IR 05000298/1987028: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20196F546
| number = ML20237E775
| issue date = 02/26/1988
| issue date = 12/15/1987
| title = Ack Receipt of 880126 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-298/87-28
| title = Insp Rept 50-298/87-28 on 871101-30.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings, ESF Walkdown,Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observations & Operational Safety Verification
| author name = Callan L
| author name = Bennett W, Madsen G, Plettner E
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name = Trevors G
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation = NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
| addressee affiliation =  
| docket = 05000298
| docket = 05000298
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = NUDOCS 8803040107
| document report number = 50-298-87-28, NUDOCS 8712290182
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| package number = ML20237E763
| page count = 1
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 8
}}
}}


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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,.,
FEB 261988 In Reply' Refer To:
Docket: 50-298/87-28 Nebraska Public Power District ATTN: George A. Trevors-Division Manager-- Nuclear Support P.O. Box 499 Columbus, NE 68601'
Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of January 26, 1988, in response to our letter and Notice of Violation dated December 21, 1987. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintaine


Sincerely, L. J. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects CC:
==REGION IV==
Cooper Nuclear Station ATTN: Guy Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska 68321 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director bec distrib. by RIV:
NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/87-28  License: DPR L6 Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
*RRI  R. D. Martin, RA
P. O. Box 499 Columbue, NE 68601 Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
*SectionChief(DRP/C) Lisa Shea, RM/ALF
Inspection At: Cooper Nuclear Station,'lemaha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: November 1-30, 1987 Inspectors: -
*RPSB-DRSS  * MIS System
      /2 !3 87 E. A. Plettner, Resident Inspector, (RI) Date[
*RIY File  * Project Engineer DRP/C
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*RSTS Operator  *W. Long, NRR Project Manager
W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector, (SRI) Date Approved: N 4 U   /2[///F7 G. L. 6ds'en, Acting Chief, Project Section C, Date Reactor Projects Division 8712290182 871221 PDR ADOCK 05000298 G  PDR
*R. Hall  *DRS
*TSS  *DRP D. Powers    yl C /DRP/C PI  DRP i(
EHolpr:cnm GMadse LJCallan
~2p/88 2/A188 2/3,/88 8803040107 80022620 DR ADOCK O


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  -g-Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted November 1-30, 1987 (Report 50-298/87-28)
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Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, engineered safety feature walkdown, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations, operational safety verification, and radiological protectio Results: Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified (failure to follow procedures, paragraph 3, and failure to maintain secondary containment integrity, paragraph 6).
.
Nebraska Public Power District
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CNSS880042 Januany 26, 1988    li ! .
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      ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  .
Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject: NPPD Response to Inspection Report 50-298/87-28 This letter is written in response to your letter dated December 21, 1987, transmitting Inspection Report 50-298/87-2 Therein you indicated that certain of our activities were in violation of NRC requirement Following is a statement of the violati,ns and our response in accordance w!.th 10CFR2.20 Statement of Violation Failure To Follow Procedures Appendix B, Criterion V, of 10 CFR Part 50, and the Itcensee's approved Quality Assurance program require that activities affecting quality be accomplished in accordance with approved instructions, procedures, and drawing CNS Procedure 0.4, "Preparation. Review, and Approval  of Procedures," Revision 10 dated October 15, 1987, specifies that approved written station procedures shall be adhered to by all station personne CNS Procedure 2.2.71, "Service Water System". Appendix "A" Valve Checklist requires Valve SW-195 to be ope Procedure 0.9, "Equipment Clearance and Release Orders " Revision 5, dated May 14, 1987, requires a caution tag to be issued when any station personnel discover or recognize an abnormal condition where there is a need for additional instruction in regard to the safe operation of station equipment. Maintenance Procedure 7.0.1 Revision 9, dated October 29, 1987, requires a Work Item Tracking (WIT) request to be issued when attempting to determine the cause for unidentified Icakage and repai Contrary to the above, on November 18, 1987, during the performance of a partial system walkdown by the NRC inspectors of CNS Procedure 2.2.71,
  "Service Water (SW) System". Appendix "A" Valve Checklist. Valve SW-19'
was found in the closed positio No caution tag or WIT was issued until November 18, 1987, when the improper position of Valve SW-195 was brought to the licensee's attention by the NRC inspector This is a Severity 1.evel IV violatio (Supplement 1) (298/8728-01)
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  ' U.S. Nuclect Rsguistory Commission          :
i' *t..'' s Pag 3 2 '!
January 26, 1988            l
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Reason For The Violation Thia violation is a result of inadequate follow-up by ' the operator who discovered the leaking in the valve (s) and closed the manual one inch tell-tale
,
drai Although the action taken' was appropriate, failure to issue a Work
;  Item and identify the abnormal position of the valve is a vi.;4 tion of CNS Procedure requirement Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken And The Results Achieved        >
!
The Operations Department determined the valve, a manual one inch tell-tale drain, had been closed because of leakage from either the Demineralizer Water System or the Service Water Syste A Work Item Tracking (WIT) request and Work Item was initiated, and the subject valve caution tagged closed ots November 18, 1987, correcting the nonconforming condition.


