IR 05000282/2003008
| ML040230251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/2004 |
| From: | Louden P NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Solymossy J Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-03-008 | |
| Download: ML040230251 (38) | |
Text
ary 23, 2004
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2003008; 05000306/2003008
Dear Mr. Solymossy:
On December 31, 2003, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a baseline inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 15, 2004, with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Patrick Louden, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000282/2003008; 05000306/2003008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information See Attached Distribution
DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML040230251.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII NAME JCameron PLouden DATE 01/22/04 01/23/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
REGION III==
Docket Nos: 50-282; 50-306 License Nos: DPR-42; DPR-60 Report No: 05000282/2003008; 05000306/2003008 Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2003 Inspectors: J. Adams, Senior Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector P. Higgins, Reactor Engineer D. W. Nelson, Radiation Specialist Approved by: P. Louden, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000282/2003008, 05000306/2003008; 10/01/2003 - 12/31/2003; Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Routine Baseline Inspection Report.
This report covers a 3-month period of baseline resident inspection and an announced baseline radiation protection inspection. The inspections were conducted by the resident inspectors and inspectors from the Region III office. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No findings of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 remained at full power during the assessment period, except for brief periods when operators reduced power to facilitate routine surveillances.
Unit 2 entered the inspection period in cold shutdown for a refueling outage. The licensee completed the outage and operators began power operation on October 10. At 70 percent power, the licensee identified a steam leak on the 23A feedwater heater flash tank. Operators reduced power and returned the reactor to Mode 2 to facilitate repairs. Following completion of repairs, operators returned to power operations, and achieved full power on October 15. Unit 2 remained at, or near, full power for the remainder of the assessment period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1RHS Heat Sink Performance (Pilot) (71111.HS)
a. Inspection Scope
Biennial Programmatic and Functional Review The inspectors selected three heat exchangers from two risk significant systems, each directly connected to the safety-related cooling water system for review. The inspectors also reviewed two performance attributes associated with the ultimate heat sink. The inspectors review of the three heat exchangers and ultimate heat sink completed the biennial programmatic and functional review inspection sample.
The inspectors selected the D2 diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger, D2 diesel generator lubricating oil heat exchanger from the emergency alternating current (AC)power system, and the 21 component cooling water heat exchanger from the component cooling water system for review. With respect to the ultimate heat sink, the inspectors reviewed licensee actions for the prevention of clogging of heat sink and sub-components from macro-fouling, and controls to prevent biotic fouling.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed procedures and associated records, and completed walkdowns and observations to verify that:
- test methodology was consistent with accepted industry practices or equivalent;
- test conditions were consistent with the selected testing methodology;
- test acceptance criteria were consistent with design basis values;
- test results appropriately considered differences between testing conditions and design conditions;
- test frequency, based on test results, was sufficient to detect degradation prior to loss of heat removal capabilities below design basis values;
- test results considered test instrument inaccuracies and differences;
- tube and shell side heat loads were approximately equal;
- inspection methods for heat exchangers were consistent with expected degradation;
- established acceptance criteria were consistent with industry standards including acceptability of the cleaning interval;
- as-found conditions were appropriately dispositioned such that the final condition was acceptable;
- chemical treatments, methods used to control biotic fouling corrosion, and methods to control macro-fouling were sufficient to ensure required heat exchanger performance;
- conditions and operation were consistent with design assumptions in heat transfer calculations;
- the licensee evaluated the potential for water hammer, where applicable;
- heat exchangers did not exhibit excessive vibration during operation, as verified by direct observation or issues identified in corrective-actions documents;
- heat exchanges were periodically flow tested at maximum design flow, when practicable;
- the licensee has addressed the potential for macro-fouling of ultimate heat sink and its sub-components; and
- the licensee has implemented controls to prevent biotic fouling of ultimate heat sink and its sub-components.
