ML20210N023
| ML20210N023 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1999 |
| From: | DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210N021 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9908100265 | |
| Download: ML20210N023 (300) | |
Text
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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES RELOCATED AlO DELETED CTS INCLUDED IN APPEIOIX B TO THE SPLIT REPORT I ADMINISTRATIVE A.1 In the conversion of the Fermi 2 current Technical Specifications (CTS) to the proposed plant specific Improved Technical Specifications (ITS), certain wording preferences or conventions .
-are adopted which do not result in technical changes (either actual or interpretational). Editorial changes, reformatting, and revised numbering are adopted to make the ITS consistent with the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications ,
NUREG 1433 Rev. 1. 7 TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" LA.1 CTS 3.1.3.8 requires that the control rod driv'.e housing be veriffed installed by visual in'spection when uaintenance has been performed in the control rod drive housing support area prior to reactor operation in Modes 1, 2, or 3. This explicit post maintenance verification is not retained in the ITS. The requirement for the control rod drive housing support to be installed is included in the physical design' requirements, and will be relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM),
which requires revisions be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. Post maintenance inspections conducted as part of the plant configuration management control serve the same function as the current Technical Specification requirements. Control of changes to these requirements by Technical Specification amendment is not necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since there is no change in the design requirement for the CRD housing support. The relocation of this information maintains the consistency with NUREG 1433. LA.2 Details of the snubber inspection requirements located in the Fermi CTS 3.7.5 are being relocated from the Technical Specifications. These details will be defined in the Fermi TRM consistent with the CTS requirements. Revisions to these snubber , inspection requirements will be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. ISI ! requirements that may overlap with these CTS requirements now i relocated in the TRM. are controlled by 10 CFR 50.55a. which requires that applicable ASME code requirements be met unless I relief is granted by the NRC.
-FERMI UNIT 2 1 REVISION 12, 08/02/99l
GENERIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE ("LC" Labeled Comments / Discussions) Detroit-Edison has evaluated each of the proposed Technical Specification changes identified as less restrictive "LC" category change in accordance with the criteria specified by 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The bases for the determination that the proposed changes do not inv'olve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92. The criteria and the conclusions of the evaluation are presented below. The proposed changes are based on system reliability analysis documented in:
- 1) NED0 30851-P A. " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System." Harch 1988:
- 2) NED0 30851-P A. Supplement 2. " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common To RPS And ECCS
' Instrumentation." July 1986: lf
- 3) NEDC-30936P A. "BWR Owner's Group Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation o
Instrumentation)," December 1988: and lP
- 4) NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Fermi Unit 2 Amendment No. 75. dated September 6. 1991.
\7 i
Fermi.has confirmed the plant specific application of these NRC reviewed and approved Topical Reports. The proposed increased Completion Times and increased Surveillance Frequencies are consistent with the allowed outage times and Surveillance intervals reviewed and approved in these Topical Reports and the issued SER. Thesechangesareconsideredappropriatebasedonl t the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the function. FERMI - UNIT 2 9 REVISION 12 08/02/99l h
i
-GENERIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE
'("LC" I ahaled Cc 7ts/ Discussions) 1.' Does the change involve a_ significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change does_ not involve 'a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated because the allowed out of service time and Surveillance intervals are not a parameter or system assumed to be an initiator for any accidents 'previously analyzed. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in' the consequences of an accident previously evaluated because this change does not further degrade the capability of the instrumentation to perform its required function under these circumstances (only the out of service time or test interval is affected by this change). Additionally, the increased times allowed will not adversely affect the performance of any other credited equipment. As such, the consequences remain unchanged from those that would apply utilizing the existing CTS requirements.
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed changes will not involve any physical changes to plant systems, structures or components (SSC), or changes in normal plant operation. Therefore, these changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed changes are based on system rel.iability analysis performed by General Electric, reviewed and approved by the NRC. with Fermi confirmation of the plant specific application of these Topical Reports, as well as the SER. These changes are considered appropriate based on the remaining capability to trip the diversity of the sensors available to' provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the function. Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety. FERMI UNIT'2 10 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 4 Volume 4 SECTION 33.1.1-33.4.1 Remove Replace 3.3.1.2 DOCS pg 8 Rev 0 '~ 3.3.1.2 DOCS pg 8 Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-3 Rev 0 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-3 Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-4 Rev 0 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-4 Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-5 Rev 2 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-5 Rev 12 3.3.3.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 6 3.3.3.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 12 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-23 Rev 1 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-23 Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-65 (Insert) Rev 0 B 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-65 (Insert) Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-66 B 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-66 Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-66 (Insert) Rev 0 B 3.3.3.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-66 (Insert) Rev 12 3.3.4.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-32) pg i of 4 Rev 6 3.3.4.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-32) pg i of 4 Rev 12 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 6 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 12 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 6 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 12 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 6 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 12 Rev 12 08/02/99
crr u i DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.1.2 - SRM INSTRUMENTATION 1 L.6 CTS 3.9.2 footnote
- restricts the use of special movable detectors in place of SRMs to "during CORE ALTERATIONS." The ITS extends this allowance for special movable detectors during all of Mode S. The SRMs are used to only to monitor neutron level. They I have no safety function and are not assumed to function to prevent or to mitigate any postulated event. In Mode 5 at times other h ,
l than during Core Alterations, the function of the SRMs is even ) less critical. Therefore, since special movable detector use is q l m i acceptable, and allowed by CTS during more risk significant 9y i operations (i.e., during Core Alterations), their,use for routine ; i l monitoring is also acceptable. These special detectors must be ; connected to the normal SRM circuits, such that the applicable' ' neutron flux indication can be generated. These special detectors N, provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes since j they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling.- l They must still meet the location requirements,.of SR 3.3.1.2.2 and ~ l all ofher required SRs for SRMs'. As such, the special moveable detectors provide an equivalent level of monitoring to that of the SRMs. i RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS None TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES The CTS Bases for this Specification have been replaced by Bases that reflect the format and applicable content of ITS 3.3.1.2 consistent with the BWR STS. NUREG-1433. Rev. 1.
?
FERMI - UNIT 2 8 REVISION 12 08/02/99l L
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 BASES LC0 (continued) penetration either via indicated status of the active valve and prior knowledge of passive valve or via system boundary status. If a normally active PCIV is known to be closed and l deactivated, position indication is not needed to determine status. Therefore, the position indication for valves in this state is not required to be OPERABLE. i The following list is a discussion of the specified instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3.1 1 in the accompanying LCO.
- 1. Reactor Vessel Pressur.g Reactor vessel pressure is a Type A, Category I variable provided to support monitoring of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) integrity and to verify operation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Two independent pressure transmitters with a range of 0 psig to 1500 psig monitor pressure. Wide range recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.
- 2. 3. Reactor Vessel Water Level Fuel Zone: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Wide Ranoe Reactor vessel water level is a Type A. Category I variable j provided to su] port monitoring of core cooling and to verify I operation of t1e ECCS. The wide range and fuel zone range water level channels provide the PAM Reactor Vessel Water Level Function. The wide range water level channels measure from 220 inches above the top of active fuel to a point 10 inches above the top of active fuel. The fuel zone range water level channels measure from 50 inches above the top of active fuel to the bottom of active fuel. The two i measurement systems provide overlapping ranges to give the '
operator water level information covering the area of interest during an accident. Wide range water level is measured by two independent differential pressure transmitters. The output from these wide range channels is recorded on two independent recorders. Fuel zone range water level is measured by two independent differential pressure transmitters. The output from these fuel zone range channels is recorded on two independent recorders. Each of these recorders also provides indication of l uncompensated fuel zone range water level (indication of l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.3.1 - 3 Revision 12, 08/02/99
I f PM Instrumentation ! B 3.3.3.1 l BASES LC0 (continued) which is not required by this LC0 for PM OPERABILITY requirements) as well as compensated fuel zone range water level (i.e., the required PM indication). In addition to uncompensated and compensated water level indication, indication of reactor vessel pressure is provided on each recorder. This reactor pressure signal is used to derive the compensated fuel zone range water level indication which provides a more accurate measurement during LOCA transients. This indication of reactor pressure is not required by this LC0 for PM OPERABILITY requirements, however, the signal input to the compensation circuit is required.
- 4. Sucoression Pool Water Level Suppression pool water level is a Type A. Category I variable provided to detect a breach in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). This variable is also used to verify and provide long term surveillance of ECCS function.
The wide range suppression pool water level measurement provides the o>erator with sufficient information to assess the status of )oth the RCPB and the water supply to the ECCS. The wide range water level indicators monitor the suppression pool water level from 144 inches below the normal water level to 56 inches above the normal water level. Two wide range suppression chamber water level signals are transmitted from separate differential pressure transmitters and are continuously recorded on two recorders in the control room. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.
- 5. Suooression Pool Water Temnerature Suppression pool water temperatur is a Type A, Category I variable provided to detect a condition that could potentially lead to containment breach and to verify the effectiveness of ECCS actions taken to prevent containment breach. The suppression pool water temperature instrumentation allows operators to detect trends in suppression pool water temperature in sufficient time to take action to prevent steam quenching vibrations in the suppression pool.
l FERMI . - UNIT 2 B 3.3.3.1 - 4 Revision 12. 08/02/99
l l l' PM Instrumentation l B 3.3.3.1
]) BASES l LCO (continued)
H Only two Category I thermocouple channels are needed for post accident monitoring of sup>ression pool water temperature (Refs. 3 and 4). Tie outputs for the PAM dl sensors T50N404A and T50N405B are recorded on two independent recorders in the control room (channel A is redundant to channel B). Both of these recorders must be OPERABLE to furnish two channels of PAM indication. These l recorders are the primary indication used by the operator ~ n, i during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals 5 specifically with this portion of the instrument channels.
- 6. Drywell Pressure
- Drywell pressure is a Type A. Category I variable provided ..
to detect a breach of the RCPB and to verify ECCS functions that operate to maintain RCS integrity.s Two wide range
' drywell pressure signals'are transmitted from separate pressure transmitters and are continuously recorded and
' displayed on two control room recorders. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.
9 7. 8. Pr- mary Containment Hydrooen and Oxvoen Concentrat' on l L.J Primary containment hydrogen and oxygen analyzers are Type C. Category I instruments provided to detect high hydrogen or oxygen concentration conditions that represent a potential for containment breach. This variable is also important in verifying the adequacy of mitigating actions.
- 9. Primary Containment Hioh Ranoe Radiation Monitor
- Primary containment area radiation (high range) is a Type E.
l Category I variable, and is provided to monitor the potential of significant radiation releases and to provide release assessment for use by operators in determining the l need to invoke site emergency plans. The instrumentation i provided for this function consists of redundant sensors. microprocessors and indicators. A common 2 pen recorder in i the control room continuously records signals from both channels. The redundant indicators in the relay room and the common recorder in the control room are the primary l indication used by the operator during an accident.
. s
-l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.3.1 - 5 Revision 12. 08/02/99
l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES j ITS: SECTION 3.3.3.1 PAM INSTRUMENTATION j A.5 CTS Table 4.3.7.51 footnote # states that the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable. This is not required in j ITS 3.3.3.1 because any potential confusion concerning when the n ) surveillance is required is eliminated by specifying the precise t4 i requirements for performance of the Surveillance such that an explicit exception to 4.0.4 is not necessary. The ITS SR 3.3.3.1.2 Note 2 modifies the Frequency such that it is "Not required to be performed until 72 hours for one channel and 7 days for the second channel after 2 15% RTP." This is an administrative change with no impact on safety. , t TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE None TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" '
LR.1 CTS Table 3.3.7.5-1. Action 81, requires that with the Operable channels less than the minimum required, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within ! 72 hours and restore the inoperable channel within 7 days. ITS l 3.3.3.1. Action C. requires the channel restored within 7 days, but does not require the preplanned alternate method of monitoring to be initiated within 72 hours. This is acceptable because the requirement to initiate an alternate monitoring plan does not impact the requirement to~ restore the channel within 7 days. Furthermore. the probability of an accident during the allowed T repair time is minimal. Additionally, the requirement to initiate M i alternate methods of monitoring post accident parameters is not of any safety significance until a post accident event requires this
$ l monitoring. Regulatory control of changes to this requirement Q (e.g., Technical Specification amendment or 10 CFR 50.59) is not necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since the requirement for post accident instrument channel Operability and actions for inoperable instrumentation, continues to be required by the Technical Specifications.
FERMI - UNIT 2 2 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1
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3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (g73) 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAN) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.3.1 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1 (23.75) shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2. ACTIONS n. l NOTES - - - - - - - - - --------- !
- 1. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
'(Doc L.i h
- 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. I (Doc. A.1)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION .. COMPLETION TIME l A. One or more Functions A.1 Restore required 30 days 781 31 1 S'-le with one required channel to OPERABLE Ac h (D.a channel inoperable. status. /)che f3 4 /h I h B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action in associated Completion accordance with Imediately h*C L*N Time of Condition A Specification 5.6. .
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O' <("'Va;?,~3.4 f C. -------- NO TE----- C.1 Restore one required 7 days T8L 3.3 7.7-l, Not applicable to channel to OPERABLE phydrogen.ma status. Ada* D*"M4 y i channels. - 8
!D_ .gL _
0 One or more Functions with two required channels inoperable. (continued) BWR/4 STS 3.3-23 Rev 1, 04/07/95 Rev12i
&l
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 Insert B 3.3.3.1-1
- 2. 3. Reactor Vessel Water Level Fuel Zone: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Wide Ranae Reactor vessel water level is a Type A Category I variable provided to support monitoring of core cooling and to verify operation of the ECCS. The wide range and fuel zone range water level channels provide the PAM Reactor Vessel Water Level Function. The wide range water level channels measure from 220 inches above the top of active fuel to a point 10 inches above the top of active fuel. The fuel zone range water level channels measure from 50 inches above the top of active fuel to the bottom of active fuel. The two measurement systems provide overlapping ranges to give the l operator water level information covering the area of interest during an accident. Wide range water level is j measured by two independent differential pressure i transmitters. The output from these wide range channels is l recorded on two independent recorders. Fuel zone range water !
level is measured by two independent differential pressure transmitters. The output from these fuel zone range channels is recorded on two independent recorders. Each of these recorders also provides indication of uncompensated fuel zone range water' level (indication of which is not required by this LC0 for PAM OPERABILITY requirements) as well as compensated fuel zone range water level (i.e.. the required PAM indication). In addition to uncompensated and compensated water level indication, indication of reactor vessel pressure is provided on each recorder. This reactor pressure signal is used to derive the compensated fuel zone range water level indication, which provides a more accurate measurement during LOCA transients. This indication of reactor pressure is not required by this LCO for PAM OPERABILITY requirements, however, the signal input to the compensation circuit is required. FERMI UNIT 2 Page B 3.3 65 (Insert) REVISION 12 08/02/99l
i PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 au Kel Wadt/ L& ~ f"ilt l q BASES W- ^
~, --
A. / oldc/kt2fC) LC0 2.) 3- .
" Reactor vessel Water Level (con n edT The wi range water level struments are unc nsated fo m vari
,an on in reactor wat density and are c accurate at noera anal pressure and t rated to b orature.
p 1 Y unoression Pool Water Level Suppression pool water level is a tegory I variable provided to detect a breach in the reactor coolant pressure r , boundary (RCPB). This variable is also used to verify and
- l provide long term surveillance of ECCS function. The wide .
range suppression pool water level measurement provides the l operator with sufficient infomation to assess the status of I
'_ _ both the RCPB and the water supply to the ECCS. The wide :
i pyf NcMS BE1.DW 7N6 MM~ water ^% rangelevel water level nr.t. fromT^i; indicators l i c.; monitor
;' ti; ~~~the suppression
_ _;; :... ' '...; pool I J vfATER LJWEL- toJ= ^ ' ' ^ "
-?. Two wide range suppression pool water level signal s:are transmitted from separate
% woes A80EE fy differential pressur,e transmitters and are continuously j
i NortMK WM recorded on two recorders in the control room. These ' ggve recorders are the primary indication used by the operator P1 during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel. Drywell Pressure ggg (Drywell pressure is a goryIvariableprovidedtodetecth breach of the RCPB and to verify ECCS functions that operate to maintain RCS integrity. Two wide range drywell pressure signals are transmitted from separate pressure transmitters i i and are continuously recorded and displayed on two control I room recorders. These recorders are the primary indication : used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.
$lSoA92 A tM kor r
f,2 T Primary Containment # - rAa Radiation "M S trT;d
,lMf 6/L7 x) r
_ f Primary containment ar ~ on (high range) is provided r to monitor the " ~ of si radiation releases g g*3 3,f 3 and to d lease assessment for use tors in u ing the need to invoke site emergency plans.
^
(continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-66 Rev 1, 04/07/95
PM instrumentation B 3.3.3.1 Insert B 3.3.3.1 2 Not used - Removed in Rev 12 >> h s Insert B 3.3.3.1 3 ., Primary containment area radiation (high range) is a type E, l Category I variable, and is provided to monitor the potential of significant radiation releases and to provide release assessment for use by operators in determining the need to invoke site emergency plarts. The instrumentation provided for this function consists of redundant se.nsors, microprocessors and indicators. A common 2 pen recorder in the control room continuously records signals from both channels. The redundant indicators in the relay room and the i common recorder in the control room are the primary indication used by the operator during and accident. Therefore, the PM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel. FERMI UNIT 2 Page B 3.3 65 (Insert) REVISION 12 08/02/99l
m
]
I i 5peciviceno,0 3.a ts. I
'1NSTRUMENTATf0N 3/4,3,4 ATW5 REttRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION i
llMITING CONDITION FOR OPERAff0N ! 1 [,(o 3,3,4,lt:t1r"* P The anticipated transient without scram'irecirculation pump trip (ATWS nuir trip seImointa a 6 c.unsis 6=ns wisn Ine as t ues $7.s T. npo. ir m g*j l
.(wnhnnt Se column ofiable 3.3.4-V.f--
APPttcABftfTY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1. AC. TION: ae---[ ADO AcT7ous Np7E ) )
- a. .
With an ATVS.RPT system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less -
- Am64 A conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values declare the channel inoperable until the channel it column r= " a of
*=d Table
*n 1 u iv ..gyvins no mstac consiste%t with (40,4 d opgir.HE.W)3.3.4-2 a OPERABLE statusrvsn u.s w (the prio mooint value. ; y.im. Hil hDb REQuttED Ac1 ten A.2. Moit \T WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelso{nelessthanreoutredbythe - 4 b.
Minimus OPERABLE Channels per Trip System reoutrement for one or both .tj l, $ j gGOg 4 tri sy ace _tne inoperable channel (s) in the trtpped condttion witgi i davQ- l With the numoer of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by Y ACDN 4 c. the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip g gg oc system and: , If the inoperable channels consist of one reactor vessel water level l. channel and one reactor vessel pressure channel, la h Il
, or, if ll i inoperable channels in the tripped condition within p system 3:*.
this action will initiate a pump trip, declare the 2 inoperable.
- 2. If the inoperable channels include two reactor vessel water level i
{ channels or two reactor vessel pressure channels, declare the trip j system inoperable. V MSY.5,p M [ ; g ld i
- d. 'With one tric system nocerable./festore the inoperable trip system to 2 OPERABLE status withinpfor be in at least STARTUP withtn the next g DO9 D 6 hours. 4, y,, p g ggg g With both trip systems i rabl . restore at least one tri system to A 0 0N be.** OPERABLE status within or ce in at least STARTUP wit in the next 6 y (JSm Pamf bvm SMvsu s Rey]c.! D.lf g
se. M 9.t.1 1.2.0.r Each ATWS-RPT system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated p 3.w , i,9. OPERABLE by the cerformance of the CHANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequenctes shown in Table 4.3.4-1. g 3,3,q ,;,3 - - - " " - - - " " " ~ A.T LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS G ' ' - " gg gg f E 3.M.I.4 @?.3.4.0- shall be performed at least once per Au montns, ac.b an l 3/4 3 32 Amenoment flo. 55 FERM1 - UNIT 2 PAGE / OF 04 b 12_ l
. Rev6 I n
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION' 3.3.4.1 ATWS RPT INSTRUENTATION A.4 For CTS Specification 3.3.4 (and ITS 3.3.4.1), the ATWS RPT system instrumentation is interpreted to include the actuated device (s) (i.e., two trip breakers per recirculation pump). Since each j instrumentation channel (reactor water level and reactor pressure) ultimately provides signals that can result in all four breakers tripping, any inoperable _ breaker is necessarily associated with I portions of all channels being inoperable. For the' case of an inoperable ATWS RPT breaker CTS 3.3.4 Action e does not allow inoperable channels to be placed in trip and continued operation permitted. Due to the reformatting to ITS. where multiple l Condition entry applies, and the ITS presentation of Action A for any number of inoperable channels the ITS option for tripping T i l l channels must be taken ' exception to in order to conform to CTS requirements. Since ITS Action A can apply to one or many k inoperable channels, the Note to Required Action A.2 is provided \I to direct a restoration requirement (and preclude a channel tripping allowance) in the event of an inoperable trip breaker. Q
,This explicit limitation is only a clarification of the requirements that would be imposed by compliance with CTS 3.3.4 )
requirements. The changes to the time allowed to restore the ; inoperable breaker / channels are addressed by DOC L.1. Therefore. l this change only reflects a presentation clarification necessitated by the ITS format. A.5 CTS 4.3.4.2 requires an LSFT "and simulated automatic operation" of all channels. The simulated automatic operation is interpreted in the CTS to be included in the LSFT. since the CTS LSFT definition " includes the actuated device." ITS SR 3.3.4.1.4 Q requires an LSFT but explicitly states " including breaker actuation." Since the ITS LSFT definition is revised to exclude the actuated device (refer to Section 1.0), explicitly adding V
)
or
" breaker actuation" captures the CTS requirement. This clarification is an administrative presentation preference only.
A.6 CTS Table 3.3.41. Note (*), allows required surveillance testing "without placing the trip system of the tripped condition provided the other channel in the same trip function is OPERABLE." ITS SR Note 2 provides the same allowance stated as " entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed provided the associated Function maintains trip capability." This represents consistency in presentation with other Specifications. I and as such, is considered an administrative change. hERMI . UNIT 2 2 REVISION 12. 08/02/99l
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.4.1 ATWS RPT INSTRUENTATION
' TECHNICAL CHANGES MORE RESTRICTIVE None TECHNICAL'CHANrER I NR RESTRICTIVE Generic" LA.1 ' CTS 3.3.4 requires that ATWS RPT actuation instrumentation trip !
'setpoints to be within Trip Setpoint column values of CTS Table 3.3.4 2. Additionally CTS 3.3.4 Action'a requires that an I inoperable A1WS RPT actuation instrument channel setpoint be restored consistent with the trip setpoint value. However.
Actions only apply if the allowable value is exceeded. ITS 3.3.4.1 requires only that instrumentation setpoints be within the allowable value. Trip setpoints reflect operational details while the allowable value reflects channel Operability. Requirements.for trip setpoints are relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), which requires revisions be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. The trip setpoint is established based on a combination of instrument design factors, environmental factors. and the' allowable value (which is what is conservatively derived
]9 from the value assumed in the safety analyses). Therefore, these l
. details can be-adequately defined and controlled in the TRM. (%
consistent with the NUREG 1433. This continues to provide adequate' protection of the public health and safety since the ' requirement for instrument channel Operability and the allowable g value setpoint. continues to be required by the Technical
' Specifications.
TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE "Speci fic" L.1 CTS 3.3.4 Actions b and c.1 require tripping inoperable channels within 1 hour: however. CTS 3.3.4-Action d would allow 72 hours ; with both channels in one trip system inoperable prior to ) requiring a plant shutdown. ITS 3.3.4.1 Action A allows 14 days to trip inoperable channels: and ITS 3.3.4.1 Action B allows 72 hours to restore trip capability in the event one of two trip Functions has lost trip capability. The AlVS RPT design is such that either trip system will trip both recirculation pumps. Each trip system can be tripped by either of two Functions -(reactor vessel low water level or reactor vessel FERMI - UNIT 2 3 REVISION 12. 08/02/99lM
1 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.4.1 AWS RPT INSTRUMENTATION ; o .
. high pressure), arranged in a 2 out of 2 trip logic for each Function. (Note: although not ~ assumed or credited. the logic of m the two separate functions is also combined such that one low Q 1evel and one high pressure signal would cause a trip system trip.
This feature would be described as a 1 out of 2 taken twice
- logic.)- Due to the following considerations. the . extended y
! ITS 3.3.4.1 Completion Times do not reflect _ a significant impact on safety: 1) the significant redundancy and diversity of trip
-initiating signals. which may allow for maintaining trip capability even in the event of multiple ATWS RPT channel I inoperabilities: 2) increased likelihoo. of an inadvertent loss of forced circulation while operating with inoperable ATWS RPT channels that have been tripped to comply with required Actions:
l and 3) the extremely low probability of an AWS event that would require AWS RPT trips to function. L.2 CTS 3.3.4 Action d and e require a plant shutdown in the event that required restoration or required channel tripping is not accomplished in the required time. ITS 3.3.4.1 Action D includes an option to the required plant shutdown - the option to remove the associated recirculation pump from service. This option accomplishes the functional purpose of the instrumentation and enables continued operation in a previously approved condition (under the restriction of other Specifications for single loop Q operation). Therefore. these changes do not have a significant l impact on safety. RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS None TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 4 The CTS Bases for this Specification have been replaced by Bases that reflect the format and applicable content of ITS 3.3.4.1 consistent with the BWR STS. NUREG 1433. Rev. 1.
)
FERMI UNIT 2 4 REVISION 12 08/02/99l l
l INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 5
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Volume 5 SECTION 3.3.5.1-3.3.8.2 (cont'd) Remove Replace 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-38 Rev 0 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-38 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-39 Rev 0 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-39 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-40 Rev 0 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-40 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-42 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-42 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-45 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-45 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-46 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-46 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-47 Rev 6 -- B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-1 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-1 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-2 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-2 Rev 12 l B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3'.5.1-3 Rev 0 'B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-3 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-4 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-4 Rev 12 j B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-5 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-5 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-6 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-6 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.17 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-7 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-8 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-8 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-9 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-9 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 10 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-10 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-11 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-11 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-12 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-12 Rev 12 i i B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-13 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-13 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-14 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-14 Rev 12 Rev 12 08/02/99
Volume 5 SECTION 3.3.5.1 3.3.8.2 (cont'd) - Remove Replace B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 15 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-15 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 16 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-16 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 17 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 17 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-18 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-18 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 19 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-19 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 20 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3 3.5.1-20 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.121 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-21 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-22 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-22 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-23 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-23 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-24 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-24 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-25 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-25 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.I ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-26 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-26 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3'5.1-27 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-27 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-28 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-28 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.!-29 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-29 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-30 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.130 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-31 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-31 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-32 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-32 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-33 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-33 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-34 Rev 6 -- B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-35 Rev 6 -- B 3.3.5.I ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-36 Rev 6 -- 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-23)pg 1 of 8 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-23) pg 1 of 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3 24) pg 2 of 8 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-24) pg 2 of 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-25) pg 3 of 8 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-25) pg 3 of 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-26) pg 4 of 8 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-26) pg 4 of 8 Rev 12 l 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3 27)pg 5 of 8 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-27) pg 5 of 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3 28) pg 6 of 8 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-28) pg 6 of 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3 30) pg 7 of 8 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-30) pg 7 of 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-31) pg 8 of 8 3.3.5.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-31) pg 8 of 8 Rev 12 { 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 12 Rev 12 08/02/99
Volume 5 SECTION 3.3.5.1-3.3.8.2 (cont'd) b " L . Remove Replace 33.5.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 0 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 6 Rev 6 33.5.1 DOCS pg 6 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 7 Rev 6 33.5.1 DOCS pg 7 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 8 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 9 Rev 6 33.5.1 DOCS pg 9 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 10 Rev 6 33.5.1 DOCS pg 10 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-38 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-38 Rev 12 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-39 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-39 Rev 12 33.5.I NUREG M/U pg 33-40 Rev 6 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-40 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-41 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-41 Rev 12 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-42 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-42 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-44 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-44 Rev 12 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-45 Rev 6 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-45 Rev 12 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-46 Rev 6 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-46 Rev 12 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 33-47 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-47 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-102 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-102 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-103 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-103 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-104 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-IN Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-111 Rev 6 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-111 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-112 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33112 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-118 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-118 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-119 Rev 6 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-119 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-124 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-124 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-128 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-128 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-130 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-130 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-131 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-131 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-132 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-132 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-133 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-133 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-134 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33134 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-135 Rev 6 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-135 Rev 12 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-136 Rev 6 B 33.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 33-136 Rev 12 33.5.1 JFDs pg i Rev 6 33.5.1 JFDs pg i Rev 12 Rev 12 08/02/99
Volume 5 SECTION 33.5.1-33.8.2 (cont'd).. ' Remove Replace 3.3.5.1 NSHC pg i Rev 0 3.3.5.1 NSHC pg i Rev 12 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-50 Rev 0 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-50 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-5i Rev 0 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-51 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-5 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-5 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-6 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-6 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-7 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-7 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-8 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-8 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-9 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-9 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.210 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-10 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-11 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-11 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-37) pg 2 of 5 - 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-37) pg 2 of 5 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-38) pg 3 of 5 Rev 6 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-38) pg 3 of 5 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-39) pg 4 of 5 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-39) pg 4 of 5 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-40) pg 5 of 5 3.3.5.2 CTS M/U (3/4 3-40) pg 5 of 5 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 DOCS pg 4 Rev 6 3.3.5.2 DOCS pg 4 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-48 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-48 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-50 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-50 Rev 12 ., 1 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-51 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-51 Rev 12 j B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-144 B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-144 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-146 B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-146 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-149 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-149 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-151 B 3.3.5.2 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-151 Rev 12 I 3.3.5.2 JFDs pg i Rev 0 3.3.5.2 JFDs pg 1 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-53 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-53 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-54 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-54 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-55 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-55 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-56 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-56 Rev 12 ' 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-57 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-57 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-58 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3 58 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-59 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3 59 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3 60 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-60 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 1 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-1 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.19 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-9 Rev 12 Rev12 08/02/99
E Volume 5 SECTION 3.3.5.1-3.3.8.2 (cont'd) J'* "4 7 Remove Replace B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-10 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-10 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1 11 Rev 0 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-11 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-12 Rev 0 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-12 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-13 Rev 0 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-13 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-14 Rev 0 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1 14 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-15 Rev 0 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-15 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1 16 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-16 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1 17 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1 17 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-18 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-18 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-19 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 19 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-20 Rev 6 - B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-20 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.121 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-21 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-22 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-22 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33,6.1-23 Rev 6 .B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-23 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-24 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-24 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-25 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-25 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-26 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.126 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-27 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-27 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-28 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-28 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-29 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-29 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-30 Rev 6 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.130 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 33.6.1-31 Rev 12 B 33.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-32 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-10) pg 2 of 13 33.6.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-10) pg 2 of 13 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-11) pg 3 of 13 Rev 6 33.6.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-11) pg 3 of 13 Rev 12 3J.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-12) pg 4 of 13 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-12) pg 4 of 13 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3 13) pg 5 of 13 33.6.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-13) pg 5 of 13 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-14) pg 6 of 13 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-14) pg 6 of 13 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-15) pg 8 of 13 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-15) pg 8 of 13 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-16) pg 9 of 13 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 316) pg 9 of 13 Rev 12 3 3.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-17) pg 10 of 13 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-17) pg 10 of 13 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3 20) pg 1I of 13 3.3.6.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-20) pg i1 of 13 Rev 12 33.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-21) pg 12 of 13 3.3.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-21) pg 12 of 13 Rev 12 I Rev 12 08/02/99
l 1 Volume 5 SECTION 3.3.5.1-3.3.8.2 (cont'd)T OL7 - Remove Replace 3.3.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-22) pg 13 of 13 3.3.6.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-22) pg 13 of 13 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 12 l l 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 7 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 7 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 8 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 8 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 9 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 9 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 10 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 10 Rev 12 ! 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg iI Rev 0 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 11 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 12 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 DOCS pg 12 Rev 12 I 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-53 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-53 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-54 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-54 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-55 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-55 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-56 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-56 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-57 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 NUREG hW pg 3.3-57 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-58 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-58 Rev 12 3.3 6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-58 (Insen) Rev 0 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-58 (Insen) Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG hW pg 3.3-59 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 NUREG hW pg 3.3-59 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-61 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-61 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-62 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-62 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-152 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-152 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-160 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-160 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-160 (Insen) B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-160 (Insen) Rev 12 l B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-161 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-161 Rev 12 i B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-164 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-164 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-169 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-169 Rev 12 B 3J 6 i NUREG M/U pg B 3.3170 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-170 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-171 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-171 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3172 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-172 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-173 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-173 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-1~4 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-174 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-174 (Insen) Rev 12 l B 3.3.6.1 NUREG t 1/U pg B 3.3-176 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-176 Rev 12 B 3.3.6. NURF'J M/U pg B 3.3-178 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-178 Rev 12 Rev 12 08/02/99
Volume 5 SECTION 3.3.5.1-3.3.' 8 .2 . c ., . Remove Replace B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-179 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-179 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3180 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-180 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3181 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-181 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3183 B 3.3.6.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-183 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 JFDs pg i Rev 0 3.3.6.1 JFDs pg 1 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 JFDs pg 2 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 JFDs pg 2 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NSHC pg 15 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 NSHC pg 15 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NSHC pg 16 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 NSHC pg 16 Rev 12 s 3.3.6.1 NSHC pg 17 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 NSHC pg 18 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.2 ITS pg B 3.3.6.2-8 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.2 ITS pg B 3.3.6.2-8 Rev 12 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 6 Rev 6 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 6 Rev 12 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 7 Rev 6 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 7 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-1 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-1 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3'.6.3-2 Rev 6 h 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-2 Rev 12 3.3.6.3 DOCS pg i Rev 6 3.3.6.3 DOCS pg i Rev 12 3.3.6.3 DOCS pg 2 Rev 6 3.3.6.3 DOCS pg 2 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-198 (Insert) Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/Upg B 3.3-198 (Insert) Rev 12 B 3.3.7.1 ITS pg B 3.3.7.1-11 Rev 6 B 3.3.7.1 ITS pg B 3.3.7.1-11 Rev 12 3.3.7.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-48) pg 2 of 5 Rev 6 3.3.7.1 CTS M/U (3/4 3-48) pg 2 of 5 Rev 12 3.3.7.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 6 3.3.7.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 12 B 3.3.7.1 NUREG M/II pg B 3.3-219 Rev 6 B 3.3.7.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-219 Rev 12 I Rev12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1
) ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Tl E. As required by E.1 Declare Automatic 1 hour from Required Action A.1 Depressurization discovery of and referenced in System (ADS) valves loss of ADS Table 3.3.5.1 1. inoperable. initiation f0 capability in
- 4. both trip g systems ,
se l E.2 P1 ace channel in % hours from trip. discovery of inoperable channel concurrent with HPCI or reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inoperable AND 8 days (continued) l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 38 Revision 12 08/02/99
)
r. f 1 L L ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 l'
). ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION' COMPLETION TIME l F. As required by F.1 - -- NOTE -- - - Required Action A.1 Only applicable for ) and referenced in Functions 4.c 4.e.. ! Table 3.3.5.1 1. 4. f. 4.g. 5.c 5.e, l 5.f, and 5.g.
.M.
Declare ADS valves 1 hour from 5 inoperable, discovery of-loss of ADS' initiation capability in d both trip
- 4. systems k
- g -
l F.2 Restore channel to % hours from OPERABLE status. discovery of inoperable
- s. -
channel concurrent with ! HPCI or RCIC i inoperable ! l 8 days
-l - G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion supported feature (s)
V Time of Condition B, inoperable. l C, D E, or F not met. s l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 39 Revision 12. 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS
.]
.....................................N0TES - - - ----.- - ------ -- -
- 1. . Refer to Table 3.3.5.1 1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of ..
required Surveillances.. entry into associated Conditions and Required y Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for i Function 3.c: and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions other than 3.c and Q 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains q ECCS initiation capability. .:
..............................................................................1 SURVEILLANCE -
FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 . Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.5.1.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform' CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months b di SR 3.3.5.1.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months k4 1 l I
' l. FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 40 Revision 12 08/02/99 J
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.11 (page 1 of 6) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE COBOITIONS NODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OROTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SlRVEILLACE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
- 1. Core Spray System
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2.3. 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 m 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Law. SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4I *) 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 r.
SR 3.3.5.1.5 *
- b. Drywell 1.2.3 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psia Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 dl c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 441 psig SR 3.3.E.1.2 (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3
- SR 3.3.5.1.4 q
- SR 3.3.5.1.5 Q 4(a). 5(8) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 a 441 psig SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 I SR 3.3.5.1.5
)h[1
- d. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 (c) C- SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 4(a). 5(a) ;
k 2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a). 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)
(a) When associated sesystem(s) of LCO 3.5.2 are required to be OPERABLE. hI (b) Also required to initiate the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG). (c) Individual component controls. 4 l FERMI UNIT 2- 3.3 41 Revision 12, 08/02/99
i l I l l ECCS Instrumentation ! 3.3.5.1
)/
Table 3.3.5.11 (page 2 of 6) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS NODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OROTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIRENENTS VALUE
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- b. Drywell 1.2.3 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig 1 Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 l SR 3.3.5.1.3 .-
1 SR 3.3.5.1.4 . SR 3.3.5.1.5 l Al ig v
- c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2
= 441 psig 1
(In,jection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 4(a),5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 441 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 . SR i3.3.5.1.3 l SR ' 3.3.5.1.4 i SR 3.3.5.1.5 l 1 l d. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 103.8 Level - Low Low. Level l SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches ' 2 (Loop Select Logic) 4(a), $(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l e. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 886 psig Pressure-Low (Break SR 3.3.5.1.2 Detection Logic) 4(a),$(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- f. Riser Differential 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 0.927 psid Pressure - High (Break SR 3.3.5.1.2 Detection) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 gl g. Recirculation Ptsp Differential 1.2.3 4 per plmp B SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 1.927 psid Pressure - High (Break SR 3.3.5.1.3 Detection) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)
(a) When associated subsystem (s) of LCO 3.5.2 are required to be OPERABLE. s l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 42 Revision 12. 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.11 (page 3 of 6)
. Emergency Core Cooling System Instrimentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS NODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SlRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE b I
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- h. Manual Initiation 1.2.3. (c) C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA Y 4(a), $(a) ,
- 3. High Pressure Coolant In.lection (W CI) System
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 m 103.8 Level - Low Law. SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Al Level 2 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- b. Drywell 1. 4 8 SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High, SR 3.3.5.1.2 ll 2(d). 3(d) '
SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 O SR'3.3.5.1.5 Q c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High. Level 8
- 1. 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 219 inches SR 3.3.5.1.2 l 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 V d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low
- 1. 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 0 inches SR 3.3.5.1.2 I i 2Id)3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- e. Suppression Pool Water 1. 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 5.0 inches Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.2
%r l 2(d). 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued) b
),, (a) When the associated subsystem (s) are required to be OPERABLE.