"
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Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violation i The Operations Supervisor will discuss this event with all operating crew        -
  . . .
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    -3-DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
'
  * R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations
personnel during scheduled weekly Operations Supervisor meeting Specifically stressed will be the requirements of CNS procedure 0.9 regarding caution
  * L. Peaslee, Surveillance Coordinator
'
  * M. Norvell, Maintenance Manager
tagging, and procedure 7.0.1 regarding initiating a Work ltem Request when
  * D. Black, Operations Supervisor
  * E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
  * Brungardt, Operations Manager
  *E. M. Mace, Engineering Manager
  *L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee employees during the inspection period,
  * Denotes those present during exit interview conducted on December 1, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The following open and unresolved items were reviewed by the NRC inspector to verify that the licensee's responses to the items identified in previous inspection reports are now in conformance with regulatory requirements and corrective measures were completed in a timely manne (Closed) Open Item 298/8627-08: Technical Specification (TS) Management Change - This item involved recent organizational changes implemented by NPPD which required subsequent CNS TS revision in the following areas:  ;
Paragraph 6.1 Organization      {
Paragraph 6.2 Review and Audit      j Figure 6. NPPD Nuclear Power Group Organization Chart  j Figure 6.1.2 CNS Organization Chart      j The District initiated action to update the TS as Change No. 45. In a letter to the Senior Resident Inspector, CNS, dated October 29, 1987, the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) confirmed the change submittal and recommended that~the item be closed. The NRC inspector reviewed Change No. 45 and concurs that the item be closed on the basis that it is a licensing issue to be resolved by NR .
I This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 298/8704-03: Records Documenting Performance of Procedure 7.3.1 - This item involved records relating to Maintenance Procedure (MP) 7.3.1 " Protective Relays Setting and Testing,"
i-    - - _ _ -  - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ _


plant equipment needs repai Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved I
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Full compliance will be achieved by March 31, 1988..
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    -4-Attachments "B," "C," and "D." -The licensee was unable to retrieve the requested. records within the 4-day time frame covered by the inspectio The records requested covered three testing. periods for the following:
u  Attachment "B" performed each refueling cycle (covering 3 years)
Attachment "C" performed each second refueling cycle (covering 6 years)
1  ' Attachment "D" performed each third refueling cycle (covering 9 years)
The records were located and presented to the NRC inspector for revie The review revealed that MP 7.3.1, Attachments "B," "C," and "D" had been performed as required for three testing period This item is close . Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Walkdown The NRC inspectors performed an independent walkdown of the Service Water (SW) System supply to the Reactor Equipment Cooling and Residual Heat Removal Systems. The inspection was performed to verify operability, to confirm that licensee system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, and to identify equipment conditions or items that might degrade system performanc In> preparation for performing the walkdown of the service water system, the NRC inspectors conducted a. review of and a comparison between the following licensee system checklist and applicable as-built drawing:
  . System Operating Procedure (SOP) 2.2.71, " Service Water System,"
Revision 21, dated October 8, 1987, Appendix "A," Valve Checklist, Revision 18
  . As-Built Drawing Burns and Roe 2036 for Service Water System During the performance of the system walkdown the NRC inspectors noted that Valve SW-195 " Service Water / Demineralized Water (SW/DW) crosstie
  .tell-tale drain" was incorrectly positioned as required by the Valve Checklist. The NRC inspectors informed the licensee of the incorrectly positioned valve and asked for an explanation. The licensee explained
  .that the valve had been shut because leakage was detected in the lin The licensee had not issued a Work Item Tracking (WIT) request or an Equipment Clearance or Release Order to tag the valve with a caution ta Thus, the licensee had no means of tracking the trouble in the SW/DW crosstie lin CNS Procedure 0.4, " Preparation Review and Approval of Procedures,"
Revision 10, dated October 14, 1987, states that approved written station procedures shall be adhered to by all station personne _ - _ - ._-__-_ __ _ _ _ -