The inspectors reviewed two corrective action program (CAP) action requests (AR)concerning heat exchanger and ultimate heat sink performance issues to verify that the licensee had appropriate thresholds for identifying issues and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors also evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for identified issues, including the engineering justification for operability, where applicable.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1RST Post-Maintenance and Surveillance Testing (Pilot) (71111.ST)
.1 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed four inspection samples, comprised of the following post-maintenance testing activities:
- D5 diesel generator following 18-month preventative maintenance on October 31, 2003;
- 22 diesel-driven cooling water pump following annual inspection on November 12, 2003;
- 21 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump following routine maintenance on November 13, 2003; and
- D6 Diesel Generator following 18-month preventative maintenance on December 12, 2003.
During completion of the inspection samples, the inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to verify that:
- testing activities satisfied the test procedure acceptance criteria;
- effects of the testing had been adequately addressed prior to the commencement of the testing;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy;
- applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- affected systems or components were removed from service in accordance with approved procedures;
- testing activities were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures;
- jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored, where used;
- test data/results were accurate, complete, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the operability of the system in accordance with approved procedures; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented in the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed five inspection samples, comprised of the following surveillance testing activities:
- 12 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump and Suction Valve from Refueling Water Storage Tank Quarterly test on November 19, 2003;
- D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test on December 1, 2003;
- 11 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction and Discharge Pressure Switch Calibration on December 3, 2003;
- Unit 2, Train A Safeguards Logic Test at Power on December 4, 2003; and
- Unit 2, Train A Reactor Protection Logic Test at Power on December 4, 2003.
During completion of the inspection samples, the inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to verify that:
- preconditioning does not occur;
- effects of the testing had been adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- acceptance criteria was clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and was consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, properly documented, and the calibration frequency was in accordance with Technical Specifications, Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy;
- applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequency met Technical Specification requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;
- the tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures;
- jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data/results were accurate, complete, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for in-service testing activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed with an adequate operability evaluation or declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data have been accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented in the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection, the inspectors completed one adverse weather inspection sample. The inspectors selected the Unit 1 and Unit 2 condensate storage tanks and the safety-related Unit 2 diesel generators D5 and D6. The inspectors completed system walkdowns and reviewed applicable procedures and associated records to verify that the risk significant systems were adequately protected against impending cold weather.
The inspectors used the licensee checklists and procedures to verify that the systems were aligned as required. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action program action requests and work orders to verify that the licensee had entered problems identified with cold weather operations into the corrective action system and was taking the appropriate compensatory actions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed two inspection samples, comprised of partial in-plant walkdowns of accessible portions of trains of risk-significant mitigating systems during times when the trains were of increased importance due to the unavailability of the alternate train. The inspectors verified the alignment of the following plant equipment:
- emergency diesel generator D5 while D6 was out of service for an 18-month inspection on December 8, 2003; and
- Unit 1 cooling water system and Unit 2 Train A cooling water system while the Unit 2 Train B cooling water system was out of service on December 17, 2003.
The inspectors utilized the licensees applicable valve and electric breaker alignment checklists to verify that the components and required support systems were properly positioned to support the proper operation of the inspected systems. The inspectors also examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work orders (WO) and AR CAPs associated with the trains to verify that those documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. The inspectors used the information in the appropriate sections of the USAR to determine the functional requirements of the systems.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
On December 18 and 19, 2003, the inspectors conducted an in-plant walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary building 695 foot elevation completing one internal flood protection inspection sample. These areas of the Unit 1 and 2 contain safety-related and risk significant equipment including both trains of residual heat removal pumps, safety injection pumps, and containment spray pumps.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR, Individual Plant Examination, and plant procedures associated with internal flooding in the area of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary building, 695 foot elevation.
The inspectors verified by physical inspection that the licensee maintained the material condition of piping systems in these areas. The inspectors also verified that drain paths from these areas had been maintained and that there were no accumulation of loose materials that could plug drain paths. The inspectors performed a physical examination of flood barrier integrity to determine if flood barriers were capable of performing their intended function.