(c) Individual component controls, p (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig. d l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 43 Revision 12, 08/02/99 a
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1
')'. Table 3.3.5.11 (page 4 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE COICITIONS NDDES OR REQUIRED REFUtENCED OTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVElllANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE h *
- 3. . WCI System (continued)
- f. Nanual Initiation 1. (c) C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 2(d),3(d) ~,
- 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A Iy l a. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 24.8 Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches l Level 1 2(d). 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l b. Drywell 1, 2 E SR .3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - Hi@ ~
SR 3.3.5.1.2 l 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 p, SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
$ c. Automatic Depressurization
- 1. 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 117 seconds Qll System Initiation Timer 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l d. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 171.9 Level- Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches
'l (Confirmatory) 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l e. Core Spray Punp 1, 1 per ptmp F SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 125 psig Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2 I l Pressure - High 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 lA (continued) 4 Tl (c) Individual conponent controls.
2 (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig. 1 i l i i u i l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 44 Revision 12 08/02/99
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1 l ECCS Instrumentation t 3.3.5.1 l r Table 3.3.5.1 1 (page 5 of 6) i Emergency Core Cooling System Instrtmentation l APPLICABLE CONDIlIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PDt REQUIRED SlRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION COMITIONS FIMCTION ACTION A.1 P.EQUIREENTS VALUE l
- 4. ADS Trip System A (continued) bl-
- f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Ptap 1, 2 per pump F SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 a 115 psig to l Discharge 2Id). 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 ,
a Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l g. Drywell 1, 2- F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 450 seconds Pressure-High Bypass SR 3.3.5.1.3 l 2Id).3Id) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 gl h. Manual inhibit 1. 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.5 NA l , 2(d), 3(d) , h 1. Manual Initiation 1, 1 r F SR' 3.3.5.1.6 NA ( 2(d),3(d)
- 5. ADS Trip System B I
,l a. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Low.
A
'l Level 1 2(d), 3(d)
SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l b. Drywell 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 l 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l c. Automatic 1. 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 117 seconds Depressurization SR 3.3.5.1.4 l System Initiation 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 g Timer Il d. Reactor Ve..sel Water level - Low. Level 3
- 1. 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 171.9
' 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches (Confirmatory) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l e. Core Spray Pwp 1, 1 per ptsp F SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 125 psig Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2 3[ l Pressure - High 2Id).3Id) SR 3.3.5.1.3 i SR 3.3.5.1.4 1 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued) i l
O l (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig. V G
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l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 45 Revision 12 08/02/99 J
1 ECCS Instrumentation ) 3.3.5.1 l Table 3.3.5.11 (page 6 of 6) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE COICITIONS . N00ES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FLMCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
- 5. ADS Trip System B (continued) d'l f. Low Pressure Coolant 1. 2 per ptsp F SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 115 psig I InMion Ptap SR 3.3.5.1.2 ;
Discharge 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 Y. Ml Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.4 i i SR 3.3.5.1.5 1 l g. Drywell 1, 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 450 seconds Pressure - High Bypass SR 3.3.5.1.3 l 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 Nl h, Manual Inhibit 1, 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.5 NA ble 2(d),3(d)
- 1. Manual Initiation 1. I r F SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 2(d),3(d) m 9 l (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.
l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 46 Revision 12 08/02/99 _~
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 ! l
) B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that the fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient. q For most anticipated o !
Basis Accidents (DBAs)perational occurrences
, a wide range andand of dependent Design independent parameters are monitored.
The ECCS instrumentation actuates core spray (CS). low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). Automatic Depressurization System (ADS),
- and the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The equi) ment involved with each of these systems is described in t1e Bases for LC0 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating."
Core Sorav System The CS System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure- High. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the eight trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one out of-two taken twice logic (i.e., two trip systems) for each Function. Once an initiation signal is received by the CS control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset. Automatic initiation starts both CS pumps in both loops five seconds after initiation when normal AC power is available. If normal AC power is not available, each Jump starts five seconds after standby power becomes availa)le to that pump. When RPV pressure decreases below the injection permissive setpoint, the pum) injection valves open allowing water to be sprayed over t1e core, s l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 1 Revision 12, 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
-). BASES BACKGROUf0 (continued) l The CS test line isolation valve, which is also a primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), is closed on a CS initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the -
accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated p in the event CS is not operating. k TheCSSystemalsomonitorsthepressureini!hereactorto enscre that, before the injection valves open, the reactor n, pressure has fallen to a value below the CS System's maximum. ' design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one out-of two taken twice logic. Low Pressure Coolant In.iection System ! The LPCI is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal ( (RE) System, with two LPCI subsystems. The LPCI subsystems ' may be initiated by automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1: Drywell Pressure-High: or both. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which, in turn, are connected to 4 four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are 1 connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one out-of two taken twice logic (i.e., two trip systems) for each Function. Once an initiation signal is received by the LPCI control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until i manually reset. l l Upon receipt of an initiation signal, if normal power is available, all four RHR pumps start with no delay. Otherwise, they each start when standby )ower is available. Valves are automatically positioned for _PCI injection, which occurs when RPV pressure falls below the injection permissive setpoint. This setpoint is selected to protect the RHR system from overpressure. A Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signal initiates the loop selection logic, a divisional 12ed subsystem using redundant sensors that determines which if any. recirculation loop is broken. This logic then aligns the pumps injection valves to the unbroken loop to ensure the system function of flooding the core to at least 2/3 core height will be accomplished. Once selected, the injection path is sealed in for five minutes, after which a timer allows the operator to throttle the 1 l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 -2 Revision 12. 08/02/99 j
r j l ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 ,
] BASES BACKGROUND (continued) flow. Once identified, the broken recirculation loop is .
isolated for ten minutes. These times ensure the LPCI l design flows will reflood the core to at least 2/3 core height. The loop selection logic has four channels that are arranged in a one out-of-two taken twice logic for each of the following Functions: RPV Pressure (which initiates the .r, break detection logic on a decreasing setpoint): Reactor e Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 (which provides a break detection permissive signal): and differential pressures between the recirculation loop risers, and between the I recirculation pump suction and discharge (which are used to { determine recirculation pump operation and which loop (s) are unbroken). The recirculation pump discharge valve bn the unbroken loop is closed by the loop selection logic to. direct LPCI flow to l rq the reactor through the suction line without being diverted through the recirculation pump. The RHR test / suppression pool cooling line isolation valve. I suppression pool spray isolation valves, and containment spray isolation valves (which are also PCIVs) are also closed on a LPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated in the event LPCI is not operating. Hiah Pressure Coolant In.iection System The HPCI System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 or Drywell Pressure- High. Each of these variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters. which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a q' one-out of two taken twice logic for each Function.
$w The HPCI test line isolation valve (which is also a PCIV) is '
closed upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analysis and , maintain primary containment isolated in the event HPCI is not operating.
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l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 3 Revision 12 08/02/99
1 i ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
] BASES ~
8ACKGROUND (continued) The HPCI System also monitors the water levels.in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the_ suppression' pool because these are the two sources of water for HPCI operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal , source. Upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless both sur.pression pool suction valves are open. If the water level in the CST r, falls below a preselected level, first the su)pression pool - suction valves automatically open, and then t1e CST suction valve automatically closes. Two channels of level transmitters and trip units are used to detect low water level-in the CST. Either channel can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST suction valve to close. Two channels of level transmitters and trip units monitor suppression pool water level. The suppression pool
' suction valves also automatically open and the CST suction valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool. To prevent losing suction to the pump.
l the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path l must be open before the other automatically closes. The HPCI provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High. Level 8 trip, at which time the HPCI turbine trips. which causes the turbine's stop valve and the injection valves to close. The logic is two out of two to provide high reliability of the HPCI System. The HPCI System automatically restarts if a Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 signal is subsequently received. Automatic Deoressurization System The ADS may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs when signals indicating Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1: Drywell Pressure-High or Drywell Pressure-High Bypass Timer: confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3: and CS or LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure-High are all present and the ADS Initiation Timer has timed out. There are two transmitters each for Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 and Drywell Pressure-High. and one transmitter for confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 in each of the two ADS trip systems. Each of these l transmitters connects to a trip unit, which then drives a relay whose contacts form the initiation logic. i- I g l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 -4 Revision 12 08/02/99 l i
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) BASES BACKGROUND (continued) !
1 Each ADS tri) system includes a timi delay between satisfying t1e initiation logic and the actuation of the ADS valves. The ADS Initiation Timer time delay setpoint chosen l 1s long enough that the HPCI has sufficient operating time to recover to a level above Level 1, yet not so long that the LPCI and CS Systems are unable to adequately cool the fuel if the HPCI fails to maintain that level. An alarm in the control room is annunciated when either of the timers is . timing. Resetting the ADS initiation signals resets the ADS ' Initiation Timers. The ADS also monitors the discharge pressures of the four LPCI pumps and the four CS pumps. Each ADS trip system includes a single pressure transmitter from each CS pump and two pressure transmitters from each LPCI pump in the associated Division (i.e., Division 1 LPCI subsystems A and
- C. and CS pumps A and C input to ADS trip system A: and division 2 LPCI subsystems B and D, and CS pumps B and D input to ADS trip system B). The signals are used as a permissive for ADS actuation, indicating that there is a source of core coolant available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Either one LPCI pump (two out of-two logic) or both core spray pumps in the same division is sufficient to permit automatic depressurization.
The ADS logic in each trip system is arranged in two
- strings. Each string has a contact from each of the l following variables
- Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1: Drywell Pressure-High; and Drywell Pressure- 1 High Bypass Timer. One of the two strings in each trip !
system must also have a confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3. Each of these contacts in both logic strings must close, the ADS initiation timer must time out. and a CS or LPCI pump discharge pressure signal must be present in both strings to initiate an ADS trip system. i I i Either the A or B trip system will cause all five ADS relief I valves to open. Once the Drywell Pressure-High signal, the l ADS Low Water Level Actuation Timer, or the ADS initiation i i signal is present. it is individually sealed in until ' manually reset. The reactor vessel water Level Low Low Low. Level 1 does not seal in to give HPCI an opportunity to restore level before ADS initiates a blow down. Manual inhibit switches (one for each ADS trip system) are l provided in the control room for the ADS. l l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 5 Revision 12. 08/02/99 I L J
1 L L ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 l BASES BACKGROLN) (continued) Fearoency Diesel Generators The EDGs may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for coidtions of 1 Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 or Drywell ' Pressure-High. The EDGs are also initiated upon loss of voltage signals. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in n, turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the four > trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are connected to a one out of two taken twice logic to initiate all four EDGs (11,12,13, and 14). The EDGs receive their initiation signals from the CS System initiation logic. The EDGs can also be started manually from the control room and-locally from the associated EDG room. The EDG initiation ' signal is a sealed in signal and must be manually reset. The EDG initiation logic is reset by resetting the associated ECCS initiation logic. Upon receipt of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) initiation signal, each EDG is automatically started, is ready to load in approximately l 10 seconds, and will run in. standby conditions (rated 1 voltage and speed, with the EDG output breaker open). The ! EDGs will only energize their respective Engineered Safety Feature buses.if a loss of offsite power occurs. (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1.) ! APPLICABLE. The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety SAFETY ANALYSES, analyses of References 2, 3. and 4. The ECCS is initiated LCO, and to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting APPLICABILITY the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the ' 10 CFR 50.46 limits. ECCS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(11). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion. The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent u)on.the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation clannel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1 1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values. where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. f l~ FERMI - UNIT.2' B 3.3.5.1 - 6 Revision 12. 08/02/99
l l l ECCS Instrumentation ; B 3.3.5.1
] BASES I
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Table 3.3.5.1 1, footnote (b), is a'dded to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions are also required to be OPERABLE to perform EDG initiation. Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The' nominal i setpoints are selected to ensure that the set >oints do not n l exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CA.IBRATIONS or > between successive verifications of the trip unit setpoints. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip set >oint, but within its Allowable Value, is ' acceptable. A clannel is inoperable if its actual trip , setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip ' setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which' l an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to i the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured out)ut val'u e of the process l parameter exceeds the setpoint, t1e associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived I from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration. process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g. , drift). The trip setpoints derived i in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances. instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for. l In general, the individual Functions are required to be l OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or EDG) initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis transient or accident. To ensure reliable ECCS and EDG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals. The specific Applicable Safety Analyses. LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis. y l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 7 Revision 12 08/02/99 a
1 l [ ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
'] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Core Sorav and Low Pressure Coolant'Iniection Systems 1.a. 2.a. Reactor _ Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The low pressure ECCS and associated EDGs are initiated at n Level 1 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are ' available to )revent or minimize fuel damage, The Reactor Vessel Water _evel-Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to'be CPERABLE 'and capable of initiating the ECCS during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. In addition, the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the' , recirculation line break (Ref.1). The, core cooling
' function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure ! core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate l cooling. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or EDG(s) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and EDG initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2, "ECCS-Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems: LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating": and LCC 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown " for Applicability Bases for the EDGs. J l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 8 Revision 12. 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation ) B 3.3.5.1
] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 1.b. 2.b. Drywell Pressure-Hiah l
High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The low pressure ECCS and associated EDGs are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low Low, e. Level 1 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the - recirculation line break (Ref. 3). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. 1 1 High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be , indicative of a LOCA inside primary cont'inment. a The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or EDG is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels cf the CS and LPCI Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be i OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2. and 3 to ensure that no single l instrument failure can preclude ECCS and EDG initiation. In MODES 4 and 5. the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required, since there is insufficient energy in tne reactor to pressurize the. primary containment to Drywell Pressure-High setpoint. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the EDGs. 1.c. 2.c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (In.iection Permissive) Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that. prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems. the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. In addition, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low' Function is directly assumed in the s I
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) I I analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref.1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. - The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated i from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. e, The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equiment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to l ensure t1at the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS is required ; to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure l can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and ! LC0 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS l subsystems. 1.d. 2.h. Manual Initiation ! The Manual Initiation channels provide manual initiation capability to individual components. The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any i, accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However. the W Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of s the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the ms plant licensing basis. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the k channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the individual components. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the i low pressure ECCS subsystems. l l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 10 Revision 12, 08/02/99
l ECCS Instrumentation i B 3.3.5.1 l BASES
-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.d Reactor Vessel Water Level-Lo'w Low Level 2 (Looo Selection Looic)
LPCI Loop selection logic is initiated on decreasing RPV water level at level 2. This gives the logic time to detect the broken recirculation loop and select the unbroken recirculation loop for LPCI injection. The LPCI pumps are initiated at level 1. .r. Reactor. Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the i difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual i water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The transmitter . l signals feed trip units whose outputs drive relays. Output ' contacts of the relays are configured in a one out of two
' taken twice initiation logic.
I The same instrumentation and relay logic is used for HPCI l initiation (Function 3a). That system's design basis ; establishes the Allowable Value while accounting for i q measurement uncertainties. LPCI loop selection initiation l is not directly assumed by any safety or transient analysis. l but is required to function to support the LPCI system. ; which is assumed to function in t1e accident analysis ! (Ref. 1). Four channels are required to be OPERABLE whenever LPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude LPCI initiation. 2.e. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (Break Detection Loaic) 1 This function is provided in the LPCI break detection logic. If only one recirculation pump is running, the logic trips that pump in order to obtain a meaningful measurement of recirculation riser differential pressure (Function 2.f). Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low inhibits the break detection logic from acting on the value of riser differential pressure until reactor pressure has fallen below the set point due to the pump trip. This allows the logic to identify the broken recirculation loop. Although this function is not directly assumed by the safety analysis, it is required for the LPCI loop selection logic. hlFERMIUNIT2 B 3.3.5.1- 11 Revision 12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) and LPCI to be OPERABLE, and is the'refore a supporting function for that assumed by the analysis of Reference 1.
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Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense reactor steam dome pressure. The Allowable Value was selected, allowing for measurement uncertainties, to give adequate time, based on reactor pressure decrease following RPT, for an accurate n. riser differential pressure measurement to be made. The - logic for this Function is one out of-two taken twice. Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low are required to be OPERABLE when LPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude LPCIinjection. 1
- 2. f. Riser Differential Pressure-Hich' (Break Detection) I The LPCI break detection logic determines which l recirculation loop is broken by comparing the pressure of I the two recirculation loops. The broken loop will indicate a lower pressure than the unbroken loop. The loop with the higher pressure is then used for LPCI injection. If both pressures are the same, loop B is selected by default.
Riser Differential Pressure-High signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between corresponding recirculation loop riser pipes. Logic is one out of two taken twice. The Riser Differential Pressure-High Allowable Value is selected, allowing for measurement uncertainties, based on the analytical limit of 1.0 psid between corresponding risers. Four channels of Riser Differential Pressure-High are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure prevents LPCI injection into the unbroken riser loop and support the LPCI function. g l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 12 Revision 12. 08/02/99
i ECCS Instrumentation i B 3.3.5.1
] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.a. Recirculation Puen Differential Pressure-Hioh (Break Detection)
-The differential pressure between pump suction and discharge l
, indicates whether the pump is running. This information is I used by the LPCI break detection logic to determine whether l the sensed riser differential pressure is meaningful. If l both pumps are running or not running, the logic can use the z. riser differential pressure (Function 2.f) value to ' determine which loop is broken. If only one pump is running, the logic trips the running pump, waits until'the ; reactor pressure decreases to a pre-selected value (Function ! l 2.e), then identifies the broken loop based on riser ) differential pressure. This function is necessary to support LPCI injection, which was assumed in the safety ' analysis (Ref.1). ,- Recirculation Pump Differential Pressure-High signals are - , initiated from four differential pressure transmitters at i each of the two recirculation pumps. The output relay signals are configured in one-out of-two taken twice logic to preclude a single instrument failure preventing LPCI injection. The Allowable Value is selected allowing for measurement uncertainties to be low enough to distinguish i between pump running and not running based on the pump head curve. Four channels of Recirculation PW Differential 4 l Pressure-High for each of the two recirculation pumps are l required to be OPERABLE to support LPCI injection and preclude a single instrument failure. ! HPCI System
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3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 a low RPV water level indicates that the capability to coo) the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease I too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCI , System is initiated at Level 2 to maintain level above the l top of the active fuel. The Reactor Vessel Water _ Level-Low Low. Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPEFABLE and capable of initiating HPCI during the transients analyzed in Reference 3. Additionally, the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Function associated with HPCI is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation i I line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS. along with the stran action of the RPS ensures that the l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 13 Revision 12. 08/02/99 J
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) fuel mak cladding temperature rema' ins below the limits of 10 CF3 50.46. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
.5 The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Allowable Value is high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the Reactor Core-Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
System flow with HPCI assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1.
' Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water L'evel-Low Low.
Level 2 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. 3.b. Drywell Pressure-Hiah High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI System is initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The core cooling function of the ECCS along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible to be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. Four channels of the Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for the Applicability Bases for the HPCI System. h!FERMIUNIT2 B 3.3.5.1 - 14 Revision 12 08/02/99 1
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-H'iah. Level B High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to trip the HPCI turbine to prevent overflow.into the main steam lines (MSLs). The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High.
Level 8 Function is not assumed in the accident and r transient analyses. It was retained since it is a ' potentially significant contributor to risk. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 signals for HPCI are initiated from two level transmitters from the wide range water level measurement instrumentation. Both Level _.8 signals are required in order to trip the HPCI turbine. ' This ensures that no single instrument . failure can preclude
- HPCI initiation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to prevent flow from the HPCI System from overflowing into the MSLs.
Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-High. Level 8 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2 for HPCI Applicability Bases. 3.d. Condensate Storace Tank Level-Low Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally the suction valves between HPCI and the CST are open and, upon receiving a HPCI initiation signal. water for HPCI injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected: level, first the suppression pool suction valves automatically o)en, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. T11s ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the HPCI pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open oefore the CST suction valve automatically closes. The Function is imalicitly assumed in the accident and tr nsient analyses (wlich take credit for HPCI) since the M al ses / assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool. hlFERMIUNIT2 B 3.3.5.1 - 15 Revision 12. 08/02/99 ______ 4
t ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
-) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
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Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low ' signals are initiated' from two level transmitters. The logic is arranged such that either level transmitter can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open which, in turn, will cause the CST suction valve to close. The Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST. n. 4 Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is' required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. 3.e. Sunoression Pool Water Level-Hioh
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Excessively high suppression pool water could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the safety / relief valves. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of HPCI from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of HPCI continuing to provide l additional water from a source outside containment. To i prevent losing suction to the pump. the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. This Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCI) since the analyses assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool. Suppression Pool Water Level-High signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The logic is arranged such that either transmitter can cause the suppression pool t suction valves to open which, in turn, will cause the CST suction valve to close. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level-High Function is chosen to ensure that HPCI will be aligned for suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression pool design loads would be exceeded. l l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 16 Rev1sion 12, 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Two channels of Suppression Pool Wa'ter Level-High Function l are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can
)reclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to i C0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. !
3.f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual initiation ' capability. : b - The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the , Q
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Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant k , licensing basis. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the ; channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the ' position of individual controls. The Manual Initiation 1 Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. Automatic Deoressurization System 4.a.'5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of j FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 17 Revision 12, 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low" Low. Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 r Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure ' core flooding systems'to initiate and provide adequate. cooling. , 4.b. 5.b. Drywell Pressure-Hiah High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. Therefore. ADS receives one of the signals necessary
' for initiation from this' Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High is
' assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. 3 Drywell Pressure-High signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. I 1
Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High Function are only ! required to be OPERABLE when ADS is required to be OPERABLE j to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS ' initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A. while the other two channels in)ut to ADS trip system'B. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for ADS Applica)ility Bases. l 4.c. 5.c. Automatic Deoressurization System Initiation Timer l The purpose of the Automatic Depressurization System i Initiation Timer is to delay depressurization of the reactor ! vessel to allow the HPCI System time to maintain reactor ' vessel water level. Since the rapid depressurization caused by ADS operation is one of the most severe transients on the reactor vessel. its occurrence should be limited. By ! delaying initiation of the ADS Function, the operator is UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1-18 hl FERMI Revision 12. 08/02/99 j
1 l ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSFS, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) given the chance to monitor the success or failure of the HPCI System to maintain water level, and then to decide whether or not to allow ADS to initiate, to delay -initiation further by recycling the timer, or to inhibit initiation permanently. The Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer Function is assumed to be OPERABLE for the I accident analyses of Reference 1 that require ECCS initiation and assume failure of the HPCI System. r. . I There are two Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer relays, one in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the Automatic De)ressurization System I Initiation Timer is chosen so that t1ere is still time after i depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.
- Two channels of the Automatic De ressurization System Initiation Timer Function are on y required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. One channel inputs to ADS trip system A, while the other channel inputs to ADS trip system B. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.
4.d. 5.d. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is used by the ADS only as a confirmatory low water level signal. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level l' signals. In order to prevent spurious initiation of the ADS due to spurious Level 1 signals, a Level 3 signal must also be received before ADS initiation commences. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 signals are initiated from two level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Allowable Value for Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 is selected at the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value for i convenience. Refer to LC0 3.3.1.1. " Reactor Protection l System (RPS) Instrumentation," for the Bases discussion of l this Function. J l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 19 Revision 12 08/02/99 l .a
r ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) l Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 I
Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is I required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument I failure can preclude ADS initiation. One channel inputs to one string of ADS trip system A, while the other channel l inputs to one string of ADS trip system B. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases. 1 .. 4.e. 4. f. 5.e. 5. f. Core Soray and Low Pressure Coolant 4 Iniection Pumo Discharoe Pressure-Hiah The Pump Discharge Pressure-High signals from the CS and l LPCI pumps are used as permissives for ADS initiation, I indicating that there is a source of low pressure cooling l water available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Pump Discharge Pressure-High is one of.the Functions
' assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting ADS initiation during the events analyzed in Reference 1 with an i assumed HPCI failure. For these events the ADS depressurizes the reactor vessel so that the low pressure ECCS can perform the core cooling functions. This core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature I
remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Pump discharge pressure signals are initiated from twelve pressure transaitters, two on the discharge side of each of the four LPCI pumps and one on the discharge of four CS pumps. In order to generate an ADS 3ermissive in one trip system, it is necessary that either _PCI pump or both CS pumps in the associated division indicate the high discharge pressure condition. The Pump Discharge Pressure-High l Allowable Value is less than the pump discharge pressure l when the pump is operating in a full flow mode and high enough to avoid any condition that results in a discharge pressure permissive when the CS and LPCI pumps are aligned for injection and the pumps are not running. The actual operating point of this function is not assumed in any transient or accident analysis. ) Twelve channels of Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure-High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be l OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can l preclude ADS initiation. Two CS channels, one each associated with CS pumps A and C, and four LPCI channels, s i FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 20 Revision 12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) two each associated with LPCI pumps'A and C, are required for trip system A. Two CS channels, one each associated with CS pumps B and D, and four LPCI channels, two each associated with LPCI pumps B and D, are required for trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.
4.o. 5.o. Drvwell Pressure-Hioh Bvoass One of the signals required for ADS initiation is Drywell
- Pressure-High. However, if the event re initiation occurs outside the drywell (e. quiring ADS g., main steam line break outside containment), a high drywell pressure signal may never be present. Therefore, the Drywell Pressure-High Bypass Timer is used to bypass the Drywell Pressure-High Function after a certain time period has elapsed. Operation of the Drywell Pressure High Bypass Timer Function is not-
' assumed in any accident analysis. The instrumentation is retained in the TS because ADS is ) art of the primary success path for mitigation of a D3A.
There are four Drywell Pressure-High Bypass Timer relays, two in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the Drywell Pressure-High Bypass Timer is chosen to ensure that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling. Four channels of the Drywell Pressure-High Bypass Timer Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases. 4.h. 5.h Manual Inhibit The Manual Inhibit switch channels allow the operator to inhibit ADS operation without repeatedly pressing the ADS timer reset pushbuttons. There is one switch for each ADS trip system for a total of two. The Manual Inhibit Function is not assumed in any accident of transient analysis in the UFSAR. however, the operator is required to manually inhibit the ADS function in an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) situation. The Manual Inhibit Function is retained because the function was determined to be risk significant. The estimated increase s l FERMI -~ UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 21 Revision 12 08/02/99
1 ECCS Instrumentation . B 3.3.5.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) )
in the core damage frequency if the~ ADS inhibit function'is always assumed to fail is more than a factor of four. Thus this function meets criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the msition of the switch. Two channels of the Manual Inhibit
- unction (one channel per trip system) are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer .
l to LCO 3.5.1 for the ADS Applicability Bases. 4.1. 5.i. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual initiation capability to each ADS valve. h The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the 4 t Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of k the ADS functions as required by the NRC in the plant ! licensing basis. j There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the , channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the ! position of individual controls. The Manual Initiation Function is only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases. ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3 Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variaM es expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Recuired Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each adcitional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel. l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 22 Revision 12 08/02/99
)
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 1
] BASES ACTIONS (continued)
U Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate l Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.11. The applicable ' Condition referenced in the table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable. Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition. r B.1. B.2. and B.3 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature (s). Required Action B.1 features would be those
' that are initiated by Functions 1.a. 1.b 2 a. 2.b, 2.d. and 2.g (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For Required Action B.1, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) two Function 1.a channels are inoperable and untripped in the '
same trip system, (b) two Function 2.a channels are inoperable and untripped in the sane trip system, (c) two Function 1.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same system, (d) two Function 2.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. (e) two Function 2.d channels are inoperable and untri) ped in the same trip system. or (f) two Function 2.g clannels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. For low pressure ECCS. since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.1 a) plied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each ino)erable clannel would only require the affected portion of tie associated system of low pressure ECCS and EDGs to be ! declared inoperable. However, since channels in both associated low pressure ECCS subsystems (e.g.. both CS subsystems) are inoperable and untri> ped. and the Completion Times started concurrently for the clannels in both 4 subsystems. this results in the affected portions in the : associated low pressure ECCS and EDGs being concurrently I declared inoperable. For Required Action B.2. redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour allowance of Required i s k l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 23 Revision 12 08/02/99 J
)
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
] ' BASES-ACTIONS (continued) i ' Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature (s) associated i with the inoperable, untripped channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour. As noted (Note 1 to Required .
-Action B.1), Required Action B.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2. and 3. In MODES 4 and 5. the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required r, i
! Action B.3) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. There is no - similar Note provided for Required Action B.2 since HPCI i instrumentation is not required in MODES 4 and 5: thusl a Note is not necessary. Notes are also provided (Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and the Note to Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry
'into. Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable.
This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability i check is performed. I The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal l
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
For Required Action B.1. the Completion Time only begins j upon discovery that a redundant feature in the same system l (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2. the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due i to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated ; Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour Completion ' Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.3. Placing the i inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate 1 GMD G . . g
p a ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 l
] BASES l ACTIONS (continued) for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
I g Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in s trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable l p channel in trip would result in an initiation). Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. l l C.1 and C.2 Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate ! actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within l the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature (s). Required i Action C.1 features would be those that are initiated by l Functions 1.c. 2.c. 2.e. and 2.f (i.e., low pressure ECCS).' Redundant automatic initiation capabili.ty is lost if either
'(a) two Function 1.c channels are inoperable in the same trip system. (b) two Function 2.c channels are inoperable in the same trip system. (c) two Function 2.e channels are inoperable in the same trip system, or (d) two or more Function 2.f channels are inoperable. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the ) 24 hour allowance of Required Action C.2 is not appropriate and the feature (s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour. Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action C.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each ino)erable channel would only require the affected portion of t1e associated system to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for both low pressure ECCS subsystems are inoperable (e.g.,
both CS subsystems), and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in both subsystems being concurrently declared inoperable. For Functions 1.c. 2.c. 2.e. and 2.f. the affected portions are the associated low pressure ECCS pumps. As noted (Note 1) Required Action C.1 is only applicable in MODES 1. 2. and 3. In MODES 4 and 5 the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 25 Revision 12 08/02/99 l l
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) BASES ACTIONS (continued)
Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.c, 2.c. 2.e. and 2.f. Required Action C.1 is not applicable to Functions 1.d. 2.h. and 3.f (which also ( require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation , capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action C.2) e, is allowed. Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to 4 Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable) since the loss l of one channel results in a loss'of the Function (two out of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 4 and considered acceptable for the ! 24 hours allowed by Required Action C.2.
- The Completion Time is intended to allah. the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion i Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is ; acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for ' restoration of channels. j ! Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide I initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to , be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any I inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable n\ channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition G must be entered dl and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily l l result in a safe state for the chanr.el in all events. s l _ FERMI. UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 26 Revision 12. 08/02/99 J
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 ) BASES ACTIONS (continued)
~
D.1. D.2.1. and D.2.2 Required Action D 1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic component initiation capability for the HPCI System. Automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.d channels or two Function 3.e channels .r. are inoperable and untri In this situation (loss of 4 automatic suction swap),pped. the 24 hour allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate and the HPCI ; System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after ' discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability. As noted, l Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the HPCI pump I suction is not aligned to the suppression pool, since, if ' 1 aligned, the Function is already performed. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This j Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal -
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
3-
' For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation ,
capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of 'any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1 or the suction source must be aligned to the suppression pool per Required Action D.2.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip performs the intended function of the channel (shifting - the suction source to the suppression pool). Performance of either of these two Required Actions will allow operation to 1 i
... g c
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
] BASES ACi!ONS (continued) continue. If Required Action D.2.1'or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the HPCI System piping remains filled with water. Alternately, if'it is not Q desired to perforse Required Actions D.2.1'and D.2.2 (e.g.,
as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain 2 Q down the HPCI suction piping), Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. E.1 and E.2 4 l Required Action E.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system A and B Functbns result in redundant automatic initiation capability being .. lost for the ADS. Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.a channel and one
- Function 5.a channel are inoperable and untripped, (b) one Function 4.b channel and one Function 5.b channel are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one Function 4.d channel and one Function 5.d channel are inoperable and untripped.
In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required l Action E.2 is not appropriate and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of ADS initiation The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
ll For Required Action E.1 the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE. If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time is s j FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 28 Revision 12 08/02/99
I ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 i- 4 BASES ACTIONS (continued) J shortened to % hours. If the status of HPCI or RCIC 1 changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the % hours begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC -- inoperability. However, the total time for an inoperable, untripped channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from % hours to 8 days, the " time zero" for beginning the j 8 day " clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable, r. 1 untripped channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be ' q restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of
, service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped nl condition per Required Action E.2. Placing the inoperable ,
channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single . m failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if a it is not desired to place the channel .in trip (e.g., as in
' the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition G must be entered and
~
l its Required Action taken. l L1 and F.2
',l Required Action F.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions result in automatic '
initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.c channel and one Function 5.c channel are inoperable. (b) a combination of Function 4.e. 4.f. 5.e. and 5.f channels are inoperable such that channels associated with seven or more low pressure ECCS pumps are inoperable, or (c) one or more Function 4.g channels and one or more Function 5.9 channels are inoperable. to i In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required
! Action F.2 is not appro)riate, and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable witlin 1 hour after discovery of loss of (n ADS initiation capability. The Note to Required Action F.1 4 states that Required Action F.1 is only applicable for e Functions 4.c. 4.e. 4.f. 4.g. 5.c. 5.e. 5.f. and 5.g. !
i t Required Action F.1 is not applicable to Functions 4.h. 4.i. 1 5.h. and 5.i (which also require entry into this Condition ! i gl if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Inhibit and Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. ' 1 l FERMI - UNIT 2 . B 3.3.5.1 - 29 Revision 12 08/02/99 , 1
1 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
] BASES ACTIONS (continued) I Thus, a total loss of manual inhibit capability for % hours l or 8 days (as allowed by Required Action F.2) is allowed.
[ ~ l The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This l Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal l " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." l For Required Action F.1, the Completion Time only begins e, upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically - initiated due to inoperable channels within similar ADS trip l system Functions as described in the paragraph above. 'The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation l capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while ' allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. O Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide I
' initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an l
l allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable i l , channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are l
'l OPERABLE (Required Action F.2). If either HPCI or RCIC is 1 inoperable, the time shortens to % hours. If the status of '
HPCI or RCIC changes such thct the Com)letion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the 96 hours >egins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability, fbwever, the total time for . an inoperable channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Coi;;pletion Time changes from % hours to 8 days, the " time zero" for beginning the 8 day " clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable channel. If the ino>erable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status wit 11n the allowable out of l service time. Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events. Yl Ctl With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated feature (s) may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the supported feature (s) associated with inoperable untripped channels must be declared inoperable immediately. l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 30 Revision 12. 08/02/99 ( u
I ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs. the SRs for each ECCS REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.1 1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that
. when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for 1 performance of required Surveillances, entry.into associated b Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to
, 6 hours as follows: (a) for Function 3.c: and (b) for *. Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated ^
@t
% Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance.' the channel must be
- returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition
! entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on l the reliability analysis (Ref. 4) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That
' analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.
SR 3.3.5.1.1 ) Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A l CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter 1 indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the 'same value. Significant deviations l between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees ! that undetected outright channel failure is limited to 12 hours: thus it is key to verifying the instrumentation l continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL l CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based j on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, i including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. 1 s i
-l FERMI - UNIT 2- B 3.3.5.1-31 Revision 12 08/02/99 +
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 i
] BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) {
l The Frequency is based upon operating exwrience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. T1e CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO. ej SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required I channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of
\ the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL O FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all i of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by W
' other Technical Specifications and non Technical Specifications tests at least once per r'e fueling interval with applicable extensions.
Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. l The Frequency of 92 days for SR 3.3.5.1.2 is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 4. The Frequency of i 'L8 months for SR 3.3.5.1.6 is based on engineering judgement and the reliability of the components. SR 3.3.5.1.3 This surveillance provides a check of the actual trip i setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.11. If the trip ; setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted l for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analyses. Under l these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be ' equal to or more conservative than the setting accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 4. 4 l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 32 Revision 12 08/02/99 i
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES
]'
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS (continued) ! SR 3.3.5.1.4 3 i l A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. . CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive ) I calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint ! methodology. .} The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.4 is based upon the assumption of a = 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. i SR 3.3.5.1.5
*TheLOGICSYSTEMFUNCTIONALTESTdemons$ratesthe OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in i LCO 3.5.1, LC0 3.5.2. LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this ~ Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function. ;
The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant ' outage and the potential for an unalanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with t1e reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Section 6.3.
- 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
- 3. NEDC 31982 P. " SAFER /GESTR LOCA. Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis, including Errata and Addenda No. 1."
April 1992.
- 4. NEDC 30936 F A. "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation. Part 2." December 1988.
J \ k l FERMI UNIT 2_ B 3.3.5.1 -33 Revision 12 08/02/99 l 3
spectmcarwd 7 3.s.1 ( ht50 Ju. Spibh 3.5. 2. f) INSTRUMENTATION 0 M QMO 3,9,1) 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEN ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION W L.L & The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation 3.351 channels sens shown intne witn Table 3.3.31 yelues shown shall be OPERA in sne 8LEjwisn yrip setpoin columns[nen of Tpi trip e setpodnu M*l
}.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Tabit. 3.3.3-1. . (A ce Ae, tons dote )- A'Z m: -a. With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less < Amoy A conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column
\ of Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel ,
(pg ,(4 OPERA 8 tony) is restored to OPERABLE __ status its tripAetpoint aapsie (conpitent wiythe Trio setoo- value.r
- b. With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels AC770N A inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1.