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Statement of Violation i
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i  Failure to Maintain Secondary Containment ."egrity j  Technical Specification  3.7.C.1 requires that secondary containment j  integrity shall be maintained during all modes of plant operatio t i  Contrary to the above, on November 9, 1987, the inner door to the Reactor
I-5-Procedure 2.2.71, Appendix "A" " Valve Check 1 tst" lists the required position of valves in the Service Water System. Procedure 0.9, " Equipment Clearance and Release Orders," Revision 5, dated May 14, 1987, requires a ]
)  Building railroad airlock was open for at least two hours while gaps existed between the outer door and the groun This constitutes a failure to
caution tag to be issued when any station personnel discover or recognize an abnormal condition where there is a need for additional instructions in regard to the safe operation of station equipment. A licensee representative stated that in this particular case a WIT, as required by Maintenance Procedure 7.0.1,. Revision 9, dated October 29, 1987, should j have been issued to determine the leaking valve and to repair as necessary. The licensee's failure to issue a Caution Tag and WIT as required by procedure is an apparent violation (298/8728-01).
;  maintain secondary containment integrity.


'
The purpose of SW-195 is to control pressure in the cross connect piping !
This is a Severity Level IV Violatio (Supplement I) (298/8728-03)
and to indicate when one of the cross connect isolation valves develops j seat leakage. The NRC inspectors determined that SW-195 being closed did '
Reason For Violation i
not effect operability of the system in that the system could still perform its intended function ,
The licensee, when notified of the error, initiated prompt corrective action and issued a caution tag and WIT on November 18, 198 No other violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observations The NRC inspectors observed and/or reviewed the performance of Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.3.3.1, "High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Test Mode Surveillance Operation," SP 6.3.13.2, " Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting Functional Test," SP 6.3.12.4, " Diesel Fuel 1 011 Availability," and SP 6.3.12.1, " Diesel Generator Operability Test". i
    . SP 6.3.3.1, "HPCI-Test Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 22, l
          '
dated October 29, 1987: This surveillance was performed on November 4,1987, to meet the HPCI pump operability requirements of TS. The NRC inspector observed that the procedure was performed in a i professional manner by personnel qualified to perforn the test who ,
were cognizant of the surveillance requirements. Testing was performed in accordance with the procedure and suggestions to improve :
the procedure were made utilizing a procedure change form. Test results were verified by the NRC inspector to conform with TS and ,
procedure requirement . SP 6.3.13.2, " Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting Functional Test,"
Revision 3, dated July 30, 1987: This surveillance was performed between October 30 and November 9,1987,- and reviewed by the NRC inspector on November 10, 1987. The NRC inspector determined that all acceptance criteria was met and deficiencies identifie Deficiencies were properly reviewed and resolved, and retesting was satisfactorily completed. The NRC inspector noted that three temporary procedure changes, dated October 30, November 2, and November 4,1987, were initiated and incorporated into the procedur i
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Secondary containment integrity is defined in CNS Technical Specifications as the Reactor Building being intact and the following conditions being met:
_ _ _ _ _ _  _
. ., . ..
      -6-Some confusion existed concerning the applicability of temporary procedure changes during performance of part of the procedure on November 9. The NRC inspector held discussions with licensee personnel concerning the applicability of temporary procedure changes when procedures are performed after the issuance of a temporary procedure change. The licensee has agreed to review the temporary change procedure to clarify when temporary procedure changes are applicable during subsequent performance of procedures. This clarification is considered an open item (298/8728-02).