The inspectors reviewed several AR CAPs to verify that problems associated with plant equipment relied upon to prevent or minimize flooding were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On December 15, 2003, the inspectors performed a quarterly review of Crew 5 during licensed operator requalification training in the simulator, completing one licensed operator requalification inspection sample. The inspectors observed a training crew during an as-found requalification examination in the plants simulator facility. The inspectors compared crew performance to licensee management expectations. The inspectors verified that the crew completed all the critical tasks for the scenario. For any weaknesses identified, the inspectors observed that the licensee evaluators noted the weaknesses and discussed them in the critique at the end of the session.
The inspectors assessed the licensees effectiveness in evaluating the requalification program, ensuring that licensed individuals operated the facility safely and within the conditions of their licenses, and evaluated licensed operator mastery of high-risk operator actions. The inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of high risk activities, emergency plan performance, incorporation of lessons learned, clarity and formality of communications, task prioritization, timeliness of actions, alarm response actions, control board operations, procedural adequacy and implementation, supervisory oversight, group dynamics, interpretations of technical specifications, simulator fidelity, and licensee critique of performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed issue/problem-oriented reviews of the auxiliary feedwater and the cooling water systems, completing two maintenance effectiveness inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed repetitive maintenance activity to assess maintenance effectiveness, including maintenance rule activities, work practices, and common cause issues. Inspection activities included, but were not limited to, the licensees categorization of specific issues including evaluation of performance criteria, appropriate work practices, identification of common cause errors, extent of condition, and trending of key parameters. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) requirements, including a review of scoping, goal-setting, performance monitoring, short-term and long-term corrective actions, functional failure determinations associated with reviewed condition reports, and current equipment performance status.
For each system reviewed, the inspectors reviewed significant WOs and AR CAPs to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected, and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor discrepancies in the licensees maintenance rule reports were corrected.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed risk assessments for the following four maintenance activities, completing four risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples:
- unavailability of the 22 residual heat removal pump and the 22 diesel-driven cooling water pump for planned maintenance on November 12, 2003;
- unavailability of the D6 diesel generator, 12 charging pump, and the 13 condensate pump for planned maintenance on December 8, 2003;
- unavailability of the D2 diesel generator, the 22 diesel-driven cooling water pump, and the B cooling water loop for planned maintenance on December 17, 2003; and
- unavailability of the D2 diesel generator and the 121 instrument air compressor for planned maintenance on December 30, 2003.
During these reviews, the inspectors compared the licensees risk management actions to those actions specified in the licensees procedures for the assessment and management of risk associated with maintenance activities. The inspectors verified that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The inspectors used the licensees daily configuration risk assessment records, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, and observations of shiftly outage meetings to verify that the equipment configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were communicated to the necessary personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed two inspection samples related to the following non-routine plant evolutions and events:
- Unit 2 reactor coolant system (RCS) draindown and reduced inventory operations evolution on October 1, 2003; and
- operator response to a reactor power transient event caused by the addition of excess boric acid to the volume control tank on December 2, 2003.
The inspectors reviewed operator performance and compared their actions to the specified actions contained in plant operating, annunciator response, and abnormal operating procedures. The inspectors independently assessed the causes for the transient events and compared inspector conclusions to the licensees conclusions.
The inspectors also reviewed AR CAPs to verify that licensee personnel identified issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. The inspectors verified that AR CAPs documenting minor issues identified during the performance of these inspection activities were entered into the licensees corrective action system for resolution.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed two inspection samples related to the following operability evaluations:
- RHR Boric Acid Valve Leakage
- D5 and D6 Diesel Generator Piston Cracks With regard to the RHR boric acid valve leakage, the inspectors reviewed Operability Recommendation (OPR) 000451 for valve 2RH-6-1; OPR 000453 for valve 2RH-10-1; OPR 000454 for valve 2RH-1-1; and OPR 000455 for valve 2RH-10-2. For the piston crack OPR, the inspectors reviewed the licensees assessments of small cracks identified in two D5 diesel generator pistons and in one D6 diesel generator piston during boroscope exams. The inspectors performed the inspections by reviewing procedures and related records, and walking down associated plant equipment.