- c. With either ADS trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the e trip system to OPERABLE status within:
Action h F - F. 7 days, provided that the HPCI and RCIC systems are -- OPERABLE, otherwise, y qQ
- 2. 72 hours. #
h 0 MT1oo6D'
@therw'se, be in at 1pist HOT SHUTDOWN w 'hin the next k". houfsT and duce reactor fteam dome pressure o less than c /r equal jto 45 psig within thd following 24 hou p SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 54 Note 1 +3. 3 .1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated (5*'5'I'@'q) OPERABLE by the performance CHANNEL CALIBRATION of OPERATIONAL operations for the the CHANNEL CHECK',and CONDITIONS CHANNEL at the FUNCTIONAL frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1. -
M 3 MIS 'lM LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL en-enanneleTshall be performed TESTS fand-simul.ete.d_-au1omat4c. at least once per 18 months'.'* _-operattod su SpcMrreth*n(f4.3.3.3 The ECCS RESPONSE TIME of each ECCS trip function ** shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. g 351 r* For the iesel generator output breakers; completion or sogic system O'b functio 1 testing, for the J6ss of power function, to ositively verif hat i thebrskerreclosurepermitsiverelay(52XX)isre- ergized by the asso ated bus load shedd g logic contact closing rather than the XX be g re-energized by parallel path, may be d erred and must b completed later than durino e first plant outage af r September 29, 1 S. On ca b *ECCS actuation instrumentation response time need not be measured and may be ' J.51 assumed to be the design instrumentation response time. !
, FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 3 23 Amendment No Jpp,19),111 PAGE / OF 08 RevIL u
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1 SNCiPicA-1w^! 3.3.5 I (Also su %cikcah'en 3.1 -)- Mef-3 s j r.3.s.s TABLE 1 + t t-(Continued) M, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION STATEMENTS ON 30 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the OPERABLE Channels per Tripjv"== reautrement: g* M Jis 4rtpyh o or one trip system. niace that trip = 36 m th ricoed ACTiod 8 % CW. a. condition within(24 nourslor declare ske =a=ssociat ECCS , ACTid @ igP$ rale.
,. Qgpegg g g ,.7 g,79 g,
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yg ., b . For both trip ds Q clare the associated ECCS' g.gge l Pa. . ." . [*. ", b '4 0 $ N .9 ,h' ACTION 31 - ' With the nusser of OPE LEchannelslesshanrequiredbythet 60 Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System recuirement, declare 1 W kr E.'4 F.'2. i so at j rip System inoperable within 24 hours. 4 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required the ACTION 32 - Mintaum OPERABLE Channels ner Trio System reoutrement. fes _< A.l Rea Ac.r c.7 r_ - ______,...-- n 7L _ _..within z4
, hours. gor a m . (qgg, g g ACTION 33 - Restore the manual initiation and/or manual inhibit function to 1 Q,gg JtE4 4cT c ,2,,F.2. OPERABLE status within 24 hours or declare the associated ECCS I l gmw g or ADS Trip System ino A60 REh Act 0,1 d F. (rable. ,
1 ACTION 34 - With the number of OPE LE channels less than required by the System recuirement, place at eT RE AktT D.Ll3 0 1'2 Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trileast one inoperable channel in t e tripped conditio 24 hours, align the HPCI system to take suction from the
. ,)
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- a. One less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the associated emeroency c1esel oenerator
( f.#. inoperable and take the ACTION reautred by Specification p f, 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
-itiCa71Fyl Less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE reouirement, b.
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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 - ECCS INSTRUENTATION A.5 CTS 3.3.3 footnote
- permits the extension of EDG output breaker logic system functional testing until the first outage after 9/29/95. This allowance will no longer be. applicable and is removed. This is an administrative change because it deletes an allowance that-is no longer applicable and has no impact on ,
safety. A.6 CTS Table 3.3.3-1 ioentifies the minimum Operable channels "per Trip System." ITS Table 3.3.5.11 specifies the minimum required. , channels based on "per function." This causes the number of '. . required channels in the ITS columns to be doubled from that specified in the CTS for Functions having two trip systems. This new categorization is used for all ECCS, except the ADS. For the ADS, each of the two trip systems are listed in the ITS Table, thus, the channels per Function do not change. Additionally, CTS. Function 2.g (Recirculation Pump Differential Pressure) number of channels is stated as 2 per trip system: however this Function is further interpreted to apply to each recirculation pump. Therefore, the equivalent ITS Function 2.g is stated as 4/ pump. These are administrative changes in presentat %n format with no change in the requirements. A.7 JS Table 3.3.3 1, Note (a), allows required surveillance testing
'without placing the trip system in the tripped condition." ITS SR Note 2 provides this allowance, but is stated as " entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed."
This represents a clarification of the intent, and as such is considered an administrative change. A.8 CTS Table 3.3.31 Action 30.b requires that on discovery of inoperable channels in both trip systems, declare the associated n ECCS inoperable. This level of inoperability may reflect a loss , of initiation capability in both divisions. In this case, d ITS 3.3.5.1 Required Actions B.1, B.2, C.1 and E.1 address the same requirement. In this conversion. Required Actions B.1. B.2. H and C.1 are modified by a Note (Note 2 for B.1 and C.1). These Notes clarify the appropriate Functions which are required to
)
comply with these particular actions. Except as addressed in A 0 other changes (e.g., refer to DOC L.4 for actions when loss of g function has not occurred), these ITS Required Actions and associated Notes reflect requirements consistent with this CTS g action for the loss of function inoperability. q s FERMI - UNIT 2 2 REVISION 12, 08/02/990
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 ECCS INSTRUMENTATION A.9 CTS 4.3.3.3 requires ECCS Response Time testing however, the details of the testing acceptance criteria are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM): outside of Technical Specifications. Since the ECCS response time acceptance criteria includes testing only the ECCS system response (and utilizing assumed values for the ECCS instrumentation response), the required Surveillance is more appropriately required in the ECCS Specification. ITS 3.5.1. This change is a presentation preference.only with no technical change or change in intent. . Refer to Section 3.5 for further discussion of any changes from '? . the CTS presentation. A.10 CTS Table 3.3.3-1 Actions 30.a. 31. and 33, as they apply to inoperable ADS actuation channels, result in options to declare associated ADS Trip System inoperable. (Note: refer to DOC L.1 for discussion of CTS change from declaring ECCS inoperable to declar'ing ADS trip system inoperable for CTS Action 30.a.). The g CTS actions would then transfer to Action c of CTS 3.3.3. and I provide additional time for restoration. ITS 3.3.5.1 Actions F 7 and G combine these restoration times for clarity. Any technical changes are addressed in other discussions of change. The revised presentation preference is an administrative change with no impact on safety. {NotealsothatCTSAction30.b(convertedtoITS M Required Action E.1) does not transfer to CTS Action c for l additional time: it declares the ADS valves inoperable and transfers Actions to LCO 3.5.1. The ITS 1 hour Completion Time of Required Action E.1 matches the CTS Action 30.b time, and the ITS l Q Required Action G.1 matches the transfer of Actions to LC0 3.5.1.} l E _. t A.11 CTS 4.3.3.2 requires an 18 month LSFT of all ECCS Instrumentation channels (which would include ADS Manual Inhibit function). CTS Table 4.3.3.1 1. Item 4.1, also required an 18 month Channel Functional Test of the ADS manual Inhibit function. ITS Table 3.3.5.11 only requires the LSFT (SR 3.3.5.1.5) for this function. The Channel Functional Test for this function is 9 adequately encompassed by the LSFT performance. Eliminating a d reference to performing a Channel Functional Test is therefore an $ administrative change that eliminates a duplicative test. _.) FERMI UNIT 2 3 REVISION 12 08/02/99U
- -- - i
l . DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 ECCS INSTRUENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES..MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 CTS Table 3.3.3-1 Actions 30.a and 32 allow the trip system associated with inoperable channels to be tripped to comply with the required action, and thereby allowing continued operation. l ITS 3.3.5.1 Required Action C.2 does not allow this option: but i . rather requires that inoperable channels be restored to Operable
- l. . status. If inoperable channels are not restored, ITS 3.3.5.1 Action H would be entered, requiring the associated ECCS features.
to be declared inoperable. The Functions associated with these 3.: required actions are functions that perform a dual role (where tripping the trip system would: 1) not be clear what direction to trip to,-and 2) result in the affected system continuing to be in an inoperable state) or functions that would inappropriately start-the affected system. Therefore, tripping the associated trip system is replaced with the more appropriate " restore channel to OPERABl.E status" otherwise declare associated ECCS features inoperable. M.2 CTS Table 3.3.3 1 Actions 31, 33, and 34 allow 24 hours to restore inoperable channels, regardless of whether the associated HPCI or ADS function is inoperable in both divisions (resulting in a loss of that ECCS function). For certain specified inoperabilities that result in a loss of initiation function, ITS 3.3.5.1 Required Actions D.1 and F.1 (and associated Notes) provide a more restrictive time of "I hour from discovery of loss of [HPCI/ ADS) l% initiation capability" to' restore or declare the associated ECCS function inoperable. This provides a more appropriate action that ; will. not adversely impact safety. g 4. M.3 CTS Table 3.3.3-1, Note (a), allows required surveillance testing 4E which causes channels to be inoperable without taking Actions for inoperable channels "provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter." ITS SR Note 2 l provides the same intended allowance by stating " entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed _ for l I Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability." In (N the case of some trip Functions literal compliance with the CTS allowance may not ensure trip capability remains (i.e., a single channel that is monitoring the parameter will not produce an initiation signal: the logic is 2-out of 2). This represents a l
, more restrictive change, which has no significant impact on l safety. '
FERMI UNIT 2 4 REVISION 12. 08/02/990 , J L J
1 l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES l ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 - ECCS INSTRUMENTATION with 10 CFR 50.59. This relocation continues to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since the requirement for instrument channel Operability continues to be required by the Technical Specifications. g i LA.3 Not used. [$ LC.1 CTS Table 3.3.31, footnote (a), allows required surveillance testing which causes channels to be inoperable without taking . Actions for inoperable channels "provided at least one OPERABLE '? I channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter." ITS SR Note 2 addresses this allowance, but includes a less pg restrictive change for HPCI Function 3.c. The ITS allowance to j delay entering Action applies to this function even though that individual trip function may not have an Operable channel in the m I same trip system. For HPCI Level 8 Function, the trip logic is such that one inoperable channel results in the. individual trip fD function not being maintained even with another 0perable channel O (the logic is 2 out of 21.e., one Operable channel will not perform the function). Since NEDC 30936P A, "BWR Owner's Group Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)," December 1988, approved the allowance for delay in entering Actions for these channels this change has a negligible impact on safety. This is acceptable based on the remaining capabilities, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the Irw probability of an event requiring ECCS. .) FERMI UNIT 2 6 REVISION 12. 08/02/99ll
)
1 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 ECCS INSTRUENTATION LR.1 CTS Table 3.3.3 2 specifies the allowable values for each Function. However, only for 5 Functions in the ECCS actuation Table (and not in any other instrumentation Table) do these values also include the descriptive method of calibration testing " increasing" or
" decreasing." ITS Table 3.3.5.11 specifies these allowable values but eliminates the descriptive method of calibration testing. This 7 detail can be removed from the Technical Specifications without affecting the required allowable value or the required Channel y ;
Calibration. Therefore, regulatory control of changes to this ! requirement (e.g., Technical Specification amendment or 10 CFR : 50.59) is not necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. ' TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE j "Speci fic" L.1 CTS 3:3.3 Action c provides actions for inoper'able ADS actuation instrument trip systems that requires restoration to Operable status within either 7 days or 72 hours (depending on the status of HPCI and RCIC). otherwise a plant shutdown is required. CTS Table 3.3.31 Action 30.a. as they apply to certain inoperable ADS @ actuation channels, allows 24 hours prior to declaring the g
" associated ECCS inoperable" (which in this case would be all ADS valves). This declaration is being relaxed to more appropriately g i l
declare the affected ADS trip system inoperable, allowing application of the additional time of CTS Action c. This ; relaxation will result in' total restoration times of 8 days or '
- 96. hours (depending on the status of HPCI and RCIC). '
ITS 3.3.5.1 Required Action E.2 provides these Completion Times. l however, it also provides an option to trip certain inoperable ADS actuation instrument channels, allowing continued operation. Furthermore, the "otherwise" action (ITS 3.3.5.1 Action G). rather l ro than require a plant shutdown, requires " declare the associated L l-E support feature (s) inoperable." This allows the Actions of ITS 3.5.1. "ECCS." to direct further Actions, which may include a plant shutdown. However, if the actuation instrument inoperability is known to affect only a single ADS valve, the transition of actions to ITS 3.5.1 would provide additional time to restore the inoperability prior to requiring a plant shutdown. j These relaxations do not introduce a significant impact on safety ! j since the ADS function would be maintained during these action extensions. These Completion Times are consistent with those 7
'C proposed in NUREG 1433. 5 ,
i FERMI UNIT 2 7 REVISION 12. 08/02/99 ll l l i
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 ECCS INSTRUMENTATION
] 7 L.2 Not used.
Q L.3 CTS Table 3.3.31 Action 30.b applies an immediate transfer of actions to associated actions for ECCS inoperability, when both trip systems have inoperable channels (potentially both divisions of ECCS lost initiation capability). This CTS action applies to several Functions with applicability in Modes 1. 2, 3. 4. and 5. ITS 3.3.5.1 Required Actions B.1 and C.1 are modified by a Note 1 that limits the immediate (i.e.. I hour prior to transfer: , discussed in a separate justification) transfer of actions in the 'l event of loss of initiation capability to apply only while in Modes 1, 2. and 3. This change will increase the allowed restoration time for a total loss of initiation capability from one or more Functions while in Modes 4 and 5 to 24 hours (as limited by Required Action B.3). This is acceptable because the < actuation of ECCS flow to the core at a specified time is not assumdd in any Mode 4 or 5 accident analysis. Events initiated . while in these lower Modes result in significantly reduced consequences and significantly increased margins of safety. ITS ! 3.5.2 continues to assure that sufficient ECCS is available in J
' Modes 4 and 5. and ITS 3.3.5.1 continues to require Operable actuation instrumentation. Therefore, this change will have a minimal impact on safety.
l 1 FERMI - UNIT 2 8 REVISION 12 08/02/99 ll l {
1 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 ECCS INSTRUMENTATION O L.4 {Both more restrictive and less restrictive changes are proposed [d and combined in this discussion for clarity and completeness.} For Functions referencing CTS Table 3.3.31 Action 30 other than l ADS initiation (refer to DOC L 1 for changes associated with the I ADS Function and with inoperabilities in one trip system, i.e., , Action 30.a), the logic is 1 out-of 2 taken twice (each of two trip systems with 1-out of 2 logic). As such, CTS Action 30.a (inoperable channel (s) in one trip system - allowing 24 hour restoration time) could reflect a loss of initiation function if both channels in one trip system are inoperable. ITS Required i ) Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 would limit Completion Times to I hour for loss of initiation function (a more restrictive change), while ITS Required Actions B.3 and C.2 retain this 24 hour Completion Time. In the case of CTS Action 30.b (inoperable channel (s) in both trip' 3 systerhs - requiring an immediat'e transfer of actions to associated s du actions for ECCS inoperability), the inoperabilities may or may 6 not reflect a loss of initiation function (e.g., in the event only one inoperable channel is in each trip system, initiation function would be available). ITS Required Actions B.1, B.2. C.1, and E.1 { would extend the Completion Time to 1 hour for loss of initiation function, while ITS Required Actions B.3 and C.2 extend the J Completion Time to 24 hours when initiation function is retained j (the extended Completion Time of Required Action F.2 for ADS is discussed in DOC L.1). These changes are acceptable based the expectation that manual or other automatic (e.g., initiation on low level if high drywell pressure is also inoperable) initiation capability would remain. and based on the _ low probability of an event that would require these automatic initiations. Furthermore, these changes correct deficiencies in the CTS that would allow inappropriate restoration times for some inoperabilities that reflect a loss of initiation function. The proposed ITS Actions are consistent with NUREG-1433. In the case of Mode 4 or 5 operation, the actuation of ECCS flow to the core at a specified time is not assumed in any Mode 4 or 5 accident analysis. Events initiated while in these lower Modes result in significantly reduced consequences and significantly increased margins of safety. ITS 3.5.2 continues to l assure that sufficient ECCS is available in Modes 4 and 5, and ! ITS 3.3.5.1 continues to require Operable actuation j instrumentation. Therefore, this change will have a minimal impact on safety. FERMI UNIT 2 9 REVISION 12 I 08/02/99 ll
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 - ECCS INSTRUMENTATION RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS None TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES The CTS Bases ~ for this Specification have been replaced by. Bases that reflect the format and applicable content of ITS 3.3.5.1 consistent with the BWR STS. , NUREG 1433. Rev. 1.- "; I l i l l s FERMI UNIT 2 10 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued) C7
, CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by D.1 NOTE Required Action A.1 Only applicable if gi, y;3,,. #
and referenced in HPCI pump suction is 4 '4'" '3 4 Table 3.3.5.1-1. not aligned to the suppression pool. f Declare HPCI System I hour from inoperable. discovery of . loss of HPCI initiation capability
- AtID D.2.1 Place channel in 24 hours trip.
E . D.2.2 Align the HPCI pump: 24 hours y suction to the suppression pool.
,..y 1 E. As reg red by E.1 -
- NOTES---- -
Requi ed Action A.1 1. Only applicab e and eferenced in in MODES 1, . Tab e 3.3.5.1-1. and 3. O t'g 2. Only a icable for F ctions 1.d and .p. g
\
Dec are supported I ho from f ture(s) inoperable dis overy of y$ en its redundant 1 s of esture ECCS itiation initiation capability apability for is inoperable. subsystems in j both divisio
'(co inued) i
/
BWR/4 STS 3.3-38 Rev 1, 04/07/95 RevlV'
I ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1
, ACTIONS ((75 l } CONDITION
,, REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. 7 days IC (c inued) E Restore channel t OPERABLE statu
/
g /. As required by 4*.1 Declare Automatic 1 hour from yge ,'g'3-i) Required Action A.1 and referenced in ( Depressurization System (ADS) valves discovery of loss of ADS AbDb Table 3.3.5.1-1. inoperable. initiation r. I capability in ' i both trip systems ale
#.2 Place channel in 96 hours from R %3 -3, trip. discovery of Ac h 30.a,31 inoperable g channel concurrent with h53 3 HPCI or reactor gdm core isolation cooling (RCIC) f inoperable Ih gg 8 days 3
(continued) 1 BWR/4 STS 3.3-39 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1 5.
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 _, ACTIONS (continued)
! CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME t?
k b f . As Required by A.1 [ ,&.1 requiredAction NOTE Only applicable for b and referenced in Functions 4.c, 4.e, g,g p/ Table 3.3.5.1-1. 4.f. 4.g. 5.c, 5.e,
. 5.f. and 5.g. .
Declare ADS valves I hour from inoperable. discovery of ,, loss.of ADS '; initiation capability in
'e' both trip systems [
AllD 6 p.2 Restore channel to 96 hours fr st 304 -l, OPERABLE status. discovery of A ctia 31,75
, . inoperable 4 channel concurrent witte #~ 3 'I' d'* "
HPCI or RCIC inoperable eT t A110 8 days U rat-5 kAf. Required Action and Ar.1 Declare associated Immediatelyl L 3.5,3-l 8 associated Completion supported feature (s) Time of Condition B, inoperable. Ac.fim %^ not htD, E, K or . g Mim SV BWR/4 STS 3.3-40 Rev 1, 04/07/95 RevIL ,
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS CTS)
-(p),g __ _ ____ .__- _.
.-NOTES---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS b Function. i
- 2. % en a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required '
Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for n Functiong 3.c. t "; - ' ^ _ and (b) for up to 6 hours'for Functions other } T than 3.c ., provided the associated Function or the redundant Function mainta ns ECCS initiation capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours (933.1) SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. ,- p2pdays (433.1) I 3.3.5.1.3 e the trip uni N p2), days p _ A. SR .5.1.4 Perform HANNEL CALIB ON. 92 day SR 3.3.5.1 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Y ' $8(months h.M f) SR 3.3.5.1 Perform LOGIC SYSTEN FUNCTIONAL TEST. gl8gnonths (y.3,3 2) l SR 3.3.5.1.7 V ify the ECCS RESPONSE T E is within
~
(18) mits. a nthson(OOCM) GGERED T BASIS > a s.s.s.t.c, Pukm crue 2vacnau- g sur,a,, \r MZ w - --
,8 BWR/4 STS 3.3-41 Rev 1, 04/07/95 hg Ik'
i { ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1
\ CTT l I
Tebte 3.3.5.1 1 (page 1 of 6) seersesy Care Cootleg system Instroentation [gp;3J,3-/ 1 uses assulass _, _s marsnescuo
...~
at OFIER CneuuBLs PROM FuocThe seECIFIN PER REGutRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWASLE PLAICTION lugelfles PIAICTION ACTIM A.1 AEallaEMNTs VALAN
- 1. Core sprey System gg
- e. Reacter Weneel Water 1,2,3, I S M 3 J.5.1.1 Lovet - Lou Law Law, g4 t et 3 J.5.1.2 inchee g* g (/
Levet 1 4(a), 5(83 p 3.3.5.1. SR 3.3.5.1 SR 3.3.5.1
,, y,
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- st 3.3.5.1 Et !a.5.1_
- c. Reacter steen seee 1,2,3 et 3.3.5.1.1 y
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@ 3.3.5.1. g4 et 3.3.5.1 i
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- 2. Low Pressure Costant Injection (LPCI) systes / (
e. p,l \ *}/ Reactor veneet Water 1,2,3, ( 8 st 3.3.5.1.1 .t
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/
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ECCS Instrimentation 3.3.5.1 k,g Tabte 3.3.5.1 1 (pose 3 of el CTS asersency Care Caeting syetes Instrimentation g g 9,3*3 q - 3 13-2. APPLItasLE an WITIgus 913.)4 Ismas en assulam REFEMBCED , N TloA/ eruga emaamare a paan pgCIFIS % PER MWIMs amWEILLAlfM am'antg PtsICTatut Ca e lfleus FREICTIElf ACTieu A.1 Rest #1REBENTs VALUE
- 2. LPCI syetas (eentleased) '
f,l Law Pressure Cootent Inject Pia, 1,2, v
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- 3. Nish Pressure Caetent Injectlen (uPCI) syetas
- o. Reector Weseet Water 1, Lovet -Law Lou, e at 3.3.5.1.1 a (
SR 3.3.5.1.2 Lovet 2 2(#3, 3(8)
- 7) sit 3.3.5.1.3 inches
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- b. Drywett Preneure - mish 1,
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inches
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D st 3.3.5.1.1 s 44 Level - u n sh sa 3.3.5.1.2 Inches 2(0, 3(# p 3.3.5.1. SR 3.3.5.1 sa 3.3.5.1 (continue.) I., n t e...t .~t_., .re -,,e. to .NAsm. e m) mh _ t e, . t o e ,,e. e e g,,,, .. 3 h ld@ CO41/dy1#rld Cartb9b, - h CC BWR/4 STS 3.3-44 Rev 1, 04/07/95 < ~. Rey IL Re1/[
- ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 9.\ crs y- febte 3J.5.11 (pose 4 of 6) seersency Core Coolire system Instrumentation U M! 3.13 '
s' ) 1. 5.4 - 1
,, , , ,,,,, , 4.31.l-/ 1 mass on assulass eersance ofma enamnets paen- Pth/C7 ton l i
SPECIFIm fm MeJIteD WavEILLANCE ALLOWa8L. PLNCTalm CeWIfleus PWBCTIEN ACTION A.1 ReeulasMEirTs VALM 3 NPCI system (eentinued) h alsh Prenewe 1, . E sa 3.5.1;t 4 Di
' len Puge (typees)
Flow- Leu I, 3(O sa 3. .
, sa 3.3.5. .
sa 3.3.5.1 A
.2 and '
s y ager 6 j k l l Manust Initletion 1, sa 3.3.5.1.6 C mA [y 4[ 4 Autsestic Depreneurization 2(A, 3IO (C,) d j system (ads) Trip System A
- e. Reester Wessel Water g I,
gf sa 3.3.5.1.1
*4 \
a Level -Lev Lou Lou, sa 3.3.5.1.2 inchee / Level 1 2( O , 3(83 , >2a 3.3.5.1. sa 3.3.5.1 at 3.3.5.1 g,g
- b. Dryvett g Pressure- Nish 1,
[ sa 3.3.5.1.1 sa 3.3.5.1.2 s pelo y* g) 2(d), 3(O D 3.3.5.1. et 3.3.5.1 sa 3J.5.1
- c. Autsestic 1, f'*ba 3.3.5.1 Deprweeurlastion System initiation 2(0, 3(O ft(
gg j,Lf,1,1)sa 3.3.5.1 s seconds \/ q'{\/
. ,l.or
- d. aeector vessel Water 1, [p sa 3.3.5.1.1 g
Level-Leu, Level 3 ft( sa 3.3.5.1.2 t-i40t inchee /%g, (Confirentery) 2(0, 3(O W 3.3.5.1. sa 3.3.5.1 sa 3.3.5.1
- e. Core s ,ey Pu., i, ' ,79 L***. J* . , 2(e, 3<e IM*P a 3.3.5.1., t is cy o
,h A= i'i'i'i. 4i:!:!:l:' Ke}
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9? gu a: a u4 G w d~ %* *o!S q BWR/4 STS 3.3-45 Rev 1, 04/07/95 Db o
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ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 l en not tation CTS
" T34-/
s atEllaED at N OfuEn CNMRELS Patst i spaCIFIED PER afaWIRED SLRVEILLANN ALLINABLE ! FIEICTION Coettismis PLAICTION ACTION A.1 RESUla8ENTS VALW Y
- 4. ads Trip systes A I (centinued) d F M
- f. Lou Pressure Cootent 1, sa 3.3.5.1.1 _psis /
injection Pump 2 \
\N.C /
i sa 3.3.5.1.2 Discherse 2(8, 3(O g a 3.3.5.1. ! A Pressure - Nish at 3.3.5.1 ~ " ff 3 3.f.L2 at 3.3.5.1. p wdf Pns> vet ,, pa;,,,,, ,, 5R R G3 3,3,5,, ,,,,,. isb Dy 55 in
,<*. e 3.3.5.1 resou) f'4.h)
-=
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== r.:-
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- i:::!:::: ;-
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- b. Drywett 1, g Sa 3.3.5.1.1 psis r1 '- - a ' 'a 8 Q'
\ ,L , 3a, J:!:!:!:;'
sa 3.3.5.1
- c. Automatic Depressurisation system inittetten 1,
2g 3gg g Og 3,35, se 3.3.5.1
,$st 3.3.5.1 sa 3.3.5.1 5
escen.s g [Q, g
- d. er Wesset Weter 1, L. vet - Leu, Level 3 4 sa 3.3.5.1.1 sa 3.3.5.1.2 4 nches (Q.
(Confirectory) 2(d), 3<d) Xst 3.3.5.1. sa 3.3.5.1 sa 3.3.5.1
- e. Core sprey Pump
%:::":-,1, 1,
><e, 3ce ir.=e sa 3.3.5.1.1 a psis y'j )
.". i:!:!:1:!
3.3.5.,
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;., ., ts ,...to, e... e ,,.s_.
. y,g is. i Nk 7-r e
'T BWR/4 STS 3.3-46 Rev l', 04/07/95 SEYlb ff
)
)
J ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Ct1 Qs\ Tabte 3J.S.1 1 <pese 6 ef al 77Hkii3 3.3-l se.g.ney care centire syetem Im nmentation (.. y.,3,3,7 4.3.11-i s REeuleED R$ . Fv p 4
.,l"cL '"ll"" .2" Itu.c. .- .
PlacTION Cee!TIONS MACT!4BI ACTION A.1 ESEUIRS erTS WALuE {
757.E'"' y d
- f. Lou Pressure Caetant 1, s. 3.3.5.1.1 t pois M".:0 Prenewe - alsh
* ><<>.3<*
,x5 se lijf L.M 3.3.5.1. ,
(40 t
- l
., _- at 3.3.5.1. -
Ilry4000 f(ESMC . ' Awt 1 _ _ N q, Ftfy ,,
- 4 e e *> us.,,s - '3.3.5.1 ;
H,Moosud /nhibiP hLl#,f 5$ Q g_ y' m
~
5 lS53*3'5*l f M _ < Y $) y
. i Intit-rica 1 -.
m 3.3.5 i.6 m y' ;j% 1 e.3wheim E
.g,$ p,....r i T tp 4
,. 3
- l. )
j BWR/4 STS 3.3-47 Rev 1, 04/07/95 f6Y lY \ ' kev h
I i l ECCS instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BACKGROUND Core scrav system (continued) accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated in the event CS is not operating. 3 CS p discharge flow i monitored by a flow l transmitt . When the pump s running and discha e flow is trg low eno h so that pump o rheating may occur, e minimum i flow r urn line valve opened. The valve aut tically closed i flow is above the a imum flow . 4 N se int to allow t full system flow ass in the ident analysis. The CS System also monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before the injection valves open, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the CS System's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.
- Low Pressure Coolant Iniection system s The LPCI is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal
~J (RHR) System, with two LPCI subsystems. The LPCI subsystems may be initiated by automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure-High; or both. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which, in turn, are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are i
l connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic (i.e., two trip systems) for each Function. Once an initiation signal is received by P.1 the LPCI control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset. Upon an initiation signal, the L arts /
/WSEn.T 5 after a 0.5 secon a able. The j
i I N ^' 8'
- 8 3 3.5./- 2 ; '
oadingofthesanEylh g -;is ^% ~ tA jtarn n. system' discharge flow is nitored b a fl .L g g j-- [ { tra itte . When pump is nning an dischar low s B 5.% 5 IL ' ' (continued)
- f. 2 BWR/4 STS B 3.3-102 Rev 1, 04/07/95 RavW
1 l l ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 i l BASES BACKGROUND Lo d essure to Iniection Systed (continued) ow enoug o that pump overh ng may occur, n I i l e l respect e minimum flow ret line valve is ened. If M i flow aut above the mini tically closed t ow setpointi th valve is llow the full sy em flow as med ( l
' i the analyses.r = i lieu ,
p,7, The RHR test suppression pool cooling isolation valve, ! suppression pool spray isolation valves, and containment spray isolation y,alves (which are also PCIVs) are also - closed on a LPCI initiation signal to allow the full system 7 l flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated in the event LPCI is not operating. m_ . .,. .. __ ___2.___ u_ _ __ , .. . ! 7,_....... ....
,,................,....-to
......-......................v..... 6... . ..uur
;... T.'e..^.. . ..:.. :- ..'.. ;.7^2 ^ .i 's '
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^
s_._ A ._2 _ .._sA_ w.
.._-....a+,. ..__.,..-1.. .. .... ..,,, .....
1i .
, .. .u... . . _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ ___1 .re_
._,...-..........,,........A..__
___ _..A _ s a . .. a .I _ _ A . .f l _ ~ 1 51 .0 7e [ . _ _ __
;--" ' *: c ' - ": r '.n _'..t'.... ,,_ , d'..;;.er,.
mk.. 4+ 4 :::-- 4.+. 4.,+. r t L+k.*"..,4..."h't : ' ' .;; .r d;;; ... ." ',,,,... t .; ;ere-
. 1, c , , n .1 .
. Tr.; vertab.le
-........ ., .... ......__... ...... ......, ...... ..., .n
';r., ::::::':d t: ' r ' '; ::: . " ; ..;,..^.. ; T ti.; t ri-I er".: .....,n.::ted
.. .m .a '_: _ .r:ha _.;;_ , gr. ; ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., J '. ;i L= r 5 ta- r:h r h r:1 '. it.e .,l.. ;d '; d;;;;^;d 5," tre
.ddi t i . .;l . ...^.. -. 6. .s.'.1, p3 T L 6v .u6v .
te.g., __,,...:._.. ,__: ;::: ng; .t.; . u'G 1
.;el.te ett.e- . redes
*- rired. ".;r.;;l eve. .-ide. Ter ti.es; i;;1etient-aee-.
.provided:--
1 Hiah Pressure Coolant Iniection System The HPCI System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 or Drywell Pressure-High. Each of these variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3 103 Rev 1, 04/07/95 Rev 0 -
P ECCS Instrumentation B.3.3.5.1
]
BASES , BACKGROUND Hinh Pressure Coolant Iniection System (Continued) connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for each Function. The HPCI pump d charge flow is tored by a flow q transmitter. hen the pump is nning and discha low i s g low enoug o that pump ove ating may occur, t minimum flow re rn line valve is pened. The valve i , aut ically closed if low is above the a num flow } l set int to allow the ull system flow as d in the ~) a ident analysis. - I The HPCI test line isolation valve (which is also a PCIV) is closed upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analysis and maintain primary containment isolated in the event HPCI is not operating.
. The HPCI System alsa monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) anc the suppression pool because these are the two sources of water for HPCI operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal sou-ce. Upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal, the CST f,1 suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is q normally in the open position) unless both suppression pool , suction valves are open. If the water level in the CST CHAMilELF 0F LEV 6l- falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool TRAW;uivEE5 wD suction valves automatically open, and then the CST suctiot -
Wf MTS valve automatically closes. Twon-~ ' dti; :re used to UA" detect low water level in the CST. Either :d t e 'can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST
- ~
(gg ig%gG suction valve to close. A The suppression pool suction valvh rEAAL5M17FEtJ AA/D 72}# vyg5 also automatically open and the CST suction valve closes if MouiT04 Sup/4ES$taA> POOL. high water level is detected in the suppression pool. To P/ATER L.EVA prevent losing suction to the g" Jap, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the g other automatically closes. The HPCI provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 trip, at which time the HPCI turbine trips, which causes the turbine's stop valvc and the injection valves to close. The logic is two-out-of-two to provide high reliability of the HPCI System. The HPCI (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-104 Rev 1, 04/07/95 n RW IL
ECCS Instrumentation 8 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.c. 2.c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-tow (Iniection SAFETY ANALYSES, Permissive 1 (continued) LC0, and APPLICA8ILITY LC0 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. '- 1.d. 2.a'. Core SoraNnd .ow Pressure Coolant Iniention Puno Dficharae FlowClow (Ilvoass) The minimum f1 instruments are provided to rotect the . associated 1 pressure ECCS pump from ov eating when the . pump is o ating and the associated i etion vnlve is not fully o . The minimum flow line y e is opened when low j flow sensed, and the valve is a omatically closed when 1 l the iow rate is adequate to pro et the pump. The LPCI and ! C Discharge Flow-Low fu tions are assumed to be ERA 8LE and capable of clos the minimum flow valves to sure that the low press ECCS flows assumed during the-transients and accidents nalyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 j are met. The core coo ng function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of e RPS, ensures that the fuel peak j cladding temperatur remains below the ' limits of / 10 CFR 50.46. One flow tran itterperECCSpumpIsuedtod D associated systems' flow rates. The logic et the \ , arranged l .'- such that ch transaftter causes its assoc ed minimum flow val to open. The logic will close e minimum flow valve ce the closure setpoint is exc ed. The LPCI ! mini flow valves are time delayed ch that the valves wi not open for$10 seconds after e switches detect low
. The time delay is provide to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the star p of the RHR shutdown cooling mode. The Pump Dis rge Flow-Low Allowable Value ;
arevhigh enough to ensure at the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect t pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of t minimum flow valve is initiated allow full flow int he core. Each channel of mp Discharge Flow-Low Functio two CS channels and f r LPCI channels) is only requ d to be OPERABLE wh the associated ECCS is requir to be OPERABLEl to ensure at no single instrument fail can preclude t ECCS fu ton. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and 0 3.5.2 for b Applicability Bases for the low pres re ECCS subsystems (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-111 Rev 1, 04/07/95 J 8ev /k
l l 1 ECCS Instrumentation 8 3.3.5.1 BASES p) t . . APPLICABLE 1 Y 2.h. Manual Initiation I SAFETY ANALYSES, ' . LCO, and The Manual Initiation 4mssaram channels 'ntr$r- danali APPLICABILITY i-+- t.'.; .;;.;; t i: Er " 'aaia h provide manual initiation (continued) capability = d == - '"-^ -* *- *'- ="+ ~" * * ' ;-- t x t he l l
+o ndw.du Q ,--***f--
F-=,p vn=,--ruuj s....,
.-- -=;
- -[ --.
n --i-.',' y l The Manual Initiation F$nction is not sumed in any accident or transient analyses in th % AR. However, the. Function is retained for overall red Ydancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the - .h plant licensiyL'"' .&h :l i &
)
There is no Al ovanleTalue for th s unction since the channels are chanically actuated based solely on the position of _: ;r? intt- :. Each channel of.the Manual-Initiation Function. t-- ":- :' ;-- -- ' . :* -1 is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required i
- to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for l Applicability Bases _fpr the. low pressure _IG.G1. subsystems. l
- 2. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-tow (Recirculation I Discharoe Valve Permissive)
Low react steam dome pressure signals are used s f)
,' - permissives r recirculation discharge valve osure. This ensures that t LPCI subsystems inject in he proper RPV l
location assumed the safety analysis. he Reactor Steam f Dome Pressure-Low one of the Fune ns assumed to be losing th alve during the I
' transients analyzed in Re rence NSei?.T _ 7,)OPERABLEandcapableo function of the ECCS, along and 3. The core cooling the scram action of the I
/ l j g 3 3.5d i RPS, ensures that the fuel a ladding temperature remains l below the limits of 10 C 50.46. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low functio s directly used in the analysis of the recirculatio ine break (Ref.
The Reactor 5 m Dome Pressure-Low signal re initiated from four p sure transmitters that sense the ~ actor dome pressure The Iowable Value is chosen to ensure that the valve se prior to comencement of LPCI injection flow into I cre, as assumed in the safety analysis. (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-112 Rev 1, 04/07/95
.)