' At least one door in each access opening is close . The Standby Cas Treatment System is operable.
. SP 6.3.12.4, " Diesel Fuel Oil Availability," Revision 12, dated June 11, 1987: This surveillance was performed on November 22, 1987, to verify'the amount of diesel fuel available as required by TS. The NRC inspector observed that the surveillance was performed in accordance with the applicable procedure and that discrepancies were properly documented and explained in the procedur . SP 6.3.12.1, " Diesel Generator Operability Test," Revision 21, dated July 30, 1987: This surveillance was performed on November 23, 1987, to verify diesel generator operability as required by TS. The NRC inspectors observed that all prerequisites were met and communications maintained throughout the test. The procedure was performed properly and operators were cognizant of the surveillance requirement No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation The.NRC inspectors verified that the maintenance activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry i codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The.following station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed by the NRC inspectors on the indicated dates:
November 16, 1987: Work Item (WI) 87-3501 RWCU-A0-FCU-15A and WI 87-3493 Filter Demin Unit A Dome Drain November 16-19, 1987: Design Change 87-069 Gamma Tip Installation i November 25, 1987: WI 87-3595 Breaker for RHR Pump C No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Op_erational Safety Verification The NRC inspectors observed operational activities throughout the ;
inspection period. Control room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled. Proper control room staffing was maintaine . - -
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _


I All automatic ventilation system isolation valves are operable or are secured in the isolated position.
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    -7-Discussions with operators determined that they were cognizant of plant status and understood the importance of and reason for each lit annunciator. The NRC inspectors observed selected shift turnover meetings and'noted that information concerning plant status was communicated to the oncoming operators. Maintenance requests were reviewed to verify that appropriate priority was assigned and that the maintenance was performed in a timely manne On November 17, 1987, at approximately 8 a.m., while operating at steady state power, an increase above normal operating temperatures in the generator for "8" Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator (RRMG) set was noted by control room personnel. Reactor operators decreased reactor power in an attempt to decrease generator temperatures. Decreasing reactor power did not result in decreasing generator temperatures. At 9:27 a.m. , reactor operators tripped "B" RRMG set because temperatures were continuing to increase to a level where damage to the equipment was imminent. Subsequently, the licensee cleaned and replaced the brushes on the generator. Upon completing this corrective maintenance, at 2:31 p.m.,
  "B" RRMG Set was restarted and placed into service.- Generator temperatures were monitored and normal operating temperatures were observed. At 4:38 p.m., the "A" RRMG set was removed from service to clean and rebrush the generator. At 6:22 p.m., "A" RRMG Set was restarted and placed into service. The NRC inspectors observed the licensee's actions during the occurrence including the proper use of General Operating Procedure (G0P) 2.1.10, " Station Power Chanaes," Revision 14, dated April 30, 1987, andSystemOperatingProcedure'(S0P)2.2.68,
  " Reactor Recirculation System," Revision 27, dated March 19, 1987 Tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to confirm
        '
operability of plant equipment including the fire suppression syste:as and other emergency equipment. The NRC inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the service water syste Results of this salkdown are ,
documented in paragraph 3 of this report. Facility operations were ;
        '
performed in accordance with the requirements established in the CNS Operating License and T During a tour, on November 9, 1987, the NRC inspectors noted that the inner door to the reactor building railroad air lock was open. Upon entering the airlock the NRC inspectors noticed light passing through the 1
        ,
seal between the rail and the outer airlock door. Closer examination by the inspectors revealed that several gaps existed between the outer door and the ground. These gaps, in conjunction with the open inner door, constitute a failure to maintain secondary containment integrity. Failure to maintain secondary containment integrity with the reactor critical is 1 an apparent violation of TS 3.7.C.1 (298/8728-03).


