide-the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

The low pressure coolant. injection (LPCI) mode of the RHR system is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two subsystems, each with two pumps, provide adequate core flooding for all break sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by the ADS.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI '

system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components. are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor

shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer dam. age to piping ani to start cooling at the earliest moment.

The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in the reactor coolant system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized. The HPCI system continues to operate until reactor vessel pressure is below the '

pressure at whtch CSS system operation or LPCI mode of the RHR system operation maintains core cooling.

$ERMI-UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-I Amendment No.

Enclosure to NRC-98-0125 Page 3 1

ENCLOSURE-PART2 PROPOSED TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION REVISED PAGE INCLUDED PAGE:

B 3/4 5-1 I

i 4

l

)

\

l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES -

i 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN The core spray system (CSS), together with the LPCI mode of the RHR system, is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident and provides adequate core cooling capacity for all ,

break sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line i break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the ADS. I The CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized and a source for flooding of the core in case of accidental draining.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to l piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

LPCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and l operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR cut in permissive i pressure in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 3, 4, and 5, if capable of being manually realigned (remote) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR ,

shutdown cooling when necessary. l The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the RHR system is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two subsystems, each with two pumps, provide adequate core flooding for all ' reak o sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by the ADS. l The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are l testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system is provided to assure '

that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in ti.e reactor coolant system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The i HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient

! reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized. The i

HPCI system continues to operate until reactor vessel pressure is below the l pressure at which CSS system operation or LPCI mode of the RHR system l

operation maintains core cooling.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-! Amendment No.

_-

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20236W470&oldid=3171213"