ECCS Instrumentation 8 3.3.5.1
~
RASES APPLICABLE 3.e. Sunoression Pool Water Level-Hioh (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, - LC0, and This Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and APPLICABILITY transient analyses (which take credit for HPCI) since the analyses assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool. EMN Suppression Pog1 Water Level-High signals are initiated
.rrom two leve1 W g. The logic is arranged such tha C eithersewheb can cause the suppression pool suction valves .
to open,end.the CST suction valve to close. The Allowable b value for the Suppression Pool Water Level-High* Function is
-_ chosen to ensure that HPCI will be aligned for suction.from Mc.h in4wn M..-- the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression pool design loads would be
\W iQ cause exceeded.
Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level-High Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be
, OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases, f 3.f Hioh Pressure Coolant Iniection Pumo Discharoe Flow-Low (Bvoass) ']- The minimum flow in ruments are provided to protect th HPCI pump from ov heating when the pump is operating d the associated jection valve is not fully open. e minimum flow ne valve is opened when low flow sensed, and the valv is automatically closed when th ow rate is adequate t protect the pump. The High Pr ure Coolant Injectic Pump Discharge Flow-Low Funct is assumed to be OPERAB and capable of closing the m" mum flow valve to O ensu that the ECCS flow assumed d 'ng the transients and i ac dents analyzed in References , 2, and 3 are met. The c e cooling function of the EC , along with the scram ction of the RPS, ensures th the fuel peak cladding q Q
temperature remains below limits of 10 CFR 50.46. One flow transakter i sed to detect the HPCI System' flow rate. The logi s arranged such that the trans tier causes the minimum ow valve to open. The logic 1 close the minimum flow Ive once the closure setpoint s exceeded. ( (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-118 Rev 1, 04/07/95
)
k&Y 0
1 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES D - APPLICABLE .f. Hiah Pressure Coolant Iniection Pumo Discharoe SAFETY ANALYSES, Flow-Low (svoa(s) (continued) ' LCO, and J APPLICABILITY The High ssure Coolant Injecti Pump Discharge Flow-Allowab' Value is high enough fis suf cient to protect the p ensure that pump flo rate
, yet low enough to nsure I h
lthat he closure of.the mini
' all full flow into the c e.
flow valve is init ed to
'k channel is required o be OPERABLE when t HPCI is quired to be OPERA 8 . Refer to LCO 3.5. for HPCI Ic t "ility 5 :::. '
- 3. anual Initiation
- The Manual Initiation push button channe .;t ri..: -Ma=1s
.fa, m
. dMJdM in+a th "" 1:
ng e 7:frf:-*;+aS S+uprovide ... - manual tu ;7;txt initiation h capability Conq/ws*Sh g. ... 6 wn.~ i,... . , a ... ,..... L.;;s. Or th 5 ! -
, y... .
The Manual Initiation Function is n d in any accident or transient analyses in tie . However, the 4 . j Function is retained for overall rec ncy and diversity of ' the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis. ,g,. g g g g ~> There is no Allowable Valli foNhis Function since the channel is mechanically ctuated based solelyJn the position of M 7:r _____ . ^ r * : . .. .f f e Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.I for HPCI Applicability Bases. Automatie Deoressurization System 4.a. 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low tow. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability'to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level I is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the APS during the accident analyzed (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-119 Rev 1, 04/07/95 REV /k
I I ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
.. BASES
}
APPLICABLE 4.o. 5.o. St- :; C; .. am L.u on n ue. L u. . . . i: :1 g' SAFETY ANALYSES, Actmation-Timer (continued) LCO, and APPLICABILITY kw'Q"55""M'skB'iP3e depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling. Four channels of the M'- stic C:;mmi;.;; .. Si n ;... et: '.;..! ?.:t :tidTimer Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure f Ig g that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS m initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases. Y
',g,g 3.'3 6.; O ,,,,,3 3,,,,,,,,, ,,
T a Initiation ;:2. i_T:n channels "+-^d"-- c'--"-
- f. ^_ ^- = L- '- 0: provide manual initiation capability k "5-_5h[5Ib N. "NCb1b5 1---t ADS
~
t-i; g;t i '--
+at ! c' '::: ' p gagjM'[N/rt. J The Manual Initiation' Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the ADS functions _as reovired by the NRC in the plant licensing basis. gf O
i.) There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are chanically actuated based solely on the , position of ._.e s"-h Mtter:l Ch: . ..h ;' fSe Manual 5 Initiation Function T--. : - --- i - --- ' M r :'/:t erl -- on y required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases. ACTIONS e ' ote: Certain LCO Completion Times on approved top c . In orde ensee to use the times, the license the Completion Times as required afety Evaluatio R) for the report. A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-124 Rev 1, 04/07/95 (?SV /L
)
ECCS Instrumentation l B 3.3.5.1 BASES 0 ACTIONS C.1 and c.2 (continued) inoperable channel would have Required Action C.) epplied separately would only r(equire the affected portion of the associatedrefer to ACTIONS system to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for both low pressure ECCS subsystems are inoperable (e.g., both CS subsystems), and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this esults in the affected portions in both subsystems bein y concurrently declared inoperable. For Functions 1.c, 2. ,
% 2 e,#--and 2.f, the affected portions are the associated low
_ / pressure ECCS pumps. As noted (Note 1), Required Act on C.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of l automatic initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by ' Required Action C.2) is allowed dur MODES 4 a 5. Note 2 states that Reavired Action .1 is only pplicable I f,3 . for Functions 1.c. 2.c 2.#, and 2 is not applicable to Functions 1
. Required Action C.1-2.h', and 3. (which also require entry into this Conditio if a channel in these h i
Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or g transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation gj
" capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action C.2) t is allowed. Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to l Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function 4_ (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during th f,'),, development of Reference B and considered acceptable for the 24 hours allowed by Required Action C.2.
The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-128 Rev 1. 04/07/95
)
Rev I2-
I. ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES l ACTIONS D.1. D.2.1. and D.2.2 (continued) Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide i I initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been to I f.1 be acceptable (Ref.D) to pemit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inopei'able channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1 or the suction source must be aligned to the suppression pool per ', Required Action D.2.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction snurce to the suppression pool). Performance of either of thesie two Required Actions will allow operation to continue. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the HPCI System piping remains filled with water. Alternately, if it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g.,
, as in the case where , shifting the suction source could drain down the HPCI suction piping), Condition H must be entered i and its Required Action taken.
I O d Required Action E. /is intended to ensure that~ ppropriate 7 actions are take ,f multiple, inoperable cha els within l the Core Spray d Low Pressure Coolant In.je ion Pump Discharge F1 Low Bypass Functions result n redundant automatic in intion capability being los for the feature (s). For Required Action E.1, t features would be those that are. initiated by Functions .d and 2.g (e.g., low pressure CCS). Redundant automatic nitiation capability \ is lost f (a) two Function 1.d cha els are inoperable or --- (b) on er more Function 2.g chan is associated with pumps <3~ in LP subsystem A and one or e Function 2.g channels asso lated with pumps in LPCI bsysten B are inoperable. Q Sin e each inoperable channel ould have Required Action .1 ap ied separately refer t ACTIONS Note), each inoper , annel would only r(equirthe affected low pressure E S e i l ump to be declared inop able. However, since chan s for ~ nore than one low press -e ECCS pump are inoperabl and the Completion Times start d concurrently for the cha els of the low pressure ECCS umps, this results in th affected k (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-130 Rev 1, 04/07/95
-)
RevIb
i ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 1 . BASES ACTIONS .1 and E.2 (contin )1 , l {lowpressure.ECCS umps being concurrently deel re inoperable. In this situat on (loss of redundant aut ic initiation-1 capability), a 7 day allowance of Requi d Action E.2 is not appropr te and the subsystem assoc ed with each I inoperable hannel must be declared in erable within I 1 hour. noted (Note I to Require etion E.1), Required - Action 1 is only applicable in S 1, 2, and 3. In - and 5, the specific initi MODES on time of the ECCS is ! not a used and the probability a LOCA is lower. Thus, a J tota less of initiation capabi ty for 7 days (as allowed j by quired Action E.2) is al d during MODES 4 and 5. A i No e is also,provided (Note to Required Action E.1) to ineate that Required Ac on E.1 is only applicable to low ressure ECCS Functions. equired Action E.1 is not I applicable to HPCI Funct n 3.f since the loss of one j
/ channel results in a lo s of the Function (one-out-of-one L logic). This loss wa considered during the development of 3 Reference 5 and cons ered acceptable for the 7 days all by Required Action .2.
The Completion Ti is intended to allow the operator ime l A to evaluate and epair any discovered inoperabiliti . This 9 j (/ Completion Ti also allows for an exception to th normal 6
" time zero" f beginnir.g the allowed outage ti clock." _
For Require Action E.1, the Completion Time y begins upon disco ry that a redundant feature in t same system (e.g.,bo CS subsystems) cannot be autom ically initiated due to 1 operable channels within the sa Function as descri d in the paragraph above. The our Completion Time f om discovery of loss of initiat' n capability is acce able because it minimizes risk ile allowing time for res ration of channels. If the instrumentation that cent is the pump minimum flow talve is inoperable, such that e valve will not'
.iutomatically open, extended mp operation with no
<njection path available cou lead to pump overheating and tailure. If there were a ilure of the instrumentation, such that the valve would ot automatically close, a portion cf the pump flow could diverted from the reactor vessel injection path, causin insufficient core cooling. These i i (continued)
BWR/4 STS. B 3.3-131 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ) RsV/L
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES O ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (con inued) consequences c be averted by the operato s manual control of the valve, ich would be adequate to intain ECCS pump protection d required flow. Furthe e, other ECCS pumps would be s ficient to complete the a used safety function if no ad ional single failure we to occur. The 7 day Complet n Time of Required Actio .2 to restore the D n inoper le channel to OPERABLE tus is reasonable based o the Ining capability of th associated ECCS subsystem , th redundancy available in e ECCS design, and the tow / p bability of a DBA occurr ng during the allowed out rvice time. If the ino rable channel cannot be r tored t OPERABLE status with the allowable out of ser ce time, Y Condition H sust be e ered and its Required Act taken. The Required Actions o not allow placing the c nnel in trip since this ac on would not necessarily sult in a safe state for t channel in all events.
' ~
W1 n 2 Required Action g f
.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are tak n if multiple, inoperable, untripped I 6
channels within similar ADS trip system A and B Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.a channel and one Function 5.a channel are inoperable and untripped, (b Function 4.b channel and one Function 5.b channel are) one inoperable and untripped, or (c) one Function 4.d channel and one tion 5.d channel are inoperable and untripped. In thi tion (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 our or B day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action is not appropriate and all ADS valves must be 4' declared inoperable within I hour after discovery of loss of ' ADS initiation capability. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
For Required Action i upon discoveryJ thal.@the ADS cannot be automaticallyl, I
/ the Compl initiated due to Tnoperable, untripped channels within (continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-132 Rev 1, 04/07/95 / REVl2-
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 8ASES ACTIONS .1 anc (continued) similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The I hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an D 4* < allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to b I *2 acceptable (Ref.1) to permit restoration of any inoperable
#' channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE. If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time is shortened to 96 hours. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the 96 hours begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability. However, the total time for an inoperable, untripped channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of
, HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours to 8 days, the ' time zero" for beginning the 8 day " clock" begins upon discovery of' the inoperable, untripped channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel muste placed in the tripped n condition per Required Actionm.2. Placing the inoperable
()
channel in trip wouia conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to acconnodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alte nately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in @
the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would s result in an initiation), Condition 'nust be entered and p its Required Action taken. ' Q
.1 an 2 F %
Required Action .1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Automatic initiation capability is lost if either channel and one Function 5.c channel are(a)(b) inoperable, one a Function 4.c ombination of Function 4.e. 4.f. 5.e and 5.f channels are # f,1 inoperable such that channels associated with esuror more 66VEAJ ow pressure ECCS pumps are inoperable, or (c) one or more (continued) BW.V4 STS B 3.3-133 Rev 1, 04/07/95
f ECCS Instrumentation l
. 8 3.3.5.1 I
BASES m (g}.1 ante 2 \ ACTIONS . (continued) .y Function 4.g channels and one or more Fu ction 5.g channels are inoper . g In this s untion (loss of automati initiation capability), ' the 96 our or 8 day allowance, applicable, of Required 2 Action .2 is not appropriate and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 our after discovery of loss of Q b ADS initiation capability. The Note to Required Action 4 states that Required Action .1 is only applicable for Functioris 41 4.e, 4.f, 4.g. 5.c, 5.e, 5.f, and 5.g. gig 9 Requi ActioQ.1 is not applicable to Functions 4.h Y nd 5 MichasorequireentryintothisConditionIfa - chann i these Functions is inoperable), since they are inNbM the Manual Initiation f Functions and are not assumed in any
'd put accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of annual initiation capability for 96 hours or 8 days (as I allowed by Required Action .2 allowed. %
The Completion Time'is inten o all'ow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This completion Time also allows for an exception to the nomal
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
upondiscoverythat)theADScannotbeautomaticallyFor Required Ac [.) initiated due to inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The to I hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation e capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while I 4 allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. g l Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide ' ' initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an j allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be f.2. 4 acceptable (Ref.D) to pemit restoration of any inoperab l channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are 1 OPERABLE (Reauired Action n'.2). If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time shortens to 96 hours. If the status of ld HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the 96 hours begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability. However, the total time for an inoperable channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours to 8 days, the " time zero" for beginning the 8 day " clock" begins upon discovery of the (continued) BWR/4 STS 8 3.3-134 Rev 1, 04/07/95 s h
ECCS Instrumentation
- B 3.3.5.1 BASES l ,
I ACTIONS , .1 ad 2 (continued) inoperable channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition st be entered and its' Required Action taken. The Requ ed Actions do not allow placing.,g the[ hm channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state fo the channel in all events. g G l l b :r A., With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not ' met, the associated feature (s) may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the supported feature (s) associated with inoperable untripped channels must be declared inoperable immediately. SURVEILLAACE D., i * - Ce'rtain Frequencies are basad - .,,,,i oved REQUIREMENTS topical reports, n .f:- #ar a ;....w M use these Frequencies, the H r..... y"'s. 5y~fhe staff SERmust W" Fre uencies as for the topical repor .
,) As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each ECCS ", instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of l
Table 3.3.5.1-1. b The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that k when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated m Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours as follows: (a)forFunctionK3.c 7-and (b for Functions other than 3.cA3.f,y(aIdb. ~ LT, U.provided - theass)ociatedFunctionorredundantFunctionmaintains initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition Q a 7 entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on
~
the reliability analysis (Ref.M assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary. (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-135 Rev 1, 04/07/95
- Rev a-Il Y
)
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.I BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.1 REQUIRENENTS . (continued) Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations' between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees ' that undetected outright channel failure is limited to 12 hours; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based-on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability.> If a channel is outside the criteria l it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channei failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of
]
A channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO. g% 6 SR 3.3.5.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is perfo: sed on each required T,:;g-21)5 r channel to er.sure that the entire channel will perform the g ___ intended function.ft Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology, g ,g The F based on the reliability hT P. 2 Caaa's>requency of 92 days
=
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g J gbasd r yw~"ey ,I ann.s T -sorr.i.s n
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we' ' UJ u4e* (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-136 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l i Rev lo 1
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG - 1433 ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 ECCS INSTRUMENTATION NON BRACKETED PLANT SPECIFIC CHANGES P.1 These changes are made to NUREG 1433 to reflect Fermi 2 current licensing basis; including design features, existing license requirements and commitments. Additional rewording, reformatting, and revised numbering is made to incorporate these changes consistent with Writer's Guide conventions. Refer to CTS Discussion Of Changes to the related requirement for a detailed justification of changes made to the current licensing basis which are also reflected in the n V) ITS as presented. 11
<t t
-L %
l l l l l l l l l FERMI - UNIT 2 1 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1. ECCS INSTRUMENTATION 1 TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE i (Soecification 3.3.5.1 "L.1" Labeled Comments / Discussions) Detroit Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification change identified as "Less Restrictive" in accordance with the criteria specified by 10 CFR CO.92 and has determined that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
- The bases for the determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92. The criteria and the conclusions of the evaluation a
- e presented below.
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or )
consequences of an accident previously evaluated? L The proposed change provides: ,1) increased outage times for some j inoperable channels affecting a single ADS trip system: 2) an option to l trip certain inoperable ADS actuation instrument channels, allowing
]
1 continued operation: and 3) an option to declare the associated support i feature (s) inoperable, rather than require a plant shutdown. This change will result in an increase in the probability of previously evaluated LOCA events (as represented by inadvertent ADS actuation); a
- single failure could lead to a satisfying portions of the ADS logic.
However, this increase is judged not significant because: 1) operation with channels tripped is curre!1tly accepted as part of required surveillance testing: 2) tripping these same drywell pressure and reactor water level channels is allowed by other Specification *s l (CTS 3.3.3) Actions: and 3) there continues to remain an incentive to minimize the time the channel is in the tripped condition. This is due to the potential risk of an inadvertent loss of plant availability that could result from a spurious trip of another channel. Therefore the change will not result in a significant increase in the probability of a
- previously evaluated accident.
The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated because this change does not further degrade the capability of the instrumentation to perform its required function. Additionally, the increased time allowed will not adversely affect the performance of any other credited equipment. As such, the consequences remain unchanged from those that ; would apply utilizing the existing CTS requirements. FERMI UNIT 2 1 REVISION 12. 08/0U99l
1 RCIC System Instrumentation ' 3.3.5.2
'] SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
..................................... NOTES - --- ----- ----- ----- --- -
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2:
and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1 and 3 provided the associated i Function maintains RCIC initiation capability. ,
)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours l
'SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days I l
SR 3.3.5.2.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days l SR 3.3.5.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months ! i l SR 3.3.5.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months s SR 3.3.5.2.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months l l t
! FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 50 Revision 12. 08/02/99 l
l 1 E
RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 ; Table 3.3.5.2 1 ( a 1 of 1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooli tem Instrumentation CONDITIONS REWIRED REFERENCED SLRVEILLANCE CMNNELS FRON REQUIRED REQUIREENTS ALLOWABLE FUNCTION m N ION ACTION A.1 VALUE
- 1. F.eactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.2.1 = 103.8 inches Level- Low Low. Level 2 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4 **'
SR 3.3.5.2.5 ,
- 2. Reactor Vessel Water 2 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 s 219 inches Level- High. Level 8 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4 SR 3.3.5.2.5
- 3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.1 a 0 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4
, SR 3.3.5.2.5 L
gl 4. Manual Initiation 1 per valve C SR 3.3.5.2.6 NA 1 l l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 51 Revision 12 08/02/99
I l l l RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2
.] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Two level transmitters and trip units in the HPCI system are used to detect low water level in the CST. The Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low function Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure adequate pump suction. head while water is being taken from the CST. 1 . t' Two channels of Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function l are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is - required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument - failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. l Refer to LC0 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.
- 4. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual initiation capability to individual vlaves. >
~ -
' The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the RCIC function as required by the NRC in the plant j licensing basis. 1 There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the valve control. One channel per valve of !
Manual Initiation is required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is l required to be OPERABLE. l ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3. I l Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been l entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or ! variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be l inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Recuired Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each l adcitional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows , separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel. _s; i l l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.2- 5 Revision 12. 08/02/99
l RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued) bl Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.21. The applicable ! Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. ! Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable. 1 Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition. .
. 1 B.1 and B.2 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss l of automatic initiation capability for the RCIC System. In' this case, automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function I channels in the same trip system are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour allowance of Required ;
Action B.2 is not appro)riate, and the RCIC System must be l declared inoperable wit 11n 1 hour after discovery of loss of , RCIC initiation capability. l The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time I to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This I Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal ;
" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." l For Required Action B.I. the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 channels in the same trip system. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.
Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate j l FERMI UNIl 2 B 3.3.5.2 - 6 Revision 12. 08/02/99
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2
) BASES q
ACTIONS (continued) for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. 1 Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in l trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation). Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken. L1
]
A risk based analysis was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours (Ref.1) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (similar to Required Action B.1) limiting the allowable out - of service time, if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This Condition applies ~
- to the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function whose logic is arranged such that any in~ operable channel will result in a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability. As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. This Condition also applies to the Manual Initiation Function. Since this Function is not assumed in J., any accident or transient analysis, a total loss of manual
,.st initiation capability (Required Action C.1) for 24 hours is % allowed. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily ,
result in a safe state for the channel in all events. D.1. D.2.1. and D.2.2 Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic component initiation capability being lost for the feature (s). For Required Action D.1, the RCIC System is the only associated feature. In this case, automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3 channels are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability. As noted. Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool since, if aligned, the Function is already performed. 's l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.2- 7 Revision 12. 08/02/99
u RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 l
) . BASES-ACTIONS (continued)-
The Completion Time is intended to a 'llow the o rator t'ime to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperab ities. This
' Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal
" time zero" for- beginning the allowed outage time " clock."
For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour .y,
' Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation -
capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while l allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. - Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide ! initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not'. 1 assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable' out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref.1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel ! cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable i l out of service time, the channel must be placed in the l !- tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs L the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction i source to the suppression pool). Alternatively, Required
~ Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction !
- to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended l l
fu mtion. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed. measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the l RCIC suction piping) Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken. M l With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared l inoperable immediately. As noted in the beginning of the SRs. the SRs for each RCIC SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS System instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.21. B 3.3.5.2 - 8 Revision 12, 08/02/99 hl_ FERMI-UNIT 2
l RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2
) BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l l The Surveillances are modified by a' Note to indicate tha't l when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated i
Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2: and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1 and 3 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour e allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status e or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis ' (Ref.1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the ' 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary.
' SR 3.3.5.2.1 -
Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a parameter on other similar channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations , between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent. checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO. gl FERMI-UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.2- 9 Revision 12 08/02/99
e-RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 j l BASES
}.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS (continued) l SR 3.3.5.2.2 and SR 3.3.5.2.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intyded function. A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL e FUNCTIONAL' TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all - of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by
~ other Technical Specifications and non Technical
\ Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the r assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint
' methodology. *
\g The Frequency of 92 days for SR 3.3.5.2.2 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1. The Frequency of <
18 months for SR 3.3.5.2.6 is based on engineering judgement 3 and the reliability of the components. SR 3.3.5.2.3 This surveillance provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the setting accounted for in the appropriate setpoint < methodology. but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions. the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1. l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.2 - 10 Revision 12 08/02/99
I l i RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2
,] BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.5.2.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument . loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary i range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel l adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive i calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint - methodology. - ( l The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.2.4 is based upon the assumption of a = 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. SR 3.3.5.2.5 l The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific l channel. The system functional testing performed in LC0 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an un)lanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with tie reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month l l g Frequency. l $ l 6 REFERENCES 1. Safety Evaluation Re] ort for Fermi Unit-2 Amendment e l No. 75. dated Septem)er 6. 1991. l l s l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.2 - 11 Revision 12 08/02/99
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- b. -*.'l Ni ml ~JI ed FERMI - UNIT 2 h3/433-o Amenoment No. 75 z
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l l l 5PEctFue w J 3- 3 5,L 1 O i .) (_co 3.3.r,L-TOLE 2.2.5 M Continued) REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTION STATEMENTS MrT40N-ft. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OP RABLE Channels per Trip System recuirement: () t ACT100 8 .g,-- C. a.
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,, $nd/or nours inat psysteWplacnneinopersoneenannetts))in@$R Inp system in the tripped conditionIWTTh g declare tne nL46 system inoperno6e, g
Rea g og 8,l b. For both trip systems, declare the RCIC system inoperable. S" U.I Ati;;ai 3; - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System recuirement, place at DMp least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 j hours or align RCIC to take suction from the suppression pool i mom E . Hor declare t e RCIC system inoperable. [ ADO RED Acuop b.I d7.
%T:^N :: Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status r ,_
g ng g within 24 hour r declare tne RCIC system inoperable. 1 h cTID AJ E k l FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 3 38 Amencment ho. 75. 83 PAGE 3 0F 05 Rev al\ Rev(o
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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.2 RCIC SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION changes to be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. This
- continues to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since the requirement for instrument channel Operability continues to be required by the Technical Specifications.
I LA.3 Not used. l LC.1- CTS Table 3 3.51. Note (a), allows required surveillance testina which causes channels to be inoperable without taking Actions for inoperable cnannels "provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter." For the RCIC Level 8 Function, one inoperable channel results in the individual trip function not being maintained even with another Operable channel (the logic is 2-out of 2, i.e., one Operable channel will not perform the function). As such, the CTS allows 6 hours for O testing with a loss of initiation function for Level 8. Fermi $ Unit-2 Technical Specification Amendment 75, dated September 6.
.1991, approved the allowance for delay in entering Actions for these channels. ITS SR Note 2 addresses this allowance, but includes a less restrictive change for RCIC Function 2. The ITS allowance to delay entering Actions applies to this Function even s though the Function may not have an Operable channel in the same trip system. The safety significance of one Level 8 channel g
inoperable is the same as for both Level 8 channels inoperable, since both reflect a complete loss of the Level 8 Function. g' Therefore. this change has no significant impact on safety. 1 1
~
I FERMI - UNIT 2 4 REVISION 12 08/02/99l 1 l
l RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 l 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (CTS) Yst, ) 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation 1 LCD 3.3.5.2 The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE. (.I.3,5 ) l APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, . I MODES 2and3withreactorsteamdonepressure>p150)psig. ACTIONS - NOTE- --- -- Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel _ (Boc4.2.) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition' inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for Immediately [Acnou a,b the channel. t , i TGL 3 3.85-l, B. As required by B.1 Declare RCIC System I hour from Acf/m SD.b Required Action A.1 inoperable. discovery of and referenced in loss of RCIC Table 3.3.5.2-1. initiation capability AND B.2 Place channel in 24 hours T Bt 5 3 5 -1, trip. A< b n $~D.c. C. As required by C.1 Restore channel to 24 hours TBL 3 3 Pl j Required Action A.) OPERABLE status. and referenced in y , g ,a Table 3.3.5.2-1. # Ac4in67l-u ti m 5 (continued) k BWR/4 STS 3.3-48 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
1 l l RCIC Systes Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l lg
.,,) '
NOTES- ---- l i l
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to detemine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function. ---,,f,f)
(y 3 l I
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for perfomance of required Surve111ances, entry into associated Conditions and Required 3.3.5-i Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 3and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions Ig rs for Function 2 Kprovidedte; p ,ugj 1
ass lated Function maintains RCIC initiation capa i .. l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY , l l SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perfom CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours .(TBL43.5.\~lh 1 ' i SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perfom CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. J92gdays l -- iO l ~ g SR 3.3.5.2.3 Q,*:.L.)Je
. the trip unity [.sdpoinQ f92gdays i N &
gS 1 \-P _ l ( j SR NEL CALI TION. 92 da
.3.5.2.K erfom 1
SR 3.3.5.2. Perfom CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {18 months SR 3.3.5.2. Perfom LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. f!8fmonths (LI. 3 5.2.) l - 5g 3.3.5.2. C- Pubem ammt FwcnuaAc resr te monf4s
, . . m -
j Mg BWR/4 STS 3.3-50 Rev 1, 04/07/95 N. l _. fW L
RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 i
\ tem e 3.3.5.2 1 (pose 1 of 1) c'crs >
/
' Deester Core teoletten Coolise system Instrumentation IS b5 3 3* 6 ~ I; 1 3.S=1s 4.35.1-1 enetisans funcyoy 30eUIAED REftasucas enessELS PEM EBERRID RENEILLangg m s masi PUNCTION POR PUNCTits ACTION A.1 REGulRWENTs WAu2
- 1. Rosetor vesset Weter a et 3J.5.2.1 k inchee Lovet -Lee Leu, Level I sa 3J.5.2.2 p 3.3.5.2 0 st 3J.5.2 sa 3J.5.2
- 2. Reacter veneet Water c se 3J 5.2.1 s inehoe -
Level-alsh, Level 8 sa 3J.5.2.2 p 3.3.5.2.
- h.p m 3.3.5.2 sa 3J.5.2
'- m ':," ~ '" 6
- 4 iiii;( 'A'- (c>
p 3.3.5.2 get 3J.5.2. ER 3.3.5.2
- 4. siepress Poet Weter 823 D tan 3.3.5.2.13 (1513 inchee Level- ich er 3 J.5.2.2 tst 3.3.5.2J3
-l m 3.3.5.2.5 i
- s .s.s u '
~
~
\ 5. menuet inittetten s
-T c sa 3.3.5.2.6 r na g f 'g
/
PWvah4 ) ~% Ly e BWR/4 STS 3.3-51 Rev 1, 04/07/95 N. .
l RCIC System Instrumentation I B 3.3.5.2 l BASES I n APPLICABL'E Manual Initiation SAFETY ANALYSES, LC0, and APPLICABILITY TheManualInitiation--'6kaundI" f:t: th: Pi:: ~,,^
- - -!'":-' M' 9 . d x: ;
' It ht's 1:st: t%t f: n i-t-t 0; - l (continued) ti; n;_ _-. n n. ; n. ..
^
,o . ..w = . . W .o ...d provideJ+ manual )
initiation capabilit it = f: :n :xhftte- 'e ' { C Ar* 6=- thhvidad #lv45)
. TheManualInitiationNnctionisn ssumed in any accident or transient analyses in t AR. However, the )l Function is retained for overall re ancy and diversity.cf .y the RCIC function as required by the NRC in the plant -
licensing basis.
~
fg There is no Allowable Jalue for this Function since the positionoftheE=]^nchannelOne is mechanically channel of Manual actuated based solely on th Initiation is required to be OPERABLE when RCI_C i_s required . to be OPERABLE. g ACTIONS
- Rev e: Certain LCO Completion Times n approved top c In ord ensee to use the times, the licens he Completion Times as required afety Evaluat o for the
- c. 3 report.
~
"J ,
A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels ' provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel. I 1 (continued) l BWR/4 STS B 3.3-144 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l 1 ,o '
l l RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) inoperable channel in trip would' conservatively compensate I for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. l Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in-trip channe(e.g., l in tripaswould in the result case where in anplacing the inoperable initiation), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken. / l L1 - i 4 risk based analysis was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours (Ref.1) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (siellar to Required Action B.1) limiting the allowable out- ' of service time, if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This Condition applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function whose logic is arranged such that any inoperable channel will result in a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability. As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. This Condition also applies to the Manual 6 Initiation Function. Since this Function is not assumed in l ;J any accident or transient analysis, a total loss of manual 7 initiation capability (Required Action C.1) for 24 hours is l allowed. 'The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events. D.1. D.2.1. and D.2.2 i Required Action D.) is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if cultiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic component initiation capability being lost.for the feature s only ass (oc). iatedForfeature. RequiredIn Action D.1, automatic this case, the RCIC System is the initiation capability is lost if two Function 3 channels r tr ~- g _e..__.u. g " are inoperable and untripped. In this situation i allowance o(loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour 1 f Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-146 Rev 1, 04/07/95
.)
, Rev I2-
i I RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 l
. BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. . The Frequency is based upon operating experience that . demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
, SR 3.3.5.2.2 l
A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed ~on each required , r T$ T'F-W, channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. j
/MN f) i Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the
(" assumptions of the current plant specific _setpoint methodology. for 62 3 3G ,2 i TheFrequencyof92daysYisbasedo'niere)_liabilit y analysis of Reference 1. The Frcbutec'/ di Il At'ai 5 --' Cfe on ouglnurin we.~d.judgenuk \,G u Sp. m 5nww+1 3.S.2. C. is badse 2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 g O* Th: ;.iCa.U.,;. c' . 'p et+1 provides a check of the actual l trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if I the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the setting accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint (continued) l l BWR/4 STS B 3.3-149 Rev 1, 04/07/95 I i lI G \ I?W lo I i
l RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 \ BASES (continued) . REFERENCES 1. MEDE- 0-06-2, " Add due to Bases f r Changes to Sur 111ance Test tervals and Al owed Out-of- ervice Ti s for Select Instrumentati Technical cifications February 1991. x
/ -
M/y EAh>n depat fw Ferrni a'nW-2 Amerdm<de. 75, daled Sykmk 6,199 / . l w e l l l l l l BWR/4 STS B 3.3-151 Rev 1, 04/07/95 J ffEv'I2-L
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1433 ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.2 RCIC SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION NON-BRACKETED PLANT SPECIFIC CHANGES P.1 These changes are made to NUREG 1433 to reflect Fermi 2 current licensing basis: including design features, existing license requirements and comitments. Additional rewording, reformatting, and revised numbering is made to incorporate these changes consistent with Writer's Guide conventions. Refer to CTS Discussion Of Changes to the related requirement for a detailed justification of changes made to the current licensing basis which are also reflected in the ITS as presented. P.2 Bases changes are made to reflect plant specific design details, equipment terminology, and analyses. P.3 Bases changes are made to reflect changes made to the Specification. Refer to the Specification, and associated JFD if applicable. for
, additional detail. ,
P.4 Change made for editorial preference or clarity. P.5 The reference to the NRC Policy Statement has been replaced with a more appropriate reference to the Improved Technical Specification
" split" criteria found in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
FERMI UNIT 2 1 REVISION 12. 08/02/99l
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition A Table 3.3.6.1-1 for or B not met. the channel. D. As required by D.1 Isolate associated 12 hours - Required Action C.1 main steam line and referenced in (MSL). Table 3.3.6.1-1. -
.QB D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours g .
D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours E. As required by E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1 1. F. As required by F.1 Isolate the affected I hour Recuired Action C.1 penetration flow anc referenced in path (s). Table 3.3.6.1-1. G. As required by G.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours 7 w Required Action C.1 and referenced in penetration flow path (s). Q Table 3.3.6.1-1. (continued) J-
! FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 53 Revision 12 08/02/99
l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) ]~ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by H.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours dl Re uired Action C.1 8 an referenced in Nil Table 3.3.6.1 1. l H.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 nours Required Action and '. associated Completion l Time for Condition F l l or G not met. ! h I. As required by Recuired Action C.1 I.1 Declare associated standby liquid 1 hour anc referenced in control subsystem ! Table 3.3.6.1-1. (SLC) inoperable. j 7 M l I.2 Isolate the Reactor 1 hour Water Cleanup System. l J. As required by J.1 Initiate action to Immediately Recuired Action C.1 restore channel to 4 anc referenced in OPERABLE status. Table 3.3.6.1 1. 2 Vl J.2 Initiate action to Immediately isolate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System. l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 54 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS
~']
............................_.........N0TES --
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.11 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.
- 2. -When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions. and Required Actions may be delayed for up to:
- a. 2 hours for Function 5.a when testing non-redundant circuitry that results in loss of isolation capability associated with this
'N Function, provided Functions 5.b. 5.c and 5.e are OPERABLE: '.
.o l b. 6 hours for Functions 1. 2. 5 (other than non redundant circuitry of 5.a), and 6, provided the associated Function maintains isolation
.y capability: and
- c. 8 hours for Functions 3 and 4. provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days
'SR 3.3.6.1.3. Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days SR. 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR.3.3.6.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months P
l SR 3.3.6.1.6' Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months (continued) !~ l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3-55 Revision 12. 08/02/99 i l-
l .r* Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS (continued) 1 SLRVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ] 'i Qj SR 3.3.6.1.7 --------.......-..N0TES-- - -- --- -----
- 1. Radiation detectors may be excluded. I
- 2. Channel sensor response times are not required to be measured. 1 Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 18 months on a ".
is within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS 1 l l l l i l l- l l l l I FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 56 Revision 12 08/02/99 l l
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.11 (page 1 of 4) Primary Containment Isolation Instrismentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE l
- 1. Main Steam Line Isolation I
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 = 24.8 inches.
Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.6.1.:' Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 il SR 3.3.6.1.7
- b. Main Steam Line 1 2 E SR 3.3.6.1.1 m 736 psig i Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 p SR 3.3.6.1.4 g SR 3.3.6.1.5
- c. Main Steam Line 1.2.3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 118.4 psid Flow - High MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
's l SR 3.3.6.1.7
- d. Condenser 1. 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 7.05 psia Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2
~ 2(a),3(a) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- e. Main Steam Tunnel 1.2.3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 206*F Tegerature - High trip SR 3.3.6.1.2
('- string SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- f. Main Steam Line 1.2.3 2 0 SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 3.6 x full Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 power SR 3.3.6.1.4 background
] SR 3.3.6.1.5 g.. Tuat4ne Building Area 1.2.3 4 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 206*F W@ l Tenperatu e-High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 t-1 ' h. Manual Initiatico 1.2.3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA
( valve I
- i (continule 1 g l (a) Except when bypassed during reactor shutdown or for reactor startup under adninistrative control.
l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 57 Revision 12 08/02/99
F l [ Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 1 3.3.6.1 l Table 3.3.6.11 (page 2 of 4) j ._/ Primary Containment Isolation Instrtmentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS NODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANE LS FRON SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CCSITIONS SYSTEN ACTION C.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
]
- 2. Primary Containment
' Isolation , J s
j- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 171.9 inches l
'l Level - Law. Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 I SR 3.3.6.1.3 .