,
When informed of the problem, the licensee took immediate action to repair the gaps that existed in the outer doo I i
s i
No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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U.S. Nuciccr Rsgulctory Commission
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Pcg3 3 Jcnuary 26, 1988 The Secondary Containment System is designed to be s u f ' i c i e n t i .- toak-tight to allow the Standby Gas Treatment System to reduce the Reactor Building pressure to a minimum sub-atmospheric pressure of 0.25 inches of water (under calm wind conditions) when the Standby Gas Treatment System fans are exhausting the Reactor Building at a rate of 1001 per day of the Reactor Building free volum Given the above, the District cannot definitely conclude that the integrity of secondary containment had not been maintaine Ilowever, since the potential did exist, the District has taken action, accordingl The reason for this violation was lack of procedural guidance end failure to recognize the need to maintain the exact configuration of the outer railroad airlock door when the inner door is opene Corrective Steps Taken And Results Achieved The gaps that were noted to exist consisted of a small section around each rail beneath the outside railroad airlock door These gaps were a result of not replacing the rail seal plates prior to shutting the outside doors, subsequent to moving a rati car into the airloc The rail seal plates are devices that, when placed over the track rails, fill the void between the rail and track be The seal plates vere immediately installed when notified of the condition by the Resident Inspector and the personnel involved counseled about the importance of replacing the rail seal plate Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Py vent Further Violation Two procedures are being generated to prevent recurrenc The Mrst is Surveillance Procedure 6.3.10.17, which was originated on November 14, 1987, and deals with the inspection of eecondary containment penetration The second procedure has also been generated and placed in SORC routing and will provide stacific direction for the operation of the railroad airlock door Steps to verify seal integrity after the opening and closing of a railroad airlock door have been included in the procedur Additionally, to heighten personnel awareness of the concern, the District will fabricate and mount signs on the airlock doors stating: "PRIOR TO SilUTTING EITilER RAILROAD AIRLOCK DOOR, ENSURE TilAT Tile ASSOCIATED RAIL SEAL PLATES ARE INSTALLED".


In the interim period until these pre..dures are approved, a Special Order has been issued by the Division Mr .ia * , of Nuclear Operations designating specific individuals responsible to cor e inate opening and closing the railroad airlock door Date When Full Compliance Will Be Af seved All corrective actions will be completed by March .. 198 _  _ >
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(e * . .
L-8- Radiological Protection Observations The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in.conformance with facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements. Radiation work permits contained appropriate information to ensure that work could be performed in a safe and controlled manner. Personnel in radiation controiled areas were wearing the required personnel monitoring equipment and protective clothing. Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled based on the activity levels within the area. Radiation monitors were utilized to check for contaminatio .No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Exit Interviews An exit interview was conducted on~ December 1, 1987, with licensee representatives -(identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the senior resident inspector and the resident inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio >


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.- - . - U.S. Musicer. Regttlatory Commission    !
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:  ~Jc= ry 26,1983    ,
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If-you have . any questions regarding this response, please contact me or R. Horn at the site. ' A one week extension for submission of this response was granted in a telephone conversation with Region I ,
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Sincerely, l
~
  ./ Y C. A. Trevors
<- Divi 61on Manager''
Nuclear Support    ;
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  /jw      *
i cci U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Comunission .
Region IV    "
Arlington, TX
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NRC Resident Inspector    i
      ,
Cooper Nuclear Station    L
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Revision as of 03:20, 25 January 2021

Insp Rept 50-298/87-28 on 871101-30.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings, ESF Walkdown,Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observations & Operational Safety Verification
ML20237E775
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1987
From: Bennett W, Madsen G, Plettner E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237E763 List:
References
50-298-87-28, NUDOCS 8712290182
Download: ML20237E775 (8)


Text

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l e s f

APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/87-28 License: DPR L6 Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)

P. O. Box 499 Columbue, NE 68601 Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)

Inspection At: Cooper Nuclear Station,'lemaha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: November 1-30, 1987 Inspectors: -

/2 !3 87 E. A. Plettner, Resident Inspector, (RI) Date[

k' YSh)

W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector, (SRI) Date Approved: N 4 U /2[///F7 G. L. 6ds'en, Acting Chief, Project Section C, Date Reactor Projects Division 8712290182 871221 PDR ADOCK 05000298 G PDR

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

. .