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations against Technical Specifications, USAR, and other design information; determined whether compensatory measures, if needed, were taken; and determined whether the evaluations were consistent with Administrative Work Instruction 5AWI 3.15.5, Operability Determinations. The inspectors also reviewed AR CAPs to verify that licensee personnel identified issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs)
Cumulative Effects of OWAs
a. Inspection Scope
On December 30, 2003, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of all identified OWAs to determine if there was a significant impact on plant risk or on the operators ability to respond to a transient or an accident. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, AR CAPs, and Operating Information documents to determine if there were OWAs that had not been evaluated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed two inspection samples related to the following post-maintenance tests:
- Unit 2 RHR system pressure test following maintenance on system valves on October 7, 2003; and
- 22 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump test following governor maintenance on October 9, 2003.
The inspectors reviewed PMT activities associated with the scheduled and emergent work activities listed above to verify that the testing was adequate for the scope of the work performed and the equipment remained capable of performing the intended function. The inspectors reviewed the appropriate sections of the Technical Specifications, USAR, and maintenance documents to determine the systems safety functions and the scope of the maintenance. The inspectors also reviewed AR CAPs to verify that licensee personnel identified issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the licensees performance during the portions of the 22nd Unit 2 refueling outage (2R22) conducted during this inspection period (October 1 through October 13, 2003). This inspection effort completed one refueling outage inspection sample that commenced and was counted as a sample in the previous inspection period. The inspection consisted of in-plant observations of equipment alignment, evolutions and outage activities. Specifically, the inspectors determined whether the licensee effectively managed elements of shutdown risk pertaining to reactivity control, decay heat removal, inventory control, electrical power control, and containment integrity.
The inspectors performed in-plant observations of the following outage activities daily:
- outage management turnover meetings to verify that the current shutdown risk status was accurate, well understood, and adequately communicated;
- walkdowns of the main control room to observe the alignment of systems important to shutdown risk;
- observed the operability of RCS instrumentation and compared channels and trains against one another;
- observed ongoing work activities in the plant; and
- reviewed issues that the licensee entered into its corrective action program to verify that identified problems were being entered into the program with the appropriate characterization and significance.
Additionally, the inspectors performed in-plant observations of the following specific activities:
- control room staff draining reactor level to the reactor vessel to the flange;
- control room staff operations at reduced inventory conditions;
- reactor pressure vessel head lift;
- reactor coolant system heat up;
- reactor start up;
- reactor low power physics testing; and
- generator synchronization to the grid.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed four inspection samples related to the following surveillance test activities:
- Surveillance Procedure (SP) 2331; 21 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Auto Start and Functional Testing Each Refueling Shutdown on October 5, 2003;
- SP 2750; Post Outage Containment Close-Out Inspection on October 8, 2003;
- SP 2103; 22 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Monthly Test; and The inspectors performed in-plant observation of surveillance testing activities and in-office reviews of completed surveillance testing documentation to assess operational readiness and ensure that risk-significant structures, systems, and components were capable of performing their intended safety function. The inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review for preconditioning, integration of testing activities, applicability of acceptance criteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use, control of temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance, documentation of test data, Technical Specification applicability, impact of testing relative to performance indicator reporting, and evaluation of test data.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors completed one temporary plant modification inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed temporary modification 03T163, which provided a tent and temporary heat for the cooling water dump to grade. The inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of design documents, safety screening documents, and USAR to verify that the temporary modification was consistent with modification documents, drawings and procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the post-installation test results to confirm that tests were satisfactory and the actual impact of the temporary modification on the permanent system and interfacing systems were adequately verified. The inspectors also reviewed AR CAPs to verify that licensee personnel identified issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation and Simulator-Based Training
.1 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the licensees performance of an emergency preparedness drill on November 5, 2003, completing one emergency planning drill evaluation sample.