SR 3.3.6.1.4 i SR 3.3.6.1.5 ) bl b. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 103.8 inches i Level - Low. Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 l c. Drywell Pressure- High 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2
* < SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 i d. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 per valve G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA
- 3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (WCI) System Isolation
- a. WCI Steam Line 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 410 inches Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with j SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 a 1 second and SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 5 seconds
- b. HPCI Steam Supply Line 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 90 psig Pressure - Low ]
SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 i SR 3.3.6.1.5
- c. HPCI Turbine 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig '
Exhaust Diaphrayn SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure -High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- d. HPCI Equipment Room 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 162*F Tenperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 m SR 3.3.6.1.5 O e. Drywell Pressure - High .1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 f9 SR 3.3.6.1.3 T SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 (continued) l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 58 Revision 12, 08/02/99 i
l
l Primary Coritainment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 l Table 3.3.6.).1 (page 3 of 4) Primary Containment isolation Instrtmentation i APPLICABLE CONDITIONS { MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 3. High Pressure Coolant Inject,on ( WCI) System b : 2 **. ion
.) (continued) h f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 r va e G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA l
- 4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation
- a. RCIC Steam Line 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 Flow - High m 95.0 inches SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 = 1 second and SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 5 seconds
- b. RCIC Steam Supply 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 53 psig Line Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- c. RCIC Turbine 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- d. RCIC Equipment Room 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 Temperature - High s 162*F SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 h
Q
- e. Drywell Pressure - High 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 b f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA l
I
.) valve 4
- 5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation
- a. Differential 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 63.4 gpm Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 i
- b. Area 1.2.3 1 per l
Temperature - High F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 183*F area SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 i SR 3.3.6.1.5 l (continued) i l l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 59 Revision 12 08/02/99 i
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 4) > Primary Containment Isolation Instrtmentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS NODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SlRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEN ACTION C.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
- 5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation p (continued)
- c. Area Ventilation 1.2.3 1 per F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 53*F l Differential room SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
.!. d. SLC System Initiation 1.2 2(b) I SR 3.3.6.1.5 NA kl e. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 = 103.8 inches Level - Low Low. SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 r G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA j,. va.ve
- 6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation
.a. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.bl.1 s 95.5 psig D Pressure - High SR 3.?,.6.1.2 l SR 3,3.6.1.3
- SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 l b. Reactor vessel Water 3.4.5 2(c) J SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 171.9 inches Level- Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 g c. Nanual Initiation 1.2.3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (b) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems.
(c) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RtR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained. 1 l 1 1 1 l l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 60 Revision 12 08/02/99
I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ) B 3.3.6.1 j l
] B 3.3 ' INSTRUENTATION B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation I
BASES i BACKGROUND The primary containment isolation instrumentation ; automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation .y l systems, is to limit fission product release during and -
- following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Primary !
containment isolation within the time limits specified for ! those isolation valves designed to close automatically ' ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in. the analyses for a DBA. l l, The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause: initiation of primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary ! (RCPB) isolation. Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input , signals with pre established setpoints. When the setpoint l is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then I outputs a primary containment isolation signal to the { isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by ! monitoring.a wide range of independent parameters. The ! input parameters to the isolation logics are (a) reactor 1 vessel water level (b) area ambient and differential temperatures, (c) main steam line (MSL) flow and radiation, (d) Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System initiation, ; (e) condenser pressure (f) main steam line pressure, (g) high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line flow, (h) dr pressure, (1) HPCI 6nd RCIC steam line pressure.ywell(j) HPCI 1 l and RCIC turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure, (k) reactor ' water cleanup (RWCU) differential flow, and (1) reactor steam dome pressure. Redundant sensor input signals from ; each parameter are typically provided for initiation of ' Si isolation. The only exceptions are SLC System initiation and RWCU differential flow. In addition, manual isolation of the valves is provided. Primary containment isolation instrumentation has inputs to the trip logic of the isolation functions listed below.
-l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 1 Revision 12, 08/02/99
I I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL. The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break. This Function isolates the MSL and MSL drains isolation ' I valves. i 1.d. Condenser Pressure-Hiah The Condenser Pressure-High Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a 4 loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of ! the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Pressure-High Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the , addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and oossible rupture of the diaphragm installed to prot s the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident. This function is credited with closing the MSIV's by the analysis of the " Loss of Condenser Vacuum" event (Ref. 2). Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the condenser. Four channels of Condenser Pressure-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1 1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 during reator shutdown or for g reactor startup when bypassed under administrative control.
~ ,j, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Keylocked switches are provided to manually %st bypass the channels when necessary for conducting startup I and shutdown operations while condenser pressure is above the trip setpoint. This also allows limited period of time to unbypass the channels when the bypass is no longer needed s and condenser pressure is below the trip setpoint.
{ l
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I
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 l BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 1 ! This function is provided primarily~ as a backup to the l l closure of the turbine stop valves on Condenser Pressure-High. It is provided because of the potential consequence , of exceeding off site doses, and because the turbine stop l valves and associated control system does not meet l . Protection System standards. L ; This Function isolates the MSL and MSL drains isolation l valves. . 1.e. and 1.a. Area Temoerature-Hiah Area temperature is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. If the leak is allowed to continue without isolation. offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these
- instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs.
Area temperature signals are initiated from resistance temperature detectors (RTD), located in the area being monitored. Sixteen channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High Function and eight channels of Turbine Building Area Temperature-High Function are available. Each of these Functions consist of two trip strings per trip h system (for a total of 4 trip strings). For the Main Steam a
)
Tunnel Temperature-High Function, each trip string has ) inputs from four channels. Two channels per trip string of each Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no 1 l single instrument failure can preclude the isolation ' function. The ambient temperature monitoring Allowable Value is chosen i to detect a feedwater line break inside the steam tunnel. j These Functions' isolate the MSL and MSL drains isolation l: valves. 1.f. Main Steam Line Radiation-Hiah High MSL radiation indicates there is a major fission product release due to a fuel cladding failure, and could provide an active role in mitigating release due to a control rod drop accident (Ref. 2). While MSIV closure initiated by Main Steam Line Radiation-High is not required I l FERMI- - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 10 Revision 12 08/02/99 L
e Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 l BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) to ensure compliance with those guidelines of 10 CFR 100, l (Ref. 9) it is retained to maintain the overall diversity of parameters that cause an MSIV closure. Main Steam Line Radiation-High signals are initiated from
. steam tunnel monitors that sense the presence of excessive radiation levels, indicative of a fuel cladding failure. )
- Four channels are available and required to be OPERABLE to ,
I l ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the . l 1 solation function. 1 The Allowable Value is based on the NRC guidelines of 3.6 times the full power background radiation level with nominal full power hydrogen injection rate. This allowable value remains fixed at this nominal full-power basis even when 1 operating at reduced power and/or reduced, or eliminated,
. hydrogen injection rates.
This Function shares common instrumentation with the RPS. This Function isolates the MSIVs, the MSL drains, and the 3 Reactor Water Sample System. 1.h. Manual Initiatio.D The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation ca) ability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that taces credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis. N There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the valve control. One channel of Manual Initiation Function per valve is available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3. since these are the MODES in which the MSL isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE. l-FERMI UNIT 2. B 3.3.6.1- 11 Revision 12. 08/02/99
l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
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1 I BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
*1 mary Containment Isolation c.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the ca) ability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves w1ose penetrations communicate with the prim::ry containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure -
that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 3 Function are i available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.1.1). since isolation of these valves is not critica7 to orderly plant shutdown. This function shares common instrumentation with the RPS. This Function isolates the drywell sumps and TIP isolation valves. 2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low low. Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed to be isolated post-LOCA. f l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 12 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 h BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) l Reactor Vestel Water Level-Low Low', Level 2 signals are l initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference l between the pressure due to a constant column of water l (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation l function. - The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 2 Initiation Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.5.1), since isolation of. these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown. This Function isolates Reactor Water Sample System. TWMS,
, Drywell and Suppression. Pool Ventilation System, Nitrogen l Inerting System, Recirculation Pump Seal' System, Primary l
Containment Pneumatic Supply System, and PCMS isolation valves. l 2.c. Drywell Pressure-Hiah
)
High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell l pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is. implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. This Function shares common instrumentation with the RPS. The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the RPS Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.1.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.
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Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
This Function isolates certain RHR. CS, HPCI and RCIC isolation valves, as well as groups of drywell sumps. TIP. Reactor Water Sample System.1TMS. Drywell and Suppression Pool Ventilation System. Nitrogen Inerting System. Recirculation Pump Seal System. Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply System, and PCMS isolation valves. 2.d. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation ca) ability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that taces credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as Q w required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis, ( There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. One channel of the Manual Initiation Function per valve is available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2. and 3. I since these are the MODES in which the Primary Containment
) l Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.
Hiah Pressure Cp_olant In.iection and Reactor Core Isolation Coolino Systems Isolation 3.a. 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-Hioh Steam Line Flow-High Functions are provided to detect a break of the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam line isolation valves of the appropriate system. If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover. Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any UFSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the RCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.
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i; l l Primary Containment I. solation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- The HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High signals are initiated from transmitters (two for HPCI and two for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam lines flow elements.
Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the I isolation function. A time delay relay is used in the logic : to delay isolation long enough to prevent spurious isolation. , l resulting from start-up pressure transients. 4 The Allowable Values-are chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event. These Functions isolate the HPCI and RCIC isolation valves, as appropriate. 3.b. 4.b. HPCI and RCIC Steam Sucolv Line Pressure-Low Low MSL pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in the HPCI or RCIC turbine may be too low to continue operation of the associated system's turbine. These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR. However, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate a possible system break. These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3). The HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low signals 4 are initiated from transmitters (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam line. Four l channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to prevent damage to the system's turbine. These Functions isolate the HPCI and RCIC system isolation valves, as appropriate. j FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 15 Revision 12. 08/02/99
i l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 l
) BASES 1 APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Additionally, the HPCI and RCIC steam su) ply line pressure-low signals are combined with ECCS drywell pressure-high signals to isolate the HPCI and RCIC turbine l exhaust line vacuum breaker. 1 3.c. 4.c. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaohraam I Pressure- Hioh High turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure indicates that the - pressure may be too high to continue operation of the ' associated system's turbine. That is, one of two exhaust diaphragms has ruptured and pressure is reaching turbine casing pressure limits. These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident. analysis in the UFSAR. These instruments are included in the TS because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3). The HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High I signals are initiated from transmitters (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the area between the rupture diaphragms on each system's turbine exhaust line. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Allowable Values are high enough to prevent damage to the system's turbine. These Functions isolate the HPCI and RCIC system isolation valves. as appropriate. 3.d. 4.d. HPCI and RCIC Eauioment Room Temoerature-Hioh Area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the associated system steam piping. The isolation occurs when a i very small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high flow instrumentation. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. i These Functions are not assumed in any UFSAR transient or { accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for ' large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks. l o l hl FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 16 Revision 12. 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 ; BASES APPLICABLE SAFEU ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
~
HPCI and RCIC Equipment Room Temperature-High signals are initiated from thermocouples that are appropriately located to protect the system that is being monitored. Two instruments monitor each area. Two channels for each HPCI and RCIC Equipment Room Temperature-High Function are
. available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. ,
The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpa. These Functions isolate the HPCI and RCIC system isolation valves as appropriate. 3.e. 4.e. Drvwell Pressure-Hiah High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI and RCIC isolation of the turbine exhaust is provided to prevent communication with the drywell when high drywell pressure exists. A potential Jeakage path exists via the
?, turbine exhaust. The isolation is delayed until the system becomes unavailable for injection (i.e.. low steam line pressure). The isolation of the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust'by Drywell Pressure-High is indirectly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis because the turbine exhaust leakage path is not assumed to contribute to offsite doses.
o High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure j g transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Drywell Pressure-High
) Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to (g ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure-High Al'Mable Value-(LC0 3.3.5.1), since this is indicative of a I Q inside primary containment. This Function is combined with the HPCI and RCIC steam supply line pressure-low signals to isolate the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker. l FERMI . UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 17 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 3. f. 4.f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for these Functions. They are retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.
N There is no Allowable Value for these Functions, since the - l channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. One channel of Manual Initiation Function per valve is available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 since these are the MODES in which the HPCI and RCIC systems' Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE. . Reactor Water Cleanuo System Isolation 5.a. Differential Flow-High j
)
The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU System. This will detect leaks in the RWCU System when area or differential temperature would not ; provide detection (i.e., a cold leg break). Should the i reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break. offsite ' dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation of the RWCU System is initiated when high differential flow is sensed to prevent exceeding offsite doses. A time delay is provided to prevent spurious trips during most RWCU operational transients. This Function is not assumed in any UFSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs. The high differential flow signals are initiated from transmitters that are connected to the RWCU pump outlet and RWCU system discharge to condenser and feedwater. The outputs of the transmitters are compared (in a common summer) and the resulting output is sent to two high flow trip units. If the difference between the inlet and outlet flow is too large, each trip unit generates an isolation signal. Inoperability of the non redundant circuitry causes the channels in both trip systems to be inoperable. The j FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 18 Revision 12 08/02/99
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. Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
'] BASES
. APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) remainder of the circuit is redundant and can be considered on a per trip system basis.
The Differential Flow-High Allowable Value ensures that a break of the RWCU piping is detected. This Function isolates the RWCU isolation valves. 5.b. 5.c. Area and Area Ventilation Differential - Temperature-Hioh RWCU area and area ventilation differential temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the RWCU System. The isolation occurs even when very small leaks have occurred and is diverse to the high differential flow instrumentation for the hot portions of the RWCU System. If the small leak'
. continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. Credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.
Area and area ventilation differential temperature signals are initiated from temperature elements that are located in
- j. .the area or room that is being monitored. Twelve
, thermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature-High
'l Function (two per area). Two channels per area are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure j can preclude the isolation function.
Eight thermocouples provide input to the Area Ventilation d Differential Temperature-High Function. The output of these thermocouples is used to determine the differential
! temperature in four rooms containing RWCU piping and I.
equipment. Eacn channel consists of a differential temperature instrument that receives inputs from thermocouples that are located in the inlet and outlet of i the room cooling system and for a total of four available channels (one per room). The Area and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm. These Functions isolate the RWCU isolation valves, as appropriate. l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 -19 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 3 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 5. d .- SLC System Initiation The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 4). SLC System initiation signals are initiated from the two SLC pump start signals.
There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function . since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on I the position of the SLC System initiation switch. Two channels (one from each ) of the SLC System Initiation Function are avai e and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LCO 3.*1.7). As noted (footnots (b) to Table 3.3.6.11). this Function is l cnly required to cic;e one of the RWCU isolation valves a since the signals only provide input into one of the two trip systems. j 5.e. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool I the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease i too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore. isolation of l some interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to isolate I the potential sources of a break. The isolation of the RWCU System on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that the fuel l peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of J i 10'CFR 50.46. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, l' Level 2 Function' associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed in the UFSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break is bounded by breaks of larger i systems (recirculation and MSL breaks are more limiting). Reactor Vessel-Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are ; initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no l-l- FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 20 Revision 12 08/02/99
E l l l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation l B 3.3.6.1
) BASES
, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. l The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Allowable l Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel l Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.5.1). I since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. This Function isolates the RWCU isolation valves. -
- 5. f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation ca) ability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that )
i b taces credit for this Function. It is retained for overall l redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as ! required by the NRC in the riant licensing basis. l There is no Allowable Value ,or this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the valve control. l 1-One channel of the Manual Initiation Function per valve is i available and required to be OPERABLE in N0 DES 1, 2. and 3 l since these are the MODES in which the RWCU System Isolation l automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE. ! Shutdown Coolina System Isolation 6.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Hiah The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Function is provided to isolate the shutdown cooling portion of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenarlo, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High signals are initiated from two transmitters that are connected to different taps on the RPV. Two channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2, and 3, since these l-l l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 21 Revision 12 08/02/99 l t
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY (continued) are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized:
thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization. This Function shares common instrumentation with the RPS. l This Function isolates the RHR shutdown cooling valves, as appropriate. - 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low. Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water ) Level-Lew, Level 3 Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System 1 is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL. The RHR ' 3 Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports
/ actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure.due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (c) to Table 3.3.6.11), only two channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 4 and 5 (and must input into the same trip system), provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.
$ . . g
l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
) BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low'. Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be_ threatened. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3. 4. and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2. another - isolation'(i.e.. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains 4
. isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this l flow path. j This Function isolates the RHR shutdown cooling isolation valves, as appropriate.
6.c. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that s' takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis. j b '
- d. There is no Allowable Value for this Function. since the t channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the
% position of the push buttons.
One channel of the Manual Initiation Function per valve is l available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2. and 3 ' since these are the MODES in which the containment isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE. l ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3. Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the . Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times basad on initial entry into the l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 23 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued) Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment' isolation instrumentation channel. Akl Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide
. isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours for Functions 1.f. 2.a. 2.c. and 6.b and 24 hours for Functions other than Functions 1.f. 2.a. 2.c. and. 6.b has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of- ,
service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable
'out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel-in tri t (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable clannel in trip would result in an isolation). . Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.
IL1 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path (s). The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. The other isolation functions are considered to be maintaining _ isolation capability when sufficient channels are_ OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the aw hlFERMI_UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1-24 Revision 12. 08/02/99 l-
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
) BASES ACTIONS (continued) two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 1.a.1.b.1.d, and 1.f. this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE.or in trip. For Function 1.c. this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip.
For Functions 1.e and 1.g. each Function consists of channels that monitor several locations within a given area (e.g.. different locations within the main steam tunnel . area). Therefore, this would require both trip systems to have one channel >er location OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.a. 2. ), 2.c 3.b 3.c, 4.b. 4.c, 5.e. and 6.b. this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 3.a. 3.d. 4.a. 4.d. 5.a 5.d and 6.a. this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 5.b and 5.c. each Function consists of channels that monitor several different locctions. Therefore, this would require one channel per location to be OPERABLE or 'in trip (the channels are not required to be in the same trip system). The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation g Functions (Functions 1.h 2.d. 3.f. 4.f. 5.f. and 6.c), g since they are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Cd Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1 1. The applicable Condition specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Com)letion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for t1at channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition. l
]
1 i l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 -25 Revision 12. 08/02/99 i
i Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 1 I
.) BASES ACTIONS (continued)
D.1. D.2.1. and D.2.2 l If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed l in trip within the allowed Completion Time the plant must ! be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within l 36 hours (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2). Alternately. - the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1), - , and, if allowed (i.e., plant safety analysis allows l operation with an MSL isolated) operation with that MSL isolated may continue. Isolating the affected MSL accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channel. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. i L.1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed
- s. in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours.
The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power i conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. E.1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations i ' may continue if the affected penetration flow path (s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels. For the RWCU Area and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High Functions the affected penetration flow path (s) may be considered isolated by isolating only that portion of. the system in the associated room monitored by the inoperable channel. That is, if the RWCU pump room A area channel is inoperable, the pump room A area can be isolated while allowing continued RWCU operation utilizing hlFERMIUNIT2 B 3.3.6.1 - 26 Revision 12 08/02/99
l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
) BASES ACTIONS (continued) the B RWCU pum). For the RWCU Differential Flow-High Function, if t1e flow element / transmitter monitoring RWCU flow to radwaste and condensate is the only portion of the channel inoperable, then the affected penetration flow path (s) may be considered isolated by isolating the RWCU return to radwaste and condensate.
Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected s penetration flow path (s) (e.g., as in the case where - isolating the penetration flow path (s) could result in a 1l reactor scram). Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path (s). 1.1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed g in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations
/
may continue if the affected penetration flow path (s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels. p The 24 hour Completion Time is acceptable due to the fact t
' that these Functions (Manual Initiation) are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR.
k Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path (s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the reactor scram), penetration Condition H flow mustpath (s) could be entered result and in a its Required Actions taken. l H.1 and H.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired. the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full j FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 27 Revision 12 08/02/99 i l i
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
) BASES
. ACTIONS (continued) power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
yl 1.1 and I.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem (s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System N is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that - t the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated j SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System. l The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System. il- J.1 and J.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated
) penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the 1 J shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core coolini, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay 1 heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.
l SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs. the SRs for each v REQUIREMENTS Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.11. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 28 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES , SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS (continued) (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the a'v erage time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path (s) when necessary. SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures.'- that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays [ associated with the channels required by the LC0. k SR 3.3.6.1.2 and SR 3.3.6.1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required a channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the u intended function. A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of ( the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all i of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non Technical _/ l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 - 29 Revision 12. 08/02/99
l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1
) BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
- Specifications tests at least once 'per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint
- methodology.
The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the - N reliability analysis described in References 5 and 6. The - 1 18 month Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.6 is based on engineering judgment and the reliability of the individual valve control components. SR 3.3.6.1.3 This surveillance provides a check of the actual trip
- setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.6.11. If the trip i
setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted ' for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not
} beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still
.. within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than that accounted for in the !
appropriate setpoint methodology. 1 The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of References 5 and 6. ' SR 3.3.6.1.4 ' A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument I loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.4 is based on the assumption of a = 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. l j FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1- 30 Revision 12 08/02/99 l
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 ) BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SR 3.3.6.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LC0 3.6.1.3 overla)s this Surveillance to provide complete testing of t1e assumed safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant - outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. ' 0)erating experience has shown these components usually pass N tie Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. l SR 3.3.6.1.7
- This SR ensures that tas individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The instrument response times must be added to the PCIV closure times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.
ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acce tance criteria for the instrumentation portion are included in Reference 7. while the acceptance criteria for the PCIV closure times are included in Reference 8. This test may be performed in one measurement, or in overlapping segments, with verification thatallcomponen}saretested. A Note to the Surveillance states that the radiation detectors may be excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty of generating an appropriate detector input signal and because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time. Response times for radiation detector channels shall be measured from l detector output or the input of the first electronic i component in the channel, l In addition, Note 2 states the response time of the sensors are excluded from the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. The sensors for the tested Functions are assumed i to operate at the sensor's design response time. This allowance is supported by Reference 10 which determined that significant degradation of the sensor channel response time l can be detected during performance of other Technical I / 1 l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.1 -31 Revision 12. 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 ] BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Specification SRs and that the sens'o r response time is a small part of the overall response time testing. ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are - infrequent occurrences. , REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.
- 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
- 3. NED0 31466, " Technical Specificatio~n Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment."
November 1987.
- 4. UFSAR Section 4.5.2.4.
}
- 5. NEDC 31677P A. " Technical Specification Improvement !
Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation." l July 1990.
- 6. NEDC 30851P A Supplement 2. " Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
- 7. UFSAR. Section 7.3.
- 8. UFSAR. Section 6.2.
- 9. NED0 31400, " Safety Evaluation for Eliminating the BWR MSIV Closure Function and Scram Function of the MSL Radiation Monitor." Licensing Topical Plant Report for BWROG.
- 10. NED0 32291, " System Analysis for Elimination of l Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January i 1994: and Fermi 2 SER for Amendment 111. dated April ;
18, 1997. l 1
.e . .
5pginenod .33 s. /
,.3 i
lSo Sec FPdcahas 33.(,. t) 1 INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-4rbEL Each isolation actuation instrumentation enannel shall be i
' gg gog i demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPEKATIONAL i CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1. 45' l g3'3,y*f 4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS fai; A h w .usdic vy-r uidof i all channels shall be perfcrmed at least once per 18 months. ' L A.2.
- Md:iB The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of g isolation trip function
- gy,3,4'g*7 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at reast once per 18 months.m g g -jQtadiation detectors are exempt from response time testina.J Each test s is I g 3,3.c,g,7 1htTude a east one enannel per rip system such that at leas nce every N times 18 nths, where N is th totalI number channels a teste I (Jo m 1 (
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SfEtt Fica-7: od ii'. 3. (, ,l hl.so s*e SpeciOcAb 3 3.(,.Q
-Tn M :.^. -i (Continued)
_ _ _ ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 04 8'" ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 20 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN l '7 4CMM D j $ within the next 24 hours y Mod D ACTION 21 c? n -- - =:= with the associated isolation valves close within @ hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours a in COLD SHUTDOWN within tne next 24 hours.% g,g ) ACTIDM E ACTION 22 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours. ACTio M F ACTION 23 Close the affected s.ystem isolation valves within I hour A.q 3:: n . .w. . < < - , + - , , y + m. 4.e--..wu , Su V84hdm 31ACTION A,.'3- g4 Estantisn SECONDARY CONTAINMENT aperating INTEGRITY with the standby gas within I hour. l Din:!: 'n]the closed position the affected system isolation ( g ,9 p ACTION 2 -
,, g valves within I hour : t f x'.x tr. :'u*'- - : : ;x; cf "" '
I l in;;;.. Lie. f,q p.,,, i ACTION 26 - Restore t,hgfmanual initiation function to OPERABLE status within(!) i
/ICT10M (j hours ori close the affected system isolation valves within the d' wrt nous =d enbr: tr., e f f e;nd ;y:t; .n;.. ak. ,
CZ l g \ ACTION b utstore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within pgA hours or establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the g;g,g y, Stan Treatment System operating. TABLE NOTATIONS J* When handling irradiated fuel in the seconeary containment, during CORE
,) l ALTERATIONS. or during operations with a potential for draining the g
- t
- reactor vessel. i !
TSL 3 '54.1-1, ** The high condenser pressure input _to the isolation actuation Nok (a) instrumentation may be bypassedJ ktartun a.mevtoncenseptressure ' aoove the g reacto aown o setooin reactoo g g jS 3,, Actuates Campers shown In Table 3.6.5.2-1. \ paWic .he. 3342.
/***
(a) A channel may be placed in an inocerable status for uo to ~6 ,hours for ,(
-- -- -^
recutred surveillance withoutI:;r- .c r:
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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES-
-ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUENTATION administrative..
A.9 CTS Table 3.3.2-1. Actions 23. 25. and 26 require the affected l5' system isolation valves be closed and the affected system declared inoperable. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Actions F and G require that the affected system isolation valves be closed. but do not provide direction to declare the affected system inoperable. The assessment of the Operability status of systems is an ongoing function of the licensed operator, and therefore the explicit statement is considered an unnecessary informational reminder. . Elimination of this reminder is presentation preference which
-represents no change in intent. Therefore, it is an administrative change with.no impact on safety.
A.10 CTS Table 3.3.2-1. footnote (a). allows required surveillance o testing without " placing the trip system in the tripped 4 condition." ITS SR Note 2 (part b) provides the same allowance. lg stated as " entry into.the associated Conditions and Required q
; Actions may be delayed." - Furthermore, for the HPCI and RCIC V Isolation Functions, the CTS footnote provides details that are consistent with the ITS Note 2 (part c) allowance of " provided
). the associated Function' maintains isolation capability." These represent a clarification of the intent, and as such are considered administrative changes.
A.11 CTS Table 4.3.2.11 requires a Channel Functional Test on the SLC l initiation. Function for the RWCU isolation actuation.
. Additionally. CTS 4.3.2.2 requires a Logic System Functional Test (LSFT). ITS Table 3.3.6.1-1 requires only the performance of an LSFT for the SLC initiated RWCU isolation Function. This is considered an administrative change since the' requirements for a Channel Functional Test of a manual actuation channel is completely met by the requirements for an LSFT. Therefore.
elimination of duplicate testing is an administrative change with no impact on safety. I .- l j
. FERMI UNIT 2 3
(. REVISION 12 08/02/99l
T DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION A.12 CTS Table 3.3.2.1-1 Function 1.c.3 (MSL Flow - High) number of channels is stated as 2 per trip system: however this Function is further interpreted to apply to each main steam line. Therefore, the equivalent ITS Function 1.c is stated as 2/MSL. Additionally. I CTS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 1.d (MSL Tunnel Temperature - High) lists the number of channels as 2 per trip system, with footnote (c) clarifying that 2 of 4 detectors are required for a " channel" to be Operable. Since typically, channels are defined from the sensors, the presentation is reformatted to present the minimum channels consisting of the 2 of 4 detectors as "2/ trip string" . where each " trip string" contains input from 4 detectors. Furthermore, the CTS Function 1.f (Turbine Building Area Temperature - High) requirement of 2 channels per trip is presented as ITS Function 1.g with minimum channels of ~4." The y
~ ;
CTSpresentationhadbeeninterpretedtorequire2"tripstrings."l
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k each with 2 channels (similar to the presentation of CTS Function 1.d described above). The revised presentation is more consistent l with the ITS presentation listing the total number of channels. These are administrative changes in presentation format with no i change in the requirements. l A.13 CTS Table 3.3.2-1 Functions 2.b and 2.c are RWCU isolation Functions on various area temperatures and area ventilation i differential temperatures. The Function names do not adequately convey the area monitored, and the required number of channels are specified without regard to the requirements in each area. ITS Table 3.3.6.11 list these Functions as 5.b and 5.c. and specify tr the number of channels as "1/ area" and "1/ room" respectively, for 1 lk i each trip system. Furthermore, the Function names are simplified to " Area Temperature - High" and " Area Ventilation Differential Temperature High." These are administrative changes in presentation format with no change in the requirements. A.14 Not used. l4t 5 FERMI - UNIT 2 4 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION LA.2 CTS 4.3.2.3 requires Isolation System Response Time testing of "each isolation trip function"; however, the details of the , testing acceptance criteria are currently located in the Technical lg Requirements Manual (TRM), which requires revisions be contro11cd by 10 CFR 50.59. ITS 3.3.6.1 provides the Isolation System ! Response Time Surveillance (SR 3.3.6.1.7) and each Function on Table 3.3.6.11, as appropriate, references the applicability of e- g ll4 e this test to that Function. Since the majority of isolation a , Functions have no specific acceptance criteria detailed in the TRM these Functions will not have ITS SR 3.3.6.1.7 listed as a Ih'l 1 Technical Specification required Surveillance. This previously N approved placement continues to provide adequate protection of the l public health and safety since the requirement for instrument channel Operability continues to be required by the Technical Specifications. LA.3 CTS Tdble 3.3.2-1 footnotes (h)' and # provide design details and lN descriptive details for various isolation actuation functions. ITS 3.3.6.1 addresses this information in the Bases and does not include these details in Technical Specifications, consistent with
} NUREG 1433. The information is being moved to the Bases which requires changes to be controlled in accordance with the ITS 5.5.10. Bases Control Program. This relocation continues to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since the requirement for instrument channel Operability continues to be required by the Technical Specifications.
LA.4 CTS Table 3.3.2 2 footnote ** provides a calibration setpoint detail. ITS Table 3.3.6.11 addresses only the allowable value, and does not retain this calibration information (consistent with NUREG 1433). This detail is relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). which requires revisions be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. This continues to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since the requirement for , instrument channel Operability continues to be required by the Technical Specifications. LA.5 Not used. LA.6 I Not used. NL k FERMI UNIT 2 7 REVISION 12 08/02/99 ll
1 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES L ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION m
) LA.7 ' CTS 4.3.2.3 note 2, allows the sensors for Reactor Vessel Water l Level 1 and Main Stean Line Flov to be exempted from being tested (acceptable values are assumed had applied to overall channel 7 l response acceptance). For these two Functions ITS SR 3.3.6.1.7 includes Note 2 to specifically detail this allowance. however.
lg l the. specific alternate option of assuming the_ response to be the design sensor response is relocated to the Bases. This detail of performance can be adequately controlled in accordance with ITS l 5.5.10. Bases Control Program. The relocation continues to l- provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since .. the requirement for isolation system response time testing remains a Technical Specification requirement. LC.1- . CTS 3.3.2 Action b.] requires compensatory action be completed in 6 hours with inoperable channel (s) in one trip system, when tripping that channel would cause an isolation, while Action b.2 requires compensatory action be completed in 12 or 24 hours with inoperable channel (s) in one trip system, when tripping i that channel would not cause an isolation. ITS 3.3.6.1 Action l A allows either 12 or 24 hours for one inoperable channel in l one trip system regardless of the effect of tripping that I channel.
. CTS 3.3.2 Action c requires placing one trip system in trip within 1 hour when both trip systems have inoperable l channel (s): and furthermore, requires commencing the actions '
i specified in CTS Table 3.3.2-1 within the same hour. ITS 3.3.6.1 Action B addresses the same condition of inoperable l l channels in both trip systems (i.e.. this would result in a loss of automatic isolation capability) allows restoration of isolation capability, without requiring additional actions. l Furthermore. after restoring isolation capability (e.g.. i I tripping one trip system with inoperable channel (s)). ITS 3.3.6.1 Action A would continue to apply to any remaining untripped channels: thereby allowing 12 or 24 hours prior to I commencing additional actions. I l l FERMI - UNIT 2 8 REVISION 12 08/02/99l l
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION
. CTS Table 3.3.2-1 footnote (a) allows required surveillance testing that causes channels to be inoperable without taking Actions for inoperable channels "provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter."
ITS SR Note 2 (parts b and c) addresses this allowance, but includes a less restrictive change for many Functions. The ITS '
. allowance to delay entering Action applies to functions even j though that individual trip function may not have an Operable channel in the same trip system. The ITS simply requires isolation capability, which can be met by an Operable valve and -
isolation logic on the other trip system (for a typical 2 out-of-2 per trip system logic), These increased allowed Completion Times and testing times are consistent with the allowed outage times and testing allowances reviewed and approved in NED0 30851-P A, Supplement 2, " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common To RPS And ECCS Instrumentation," and are considered appropriate based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an isolation. , Since a loss of trip function continues to require immediate (1 ' hour) restoration (ITS Action B), this extension to 12 or 24 hours ln for inoperabilities that still retain trip capability will not o adversely affect safety. g LR.1 Not used. t lv TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE "Speci fic" L.1 CTS Table 3.3.21 and Table 4.3.2.11 Item 2.d, requires that the , SLCS Initiation to be Operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. ITS Table l 3.3.6.1 1 requires the SLCS Initiation to be Operable in Modes 1 and 2 only. In Mode 3 the reactor mode switch is maintained in the shutdown position, which initially inserts a reactor scram and lQ, g enforces a control rod block such that no control rods can be e ! withdrawn. This is consistent with the ITS Applicability requirements for the SLC System (ITS 3.1.7). Therefore this is a _ less restrictive change with no impact on safety. FERMI UNIT 2 9 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
l L DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION L.2 CTS Table 3.3.21 Item 2.d, requires that if there is a loss of RWCU isolation on a SLCS initiation, close the affected system p (RWCU) isolation valves within 1 hour. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 1 Item .L 5.d. Action I, requires that if there is a loss of RWCU isolation R on a SLCS initiation either declare associated standby liquid lT control (SLC) subsystem inoperable, or isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup System. This is acceptable because either action will ensure the necessary actions are performed (i.e., either isolate the RWCU system to ensure SLCS is capable of performing its safety l function, or declaring the SLCS inoperable because of the loss of . I the RWCU isolation may hinder the SLC Function). Therefore, this less restrictive change will have no impact on safety. L.3 CTS Tables 3.3.2 1 and 4.3.2.1 1, Function 5.a. require RHR shutdown cooling isolation on reactor vessel low water level in Modes 1, 2, and 3. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 1, Function 6.b does not retain the Applicability of Mode 1 and 2 for this isolation Function (see more restrictive discussion of change for inclusion of Modes 4 and 5 in the ITS). In Modes 1 and 2, the RHR System is required to be Operable for the ECCS function. RHR alignment in shutdown cooling mode of operation would render ECCS inoperable, which in turn would preclude a plant startup into Mode 2. and would require a plant shutdown if ECCS was not restored to Operable status. Furthermore, above the setpoint for the reactor vessel (shutdown cooling cut in permissive interlock) pressure - high Function the RHR shutdown cooling valves would also have an automatic isolation signal applied to assure their closure. Therefore, elimination of the Operability requirements for reactor vessel water level low isolation of RHR while in Modes 1 and 2, will not negatively impact safety. L.4 CTS Table 3.3.2 1, Action 25 as it applies to Function 5.a. RHR shutdown cooling isolation on reactor vessel low water level, requires isolating RHR within one hour. ITS 3.3.6.1 Actions for operation with inoperable reactor vessel water level low RHR isolation instrumentation, includes an optional requirement r-(Required Action J.1). This allows action to be initiated to ldp restore the channel to Operable status, in the event the RHR '< Shutdown Cooling System is not desired to be (or not capable of being) isolated. Safe plant operations may be enhanced by maintaining RHR shutdown cooling in service if no other means of decay heat removal are available. even with inoperable isolation
, capability. Therefore, this optional allowance provides for an potential increase in safety.
FERMI UNIT 2 10 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES j ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION ) i L.5 CTS Table 3.3.21 Action 20 for inoperable MSIV isolation l instrumentation requires a plant shutdown to Mode 3 and Mode 4. ITS 3.3.6.1 Action D allows isolation of the affected main steam line(s) as an option to a forced shutdown. Some channel , inoperability conditions may affect the isolation logic for only i one main steam line. In these cases, it is not necessary to require a shutdown of the unit: rather, isolation of the affected line returns the system to a status where it can perform the I remainder of its isolation function, and allow continued operation ,, (although it may be at a reduced power level). If all steam lines - are affected, a shutdown would be required to isolate the lines, l however, once isolated completing the shutdown to Cold Shutdown I should not be necessary. Therefore, this change provides appropriate options to minimize unnecessary plant shutdowns, while not adversely impacting plant safety. L.6 CTS Table 3.3.21, Action 25, requires that with the loss of the reactor vessel (RHR cut in permissive) pressure - high Function,
" disable" the affected system isolation valves closed within 1 hour. ITS 3.3.6.1. Action F, requires that with the loss of this Function, isolate the affected penetration flow path within 1 hour; but does not require the valve to be " disabled." The ITS maintains the requirement to isolate the affected penetration and the method of how the penetration is maintained isolated to comply with the required Actions does not impact the safety significant requirement to isolate the penetration.
L.7 CTS Table 3.3.2-1 Action 21, contains the requirement to "be in at least STARTUP" in addition to the requirement to close the ' associated isolation valves (i.e., MSIVs). In the event that 3 or more MSIVs are affected, closure of MSIVs in Mode 1 would result in an immediate automatic scram. In this case, the need to "be in startup" to close the MSIVs is simply an operational design detail that is implicit in the requirement to close the MSIVs. In the event that 1 or 2 MSIVs are affected, they could be closed and operation could continue above Mode 2. Therefore the specific restriction to be in startup is eliminated. This relaxation is acceptable since the affected valves are assured of being placed in their isolated position; accomplishing the safety function of the inoperable instrumentation. FERMI UNIT 2 11 REVISION 12 08/02/99lh
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION L.8 CTS Table 3.3.2 1 and footnote ** for Function 1.e. MSIV isolation on condenser high pressure, d lows bypassing "during reactor 1 shutdown or for reactor startup when condenser pressure is above the trip setpoint." CTS Table 4.3.2.11 and footnote ** f.or the same Function allows bypassing "under administrative control." ITS Table 3.3.6.11 Note (a) for Function 1.d resolves this ) inconsistency by including provisions of both CTS Notes and removing the restriction "when condenser pressure is above the trip setpoint." .The ITS Note will allow bypassing the Function
" Nring recctor shutdown and for reactor startup" (from CTS Table L.3.2-1. footnote) ~under administrative control" (from CTS Table pc 4.3.2.1-1 footnote). The result: replacing "when condenser Z pressure is above the trip setpoint" with an explicit reference to administrative controls. Operationally, the bypass must be in Q effect above the trip setpoint (to initially open MSIVs in order i to establish condenser vacuum), and must remain in effect until I sometime after vacuum is below the trip setpoint (and is assured of remaining cleared, since the manual bypass can not be made exactly at the trip setpoint transition). The change will allow reasonable efforts to minimize the time the bypass is in effect, while allowing sufficient flexibility to conduct the startup or shutdown evolution without jeopardizing an unplanned trip, and without requiring routine entry into the Actions. Since this is the intent of the existing allowance, there is no significant impact on safety with this change. !