-g-Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted November 1-30, 1987 (Report 50-298/87-28)

Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, engineered safety feature walkdown, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations, operational safety verification, and radiological protectio Results: Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified (failure to follow procedures, paragraph 3, and failure to maintain secondary containment integrity, paragraph 6).

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. . .

-3-DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees

  • R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations
  • L. Peaslee, Surveillance Coordinator
  • M. Norvell, Maintenance Manager
  • D. Black, Operations Supervisor
  • E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
  • Brungardt, Operations Manager
  • E. M. Mace, Engineering Manager
  • L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee employees during the inspection period,
  • Denotes those present during exit interview conducted on December 1, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The following open and unresolved items were reviewed by the NRC inspector to verify that the licensee's responses to the items identified in previous inspection reports are now in conformance with regulatory requirements and corrective measures were completed in a timely manne (Closed) Open Item 298/8627-08: Technical Specification (TS) Management Change - This item involved recent organizational changes implemented by NPPD which required subsequent CNS TS revision in the following areas:  ;

Paragraph 6.1 Organization {

Paragraph 6.2 Review and Audit j Figure 6. NPPD Nuclear Power Group Organization Chart j Figure 6.1.2 CNS Organization Chart j The District initiated action to update the TS as Change No. 45. In a letter to the Senior Resident Inspector, CNS, dated October 29, 1987, the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) confirmed the change submittal and recommended that~the item be closed. The NRC inspector reviewed Change No. 45 and concurs that the item be closed on the basis that it is a licensing issue to be resolved by NR .

I This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 298/8704-03: Records Documenting Performance of Procedure 7.3.1 - This item involved records relating to Maintenance Procedure (MP) 7.3.1 " Protective Relays Setting and Testing,"

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-4-Attachments "B," "C," and "D." -The licensee was unable to retrieve the requested. records within the 4-day time frame covered by the inspectio The records requested covered three testing. periods for the following:

u Attachment "B" performed each refueling cycle (covering 3 years)

Attachment "C" performed each second refueling cycle (covering 6 years)

1 ' Attachment "D" performed each third refueling cycle (covering 9 years)

The records were located and presented to the NRC inspector for revie The review revealed that MP 7.3.1, Attachments "B," "C," and "D" had been performed as required for three testing period This item is close . Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Walkdown The NRC inspectors performed an independent walkdown of the Service Water (SW) System supply to the Reactor Equipment Cooling and Residual Heat Removal Systems. The inspection was performed to verify operability, to confirm that licensee system lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, and to identify equipment conditions or items that might degrade system performanc In> preparation for performing the walkdown of the service water system, the NRC inspectors conducted a. review of and a comparison between the following licensee system checklist and applicable as-built drawing:

. System Operating Procedure (SOP) 2.2.71, " Service Water System,"

Revision 21, dated October 8, 1987, Appendix "A," Valve Checklist, Revision 18

. As-Built Drawing Burns and Roe 2036 for Service Water System During the performance of the system walkdown the NRC inspectors noted that Valve SW-195 " Service Water / Demineralized Water (SW/DW) crosstie

.tell-tale drain" was incorrectly positioned as required by the Valve Checklist. The NRC inspectors informed the licensee of the incorrectly positioned valve and asked for an explanation. The licensee explained

.that the valve had been shut because leakage was detected in the lin The licensee had not issued a Work Item Tracking (WIT) request or an Equipment Clearance or Release Order to tag the valve with a caution ta Thus, the licensee had no means of tracking the trouble in the SW/DW crosstie lin CNS Procedure 0.4, " Preparation Review and Approval of Procedures,"

Revision 10, dated October 14, 1987, states that approved written station procedures shall be adhered to by all station personne _ - _ - ._-__-_ __ _ _ _ -