The inspectors observed activities in the technical support center and attended the post-drill technical support center critique immediately following the drill and the controllers critique on November 6, 2003. The inspectors evaluated the drill performance and verified that licensee evaluators observations were consistent with the inspectors and that deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Simulator-Based Training Exercise
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a licensed shift operating crew perform an as-found exercise on the simulator on December 15, 2003, completing one emergency planning simulator exercise sample. The inspectors observed activities in the control room simulator, attended the post-exercise critique, and reviewed the final exercise critique report. The inspectors evaluated the drill performance and verified that licensee evaluators observations were consistent with the inspectors and that deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS2 As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71121.02)
.1 Source-Term Reduction and Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the licensee had developed an understanding of the plant source-term, that included knowledge of input mechanisms to reduce the source- term and that the licensee had a source-term control strategy in place that included a cobalt reduction strategy and shutdown ramping and operating chemistry plan which was designed to minimize the source-term external to the core. Other methods used by the licensee to control the source-term including component and system decontamination, and use of shielding were evaluated. This activity completed one inspection sample.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees identification of specific sources, along with exposure reduction actions and the priorities the licensee had established for implementation of those actions. The inspectors reviewed the source term reduction results achieved since the last refueling cycle against these priorities. For the current assessment period, the inspectors verified source reduction evaluations along with actions taken to reduce the overall source-term compared to the previous year. This activity completed one inspection sample.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee submittals for the following performance indicators, completing four performance indicator verification inspection samples:
- Unit 1 Safety System Unavailability - Emergency AC Power Sources for the 4th quarter 2002 through the 3rd quarter 2003;
- Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate for the 4th quarter 2002 through the 3rd quarter 2003;
- Unit 2 Safety System Unavailability - Emergency AC Power Sources for the 4th quarter 2002 through the 3rd quarter 2003; and
- Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate for the 4th quarter 2002 through the 3rd quarter 2003.
The inspectors used performance indicator guidance and definitions contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Revision 2, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify the accuracy of the performance indicator data. The inspectors review included, but was not limited to, conditions and data from logs, licensee event reports (LER), condition reports, and calculations for each performance indicator specified. The inspectors also reviewed AR CAPs to verify that licensee personnel identified issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that the licensee entered issues into its corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Inspectors also performed a screening review of items entered into the corrective action program and observed daily corrective action program meetings to identify conditions that warranted additional follow-up.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup
a. Inspection Scope
(Closed) LER 2-03-02: Unit 2 - Automatic Actuation of Unit 2 Emergency AC 4 Kilovolt (KV) Bus 26 Load Sequencer.
On July 26, 2003, while operating at 100 percent power, a fault to ground on an underground 13.8 KV feeder from the substation resulted in a loss of power to a Unit 2 Safeguards 4 KV bus when substation breakers opened to clear the fault. The bus load sequencer automatically initiated load rejection and load restoration following transfer to the station reserve transformer. The licensee lost charging flow when the two running charging pumps tripped and letdown automatically isolated as a result of the momentary loss of power to the bus. Control room operators manually started one charging pump and restored letdown.
A dielectric compound was used in the conductor terminations to fill the internal space around the conductor end on the underground feeder cables. Inspection of the A phase capnut conductor termination on the underground feeder from the substation indicated there was a phase to ground fault across the dielectric compound that had leaked out of the termination. Water in the cable contributed to this failure. The A phase termination leaked a sufficient amount of compound to allow water to fill the void.
This provided a path for the ground fault to occur outside of the termination.
The licensee entered the issues into its corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed the LER and associated ARs and did not identify any new significant issues.
The inspectors determined that the licensee took reasonable measures to evaluate the leaking termination. Therefore, a performance deficiency did not exist.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Solymossy and other member of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 15, 2004. The licensee did not identify any materials during the inspection as proprietary in nature.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
The inspectors conducted an interim radiation protection inspection exit on December 11, 2003, with Mr. A. Johnson.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- A. Johnson, Radiation Protection Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
50-306/03-02-00 LER Automatic Actuation of Unit 2 Emergency AC 4KV Bus 26 Load Sequencer (Section 4OA3)
Discussed
None.
Attachment