L.9 CTS Table 3.3.21. Action 26. requires that if manual initiation function is lost, restore the manual initiation function to Operable status within 8 hours or close the affected system ) isolation valves within the next hour. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Action G. requires that the affected penetration be isolated within 24 hours. The time allowed to isolate the associated b ) penetration if the manual initiation function is inoperable has J., : been extended from 9 hours (8 hours to restore the channel and I hour to isolate the penetration) to 24 hours. The 24 hour g Completion Time is considered adequate since the manual initiation function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. ' This change is consistent with NUREG 1433. RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS None. FERMI UNIT 2 12 REVISION 12. 08/02/99l
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES The CTS Bases for this Specification have been replaced by Bases that reflect j
.the format and applicable content of-ITS 3.3.6.1 consistent with the BWR STS.
NUREG-1433, Rev. 1.
)
i
)
l FERMI UNIT 2 13 REVISION 12. 08/02/99ll / e
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)
,, CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.) Enter the Condition associated Completion referenced in linnediatelyhcfion b, c )
Time of Condition A Table 3.3.6.1-1 for or B not met. the channel. D. As required by D.1 Isolate associated 12 hours Required Action C.1 main steam line and referenced in 78t 7 3 7-1 3 (MSL). Table 3.3.6.1-1. ggD QB D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours y E. As required by E.1 Be in MODE 2. l Required Action C.1 6 hours Ta t 3. $.? -1, and referenced in M.SE f Table 3.3.6.1-1. F. As required by F.1 Isolate the aff'ected I hour 78L 3 7'2 Required Action C.1 penetration flow and referenced in path (s). Ac km 23 Table 3.3.6.1-1. f G. As required by G.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours Required Action C.1 penetration flow and referenced in path (s).. 7 Table 3.3.6.1-1. g (continued) BWR/4 STS 3.3-53 Rev 1, 04/07/95
-r
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 A -
*CTIONS (continued) 1 !- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by M.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours 7G L 3 3.7 -lj Required Action C.1 and referenced in AND 44 y Table 3.3.6.1-1.
H.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours I E Required Action and associated Completion ) Time for Condition F ' , l or G not met. I. As required by I.1 Declare associated I hour Required Action C.1 T BL 3 3.?,,-a' standb liquid and referenced in Table,3.3.6.1-1. contro subsystem MmO j ($LC) inoperable. E 1 hour I.2 Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup System. 9 /) i J. As required by J.1 Initiate action to Required Action C.1 restore channel to Imediately Doc L,O and referenced in / OPERABLE status. Table 3.3.6.1-1. , E-4.2 Initiate action to Immediately isolate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling I System.
'be BWR/4 STS 3.3-54 Rev 1, 04/07/95 REv (1-
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ) l N SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I
) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J NOTES --
1. Refer to Table Containment 3.3.6.1-1 Isolation to determine which SRs apply for each Primary9 / '3 2'I(/ Function. \- l
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of l required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required L 3,3. 2.1, Actions may be delayed for up t ~~ l.;z p--"id^d th: :::rr'st:d inn:tt: dks mainLia- f echtie,. e.,d"4% M56kr 3 3,(,.I-l ) 4+ih)
At w ' SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. (92gdays S {92(days l MR3.3.6.1.3 %" '".,.Qe'-i the trip uniW. -> '
/ T I
(" \ /SR 3.3 6.1.4 Perform NEL CALIBRATION. 92 days f.I _ 3.3.6.1.5 Pe orm CHANNEL FUNCTIONA EST. [18 days SR 3.3.6.1. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. (18{ months SR 3.3.6.1. Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. [18[ months N fron inued)
.fA 7,3.G.(, G Parh O(AMMa, FvMcTled AL TE57- t g,m-&S I
~
va BWR/4 STS 3.3-55 Rev 1, 04/07/95 s.
1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 n SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) p
' ) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1 g _
6 SR 3.3.6.15 NOTE J pdiation detectors may be excluded. h'3'1'h
& -> 1 Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME T1Umonthson is within limits. a STAGGERED TEST BASIS Revi 's Note: is SR is ap ied ,
f on1 o Function of Table 3. 6.1-1 l wi required ponse time et \ ' I sponding o DG start me. p ,/ 2. Ckud seassreseme Ames o<z def ' { ped h be. Atlasured. r% i BWR/4 STS 3.3-56 Rev I, 04/07/95
1 l I Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 (crs) 3 0,\ Tenie 3.3.6.i i c,e.e 1 ev 6> Prisery Contalruent toototten Instrimentation Tat. s.3.1-1 {; g { 3,g ,p g 9 3 2..i-1 APPLICABLE COWIT10Ns \ pg3gg IaBES Ca aft!!aED REFERENCED \ ^ OTIER CRANNELs FacM sPECIFIED pea TalP afsulaED suave!LLANCE ALLom8LE RAICTION CONDIT!0Ns SYSTEM ACTION C.1 aEOUIREMENTs VALUE
- 1. tieln steam Line leeletten gg
- e. Reacter veneel Water 1,2,3 D sa 3.3.6.1.1 t Level Lew Lew Low, sa 3.3.6.1.2 inches Lowl 1 gsa 3.3.6.1.3 '
!*O'3 sa 3.3.6.1 4 sa 3.3.6.1 7 - r sa 3.3.6.1 g }lpiel
- b. tietn steen Line i g E_ Asa 3.3.6.1.1M t pois .
(i, c.15 cas. W a11:i?@ = l!+!t
~ ~ ~~~ ~
18 3 4 psief
.. IIeln stese Line 1,2,3 per D sa 3.3.6.1.1 s flaw- mish [MsL st 3.3.6.1.2 +eeed.eeeem.
/\ *I C'b\/
gaa 3.3.6.1.3 46eu sa 3.3.6.1. y i e. g_ _g1, sa3.3.6.1.75) q liyrg
- u.6.i.c !
.. -., g . 3 .6.1.,
w'r (IO D 2m,im Chu+ +" 3.3.6.1. sa i:lil:h 1,2,3 sa 3.3.6.1.1 s O4
- e. seeln stems Twviet D t
'*"'""-* z_e<< *ips w 4 li:ily it l sa 3.3.6.1 llW J
." !. .!. +. . !. .
Q I _ Lt;ni Rat.,ues
- f. Main s 1,2,3 I2L D sa 3.3.6.1.1 s
'a nish sa 3.3.6.1.2
/.c :. .L' :
F. (o w' pgg /I ed I N j ll i:l i Av.. i f 9 - : es x
- s. Turbine tulldine Area Toeperst m - Ni d 1,2,3 g D
,gg,, , ,
,Atsa 3.3.6.1.1 R s
. .2 g(,
F / g*
. u .6.1 9
- h. Meruel Inittetten 1,2,3 C sa 3.3.6.1. NA l e.n, l _. 'e m gth p,.in, t.to .y,4.t..p 2xat Iwken bypassed dung auhrshv%n or M J-
& fuckr sltnlq kader AdmowshethA Ccnbl a _
g 3.3-57 Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS Ub Red \
l l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 g.\ (. CTS > I Table 3.3.6.1 1 (pese 2 ef 4) # ' I' 3
- 1 ~ #
Primary Centelfmant leetetten lastrumentation i 311-2. )
.I
'/. 3. 2.. l-/
APPLICABLE Com!Tles N 1 i N MES OR REEllRED REFERENGD 4T1O Al orma Cmamats ram - SPECIFIS PM TRIP REeUIESD mavt!LLANCE ALLatii48LE PIRICTION COM ITleuE BYSTWI ACT!au C.1 REEUIAWENTS WAL&E
- 2. Pelaery Centelneont i.ieti.n
- s. teacter Wessel Water
,, ,9 Lovet -Lew, Levet 3 1,2,3 g s et 3J.6.1.1 at 3.3.6.1.2 a nahes l /l,q,, l w e 3.3.6.1.3( \
[/hss M- (6. os 2) = i:!il:
- =- y
[ 3.3.G.I-1 Drymett Preneure-sigh I8 1,2,3 Ag a em 3.3.4.1.1 ' sa 3.3.6.1.2 pets l Men 3.3.6.1.# l*h a 3.3.6.1 ' SR 3J.6.1 , 1
- c. Drywatt 1,2,3 ti) 7 su 3.3.6.1.1 Redletion- NIsh SR 3.3.6.1.2 a umJ it/hr]
SR 3.3.6.1.6 sa 3J.4.1.7
- d. seacter tiding ,3 1 (23 sa 3.3.4.1.1 s eR/hr i
and tion- mish sa 3.3.6.1.2 a 3.3.4.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 , SR 3.3.6.1.8 [\ r' '
^~
l
- e. Refuellig Floor 1,2,3 EJiheust N SR 3.3.6. 1 s (20] r i
Radiatlan - kl m 3.3. .2 at 3. .1.6 SR 3 .6.1.7 st .3.6.1.8 1 In'tletten 1,2,3 lW L r s sa 3.3.6.1. MA
- 3. NIsh Pressure test et fien N#O EA# I e.
pfweb/ WPCI steen Line Fleu - Nish 1,2,3 d1L M F st 3.3.6.1.1 s w w ..... l/,4.\ SR 3.3.6.1.2 -
*'=__ /
p 3.3.6.1.3)< a 3.3.6.1 sa 3.3.6.1..p} g 4;q g I m : : 2.15scocel,an q q ggg (cont BWR/4 STS 3.3-58 Rev 1, 04/07/95 m.**
E' l. 1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 l l l INSERT 3.3.6.1 2 l Table 3.3.6.1 1 (INSERT) s Primary Containment Isolation Instr oentation
. APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER - CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE 1
- 2. Primary Containment Isolation ,
P n
- b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low. Level 2 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 a 103.8 inches lQ Q
i SR 3.3.6.1.3 l SR 3.3.6.1.4 i SR 3.3.6.1.5 ! 1 1' l l l FERMI UNIT 2 Page 3.3 58 (INSERT) REVISION 12. 08/02/99 1
1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Table 3.3.6.1 1 (page 3 of 6)
'M' *3 S.3 Primary Centainsunt Isoletten Instrtmentation 3 '3'1 ~1
/ y.3 7..I-)
APPLICABLE ComITituts NDDES et syrna REGUIRB Cunnusts REPshsNCsD peon FUNevo4 sPECIFIsD PsR TRIP estplasD suRWEILLANCg au maa - FUNCTION COWIficus sTsfat ACTION C.1 ateUIRDENTs VALUE 3.NPCI system leetetten (centlemand) b, aPCI steen sopty Line 1,2,3 P at 3.3.6.1.1 a pois Pressure- Lou j i \ l em 3.3.6.1.2 Msm 3.3.6.1 ( #D/ ; l 3R 3.3.6.1 ' es 3.3.6.1 l 6,6,&.S.
- c. NPCI Turbine Eshaust Dieshregs Pressure mish 1,2,3 Q F st 3.3.6.1.1 sa 3J.6.1.2 s pois
*g Met 3.3.6.1 sa 3.3.6.1 at 3.3.6.1.
g . Dryuelt Pressurs. Nish 1,2,3 1p F st 3.3.6.1.1 s poish0CM) at 3.3.6.1.2 i Maa 3J.6.1. h, st 3.3.6.1 - i OP4 gymp .? H+1.- fr; uPCI C :__ r _ _ _ _ _ n .; asan temperature-utsh 1,2,3 J1 5 'kN F sa 3.3.6.1.1 st 3.3.6.1.2 s 'F gj k' hsa 3.3.6.1. i* / SR 3.3.6.1. i j tut 3.3.4.1. (} S% wien Poel i 1,2,3 a (1) F R 3.3.6.i.1 / s pov3 " Aree Amblent 7espersture = N 3R 3.3.6.1.2 / tsa 3.3.6.1.32 sa 3.3,6.1.6 at 3.3.6.1.7
- s. s4sr len Poet Ares 1,2,3 [1] F st 3 .4.1.5 t tuA3 Temperature -Tlas Deley Reteye sa 3.3.6.1.6 telnutes) se 3.3.6.1.7 h.I h Sorpression Poet Area Differentist 1,2, [1] F st 3.3.6.1.1 5 (422'r Temperature - mish sa 3.3.6.1.2 Isa 3.3.6.1.31 at 3.3.6.1.6 3R 3.3.6.1.7
- 1. Emesency Area cooler 1,2,3 (1) F st 3.3.6.1.1 1emperoture a Mish (1693*F SR 3.3.6.1.2 tsa 3.3.6.1.3 sa 3.3.6.1.6 3.3.6.1.
N ,,,,, 9 p 4 memst inttletion 1,2,3 e e sa 3.3.6.1. mA g
' ' l
- (o !
(cantinued) i j BWR/4 STS 3.3-59 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ; l r i ~ .. ' g,,(,
l Primary containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Grs)
/\
i\ Table 3.3.6.11 (pose 5 of 6) I I Primary Centainment leetetten Instrumentetlen I'I'3 " 2 I tl,'1,t.1-I { AMLICABLE ED W ITIONS NCBES OR REGUIRS enament a WFERENCS page EWCDW) OnEn I WECIFIS PER TRIP REWAIRED M RVE!Lt.ANCE ALLChmBLE FLAICTION CDe lfleus 878738 ACTlas C.1 REGUIRSENTS WALLE j
~
- 6. RCIC System leetetten toontinuesO ac!C Bepaipeant teen 1,2,3 F W 3.3.6.1.1N a* J P'F J Temperature - Nigh sa 3.3.6.1.2 44 1
)lsa 3.3.6.1.33f ~ 3,c!
st 3.3.6.1 4
- st 3.3.6.1. p' J. actC Eesipeant team 1,2,3 111 F tat 3 3.6.1.11 5 11'F 4 ifferentlel SR 3.3.6.1.2 Tempereture - ulgh 3.3.6.1.33 at 3J.6.1.6 M 3.3.6.1.7 -
)
-pMaradet inittetten teervete
-(3e> .
p7 1,2, Kper G st 3.3.6.1.gNA
- 5. aeector Water clearse
.(RWCU) System Isoletten
- e. Differardiet 1,2,3 st 3.3.6.1.1 s F1ew = Nish gig F sum at 3.3.6.1.2 7, at 3.3.6.1 rb *
. ' ' ' l '.
z
- m. Ar.e i,2,3 . 3>- F = 3.3.6.1.1 s '
temperature - W1p' 1 per
"' _st 3.3.6.1.2, 2*D/
Te i.f.i:f~ .,
= 3.3.6.5 s
gA
- c. Ares ventitetten Si"eraattei 1,2,3 .536 F st 3.3.6.1.1 5 *F /g /{,c tosperature - ai.h g eoom a ! ! '.1 !.
._ . . . . . . . . . - V \
SR 3.3.6.1 A
** ? ?+1 NJ W,1
- d. SLC System Initletion 1,2 b) 2,d y gg l
- e. Reacter Wessel Water Level- Low Low, 1,2,3 g F st 3.3.6.1.1 a nches Level 2 at 3.3.6.1.2 MsR 3.3.6.1.
[,h st 3.3.6.1 / sa 3.3.6.1. e !.!.M .. /)1.Jd)
- f. menuet initiation 1,2,3 l 8h pers
.,,,,, ! p s sa 3.3.6.1.t_./ ma 1
\('~c 'R R &
(Gontinued) (b) SLC System initietlen only irgasts into one of the tee trip o'/stees. BWR/4 STS 3.3-61 Rev 1, 04/07/95 I s l
~
Rat i2. - l i l
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1
<cro 0,I Tente 3.3.6.1 1 cas.e 4 of 6>
*5 3' N rG I Primary Centeinment leetetten Instrumentation 3 3 .'Z.- 2.
) 4 3 2.l-I APPLICABLE CCWIT!gus Nepts OR erma REsplesD CunamLs RENRENCED Pam pgg WECIFIS Pet TRIP REEllasD MRVEILLANCE ALLEMABLA PUNCTION Case!Tiens sYsTWI ACTleu c.1 Reallagerfs VALW T
- 4. Shutemasi Coottnp systes testation gg
- e. Reacter stems Dess 1,2,3 J1 F sa 3.3.4.1.1 s pois Preneure - mish A at 3.3.4.1.2 g 3J.4.1. \
f
/'/
sa 3.3.4.1 y
= 3 a.6.i
- b. Reactor Wessel Water 3,4,5 (83 J st 3.3.6.1.1 s pn,.einches il/ g g t
Level-Lou, Level 3 sa 3.3.6.1.2 4 ll
)(slt 3J.6.1. <4 at 3.3.6.1 sa 3J.6.1 (c) Only one trip systes regired in NCDEs 6 and 5 h test shutemen Caettre systes intesetty esintained.
_ r (DOC (,])
- c. Muad in%how I.2.3 ip-* a ses. sci.co un u x ^
i{ T BWR/4 STS 3.3-62 Rev 1, 04/07/95 A Rd IL
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
~
B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation BASES RACKGROUND The primary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for ' those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to th'e environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA. The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of
' primary containment pnd reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB isolation. Most channels include electronic equipm)ent (e.g., trip snits) that compares measured input signals with pre-est611shed setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a primary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic. Functional diversity is provided by ]'- %
monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input parameters to the isolation logics are (a) reactor j vessel water level, (b) area ambient and differential rodia#m temperatures, (c) main steam line (MSL) flow r;.a. ..f., . PRE 550R6 :d? Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System initiation
-^ je? condenserh, (f) main steam line pressure,, (g) high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line flow, (h) drywell nfutin se pressure, (i) HPCI and RCIC steam line pressure, (j) HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure, (k) reactor water cleanup (RWCU) differential flow, and (1) reactor MNM steam dome pressure. Redundant sensor input signals from g g ,4 g
-- J eacn parameter areYprovided for initiation of isolation.
The on1w : u;":: 1. SLC System initiatio manual isolation of the W is provided. In addition. /[ Gq('v I i Primary containment isosano@n instrumentation has inpu FLov/ the trip logic of the isolation functions listed below. (continued) BWR/4-STS B 3.3-152 Rev 1, 04/07/95
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 _ BASES
- _m PC 1.d. condenser b__C55vtC-HIC,H APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,
_ _ (continued) 82- l LCO, and and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure APPLICABILITY of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and
) possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential g gg g radiationleakagepathfollowinganaccident.4 cfcv/TCB W/TN C25M7 Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four 7}/6 MSIll'S By 7H6 pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in t Plc55#E-H Aggy3/5 07 p/6 condenser. Four channels of Condenser "!_ __-- E unction are available and are required to be Orfe,ABLE to ensure tha ul055 of C,o##5 N.fff no single i ument failure can creclude th i MUUM EdW bggg* p/* function, n s wi s uac W &
www % passeykdouw orGe mc4e s4ar4vp l avthe Aminisin 've. ce% ( The Allowab e u is (nosen o preven damage to the D condenser due to pressurization, hereby ensuring its d integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) Op'(,to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be Q l
-% OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 t.:n all td bin: ;t@ alms-McVLOCECp (TS"O cr: :h;;d since the potential for condenser 'g j
- overpressurization is minimized. L% itches are provided to g __ -
+ manually bypass the channels when eM Tm are J od , V
^ '
SE W This Function isolatesust the-Qre valver-snyo ust cxAtAls jsockisojij l333.f./%k 1.e. % 1.o. Area and-of m=is T-ernure-Hich' Area and di#'a*=a+4=1 temperature is prov8Jed to detect a P4 leak in the RCPB and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. rThe 3sa1=+4aa arence eas 2 e y :201-i' ise:.h= m d If theses %%-leak is J1 owed to continue p,7' I without isolation, offsite dose limits may be re--hed, However, credit for these instruments is nat_taken in any - transient or accident analysis in theTFSAR, since bounding , analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs. g65tSTANCE \ f.% gpVE/tA rvA E. _ Area temperature signals are initiated from i ha h 6 pg7pc70,fd @*7Dh)( located in the area being monitored. Sixteen channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature-High Function and & channels
\
of Turbine Building Area Temperature-Hig\ Function are
--available ed are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no
< -Y
/ $6TET' ~'sTngle tristrument failure can preclude the isolation 83,3,(p./,(g8 function. C;;h Nn:t h; h:: :n: t::p;r:t=; k :nt.
(continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-160 Rev 1, 04/07/95 4
Pri ary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Insert B 3.3.6.1 6 A necessary for conducting startup and shutdown operations while condenser pressure is above the trip se'tpoint. This b . also allows limited period of time to unbypass the channels l when the bypass is no longer needed and condenser pressure is-below the trip setpoint. This function is provided primarily as a backup to the closure of the turbine stop valves on Condenser Pressure - ; High. It is provided because.of the potential consequence of exceeding off-site doses, and because the turbine stop valves and associated control system does not meet Protection System standards. Insert B 3.3.6.1-6 B Each of these Functions consist of two trip strings per trip % system (for a total of 4 trip strings). For the Main Steam 1 Tunnel Temperature - High Function, each trip string has ( inputs from four channels. Two channels per trip string of each Function ... rN FERMI UNIT 2 Page B 3.3 160 (Insert) REVISION 12. 08/02/99l
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e. % 1.o. Areafantf Dif#rentMOTemoerature-Hiah
- ~
SAFETY ANALYSES, continued) LC0, and m-fe m- e APPLICA81LITY reocouples provide input to the Differe Temperatu Function. The output of thersocouples is determine erential
,M i temperature. Each channe s of a differential
/ temperature instrume race v ts from (5 thermocouples re located in the inle tiet of the ar ng system for 1 total of_four avalla ,2
( ~ s.p - - '- = -- The ambient of f t";. .;.ti;', temperature monitoring M~ 7 R2DWA70(- 1 Allowable Value is chosen to detect a -1 ' _,_. ._'_..". tf p d#.CA/ 81 5 ^ r- !" :-f !"' ited -t - :x. n) Sip 6 "JH 6 These Functions isolate the valves. . EL
, MSL A@ ML DAAWS D 1 3. Manual Initiation 1.501.AffoN i Ih5 GILT l 3 3.3.[,. I ._ ~/ - The.
u Manual Initiat.io,n push-4mt+en
. u. uci 4..i. __,->m channels '-tr:fre ri---h--
. _ _. m A i . . . u.7 p
EE'-iN[-~+55EIM-5+EaM4M"""de isolation capability. There is no specif' AariuAl safety s' analysis that takes credit for this Funct: It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.
' Mre ;.r; t . ;;;h L tL;.e Tvi um iuvi m wdt'.:ti;.. ruh Liuc. ;;r tri; y:t :,,y..; There;;r.;;l is no n Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are N mechanically actuated bas 4 solely on the position of the rhid'"" @(#ce7rn)/ .
gg (of Manual Initiation Function Crut.-suorchannel)d
.*serrequire to be OPERABLE inavailable MODES and 1, 2, and 3, si these are the MODES in which the MSL isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.
(continued)
-BWR/4 STS - B 3.3-161 Rev 1, 04/07/95 s
l l l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 8ASES O APPLICABLE hr . 2.e. Reactor Buildina and Refuelina Floor Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, RaNtion-Hiali (continued) LCO, and APPLICABILITY initia solation of primary containment ing a fuel u ha a dont . 2). I e Exhaust R fon-Hi Inalsar nitiated from f radiation ector h locate n the ventilation { exhaust ping comin the r tor building and the l 5 refue floor z , pec ely. The 5 al from each ) f det or is in o an in dual moni " whose trip T o puts are gned to
, tl I
) of Reactor 11 ding ust-H1 i 'atio annel. Four channels ction and f channels l
of Refu ng Floor aust-Hi i ction ar allable and i t are r ired to PERABL ensur ha" o single T inst nt fai can clude the is ; ion function. I e Valu are chosen promptly ec - ross h{failur TheofAllthe f" cladding.
. T^ functionsisolate e Group 6, I nd 12 valv 2 Manual Initiation i
The Manual Initiation Ex ' --- E channels intr d = r t-Ms kh5!I i .55b$5$tIb --i t k rovide manual isolation capability. There is no specific R safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. t is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of th'e isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.
- m. a _ _ - _ .. a c...... e. . + u u., o .......a &
+-iti s '- y J G J ;; p + g ry, W 'There Is'no d Allowable Value for this function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the t y_. . k L.+ +""*-'
Q W #1ve Crri+rjo r val & channelgoftheManualInitiationfunction evailable
.nd ari required to be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the Primary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.
(continued) I BWR/4 STS B 3.3-164 Rev I, 04/07/95 Re4 IL
l l l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 i BASES O l APPLICABLE So../4.f. Suno\ession/ ool Area \Temnerature-Time \M P SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued LCO, and APPLICABILITY T llowable Val are based on ma mizing the vai bility of he CI and RCIC s ms. That i , t y provi suffi ont ti
/ RCICleakag sou es in the uppressi n pool ar olated.
to isolat all ther pote tal ea be re HPC nc i p.I These F nctions isolate th roup 3 and 4 v ves, maarnariate.3 s
- 3. 4. anual Initiation The Manual Initiation mysHmtten channels 1.t-^d"r- '40 ail s
.inta m uort =ad arte ey + :' i;;' J ;..,:1,;u i,,, , . , ,
. rad"adr ' t; O.; eJ J h n v6.s i o ; .. . . 4. . .J J . ... ., d ovide manual isolation capability. There is no specific safety analysis that takes credit for these Functions.
hey are retained for overall redundancy and diversity of , l the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis. h__iU,,;N'
""_ [ . 2N.in.'L_ i",'
.ZN "[Y'f[ f[7' N5((_:d There is no Allowable Value for these Functions, since the eg channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the I
j position of the push buttons. l Crta chann.1A'of bcth u.a:I re at:: Manual Initiation ye M Functionhece available and:str required to be OPERABLE in (s MODE 3 1,'2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the HPCI ar.d RCIC systems' Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE. Reactor Water Cleanun System Isolation 5.a. Differential Flow-Hioh The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU System. This will detect leaks in the RWCU System when area or differential temperature would not provide detection (i.e., a cold leg break). Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsite dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation of the (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-169 Rev 1, 04/07/95 Q
l l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation l B 3.3.6.1 i BASES APPLICABLE 5.a. Differential Flow-Hioh (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, j LCO, and RWCU System is initiated when high differential flow is i APPLICABILITY sensed to prevent exceeding offsite doses. A time delay is provided to prevent spurious trips during most RWCU operational transients. This Function is not assumed in any (A FSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses areaerformed for__large breaks such as MSLBs p, s PwnPfrom M @ ytpcuum syh cushee_ flow signals are initrated h;,;. J1irerenuar transmitters that are connected to the ..!;t 'cr- "e
. er r "- and e .ht: ito condenser and feedwater)-ef-m::t.m..."e.:.:e!) -
The outputs of the transmitters are compared (in a common summer) and the resulting output 'is sent to two high flow trip units. If the difference between lAloptAA Alury of ##6 ,I the inlet and outlet flow is too large, each trip unit goa-etpwDANT CIMAY generates T';. an isolation signal. T ; d r .;h ;f O'ff;;;.th1 c4v5g3 n/6 c//A#MELS /Al 07 "."".:lt:m . T:=tf r 1r: ::'? 2h - . ' :. . : y:- J t; k rrntSt : c'r;': 'r tmt f; .. .- aorp zetf8 sy17sMS 7o #E i :tr:- c' n - -- e- - - 7 :' i th S;ht',;;. IdofgfAbl4. fyg /EAM/HDf.d u fr:tf =. ' OP 77/E CLCillT s$ LEDVHDAW7~ AND CAAl 86C#5/Dff6# Ad The Differential Flow-High Allowable Value ensures that a A grg 74/p Sy.strM dASIS. break of the RWCU piping is dutected. r% This Function isolates the .. , ; valves, k
' L RWCl4 IsotM10
; 5.b. 5.e. Area and Area Ventilation Differential
- s. / Temnerature-Hiah ,
RWCU area and area ventilation differential temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the RWCU System. The isolation occurs even when very small leaks have occurred and is diverse to the high differential flow instrumentation for the hot portions of the RWCU System. If the small leak continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. Credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the SAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks. g-peq ar]~are initiated from temperature elementArea and area ventilation differen that are located in theTroom that is being monitored. thermocouples provide in ut to the Area Temperature-High etion (two per area), }' d channels are required to be OP BLE to ensure that no 4 Nf34 (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-170 Rev I, 04/07/95 s...._.. hI
Primary containment Isolation Instrumer.tation B 3.3.6.1 BASES O APPLICABLE 5.b. 5.c. Area and Area Ventilation Differential SAFETY ANALYSES, Temoerature-Hioh (continued) LCO, and APPLICABILITY single instrument failure can preclude the isolation i function. i ElMT ' ' __ .. thermocouples provide input to the Area Ventilation i Differential Temperature-High Function. The output of ! these thennocouples is used to determine the differential temperaturei Each channel consists of a differential IN IOM U D N W M'MIF temperature instrument that receives inputs from
' Oft,1{ F/Fidfg MD thgrmocouples that are located in the inlet and outlet of Equ// MENT h=- ~ A the%eam cooling system and for a total of Wavailable
- enannels (two perAezes).jh 9 --1+
tr - re e tMt _ rih- 4--'- i --e *e' W
- " --d
- - te
- - t)-
^
v -
-q
/ b M E
- 5rt.f.r.:
run a.. ...nt e= f=t!M P.1 The Area and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak
. equivalent to 25 gpa:
These Functions isolate the .. - . ._..... RWCf/ / sol 47uA/ 5.d. SLC system Initiation The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC O System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of t] the boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 4). SLC System initiation signals are initiated from the two SLC pump start signals. There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the SLC System initiation switch. Two channels (one from each pump) of the SLC System ; Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LCO 3.1.7). 1 As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), this function is only required to close one of the RWCU isolation valves since the signals only provide input into one of the two trip systems. j (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-171 Rev 1, 04/07/95 J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.e. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low tow. Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool APPLICABILITY the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease (continued) too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to isolate-the potential sources of a break. The isolation of the RWCU System on level 2 supports actions to ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed in the FSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break s bounded by breaks of larger systems (recirculatio MSL breaks are more limiting). LA Reactor Vessel Water -Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable. leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. G The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable V Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level-tow Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. RWCt4 ISol.AfroAJ
$ his Function isolates the h valves.
l 5.f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation C ia+e th "!C" ';,it i.wi.ti;; m a channels istivduu .ive*4s 1;;;i; the; e. . rek; int t: e -' -- k ; cir N- m- _.==:.- rovide manual isolation capability. There is no specifi AR safety analysis that takes credit for this functi It.is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis. Thr; g s=_r"" %++ m f:- tM h;;6 v1.c =ani 4* H4ct!?- ^":h htten p re-i ,,, ,,,... . There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-172 Rev 1. 04/07/95 .J
i Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.f. Manual Initiation (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the APPLICABILITY ,n^^- W e % froJ - = PN r w (ve , 3 SN.,-Two channelgof the Manual Initiation Function 'aFa1 Table
, and ees required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since I these are t,he MODES in which the RWCU System Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.
I Shutdown Coolina System Isolation ' 6.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Hiah The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Function is provided to isolate the shutdown cooling portion of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accidentortransientanalysisinthe( The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High signals are initiated from two transmitters that are connected to different taps on the RPV. Two channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can ( preclude the isolation function. The Function is only 15 nc ; #n. required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these
# ad14l are the only MODES in whichis.needed.
the reactorThe canAllowable be pressurized;
' g r C6 ' thus, equipment protection Value p
S M if gftthe, 5 was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization, j' is Function isolates the .c;_; :: d ;; p @N- l l p,1 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel eay be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR Shutdown ' Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-173 Rev 1, 04/07/95 gar RevIb
l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 l BASES APPLICABLE 6.b. Reactor vessel Water tevel-tow. Level 3 (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCD, and is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL. APPLICABILITY The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports' actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or . inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling ! System. ' l Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are l initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg and the pressure duo to the actual water level (variable) leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (c) l
- to Table 3.3.6.1-1), only two channels of the Reactor Vessel I Water Level-Low, Lev'el 3 Function are. required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 (and must input into the same trip system), provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity l
is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that G has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system. L. ) The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water < Level-Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the ' capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES I and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventoryv' ia this flow path,
'g w- -
This function isolates the W :: C g y s w. 2 . u .rcom coouA isunoa HJsesT VALV5S, AS AfMoMIA%. i 6 3 3.G.I - I 2._ i
> pg _ -
s 1 (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-174 Rev 1, 04/07/95 j
I { l Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation I B 3.3.6.1 l
)
Insert B 3.3.6.1-12 6.c. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that 7 takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall y redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as qc required by the NRC in the plant .icensing basis. There is no Allowable Value for this Function. since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. One channel of the Manual Initiation Function per valve is available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3 since these are the MODES in which the containment isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE. I i l l l l FERMI UNIT 2 Page B 3.3 174 (Insert) REVISION 12. 08/02/99l I
~
1 1 1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 8 3.3.6.1 j BASES ACTIONS L.1 (continued) Required Action 8.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are' taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant ' automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path (s). The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that bo'th { trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given ( Function on a valid signal. The other isolation functions are considered to be maintainin isolation capability when l sufficient channels are OPERA 8L or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the l two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 1.a. 1.b, 1.d, and 1.f. this would require both j trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function 1.c, this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 1.e and 1.g, each Function consists of , channels that monitor several locations within a given area 1 (e.g., different locations within the main steam tunnel area). Therefore, this would require both trip systems to C have one channel per location OPERABLE or in trip. Fo i Functions 2.a. 2.b, 25, eve, 3.b, 3.c, 4.b, 4.c, 5.e and 6.b, this would require one trip system to have two n channels, each OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions ihev 3.a. j F/ 3.d, 0. e , ^,.-T, '; . ,,~ 0.t., -3d , 4.a. 4.d,- 5 ,- i f,% ;, i N - A i, e.3, 5.a. 5.d and 6.a. this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 5.b and 5.c, each Function consists of channels that monitor several different locations. Therefore, this would require one channel per location to be OPERABLE or in ) trip (the channels are not required to be in the same ' p Edb system). The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Functions (Functions 1.h, 2.d. 3 7 med5.ff,sincetheyarenotassumedinanyac4.',f D cide or 1
.,g transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation FI capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed.
The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The I hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes (continued) BWR/4 STS i B 3.3-176 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i
./
Rev12-
[ Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation i B 3.3.6.I BASES ACTIONS L.1 (continued) The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging I plant systems. L.1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plarft operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path (s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels. For the RWCU Area and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High Functions, the affected penetration flow pathCs) may be considered isolated by isolating only that
, port on of the system. in the associated room monitored by the inoperable channel. That is, if the RWCU pump room A area channel is inoperable, the pump room A area can be isolated while allowing continued RWCU operation utilizing the B RWCU pump. For the RWCU Differential Flow-High Function, if the flow element / transmitter monitoring RWCU g..) flow to radwaste and condensate is the only portion of the
- channel inoperable, then the affected penetration flow path (s) may be considered isolated by isolating the RWCU return to radwaste and condensate.
Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path (s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration f1pw path (s) could result in a 7 N reactortaken. Actions scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required lk The I hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path (s). A If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed I3 in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations . (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-178 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l l j l RevIL i j
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation { B 3.3.6.1 l BASES ACTIONS M (continued) may continue if the affected penetration flow path (s) is isol ated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels. The 24 hour Completion Time is acceptable due to the fact. that these Functions (Manual Initiation) are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR. Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path (s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path (s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H 'aust be entered and its Required [ Actions taken. H.1 and H.2 / If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed
\Di in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F or G is not met and the associated Ce ,pletion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a [
M00E or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full i
#.) power conditions in an orderly manner and without v challenging plant systems.
I.1 and 1.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem (s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System. (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-179 Rev 1, 04/07/95
Primary Containment 1 solation Instrumentation 8 3.3.6.1
/ BASES !.]/
ACTIONS J.1 and J.2 h If the channel is not restored to OPERA 8LE status or placed in trip within the allowed completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However,' if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is imediately. initiated to restore the channel to OPERA 8LE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can beisolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restered to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling l System is isolated.
~ '
SURVEILLANCE ev - Certain Frequencies are i REQUIREMENTS topical reports. So use these Frequenci . must a uencies as _ y the staff SER for the topical repor . % As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1. C The Surve111ances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for ; performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated ' _ Conditions and Required Actions may be delayedJpf up [ Vhourwrovicayr the associerec Function maintains Yeaoaby ity.r Upon completion of the Surveillance, or i expiration of the4=haar allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERA 8LE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on
, the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the h average time required to perfom channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the-I L testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path (s) when necessary.
SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-180 Rev 1, 04/07/95 j
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter iridicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other , channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument { channels monitoring the same parameter should read ' approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of , something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO. 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 and SR 3.3.6.1. . A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required r r channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the
' 7357,A T intended function.y I Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the l
- assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. (.
y The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on th reliability analysis described in References and . The jf mok i'" -A-- Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1. .is based on engineering. jupgment and the reliabil g of the components @ M -r 7
.....,,w.... . .- . .... ,. l l 8Y van cawI (continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-181 Rev 1,'04/07/95 hb ' Rev(s
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES O~
-L...;;11;...;. ;;fx th: r-f!*
- r: th:t :;;!; drir.; . yl.r.;
;.t;g xd th: ;;teth! '- r r;!rnd inri; .t '. T U.c SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1. continued) !
REQUIREMENTS Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when perforned at the 18 month Frequency. i P' SR 3.3.6.1.('l < E This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. - Tr-- 4: ;:-#-- ' --!; :- 9 xx': dr: th: rt :f r;:--- +4 : d- : :t nrrn; nd t; th: f.l -dir:! ; r rit-- (90 + -+ t4 :. r-- 9 :-- xxxf ::
- rr;rf r!!h'- *': PC :* -+ + ' 0, n"* f rt =r;'. =i:t: i
.,, th; D ; ;;.;nd ;t..t tix ;-h... . . ...J ;., C, by.m.1 ft......! 7x;xx tin :i"irnnfO = x t: ;. . . . . ;.
_f ant. rn;xx af thxt : :; nt'!: 2x x......c.; t;;t. The p'y instrument response times must be added to the PCIV closure _
,, times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIM .f a + k,_
W g 4 3kW crNana g :Pclq r fio. , ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criter ae sfru , h b y A -- - included in Reference 7. This test may be performed in one d.c,h t s. Brass N6 , measurement, or in overlapping segments, with verification ) (-)s' [Juoted iaba.8. ' that all components are tested. C __ - A Note to the Surveillance states that the radiation detectors may be excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty of generating an appropriate detector input signal and because the principles of detector operation p,l p,3 ' virtually ensure an instantaneous response time. Response times for radiation detector channels shall be measured from
- ! detector output or the input of the first electronic ggf component in the channel.
g33f,,f,jp iSOLATIONSYSTEMRESPONSETIMEtestsareconductedonan i 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-183 Rev I, 04/07/95 s Revlb
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1433 ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION NON BRACKETED PLANT SPECIFIC CHANGES P.1 These changes are made to NUREG 1433 to reflect Fermi 2 current licensing basis: including design features, existing license ! requirements and connitments. Additional rewording, reformatting, and revised numbering is made to incorporate these changes consistent with Writer's Guide conventions. F,efer to CTS Discussion Of Changes to the related requirement for a detailed justification of changes made to the current licensing basis which are also reflected in the - p j ITS as presented. 1 , P.2 Bases changes are made to reflect plant specific design details, equipment terminology, and analyses. P.3 Bases changes are made to reflect changes made.to the Specification. Refer to the Specification, and associated JFD if applicable, for additional . detail . P.4 Change' made for editorial preference or clarity. l l l j i FERMI - UNIT 2 1 REVISION 12. 08/02/99l l
i 1 JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1433
. ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION l
P.5- The reference to the NRC Policy Statement has been replaced with a more appropriate reference to the Improved Technical Specification
" split" criteria found in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
P.6 NUREG 1433 Table 3.3.6.11 Footnote (a) provides an allowance for ! bypassing the MSIV isolation on low condenser vacuum provided all i TSVs are closed. This reflects the standard BWR t'urbine/ isolation circuitry that automatically removes the~ bypass when any TSV is not closed. The effect of the NUREG allowance is to allow bypassing the automatic trip whenever the circuitry allows it to be bypassed - even under high reactor pressure conditions with or without condenser vacuum established, and with or without any specific need to bypass the trip. k y The Fermi Unit 2 design does not employ a GE turbine typical of most BWRs. The turbine / isolation logic at Fermi is not dependent k on the position of the TSVs. Furthermore. applying the NUREG limitation on bypassing only when all TSVs are closed would result in significant impact on operation and testing of the turbine and TSVs during startup. In providing the Fermi-specific conversion of the CTS the administrative bypassing for this trip Function is explicitly limited to shutdown and startup operations under administrative controls. Furthermore, the Bases define the administrative control to be only those times when it is necessary for the startup or shutdown operation, and only until a brief time after the condenser vacuum is established. This is entirely consistent with the intent and provisions of the Fermi CTS and reflects certain conservatism beyond the NUREG allowance. O GENERIC CHANGES O C.1 TSTF 205: NRC approved change to NUREG 1433. 1 FERMI UNIT 2 2 REVISION 12, 08/02/99l
)
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE l (Soecification 3.3.6.1 "L.8" Labeled Comments / Discussions) Detroit Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification change identified as "Less Restrictive" in accordance with the criteria specified by Q 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration. v The bases for the determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92. The criteria and the conclusions of the evaluation are presented below.
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change allows bypassing the MSIV isolation on condenser high pressure Function when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed; eliminating the CTS limit % ion "when condenser pressure is above tha b so 3 trip setpoint." Since an MSIV isolation is an analyzed event, the CTS requirement to instantaneously bypass and unbypass this trip at the trip 1 { setpoint imposes a significant probability of an unintended MSIV g isolation. The proposed change will allow appropriate flexibility to f control the evolution of bypasr,ing and unbypassing this trip as required for plant startup and shutoown while imposing a sufficient level of b safety by requiring tha TSV to be closed. Therefore, the change will not increase the probability of an accident previously ew.luated. The consequences of an MSIV closure event are unaffected by this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not contribute to an increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
This proposed change will not involve any physical changes to plant systems, structures or components (SSC), or changes in normal plant operation. Therefore. this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any act.ident previously evaluated. FERMI - UNIT 2 15 REVISION 12 08/02/99 ll
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 -PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE (Soecification 3.3.6.1 "L.8" Labeled Comments / Discussions) i
- 3. Does this changr involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? q The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin
;of safety. Operationally, the bypass must be in effect prior to reaching the trip setpoint, and must remain in effect until sometime after the trip setpoint is assured of remaining cleared since the manual bypass can not be made exactly at the trip setpoint transition.
The change will allow reasonable efforts to minimize the time the bypass is in effect, while allowing sufficient flexibility to conduct the startup or shutdown evolution without jeopardizing an unplanned trip. and without requiring routine entry into the Actions, and while imposing' y a sufficient level of safety by requiring the TSV to be closed. Since this is the intent of the existing allowance, there is not a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
)
I l l I J j FERMI UNIT 2 16 REVISION 12 08/02/99 ll
. _ NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION 3
- TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE (Soecification 3.3.6.1 "L.9" I ahaled Comments / Discussions)
.' Detroit Edison has evaluated the-proposed Technical Specification change identified as "Less. Restrictive" in accordance with the criteria specified by 10 CFR 50.92 and_has determined that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
~
s 1 i
.The bases. for the determination that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92. The criteria and the conclusions of the 1
' evaluation are presented below. '
l
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of.an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change provides an additional period of time to restore the
-manual initiation function. The proposed change does not involve a )
j significant increase in the probability of an accident previously y evaluated because the allowed outage time for operation with inoperable n
' PCIV isolation instrumentation is not an initiator of an analyzed event.
The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the
-consequences of an accident previously evaluated because this change T
does not further degrade the capability of the instrumentation to perform its required function under these circumstances (only the out of service-time is affected by this change). Additionally the increased
' time allowed will not adversely affect the performance of any other credited equipment. As such, the consequences remain unchanged from those that would apply using the existing CTS requirements.
- 2. 'Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
This proposed change will not involve any physical changes to plant systems, structures._or components (SSC), or changes in normal plant operation. :Therefore, this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from'any accident previously evaluated, v FERMI -' UNIT 2. 17 REVISION 12 08/02/99l
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.1 - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION 3 TECHNICAL CWNGES LESS RESTRICTIVE (Soecificatvi 3.3.6.1 "L.9" Labeled Comments / Discussions)
- 3. Does this change involve a signif t . ant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change does not involve a significant redur+ica in a margin N' of safety because the expectation that other manual and automatic isolation capability would remain, and based on the low probability of an event that would require containment isolation. Additionally, the ; increased time allowed will not adversely affect the performance of any i credited equipment, since the manual isolation function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Therefore, this change will not involve a significant reduction is a margin of safety.
. . l )
l l 's FERMI UNIT 2 18 REVISION 12. 08/02/99l
' Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 n,
-BASES J-
-ACTIONS (continued) capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation.to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation). Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.
B.d Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic isolation capability for the associated penetration flow path (s) or a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the SGT System. A Function is considered to be maintaining secondary containment isolation
' capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two SCIVs in the associated penetration flow path and one SGT subsystem can be initiated on an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 1 and 2. with two two out of two logic trip systems, this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip.
For Function 3 with two one out of-two logic trip systems, this would require one trip system to have one channel DPERABLE or in trip. The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Function (Function 4), since it is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a hI total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The I hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. C.1.1. C.I.2. C.2.1. and C.2.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the ability to isolate the secondary containment and start the SGT System cannot be ensured. Therefore, further actions must be performed to ensure the ability to maintain the secondary containment il FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.2-8 Revision 12 08/02/99
DfSCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Specific" L.1 - CTS Table 3.3.21 and Table 4.3.2.11. Function 6.a. requires that the reactor vessel water level Function be Operable (in addition to other specified conditions) when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during Core Alterations. ITS Table 3.3.6.21 Function 1 eliminates.the handling fuel and Core Alteration Applicabilities for the reactor vessel water level Function (but retains the other. Applicabilities consistent with the CTS). The reactor vessel low level Function only actuates in
- the event of a vessel draindown event (i.e., an event initiated as a result of an operation with a potential for draining the reactor vessel). Reactor vessel water level Function is not assumed to actuate to provide secondary isolation for any event that is postulated to occur during core alterations or fuel handling (which is performed with the reactor cavity flooded). Therefore.
this is a less restrictivt change with no impact on safety. L2 CTS Table 3.3.21. Actions 24 and 27 for an inoperable secondary )
-containment isolation instrumentation, require Secondary Containment Integrity be established with standby gas treatment (SGT) operating. These Actions are applicable at times when the 1 Secondary Containment Integrity is already required by another !
Specification , therefore, it is not necessary to explicitly repeat ! the requirement to establish secondary Containment Integrity. However, consistent with the CTS requirements for Secondary Containment Integrity (which implicitly - via the definition of ; Secondary Containment Integrity . provide options for Operable , SCIVs or taking specified actions for inoperable SCIVs)2 the ITS ' 3.3.6.2 Required Actions C.1.1 and C.1.2 for inoperable secondary ; containment isolation instrumentation explicitly present the same CTS allowances for SCIVs (maintain them Operable or take specified actions ~ for inoperable SCIVs)*. This is an administrative presentation preference presented here for completeness, i
)
l Modes 1, 2, 3 and when handling irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.
' during CORE ALTERATIONS. or during operations with a potential for draining the reactor
^
vessel
' ITS LCO 3.6.4.1 (CTS 3/4 6.5.1) ,
2 CTS definition item 1.36.a. ! ITS LC0 3.6,4.1 (CTS 3/4 6.5.1)
. FERMI UNIT 2 6 REVISION 12. 08/02/99l l
E i DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION l l As for the CTS requirement to establish SGT operating. ITS Required Action C.2.1 presents this same requirement. however. l l provides an option (Required Action C.2.2) to declare the associated SGT subsystem inoperable. This alternate Action for I the loss of secondary containment isolation instrumentation is normally allowed by the CTS definition of Secondary Containment , l i l Integrity'. Since there are accepted safe actions for loss of a SGT subsystem function which still allow for the secondary containment to be considered Operable, allowing these same actions'- ' will continue to ensure continued safe operation when the impact on the secondary containment function iss .olely due to instrumentation that affects the automatic start of SGT System. Therefore. this less restrictive change will have a negligible ! impact on safety. RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS
- l None l
l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES The CTS Bases for this Specification have been replaced by Bases that reflect the format and applicable content of ITS 3.3.6.2 consistent with the BWR STS. l NUREG 1433. Rev. 1. l l l l l l 5 CTS Definition Item 1.36.c. where " compliance with 3.6.5.3" is interpreted to include complying with any required actions.
- Tae optional allowance to comply with the Specification for the SGT System (see footnote 5).
FERMI UNIT 2 7 REVISION 12 08/02/99l l I t L.
l LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3
] B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6.3 Low Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation BASES 1
BACKGROUND The LLS relief mode functions to mitigate containment loads caused by reopenings of an SRV by reducing the frequency of subsequent SRV actuations following the initial SRV opening. The steam discharge from the SRVs cause high frequency containment loads as well as thrust loads on the SRV discharge piping. The LLS allows time for the water leg , that forms in the SRV discharge piping following SRV closure (from discharge piping residual steam condensation) to clear. Eliminating the water leg reduces the loading from the subsequent SRV actuations to acceptable levels. In addition, since subsequent SRV actuations will all
' involve the LLS SRVs. the LLS logic acts to reduce the number of challenges to the SRVs (by eliminating isolation cycling of the SRVs during some transients) and serves to dampen reactor pressure surges. Reducing the number of SRV challenges acts to reduce the probability of a stuck open relief valve event.
Upon initiation, the LLS logic will assign preset opening and closing setpoints to two )reselected SRVs. These setpoints are selected such t1at the LLS SRVs will stay open longer: thus, releasing more steam (energy) to the I suppression pool, and hence more energy (and time) will be required for repressurization and subsequent SRV openings. The LLS logic increases the time between (or prevents) subsequent actuations to allow the high water leg created from the initial SRV opening to return to (or fall below) its normal water level: thus, reducing thrust loads from subsequent actuations to within their design limits. In addition, the LLS is designed to limit SRV subsequent actuations to one valve, so torus loads will also be reduced. The LLS instrumentation logic is arranged in two divisions with logic channels A and C in one division and logic channels B and D in the other division (Ref.1). Each LLS division controls one LLS valve. The LLS division will not actuate its associated LLS valve at its LLS setpoints until gl the arming portion of the associated LLS logic is satisfied. Arming occurs when any one of the 15 SRVs opens as indicated
! by a signal from its SRV tailpipe pressure switches (one for l l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.3 - 1 Revision 12 08/02/99
p l l ! LLS Instrumentation I B 3.3.6.3
) BASES BACKGROUND (continued) arming each division) coincident with a high reactor l
1 pressure signal. Each division receives Tailpipe Pressure Switch arming signals from tailpipe pressure switches on each of the 15 SRVs. Each LLS division receives the Reactor l Steam Dome Pressure High arming signal from one reactor l pressure transmitter and trip unit assigned to that I division. These arming signals (Tailpipe Pressure Switch and Reactor Steam Dome Pressure High) seal in until manually reset. After arming, opening of each LLS valve is by a two out-of two logic from two reactor pressure transmitters and two trip units set to trip at the required LLS opening I setpoint. The LLS valve recloses when reactor pressure has I decreased to the reclose setpoint of one of the two trip units used to open the valve (one out of-two reset logic). This logic arrangement prevents single instrument failures from precluding the LLS SRV function. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre established setpoints. When the set oint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates.
) I which t en outputs a LLS initiation signal to the initiation logic.
l APPLICABLE The LLS instrumentation and logic function ensures that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment loads remain within the primary containment design basis (Ref. 2). The LLS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LC0 The LCO requires OPERABILITY of sufficient LLS instrumentation channels to ensure successfully accomplishing the LLS function assuming any single instrumentation channel failure within the LLS logic. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of the LLS instrumentation i; dependent on the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation channel Function specified in Table 3.3.6.31. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their l I FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.3 -2 Revision 12 08/02/99
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES-ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.3 LLS INSTRUMENTATION- < ADMINIS1RATIVE
.A.1- In the conversion u.' We Fermi 2 current Technical Specifications (CTS) to the proposed plant specific Improved Technical Specifications (ITS). certain wording preferences or conventions ,
are adopted which do not result in technical changes (either I actual or interpretational). Editorial changes, reformatting. and revised numbering are adopted to make the ITS consistent with the Boiling Water Reactor (BlR) Standard Technical Specifications NUREG 1433. Rev. 1. A.2. ITS 3.3.6.3 SR Note is included as a clarification of the ITS presentation of SRs: .specifying that ITS Table 3.3.6.31 be referred to determine which SRs apply for each Function. As such, its inclusion is an administrative presentation preference. TECHNICAL CHANGES'- MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 CTS 3.4.2.2 requires Operability. Surveillances, and Action
- m. limitations for the LLS reactor pressure actuation
[ instrumentation. The " arming" instrumentation for the LLS Function (reactor pressure and SRV tail pipe pressure) is not addressed in the CTS requirements for the LLS Function. ITS Table 3.3.6.3 includes Function 1 and 3 for these " arming" Functions. These additional requirements include' Operability. ! Surveillance, and Action requirements. In the case of the SRV tail pipe arming Function, the ITS 3.3.6.3 Action B is provided, and'is based ori maintaining a high degree of reliability for the supporting function, while minimiMng the potential for.any unnecessary forced shutdown. Since opening any one of 15 SRVs will suffice to arm both LLS valves. the actions allow for ll G/ O ) continued operation with multiple inoperable tail pipe pressure channels. The Actions include requirements to ensure that within 24' hours: a) a minimum of one tail pipe pressure channel in each
' division associated with 1 of the 5 lowest set Operable SRVs (to 7 l assure arming in the event just the lowest set SRVs lift); and b) 4 k
at least 11 Operable SRVs have at least 1 Operable tail pipe - switch. Additionally, Required Action B.2 is provided to ensure a 4;- significant number (at least 11 cf 15) have both tail-pipe-pressure' switches Operable. including 4 of the 5 lowest set SRVs. on any reactor startup from Mode 4. s FERMI - UNIT 2; 1 REVISION 12. 08/02/99y L :.
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.3 LLS INSTRUMENTATION
.s I
TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE
" Generic" LA.1 CTS 3.4.2.2 details the LLS valves by their plant specific designator. These details are not presented in ITS 3.3.6.3: but are relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). Changes to the TRM are controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. This detail is not required in the ITS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since these details have no impact on plant operation, and LLS Operability remains required by the ITS.
LA.2 CTS 3.4.2.2 requires that LLS actuation setpoints be within Trip Setpoint values. However, Actions only apply if the allowable value is exceeded. ITS 3.3.6.3 requires only that instrumentation setpoints be within the allowable value. Trip setpcints reflect operational details while the allowable value reflects channel Operability. Requirements for trip setpoints are relocated to the TRM. which requires revisions be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. The trip setpoint is established based on a combination of instrument design factors. environmental factors, and the allowable value (which is what is conservatively derived from the value assumed in Q the safety analyses). Therefore, these details can be adequately defined and controlled in the TRM. This relocation continues to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety since the requirement for instrument channel Operability and the I allowable value setpoint continues to be required by the Technical Specifications. (I IECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE "Speci fic" None RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS None TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES The CTS Bases for this Specification have been replaced by Bases that reflect i ' the format and applicable content of ITS 3.3.6.3 consistent with the BWR STS. NUREG-1433. Rev. 1. i FERMI UNIT 2 2 REVISION 12 08/02/99l l
I l-LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 Insert B 3.3.6.3 5 The LLS relief mode functions to mitigate containment loads caused by reopenings of an SRV by reducing the frequency of subsequent SRV actuations following the initial SRV opening. The steam discharge from the SRVs cause high frequency containment loads as well as thrust loads on the SRV l discharge piping. The LLS allows time for the water leg that forms in the SRV discharge piping following SRV closure (from discharge piping residual steam condensation) to clear. Eliminating the water leg reduces the loading from the j subsequent SRV actuations to acceptable levels. In addition, since subsequent SRV actuations will all involve the LLS SRVs. the LLS logic acts to reduce the number of challenges to the SRVs (by eliminating isolation cycling of the SRVs during some transients) and serves to dampen reactor pressure surges. Reducing the number of SRV challenges acts to reduce the probability of a stuck open relief valve event. I Insert B 3.3.6.3 1 1 The LLS instrumentation logic is arranged in two divisions with logic channels A and C in one division and logic channels B and D in'the other division (Ref. 1). Each LLS division controls one LLS valve. The LLS division will not actuate its associated LLS valve at its LLS setpoints until the arming portion of the associated LLS logic is satisfied. l4 Arming occurs when any one of the 15 SRVs opens as indicated by a signal from its SRV tailpipe pressure switches (one for arming each division) coincident with a high reactor pressure h signal. Each division receives Tailpipe Pressure Switch arming signals from tailpipe pressure switches on each of the 15 SRVs. Each LLS division receives the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure High arming signal from one reactor pressure transmitter and trip unit assigned to that division. These arming signals (Tailpipe Pressure Switch and Reactor Steam Dome Pressure High) seal in until manually reset. l 1 FERMI UNIT 2 Page B 3.3 198 (Insert) REVISION 12, 08/02/99l E
f 1 l-CREF System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES
}
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.7.1.6 l The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the . OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LC0 3.7.3. " Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System." overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safdty function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an un)lanned transient if the i Surveillance were performed with tie reactor at power. l 0)erating experience has shown these components usually pass l t1e Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. { i REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Figure 9.4.2.
- 2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.1.
- 3. UFSAR. Section 6.4.1.
j 4. UFSAR. Chapter 15. 1 5. Safety Evaluation Re) ort for Fermi Unit 2 Amendment g No. 75 dated Septem>er 6. 1991. l l J [ FERMI' UNIT 2 B 3.3.7.1- 11 Revision 12 08/02/99
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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.7.1 CREF SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION { l M.2 CTS Table 3.3.7.1 1 Actions 70.a and 70.b do not require any alternative actions if the CREF System is not placed in the recirculation mode of operation as required. Additionally. CTS 3.3.7.1 Action c provides an exception to CTS 3.0.3. As such. if the CREF System can not be placed in recirculation mode, no further Action is necessary. ITS 3.3.7.1 Actions do not exclude h I the applicability of LCO 3.0.3: and Action D provides the action to declare the associated CREF subsystem inoperable (and thereby invoke the Actions of ITS 3.7.3), or place the CREF System in Q recirculation mode of operation as required. The apparent allowance of the CTS Actions for continued unrestricted operation with inoperable CREF instrumentation is replaced with appropriate v consideration of the degradation to the CREF System function g (i.e., declare it inoperable): therefore this change does not adversely impact on safety. l M.3 CTS Tables 3.3.7.11 and 4.3.7.1-1 provide the required Applicability for control center normal makeup air radiation ; monitors, which is not consistent with the Applicability of the i CREF System that it supports (refer also to discussion "L.1" for
.' additional changes). Specifically, in Mode 4 during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) ITS Table 3.3.7.11 requires Operability of the makeup air radiation monitors, while CTS 3.3.7.1 does not. Note that Mode 5 OPDRVs are covered in both CTS (it addresses all Mode 5 operations) and ITS:
therefore this change affects Mode 4 operation only. This added Applicability provides no negative impact on safety. M.4 CTS 4.7.2.1.e.2 lists the automatic initiation Functions for CREF System: however, no specific CTS Actions or Surveillances associated with the CREF initiation Function are stated for these Functions (note the following Functions are required for ECCS and/or secondary containment isolation in other CTS LCOs. but are not directly stated as also required for CREF initiation): 1) low reactor water level: 2) high drywell pressure: or 3) fuel pool ventilation exhaust radiation monitor. ITS Table 3.3.7.1 1 : includes these Functions along with appropriate Actions, and I Surveillances, and Surveillance testing allowances, consistent with the CTS Actions for other (radiation monitoring. ECCS and/or y secondary containment isolation) automatic initiation signals and - Surveillances presented in Fermi CTS and NUREG 1433. requirements do not adversely impact safety. These added k FERMI UNIT 2 3 REVISION 12 08/02/99l : I
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crep M System Instrumentation f 8 3.3.7.1 BASES , O , REFERENCES NEDC 1677P-A ' Technical ecification aproveme 'Y An ysis for WR Isolatio Actuation I trument (continued)f,b J y 1990. ton,") I k' 4
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INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 11 Volume 11:; CTS MARKUP COMPIL'ATIONT4 4 Remove Replace 3/4 3-10(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 13 3/4310(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 13 Rev 12 3/43-11(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 3 of 13 Rev 6 3/4 3-11 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 3 of 13 Rev 12 3/4312(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 4 of 13 Rev 6 3/4 3-12 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 4 of 13 Rev 12 3/4313(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 5 of 13 3/4 3-13 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U)pg 5 of 13 Rev 12 3/4 3-14 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 6 of 13 Rev 6 3/4314(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 6 of 13 Rev 12 ( 3/4 3-15 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 8 of 13 3/4 3-15 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 8 of 13 Rev 12 l 3/4 3-16 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 9 of 13 3/4 3-16 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 9 of 13 Rev 12 3/4 3-17 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 10 of 13 3/4 3-17 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 10 of 13 Rev 12 3/4 3-20 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 11 of 13 3/4 3-20(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 11 of 13 Rev 12 3/4 3-21 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 12 of 13 3/4 3-21 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 12 of 13 Rev 12 3/4 3-22 (3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 13 of 13 3/4 3-22(3.3.6.1 CTS M/U) pg 13 of 13 Rev 12 3/4 3-23 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U)pg i of 8 3/4 3-23(3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 1 of 8 Rev 12 3/4 3-24 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 8 3/4 3-24 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 8 Rev 12 3/4 3-25 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 3 of 8 3/4 3-25 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 3 of 8 Rev 12 3/4 3-26(3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 4 of 8 Rev 6 3/4 3-26(3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 4 of 8 Rev 12 3/4 3-27 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 5 of 8 Rev 6 3/4 3-27 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 5 of 8 Rev 12 3/4328(3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 6 of 8 Rev 6 3/4 3-28 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 6 of 8 Rev 12 3/4 3-30(3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 7 of 8 3/4 3-30 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 7 of 8 Rev 12 3/4 3-31 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U) pg 8 of 8 3/4 3-31 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U)pg 8 of 8 Rev 12 l 3/4332(3.3.4.1 CTS M/U) pg 1 of 4 Rev 6 3/4 3-32(3.3.4.1 CTS M/U) pg 1 of 4 Rev 12 3/4 3 37 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 5 3/4 3-37 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 5 Rev 12 3/4 3-38 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 3 of 5 Rev 6 3/4 3-38 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 3 of 5 Rev 12 3/4 3-39 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 4 of 5 3/4 3-39 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 4 of 5 Rev 12 3/4 3-40 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 5 of 5 3/4 3-40 (3.3.5.2 CTS M/U) pg 5 of 5 Rev 12 3/4 3-48(3.3.7.1 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 5 Rev 6 3/4 3-48(3.3.7.1 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 5 Rev 12 Rev 12 08/02/99
l l $PETIPicMtori 53.6. / (blso set Spu-ilscalis 3.3.t 2.) l INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , 1
-4rM.L.Each isolation actuation instrumentation channel shall be (A MOTE 1 demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1.
4, y g3,3,gf 4 J.2.2- LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS Fe :- ht-- .viv= iw -ve u f/of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months. 4-$+<5 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TINE of Misolation trip function
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Estsonsn SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas Su ACTION 4> SAcMeeliew314, A + .+-.+ . *= aparating within I hour. gg p ACTION 2 _..,the closed position the affected system isolation ""
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i n:;;. .t'.. . , 3 ACTION 26 - Restoretghmanual initiation function to OPERABLE status witnin(f) i 4CT10Al hours ce close the affected system isolation valves within the { M e m nou 5 ;r.d d:: h r; 07.. . lf;.;;d :,;;;; . ..;.. ;;k . , J
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c;;,( ACTION 27 - Mestore ;he manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within . , hours or establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the g;gg Stan Treatment System operating. y,.3,g TABLE NOTATIONS
- When handling irradiated fuel in the seconcary containment, during CORE
,,, ) ALTERATIONS or during operations with a potential for draining the w - . - reactor vessel. L TBL 3.%.)-), ** The high condenser pressure input _to the isolation actuation Nok. (a) instrumentation may be bypasse_dfeuying reactor sn oown orJ r reactos ktartun amiendondessMressure M above the setpoin M _
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@I a enannel H OPERARt E 4 f ? d a Motpat m 'a that enannel are OPERABLDy-W n.. . = f L* .' W .- - ,
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s~pectrucaT1 erd 7.Ls.I (ktsosu Q ui h h 3.5.s.l) INSTRUMENTATIDH 3' ) 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONOTTION FOR OPERATION
# -.3.14- The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation 3.351 channels shown in tne Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERA 8LE_ pun s[nurr vn sent w un yesues shown in Ene yrip betpoin column of T trip e setpo nu JAl APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.3-i.
gym: a. (Ace Aeiron bloTE \- With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less h . Amoy A conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column . 4 \ of Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel its tripsetpoint acJustaaf (p,t ,( ope 12A8is restored tony) to(conpitent OPERABLE status wif.vthe value.rTrip setoo< L -.-
- b. With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels Ac. Tion A inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1.
- c. With either ADS trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the e trip system to OPERABLE status within:
-' 1. 7 days, provided that the HPCI and RCIC systems are ---
ACT10N 6 F OPERA 8LE, otherwise, g '@
- 2. 72 hours, #
h00 MTloc 6 Y
@therw'se, be in &L spht HOT SHUTDOWN w thin the next k" hour ~sT and duce reactor fteam dome pressure o less than o /r equal jto 45 psig within thd followino 24 hou a SURVEfLLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 5R Nore 1 -4r3.3.1 - Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated (ps.u,1,q)0PERABLE by the performance CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations forof thethe CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHECK',and CONDITIONS CHANNEL at the FUNCTIONAL TEST frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1. -
g3,ygg 'y S2 LOGIC SYSTEMbe en-enanr.1sTshall FUNCTIONAL TESTS fand-simulated _-au.tomaki performed at least once per 18 months.*sperationSI-) Su The ECCS RESPONSE TIME of each ECCS trip function ** shall be p'q Sp dttuhn demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. 351 A,5
"* For the 1esel generator output breakers: completion or logic system -
functio 1 testing,fortheJ6ssofpowerfunction,to ositively verif hat the br sker reclosure permitsive relay (52XX) is re- ergized by the asso ated bus load shedd g logic contact closing rather than the XX be g re-energized by parallel path, may be d erred and must b completed later than durino e first plant outage af r September 29,1365. S'U. O ui k o b *ECCS actuation instrumentation response time need not be measured and may be ' F5'. I assumed to be the design instrumentation response time. ! FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 Amendment No. Jpp, J9),111 PAGE / OF 08 Rev o
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\ TABLE .:.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION STATEMENTS ON 30 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the OPERABLE Channels per Tri svet.m reautrement: g* M 95 M pfys h a ripoed g D0d g'b g g. *. g a. or one trip system- niace t at trip 3 e associated in t ECCS condition within(24 hourslor de(lare (basse , to ACTM G j t.3 ds
..'[A O A Y W k 44atsa.1 Nom gQ ,b. y'E*For bothiE
trip geclare the as ciated ECCS' _! i S.gga l L' * * . . . [ . , b # 4Nhd - ,k ACTION 31 - ' With the number of OPE BLEchannelslesshanrequiredbythe1 op Minimum OPERA 8LE Channels per Trip System reoutrement, declare REn br E23 F,1 associated ADS Trip System inoperable within 24 hours. - AC%oAJ 6 Ano neg A d. 4 1 ,7-With the number of OPERABLE channels less than reoutred the ACTION 32 - ginum0gRABLE_ ne}s per Trio System reautre fes _e A.1 Na A(-T C.1 _ , _ .* hours.(cW A w e. p W hog Q w Q ACTION 33 - Restore the manual initiation and/or manual inhibit function te 1 A.lO 1 i f.EA 40T- C ,2.,F.2. OPERABLE status within 24 hours or declare the associated ECCS I j or ADS Trip System ino ACTW G A60 reb. Ac.r 0,1 d F, (rable, , 1 ACTION 34 - With the number of OPE LE channels less than required by the l i Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System reoutrement, place at
- f. T D Abf D Ll 0,'2..'23 least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within
..) 24 hours, align the HPCI system to take suction from the
/)cT1ota (y suppression pool, or declare the HPCI system inoperable. 1 ACTION 35 M the number of OPERABLE channels:
- a. One less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the associated emercency diesel oenerator
{ d24 inoperable and take the ACTION reoutred oy Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate. f- f, ItDD DI b. Less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE reouirement, declare the associated diesel generator inoperable and J,'3, p, / j take the ACTION reoutred by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate. FERMI UNIT 2 3/4 3 26 Amenoment No. 33, 75. 83
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INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.4 ATW5 RECTRCU!ATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION tiMITING C6NDIT10N FOR OPERATION t,f,o J.TN,1-9-9-T"" The anticipated transient without scram recirculation pump trip (ATW
'I niloM a 3I4Y[
APPt1CARft1TYt OPERATIONAL CON 0! TION 1. A,ts M e---.[ ADO AcTious #407E )
- a. With an ATVS-RPT system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less - *3 ,
$c1%N A conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column ra" aof ad Table
+a J l ppg j ggy3.3.4-2.OPERA declare 8LE the channel inoperable until themoiustaa channelconsistent it a statuspy tn sne sy....... u .y ..g wit (the prio setnoiot value. 1 vins Hil ,
God RFQvds0 Acato9 A.'2. Matt T-With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than reautred by the gGOg 4 b. Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System reautrement for one or both place the inocerable enannel(s) in the trtpped condition
. tj l$
trip sy within . ide@ L.I g i With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by AM g c. the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip g g-I system and: ggy3
- 1. If the inoperable channels consist of one reactor vessel Water h level [] ,.
channel and one reactor vessel pressure channel, la . or, if li i inoperable channels in the tripped condition within p system 3:'. this action will initiate a pump trip, declare the c' inoperable,
- 2. If the inoperable channels include two reactor vessel water level channels or two reactor vessel pressure channels, declare the trip system inoperable. a jN i
} 'l ASYSr/
nocerable./festore the inoperable' trip system to l ./ I
- d. With one trio system 2
OPERABLE status within@/or be in at least STARTUP r within the next " kCTl09b 6 hours. .f;u.,aq ou yu.ke: ADO ACRow 8 rabl . restore at least one trip system to gg ge . .
- With both trip systems i
.,0PERABLE status within or ce in at least STARTUP within the next 6 g py 7 yyg 'A% Pomf OvmSMsu t Atj/IC.i0lf 8 1'P4.l.) 1.2.'. P Each ATWS RPT system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and gn.3. it . i , r. CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frecuencies shown in Table 4.3.4-1. .
sa33413 A.T
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LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL. TESTS 6 ' ' --" -----"- -- - - -- -' - N 3' M *I'N @. . 2 shall be performed at least once per la montns. g gg acdm an
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r 5fEctFne4nnrJ 3- 3. 5, 2., l 9
../ t.co 3.3.0L-TOLE!.!.5IiContinued)
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ETf0N STATEMENTS M.T46N With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the ' Minimum OP E Channels per Trip System reouirement: dj MCT10d 8.g-----.<gesFor C. a. one t ip systemYplace tne inoperapie cnannel(s) ' Q
--- -- --$nd/or snat trip 3ystem in the tripped condition -.
g N CITON 6 = , , yr declare Ine KLib 3ystem in0peraDie, in@bk*. Rea gg 8 t b. For both trip systems, declare the RCIC system inoperable. Ihw Q)
; T;e5 a - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than reoutred by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System recuirement, place at i
hjd n u least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours or ali n RCIC to take suction from the suppression pool ACT10M E a e declare t e RCIC system inoperable. (Apo Kra sicnog b.th A2. ACT:C" :: Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status I gg g within24hourfsr declare the RCIC system inocerable.
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INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 12 Volume 12: IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Remove Replace 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3 38 Rev 0 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-38 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-39 Rev 0 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-39 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-40 Rev 0 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-40 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-42 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-42 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-45 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-45 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-46 Rev 6 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-46 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-50 Rev 0 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-50 Rev 12 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-51 Rev 0 3.3.5.2 ITS pg 3.3-5i Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-53 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-53 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3 54 Rev 0 '3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-54 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-55 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-55 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-56 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-56 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-57 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-57 Rev 12 3.3.6.! ITS pg 3.3-58 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-58 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-59 Rev 6 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-59 Rev 12 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-60 Rev 0 3.3.6.1 ITS pg 3.3-60 Rev 12 l Rev 12 08/02/99
li ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1
) ACTIONS (continued) {
l 4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4l E. As required by E.1 Declare Automatic 1 hour from i Required Action A.1 Depressurization discovery of and referenced in System (ADS) valves loss of ADS Table 3.3.5.1 1. inoperable. initiation k) capability in j
- 4. both trip ,
g systems ,, L a ! Nl E.2 Place channel in % hours from trip. discovery of inoperable channel ~ ' concurrent with HPCI or reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inoperable
@ \
8 days (continued) l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 38 Revision 12. 08/02/99
I l , ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1
) ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l l F. As required by F.1 -----
NOTE - - - Required Action A.1 Only applicable for and referenced in Functions 4.c. 4.e. ! Table 3.3.5.1 1. 4. f. 4.g, 5.c. 5.e. l
?:f'. .?'!:........
Declare ADS valves I hour from 5 inoperable. discovery of loss of ADS' initiation capability in Q both trip systems g . l F.2 Restore channel to % hours from OPERABLE status. discovery of inoperable i channel concurrent with HPCI or RCIC inoperable 8 days l G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated Immediately l associated Completion supported feature (s) V Time of Condition B. inoperable. l C. D. E. or F not met. l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 39 Revision 12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1
] SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
.....................................N0TES-- -- - ----- --- --- - -
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS l Function.
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances. entry into associated Conditions and Required y Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for i Function 3.c: and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions other than 3.c and 5 3.f provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains q ECCS initiation capability. n.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days l SR 3.3.5.1.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days ; SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months b d SR 3.3.5.1.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months Els l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 40 Revision 12 08/02/99
l l ECCS Instrumentation
' J.5.1 1
1 Table 3.3.5.11 (page 1 of 6)
, Emergency Core Cooling System Instrimentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS NODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OROTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE .
FUNCTION ColeITIONS FLNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE l
- 1. Core Spray System
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3. 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 24.8 inches Level- Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a). 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 r SR 3.3.5.1.5 *
- b. Drywell 1.2.3 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 m SR 3.3.5.1.5 Ol c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 a 441 psig *
(Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3
- l
- SR '3.3.5.1.4 .
T ' SR 3.3.5.1.5 ' *, M 4(a). 5(a) 4 8 SR 3'.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 a 441 psig SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
)h1r5 d. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 (c) C .SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 4(a). 5(a) k 2. Low Pressure Coolant In#ction (LPCI) System
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a). 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)
(a) When associated subsystem (s) of LCO 3.5.2 are required to be OPERABLE. bI (b) Also required to initiate the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG). (c) Individual component controls. l l l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 41 Revision 12 08/02/99 t 1
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 iable 3.3.5.1 1 (page 2 of 6)
%rgency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CoeITIONS N00ES REQUIRED REFERENCED OROTER CHNelELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ~ ALLOWABLE FUNCTION C0eITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
- 2. .LPCI System (continued)
- b. Drywell' 1.2.3 4 8 SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 +
SR 3.3.5.1.4 '7 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- c. Reactor Steam Dome - 1.2.3 4 SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 441 psig Dl patwe - Low C
SR 3.3.5.1.2 (In,jection Permisshe) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 4(a). 5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 A41 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR .'3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 - SR 3.3.5.1.5 l d. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 103.8 Level-Low Low. Level SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches 2 (Loop Select Logic) 4(a). 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- e. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 886 psig Pressure - Low (Break SR 3.3.5.1.2 Detection Logic) 4(a). 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- f. Riser Differential 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 0.927 psid Pressure-High (Break SR 3.3.5.1.2 Detection) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 gl g. Recirculation Puip Differential 1.2.3 4 per puup B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.927 psid SR 3.3.5.1.2 Pressure - High (Break SR 3.3.5.1.3 Detection) SR 3.3.5.1.4 l SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)
(a) When associated subsystem (s) of LCO 3.5.2 are required to be OPERA.BLE, 1 l l 1 1 1 1 1 j j FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 42 Revision 12 L 08/02/99 l l l
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.11 (page 3 of 6)
. Emergency Core Cooling System Instrtmentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED StRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE
\ FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 F20VIREENTS VALUE
?. LPCI System (continued)
I g h. Nanual Initiation 1.2.3. (c) C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA Y 4(a)5(a) ,
- 3. High oressure Coolant Injection ( WCI) System
- a. Reastor Vessel Water 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 103.8 Level - Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches 3l Leve's 2 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 l SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- b. Drywell 1. 4 'B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR <3.3.5.1.2
# 1 l 2(d). 3(d)
- SR 3.3.5.1.3 -
SR 3.3.5.1.4 A SR~3.3.5.1.5 Q c. Reactor Vestel Water Level - High. Level 8
- 1. 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 219 inches 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 l SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 V d. Condensate Storay Tank Level - Low 1, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 0 inches 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.2 fl SR 3.3.5.1 3 i
SR 3.3.5.7.4 1 SR 3.3.5.4.5 i e. Suppression Pool Wate.' 1. 2 D SR 3.0.5.1.1 s 5.0 inches l Level - High Sp .s.3.5.1.2 l l Ir l 2Id)3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 l SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued) h J. (a) When the associated subsystem (s) are required to be OPERABLE. (c) Individual coniponent controls, p (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig..
- l. FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 43 Revision 12 08/02/99 L
l 1
F l l-l ! ECCS Instrumentation l 3.3.5.1
} Table 3.3.5.11 (page 4 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE ColOITIONS NODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OT)ER CHANNELS FRON I SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWAILE i FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUL l b
- FFCI System 3.
N (continued) l i e
- f. Manual Initiation 1. (c) C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA l 2(d). 3(d) '
- 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A Ig l a. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 24.8 Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches l Level 1 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
- l b. Drywell 1. 2 E SR .3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig .
Pressure - High " SR 3.3.5.1.2 *
- l 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 p SR 3.3.5.1.4
, SR 3.3.5.1.5
- c. Automatic 1, 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 117 seconds y@ll Depressurization System Initiation 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 Timer l d. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 171.9 Level-Law Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches l (Confirmatory) 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l e. Core Spray Ptrap 1, 1 per ptmp F SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 125 psig Discharge ~
SR 3.3.5.1.2 I l Pressure - High 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5
-lA (continued) 4 Tl (c) Individual corponent controls.
2 (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig. 4 l l f
- 1. /
l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 44 Revision 12. 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.11 (page 5 of 6)
/ Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS NODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
- 4. ADS Trip System A (continued) bl -
- f. Low Pressure Coolant In M ion Pu p
- 1. 2 per pop F SR 3.3.5.1.1 SR 3.3.5.1.2 a 115 psig
$l Discharge 2(d). 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 .
g Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l g. Drywell 1, 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 450 seconds Pressure-High Bypass SR 3.3.5.1.3 l 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l h. Manual Inhibit 1, 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.5 NA l g(d), 3(d) , h 1. Manual Initiation 1. I r F SR J.3.5.1.6 NA k 2(d),3(d)
- 5. ADS Trip System B
,l a. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 24.8 inches a Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2
'l Level 1 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 l
I i SR 3.3.5.1.5 I l b. Drywell 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 l 2(d)3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l c. Automatic 1. 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 117 seconds Depressurization SR 3.3.5.1.4 l System Initiation 2(d)3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.5 g Timer Il d. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low. Level 3
- 1. 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 171.9
' SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches (Confirmatory) 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l e. Core Spray Pwp 1. 1 per pwp F SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 125 psig Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2 Pressure - High 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 1( l SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued) m Ol (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.
V h J l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 45 Revision 12 08/02/99
1 l ECCS Instrumentation 1 3.3.5.1 l l Table 3.3.5.11 (page 6 of 6) Emergency Core Cooling System InstrLaentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION COWITIONS FlmCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
- 5. ADS Trip System B (continued) d'l f. Lew Pressure Coolant 1. 2 per ptmp F SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 115 psig Injection Ptap SR 3.3.5.1.2 W, Discharge 2Id)3Id) SR 3.3.5.1.3 Ml Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.4 4
8 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l g. Drywell 1. 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 456 setor.ds l Pressure-High Bypass SR 3.3.5.1.3 I l 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.d i SR 3.3.5.1.! ~ Nl h. Manual Inhibit 1. 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.5 NA bl e 2(d). 3(d)
- 1. Ma.1ual Initiation 1. I er F SR~ 3.3.5.1.6 NA 2(d),3(d)
E l (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig. L 1 l l 1 l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 46 Revision 12 08/02/99 i
- c l RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS
]. _
.....................................N0TES --- -- ---- - - - ---- -- --
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.21 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC .
Function.
- 2. -When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of -
required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Function 2: and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1 and 3 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC-initiation capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours
~~ -
l SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days l SR. 3.3.5.2.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days l SR 3.3.5.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months l SR 3.3.5.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months T SR 3.3.5.2.6 Perform CHANNEL SUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 50 Revision 12. 08/02/99
RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.21 (page 1 of 1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrimentation CONDITIONS REWIRED REFERENCED SLRVEILLANCE C M LS FRON REQUIRED REQUIREENTS ALLOWABLE FUNCTION O NIE ACTION A.1 .VALUE ,
- 1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 8 SR 3.3.5.2.1 a 103.8 inches Level- Low Low. Level 2 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4 SR 3.3.5.2.5 ",
- 2. Reactor Vessel Water 2 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 s 219 inches Level - High. Level 8 SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4 SR 3.3.5.2.5
- 3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.1 = 0 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.4 - *.
, SR 3.3.5.2.5 J
gj 4. Nanual Initiation 1 per valve C SR 3.3.5.2.6 NA I l l l l l l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 51 Revision 12. 08/02/99
i Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in ' Time of Condition A Table 3.3.6.1-1 for or B not met. the channel. D. As required by D.1 Isolate associated 12 hours - Recuired Action C.1 main steam line anc referenced in (MSL). Table 3.3.6.1-1. QB D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours ~ gg - . : D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours E. As required by E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. F. As required by F.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour Required Action C.1 penetration flow l and referenced in path (s), i Table 3.3.6.1 1. l G. As required by G.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours Required Action C.1 penetration flow 7- and referenced in path (s). Q Table 3.3.6.1 1. (continued) J l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 53 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 l l ,.} ACTIONS (continued) I COEITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
.l- H. As required by H.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours ;
i Required Action C.1 . I and referenced in 8 51 Table 3.3.6.1-1. . l H.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours ! ! -QB' l Required Action and '. associated Completion Time for Condition F l or G not met. l l
# D I I. As re uired by Requi ed Action C.1' I.1 Declare associated-standby liquid I hour and referenced in control subsystem '
. Table 3.3.6.1-1. (SLC) inoperable. l QB l I.2 Isolate the Reactor 1 hour l Water Cleanup System.
.l J. -As required by J.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action C.1 restore channel to ;
l and referenced in OPERABLE status.
- l. Table 3.3.6.1 1.
l DB U ' 1 J.2 Initiate action to Immediately isolate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling l System. I s l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3-54 Revision 12. 08/02/99 L
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1
] SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS
..................................- NOTES - --- - ----------------- ---
- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1 1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions, and Required Actions may be delayed for up to:
- a. 2 hours for Function 5.a when testing non redundant circuitry that results in loss of isolation capability associated with this N Function, provided Functions 5.b. 5.c, and 5.e are OPERABLE: '.
o l b. 6 hours for Functions 1, 2, 5 (other than non redundant circudry of 5.a), and 6, provided the associated Function maintains isolation y capability; and
- c. 8 hours for Functions 3 and 4, provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.
SURVEILLANCC FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.3 Verify the trip unit setpoint. 92 days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months P J. l SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months (continued) l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 55 Revision 12, 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Ql SR 3.3.6.1.7 --- -- -- - ----NOTES - --- ----- -
- 1. Radiation detectors may be excluded.
- 2. Channel sensor response times are not required to be measured.
Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 18 months on a '", is within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS . l l l l l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 56 Revision 12 08/02/99
g Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation L 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.11 (page 1 of 4) Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED' OTER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE
~
- 1. Main Steam Line Isolation
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 e 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 il SR 3.3.6.1.7
- b. Main Steam Line 1 2 E SR 3.3.6.1.1 m 736 psig l Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 p SR 3.3.6.1.4 g SR 3.3.6.1.5
- c. Main Steam Line 1.2.3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 118.4 psid l Flow - High MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 l SR 3.3.6.1.3 1
SR 3.3.6.1.4 l SR 3.3.6.1.5 1
,8l 3
SR 3.3.6.1.7
- d. Condenser 1, 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 7.05 psia Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2
~
2(a),3(a) SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 I
- e. Main Steam Tunnel 1.2.3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 206'F Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.2
(' trip string SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 I
- f. Main Steam Line 1.2.3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 3.6 x full Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 power SR 3.3.6.1.4 background
] SR 3.3.6.1.5
- g. Turbine Building Area 1.2.3 4 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 206*F q&l Tenper ature - H1gh SR 3.3.6.1.2 Y SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.I.5 l r-
.. h. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA
( valve l l (continued) gl-(a) Except when bypassed during rextor shutdown or for reactor startup under adninistrative control. I i ,
& l l
l l l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 57 Revision 12 08/02/99
e Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.11 (page 2 of 4)
/ Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE COICITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED 01)ER CHMNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED StRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION COICITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREIEhTS VALUE
- 2. Primary Containment
' Isolation
- a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 = 171.9 inches I-l Level- Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 .,
SR 3.3.6.1.4 s SR 3.3.6.1.5 bl b. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 103.8 inches i Level - Low. Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 l c. Dr.pell Pressure-High 1.2.3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig
~~
SR 3.3.6.1.2
- SR 3.3.6.1.3 , .
SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 i d. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 per valve G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA
- 3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (FFCI) System Isolation
- a. FPCI Steam Line 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 410 inches Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 m I second, and SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 5 seconds
- b. HPCI Steam Supply Line 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 = 90 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- c. HPCI Turbine 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure -H1gh SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- d. HPCI Equipment Room 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 162*F Tenperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 m SR 3.3.6.1.5 O' e. Drywell Pressure- High 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig
'> SR 3.3.6.1.2 W SR 3.3.6.1.3 T SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 (continued)
! FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 58 Revision 12 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.11 (page 3 of 4) Primary Containment Isolation Instrtsmentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEN ACTION C.1 REQUIRENENTS VALUE
- 3. ' High Pressure Coolant In.)ection ( WCI) System b -Isolation
[ (continued)
- f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 r G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA a e 4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation
- a. RCIC Steam Line 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 95.0 inches Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 of water with SR 3.3.6.1.3 time delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 a 1 second and SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 5 seconds
- b. RCIC Steam Supply 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 53 psig Line Pressure-Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- c. RCIC Turbine 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 20 psig Exhaust Diaphragn SR 3.3.6.1.2 Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 i l
- d. RCIC Equipment Room 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 162'F Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3
] SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 h Qg.
- e. Drywell Pressure - High 1.2.3' 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 b f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA J., valve
<E
- 5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation
- a. Differential 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 63.4 gpm Flow - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- b. Area 1.2.3 1 per Tenperature - High F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 183*F area SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 (continued)
{ FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3-59 Revision 12. 08/02/99
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation l 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1 1 (page 4 of 4) Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIRENENTS VALUE
- 5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation p (continued) i d c. Area Ventilation 1.2.3 1 per F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 53*F kl Differential room SR 3.3.6.1.2 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
.!. d. SLC System Initiation 1.2 2(b) I SR 3.3.6.1.5 NA 4l e. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 = 103.8 inches Level - Low Low. SR 3.3.6.1.2 Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5
- f. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve
- 6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation
- a. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 95.5 psig D Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.2 i SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 l b. Reactor Vessel Water 3.4.5 2(c) J SR 3.3.6.1.1 a 171.9 inches Level - Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 y c. Manual Initiation 1.2,3 1 per G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA valve (b) SLC System Initiation only 1 iputs into one of the two trip systems.
(c) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when R)R Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained. l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 60 Revision 12 08/02/99
I 1 INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 13 Volume 13: IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES f Remove Replace B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-3 Rev 0 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-3 Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-4 Rev 0 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-4 Rev 12 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-5 Rev 0 B 3.3.3.1 ITS pg B 3.3.3.1-5 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-1 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-1 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-2 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-2 Rev 12 l B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-3 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-3 Rev 12 l B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-4 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-4 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-5 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-5 Rev 12 i B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-6 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-6 Rev 12 l B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.17 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-7 Rev 12 1 1 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-8 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-8 Rev 12 l l B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-9 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-9 Rev 12 .o~ , ;. B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-10 Rev 0 b 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-10 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-11 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-11 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-12 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-12 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-13 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-13 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-14 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-14 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-15 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-15 Rev 12
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B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-20 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.I ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-20 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-21 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.12i Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-22 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-22 Rev i2 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-23 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.123 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-24 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-24 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS PF B 3.3.5.1-25 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-25 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-26 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-26 Rev 12
- B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 27 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-27 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-28 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-28 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.I ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-29 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.I ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-29 Rev i2 Rev 12 08/02/99 i
Volume 13: IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES (cont'd) - Remove Replace B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-30 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-30 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.131 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-31 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 32 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-32 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-33 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-33 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-5 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-5 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-6 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-6 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2 7 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-7 Rev 12 ) B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-8 Rev 0 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-8 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-9 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-9 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-10 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-10 Rev 12 ) i B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-11 Rev 6 B 3.3.5.2 ITS pg B 3.3.5.2-11 Rev 12 l B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 1 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 1 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-9 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.19 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-10 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-10 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 11 Rev 0 'B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-11 Rev l'2 # B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 12 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 12 Rev 12 l 1 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-13 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-13 Rev 12 l B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-14 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 14 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-15 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-15 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 16 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-16 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg E 3.3.6.1-17 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-17 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 18 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 18 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-19 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-19 Rev 12 B 3.16.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 20 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-23 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-21 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-21 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-22 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-22 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-23 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-23 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.124 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-24 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.125 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.125 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.I ITS pg B 3.3.6.1 26 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-26 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-27 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.127 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.128 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-28 Rev 12 B 3.3.6. I ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-29 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-29 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-30 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-30 Rev 12 Rev12 08/02/99
Volume 13: IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BAS _ES (cont'd) ~ Remove Replace B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-31 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.1 ITS pg B 3.3.6.1-32 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.2 ITS pg B 3.3.6.2-8 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.2 ITS pg B 3.3.6.2-8 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-1 Rev 0 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-1 Rev 12 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-2 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3 2 Rev 12 B 3.3.7.1 ITS pg B 3.3.7.1-11 Rev 6 B 3.3.7.1 ITS pg B 3.3.7.1 11 Rev 12 I l l l i l Rev 12 08/02/99
L PAM Instrumentation l B 3.3.3.1 L BASES' LC0_(continued) penetration either via indicated status of the active valve l and prior knowledge of passive valve or via system boundary l status. -If a normally active PCIV is known to be closed and deactivated, position indication is not needed to determine status. Therefore, the position indication for valves in this state is not required to be. OPERABLE. The following list is a discussion of the specified instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO. l l 1. Reactor-Vessel Pressure ' l Reactor vessel pressure is a Type A. Category I variable
- l. ' provided to support monitoring of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) integrity and to verify operation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Two independent pressure transmitters with a range of 0 psig to 1500 psig monitor pressure. . Wide range recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM l
Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.
- 2. 3. -Reactor Vessel Water Level - Fuel Zone: Reactor
-Vessel Wger Level - Wide Ranoe i 1
l L Reacter vessel water level is a Type A. Category I variable i provided to support monitoring of core cooling and to verify i operation of the ECCS. The ide range and fuel zone range l water level channels provide the PAM Reactor Vessel Water 1 Level Function. The wide range water level channels measure from 220 inches above the top of active fuel to a point 10 inches above the top of active fuel. The fuel zone range water level channels measure from 50 inches above the-top of : active fuel to the bottom of active fuel. The two measurement systems provide overlapping ranges to give the operator water level.information covering the area of interest during an accident. Wide range water level is i measured by two independent differential pressure transmitters. The output from these wide range channels is recorded on two independent recorders. Fuel zone range water level is measured by two independent differential pressure transmitters. The output from these fuel zone range channels is recorded on two independent recorders. Each of these recorders'also provides indication of uncompensated fuel zone range water level (indication of l i l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.3.1-3 Revision 12. 08/02/99
PAM Instrumentation i 8 3.3.3.1 ) l BASES LCO (continued) which is not required by this LCO for PAM OPERABILITY requirements) as well as com>ensated fuel zone range water level (i.e., the required A4 P indication). In addition to uncompensated and compensated water level indication, indication of reactor vessel pressure is provided on each recorder. This reactor pressure signal is ; used to derive the compensated fuel zone range water level indication, which provides a more accurate measurement during LOCA transients. This indication of reactor pressure is not required by this LCO for PAM OPERABILITY requirements, however, the signal input to the compensation circuit is required. , l
- 4. Sucoression Pool Water Level Suppression pool water level is a Type A. Category I variable provided to. detect a breach in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). This variable is also used to verify and provide long ters surveillance of ECCS function.
The wide range suppression pool water level measurement provides the operator with sufficient information to assess the status of both the RCPB and the water supply to the ECCS. The wide range water level indicators monitor the suppression pool water level from 144 inches below the normal water level to 56 inches above the normal water level . Two wide range suppression chamber water level signals are transmitted from separate differential pressure transmitters and are continuously recorded on two recorders in the control room. -These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.
- 5. Suooression Pool Water. Temoerature Suppression pool water temperature is a Type A. Category I variable provided to detect a condition that could potentially lead to containment breach and to verify the effectiveness of ECCS actions taken to prevent containment breach. The suppression pool water temperature instrumentation allows operators to detect trends in su)pression pool water temperature in sufficient time to tace action to prevent steam quenching dbrations in the suppression pool.
I FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.3.1- 4 Revision 12 08/02/99
l I i l PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3.1
]) BASES l
LCO (continued) Only two Category I thermocouple channels are needed for post accident monitoring of sup)ression pool water temperature (Refs. 3 and 4). T1e outputs for the PAM Aj sensors T50N404A and T50N405B are recorded on two l independent recorders in the control room (channel A is redundant to channel B). Both of these recorders must be OPERABLE to furnish two channels of PAM indication. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator r, ( during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals - specifically with this portion of the instrument channels. !
- 6. Drywell Pressure l Drywell pressure is a Type A. Category I variable provided .
l 1 to detect a breach of the RCPB and to verify ECCS functions that operate to maintain RCS integrity. Two wide range drywell pressure signals'are transmitted. from separate pressure transmitters and are continuously recorded and displayed on two control room recorders. These recorders ; are the primary indication used by the operator during an ; accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals ' specifically with this portion of the instrument channel. i Q 7. 8. Primary Containment Hydrocen and Oxvoen Concentration , t ,1 Primary containment hydrogen and oxygen analyzers are Type C. Category I instruments provided to detect high hydrogen or oxygen concentration conditions that represent a potential for containment breach. This variable is also important in verifying the adequacy of mitigating actions.
- 9. Primary Containment Hioh Ranae Radiation Monitor !
Primary containment area radiation (high range) is a Type E. l Category I variable, and is provided to monitor the potential of significant radiation releases and to provide ! release assessment for use by operators in determining the need to invoke site emergency plans. The instrumentation provided for this function consists of redundant sensors. ' microprocessors and indicators. A common 2 pen recorder in l the control room continuously records signals from both l channels. The redundant indicators in the relay room and ! the common recorder in the control room are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. l l l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.3.1 - 5 Revision 12. 08/02/99
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ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
) B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that the fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient. z, 4
For most anticipated operational occurrences and Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), a wide range of dependent and independent parameters are monitored. The ECCS instrumentation actuates core spray (CS), low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), ' and the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The equi) ment involved with each of these systems is described in t1e Bases for LC0 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating."
' Core Sorav System The CS System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure-High. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the eight trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one out of two taken twice logic (i.e., two trip systems) for each Function.
Once an initiation signal is received by the CS control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset. Automatic initiation starts both CS pumps in both loops five seconds after initiation when normal AC power is available. If normal AC power is not available, each pump starts five seconds after standby power becomes available to that pump. When RPV pressure decreases below the injection permi:sive setpoint. the pum) injection valves open allowing water to be sprayed over t1e core, s l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 1 Revision 12, 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
. .s j
) BASES j
BACKGROUND (continued) l The CS test line isolation valve, which is also a primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), is closed on a CS initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated p in the event CS is not operating. h The CS System also monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before the injection vahes open, the reactor e, pressure has fallen to a value below the CS System's maximum.t design pressure. The variable is monitored by four l redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. Low Pressure Coolant In.iection System i 1 The LPCI is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, with two LPCI subsystems. The LPCI subsystems i may be initiated by automatic or manual means. Automatic 4 initiation occurs'for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1: Drywell Pressure-High: or i both. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four l redundant transmitters, which, in turn, are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a l one out-of two taken twice logic (i.e., two trip systems) for each Function. Once an initiation signal is received by the LPCI control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset. l Upon receipt of an initiation signal, if normal power is available, all four RHR pumps start with no delay. Otherwise, they each start when standby power is available. Valves are automatically positioned for LPCI injection. which occurs when RPV pressure falls below the injection I permissive setpoint. This setpoint is selected to protect the RHR system from overpressure. A Reacter V m el Water l Level-Low Low. Level 2 signal initiates the loop selection I logic, a divisionalized subsystem using redundant sensors that determines which if any, recirculation loop is broken. This logic then aligns the pumps injection valves to the l unbroken loop to ensure the system function of flooding the l core to at least 2/3 core height will be accomplished. Once selected, the injection path is sealed in for five minutes, after which a timer allows the operator to throttle the l l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 2 Revision 12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES
]
BACKGROUE (continued) flow. Once identified, the broken recirculation loop is isolated for ten minutes. These times ensure the LPCI design flows will reflood the core to at least 2/3 core height. The loop selection logic has four channels that are arranged in a one out of two taken twice logic for each of the following Functions: RPV Pressure (which initiates the n, break detection logic on a decreasing setpoint): Reactor t Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 (which provides a break detection permissive signal); and differential pressures between the recirculation loop risers, and between the recirculation pump suction and discharge (which are used to determine recirculation pump operation and which loop (s) are unbroken). C The recirculation pump discharge valve bn the unbroken loop is closed by the loop selection logic to. direct LPCI flow to q the reactor through the suction line without being diverted through the recirculation pump. The RHR test / suppression pool cooling line isolation valve, , suppression pool spray isolation valves, and containment l spray isolation valves (which are also PCIVs) are also closed on a LPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated in the event LPCI is not operating. Hiah Pressure Coolant In.iection System The HPCI System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 or Drywell Pressure- High. Each of these variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a Q one out of two taken twice logic for each Function.
~
( The HPCI test line isolation valve (which is also a PCIV) is closed upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analysis and maintain primary containment isolated in the event HPCI is not operating.
/
l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 3 Revision 12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
] . BASES BACKGROUPO (continued)
- The HPCI System also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool because these are the two sources of water for HPCI operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a HPCI-initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless both suppression pool suction valves are open. If the water level in the CST ~ e.
falls below a preselected level, first the su)pression pool t suction valves automatically open, and then t1e CST suction valve automatically closes. Two channels of level ' transmitters and trip units are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either channel can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST suction valve to close. Two channels of level transmitters and trip units ' monitor suppression pool water level. The suppression pool suction valves also automatically open and the CST suction - valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes. The HPCI provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the Reactor Vessel Water ' Level-High. Level 8 trip at which time the HPCI turbine trips, which causes the turbine's stop valve and the injection valves to close. The logic is two out of-two to provide high reliability of the HPCI System. The HPCI System automatically restarts if a Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 signal is subsequently received. Automatic Deoressurization System The ADS may be initiated by either automatic or manual ! means. Automatic initiation occurs when signals indicating Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low Level 1: Drywell Pressure-High or Drywell Pressure-High Bypass Timer: confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 3: and CS or LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure-High are all present and the ADS Initiation Timer has timed out. There are two i transmitters each for Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low { Low. Level 1 and Drywell Pressure-High, and one transmitter i for confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level 3 in 1 each of the two ADS trip systems. Each of these transmitters connects to a trip unit, which then drives a l relay whose contacts form the initiation logic. I pl FERMI-UNIT 2 83.3.5.1-4 Revision 12. 08/02/99 l
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1
') BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Each ADS tri) system includes a time 61ay between satisfying tie initiation logic and the actuation of-the ADS valves. The ADS Initiation Timer time delay setpoint chosen is long enough that the HPCI has sufficient operating time to recover to a level above Level 1, yet not so long that the LPCI and CS Systems are unable to adequately cool the fuel if the HPCI fails to maintain that level. An alarm in the control room is annunciated when either of the timers is y, timing. Resetting the ADS initiation signals resets the ADS . - - Initiation Timers. The ADS also monitors the discharge pressures of the four LPCI pumps and the four CS pumps. Each ADS trip system includes a single pressure transmitter from each CS pump and two pressure transmitters from each LPCI pump in the
- 4 associated Division (i.e., Division 1 LPCI subsystems A and' C, and CS pumps A and C input to ADS trip system A: and -
division 2 LPCI subsystems B and D, and CS pumps B and D input to ADS trip system B). The signals are used as a permissive for ADS actuation, indicating that there is a source of core coolant available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Either one LPCI pump (two out of-two logic) or both core spray pumps in the same division is sufficient to permit automatic depressurization. The ADS logic in each trip system is arranged in two strings. Each string has a contact from each of the following variables: Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1: Drywell Pressure-High; and Drywell Pressure-High Bypass Timer. One of the two strings in each trip system must also have a confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3. Each of these contacts in both logic l strings must close, the ADS initiation timer must time out. I and a CS or LPCI pump discharge pressure signal must be present in both strings to initiate an ADS trip system. Either the A or B trip system will cause all five ADS relief valves to open. Once the Drywell Pressure-High signal, the ADS Low Water Level Actuation Timer, or the ADS initiation signal is present. it is individually sealed in until i manually reset. The reactor vessel water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 does not seal in to give HPCI an opportunity to restore level before ADS initiates a blow down. Manual inhibit switches (one for each ADS trip system) are provided in the control room for the ADS. , hj'FERMIUNIT2 B 3.3.5.1 - 5 Revision 12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) Emeroency Diesel Generators The EDGs may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 or Drywell Pressure-High. The EDGs are also initiated upon loss of voltage signals. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in - turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the four. 4 trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are connected to a one out of two taken twice logic to initiate all four EDGs (11. 12. 13. and 14). The EDGs receive their initiation signals from the CS System initiation logic. The EDGs can also be started manually from the control room and-locally from the associated EDG room. The EDG initiation ~
' signal is a sealed in signal and must be manually reset.
The EDG initiation logic is reset by resetting the - associated ECCS initiation logic. Upon receipt of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) initiation signal, each EDG is automatically started, is ready to load in approximately 10 seconds, and will run in standby conditions (rated voltage and speed, with the EDG output breaker open). The EDGs will only energize their respective Engineered Safety Feature buses if a loss of offsite power occurs. (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1.) APPLICABLE The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety SAFETY ANALYSES, analyses of References 2. 3. and 4. The ECCS is initiated LCO and to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting APPLICABILITY the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits. ECCS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion. The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.11. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. s FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1- 6 Revision 12 08/02/99
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] BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Table 3.3.5.1 1, footnote (b), is a'dded to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions are also required to be OPERABLE to perform EDG initiation. Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the set >oints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CA_IBRATIONS or a between successive verifications of the trip unit setpoints. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which' an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured out)ut value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, t1e associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for. In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or EDG) initiation to mitigate the j consequences of a design basis transient or accident. To j ensure reliable ECCS and EDG function, a combination of ! Functions is required to provide primary and secondary ; initiation signals. i The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis. , l l l 1
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Core Sorav and Low Pressure Coolant In.iection Systems 1.a. 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The low pressure ECCS and associated EDGs are initiated at x, Level 1 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are - available to >revent or minimize fuel damage. The Reactor Vessel Water .evel-Low Low Low. Level 1 is one of the' Functions assumed to'be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ECCS during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. In addition, the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, i Level 1 Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the' ~ recirculation line break (Ref.1). The. core cooling function of the ECCS. along with the scram action of the t Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak j cladding temperature remains below the limits of l 10 CFR 50.46. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate cooling. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. I Level 1 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or EDG(s) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and EDG initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2. "ECCS-Shutdown." for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS ! subsystems: LCO 3.8.1. "AC Sources-Operating": and ! LC0 3.8.2. "AC Sources-Shutdown." for Applicability Bases { for the EDGs. ' I s !
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued). 1.b. 2.b. Drvwell Pressure-Hioh High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The low pressure ECCS and associated EDGs are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low Low, r. Level 1 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 3). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell. pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be . indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or EDG is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the CS and LPCI Drywell Pressure-High Function are i equired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and EDG initiation. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required, since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell ! Pressure-High setpoint. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for i Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LC0 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the EDGs. l 1.c. 2.c. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (Iniection Permissive) Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This i ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems
- maximum design pressure. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Lew is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of i permitting initicticn of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. In addition, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the 1
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' BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) analysis'of the recirculation line break (Ref.1). The core l cooling function of the ECCS. along with the scram action of l
the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. ., The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equi m nt in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure tlat tha ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak j cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of i 10 CFR 50.46. i Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS is-required l to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure I can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and i LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS l subsystems. 1.d. 2.h. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual initiation l capability to individual components. The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any l i, accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the l W Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of s the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the i g) plant licensing basis. i There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the i k channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the individual components. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. i j FERMI UNIT 2' B 3.3.5.1 - 10 Revision 12. 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation ; B 3.3.5.1 '
] BASES' APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.d Reactor Fessel Water Level-Lo'w Low Level 2 (Looo Selection Loa- c)
LPCI Loop selection logic is initiated on-decreasing RPV water level at level 2. This gives the logic time to detect the broken recirculation loop and select the unbroken recirculation loop for LPCI injection. The LPCI pumps are initiated at level 1. c Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The transmitter. signals feed trip units whose outputs drive relays. Output contacts of the relays are configured in a one out-of two taken twice initiation logic. - - The same instrumentation and relay logic is used for HPCI J initiation (Function 3a). That system's design basis l establishes the Allowable Value while accounting for measurement uncertainties. LPCI loop selection initiation is not directly assumed by any safety or transient analysis. but is required to function to su) port the LPCI system, which is assumed to function in t1e accident analysis (Ref. 1). Four channels are required to be OPERABLE whenever LPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude LPCI initiation. 2.e. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (Break Detection Logic) This function is provided in the LPCI break detection logic. l If only one recirculation pump is running, the logic trips that pump in order to obtain a meaningful measurement of recirculation riser differential pressure (Function 2.f). Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low inhibits the break detection logic from acting on the value of riser differential pressure until reactor pressure has fallen below the set point due to the pump trip. This allows the logic to identify the broken recirculation loop. Although this function is not directly assumed by the safety analysis, it is required for the LPCI loop selection logic. l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 11 Revision 12 08/02/99
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and PLICABILITY (continued)
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and LPCl w be OPERAPLE, and is the'refore a supporting function for that assumed by the analysis of Reference 1. j Reactor Meam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from l four pressure transmitters that serse reactor steam dome pressure. The Allowable Value vr., selected, allowing for , measurement uncertainties, to Ove adequate time, based on i reactor pressure decrease foH owing RPT. for an accurate e, riser differential pressure measurement to be made. The - logic for this function is one out of-two taken twice. Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low are l required to be OPERABLE who LPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude LPCI injection.
?.f. Riser Differentia'r Pressure-Hich' (Break Detection)
.. LPCI break detection logic determines which r'crculation loop is broken by comparing the pressure of tae two recirculation loops. The broken loop will indicate a lower pressure 'ian the unbroken loop. The loop with the higher pressure is :. hen used for LPCI injection. If both ,
pressures are the vaae, loop B is selected by default. I Riser Differential ?ressure-High signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmf tters that sense the difference between corresponding recirculation loop riser pipes. Logic is onewut-of two taken twice. l The Riser E ffereiitial Pressure-High Allowable Value is l selecteo, f, lowing for measurement uncertainties, based on i the analytical limit of 1.0 psid between ccrresponding I risers. Four channels vi Riser Differential Pressure-High are required to be OPERABLE to' ensure that no single instrument failure prevents LPCI injection into the unbroken risar loop and support the LPCI function. l-f l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 12 Revision 12. 08/02/99 L
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.a. Recirculation Pumo Differential Pressure-Hiah (Break Detection) The differential pressure between pump suction and discharge l indicates whether the pump is running. This information is I used by the LPCI break detection logic to determine whether the sensed riser differential pressure is meaningful. If both pumps are running or not running, the logic can use the z, riser differential pressure (Function 2.f) value to
- determine which loop is broken. If only one pump is running, the logic trips the running pump, waits until'the reactor pressure decreases to a pre selected value (Function 2.e), then identifies the broken loop based on riser differential pressure. This function is necessary to ,
support LPCI injection, which was assumed in the safety analysis (Ref.1). l Recirculation Pump Differential Pressure:-High signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters at each of the two recirculation pumps. The output relay signals are configured in one out-of two taken twice logic ! to preclude a single instrument failure preventing LPCI l injection. The Allowable Value is selected allowing for j measurement uncertainties to be low enough to distinguish i between pump running and not running based on the pump head ) curve. Four channels of Recirculation Pump Differential j Pressure-High for each of the two recirculation pumps are : required to be OPERABLE to support LPCI injection and j preclude a single instrument failure, j l {LPCI System j LA_, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool l the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCI System is initiated at Level 2 to maintain level above the l top of the active fuel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be CPERABLE and capable of initiating HPCI during the transis:@ , analyzed in Reference 3. Additionally. the Reactv Vessel ' Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Function associated with HPCI is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of on's ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS ensures that the ; F FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 13 Revision 12 08/02/99
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) fuel :eak cladding temperature rema' ins below the limits of 10 CFil 50.46. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are
- initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water _(reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. z.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Allowable Value is high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System flow with HPCI assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1. -~ Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water L'evel-Low tow. - Level 2 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. 3.b. Drywell Pressure-Hioh High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI System is initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the J possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low. Level 2 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 4). The core cooling ' function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible to be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. Four channels of the Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for the Applicability Bases for the HPCI System. l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 14 Revision 12 08/02/99
o ECCS Instrumentation 8 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO. and APPLICABILITY (continued) 3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-H'iah. Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel.such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to trip the HPCI turbine to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High.' Level 8 Function is not assumed in the accident and r transient analyses. It was retained since it is a > potentially significant contributor to risk. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High. Level 8 signals for HPCI are initiated from two level transmitters from the wide range water level measurement instrumentation. Both Level 8 signals are required in order to trip the HPCI turbine.
, This ensures that no single instrument . failure can preclude HPCI initiation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High. -
Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to prevent flow from the HPCI System from overflowing into the MSLs. Two. channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-High. Level 8 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is i required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2 for HPCI Applicability Bases. 3.d. Condensate Storaoe Tank Level-Low Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally the suction valves between HPCI and the CST are open and upon receiving a HPCI initiation signal. water for HPCI injection would be taken from the CST. However. if the l water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valves automatically open, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is - available to the HPCI pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST l suction valve automatically closes. The Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCI) since the analyses assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool. l l FERMI UNIT 2 8 3.3.5.1 - 15 Revision 12. 08/02/99
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Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low ' signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The logic is arranged such that either level transmitter can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open which, in turn, will cause the CST suction valve to close. The Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST. z, Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is' required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.
, 3.e. Sunoression Pool Water Level-Hiah Excessively high suppression pool water could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of-the reactor vessel pressure through the safety / relief valves. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of HPCI from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of HPCI continuing to provide additional water from a source outside containment. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.
- This Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCI) since the analyses assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool.
Suppression Pool Water Level-High signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The logic is arranged such that either transmitter can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open which, in turn, will cause the CST suction valve to close. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level-High Function is chosen to ensure that HPCI will be aligned for suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression pool design loads would be exceeded. hi FERMIUNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 - 16 Revision 12, 08/02/99 t
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Two channels of Suppression Pool Wa'ter Level-High Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can
)reclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to
.C0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.
3.f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation channels provide manual initiation 'I capability. b-The Manual Initiation' Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Q-Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant
, k licensing basis.
There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of individual controls. The Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. Automatic Deoressurization System 4.a. 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of I FERMI UNIT 2 . B 3.3.5.1 - 17 Revision 12. 08/02/99
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-APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO.' and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low' Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when ADS-is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can ) preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 .: Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure
- core flooding systems to initiate and provide adequate.}}