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I-5-Procedure 2.2.71, Appendix "A" " Valve Check 1 tst" lists the required position of valves in the Service Water System. Procedure 0.9, " Equipment Clearance and Release Orders," Revision 5, dated May 14, 1987, requires a ]

caution tag to be issued when any station personnel discover or recognize an abnormal condition where there is a need for additional instructions in regard to the safe operation of station equipment. A licensee representative stated that in this particular case a WIT, as required by Maintenance Procedure 7.0.1,. Revision 9, dated October 29, 1987, should j have been issued to determine the leaking valve and to repair as necessary. The licensee's failure to issue a Caution Tag and WIT as required by procedure is an apparent violation (298/8728-01).

The purpose of SW-195 is to control pressure in the cross connect piping !

and to indicate when one of the cross connect isolation valves develops j seat leakage. The NRC inspectors determined that SW-195 being closed did '

not effect operability of the system in that the system could still perform its intended function ,

The licensee, when notified of the error, initiated prompt corrective action and issued a caution tag and WIT on November 18, 198 No other violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observations The NRC inspectors observed and/or reviewed the performance of Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.3.3.1, "High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Test Mode Surveillance Operation," SP 6.3.13.2, " Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting Functional Test," SP 6.3.12.4, " Diesel Fuel 1 011 Availability," and SP 6.3.12.1, " Diesel Generator Operability Test". i

. SP 6.3.3.1, "HPCI-Test Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 22, l

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dated October 29, 1987: This surveillance was performed on November 4,1987, to meet the HPCI pump operability requirements of TS. The NRC inspector observed that the procedure was performed in a i professional manner by personnel qualified to perforn the test who ,

were cognizant of the surveillance requirements. Testing was performed in accordance with the procedure and suggestions to improve :

the procedure were made utilizing a procedure change form. Test results were verified by the NRC inspector to conform with TS and ,

procedure requirement . SP 6.3.13.2, " Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting Functional Test,"

Revision 3, dated July 30, 1987: This surveillance was performed between October 30 and November 9,1987,- and reviewed by the NRC inspector on November 10, 1987. The NRC inspector determined that all acceptance criteria was met and deficiencies identifie Deficiencies were properly reviewed and resolved, and retesting was satisfactorily completed. The NRC inspector noted that three temporary procedure changes, dated October 30, November 2, and November 4,1987, were initiated and incorporated into the procedur i

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-6-Some confusion existed concerning the applicability of temporary procedure changes during performance of part of the procedure on November 9. The NRC inspector held discussions with licensee personnel concerning the applicability of temporary procedure changes when procedures are performed after the issuance of a temporary procedure change. The licensee has agreed to review the temporary change procedure to clarify when temporary procedure changes are applicable during subsequent performance of procedures. This clarification is considered an open item (298/8728-02).

. SP 6.3.12.4, " Diesel Fuel Oil Availability," Revision 12, dated June 11, 1987: This surveillance was performed on November 22, 1987, to verify'the amount of diesel fuel available as required by TS. The NRC inspector observed that the surveillance was performed in accordance with the applicable procedure and that discrepancies were properly documented and explained in the procedur . SP 6.3.12.1, " Diesel Generator Operability Test," Revision 21, dated July 30, 1987: This surveillance was performed on November 23, 1987, to verify diesel generator operability as required by TS. The NRC inspectors observed that all prerequisites were met and communications maintained throughout the test. The procedure was performed properly and operators were cognizant of the surveillance requirement No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation The.NRC inspectors verified that the maintenance activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry i codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The.following station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed by the NRC inspectors on the indicated dates:

November 16, 1987: Work Item (WI) 87-3501 RWCU-A0-FCU-15A and WI 87-3493 Filter Demin Unit A Dome Drain November 16-19, 1987: Design Change 87-069 Gamma Tip Installation i November 25, 1987: WI 87-3595 Breaker for RHR Pump C No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Op_erational Safety Verification The NRC inspectors observed operational activities throughout the ;

inspection period. Control room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled. Proper control room staffing was maintaine . - -

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-7-Discussions with operators determined that they were cognizant of plant status and understood the importance of and reason for each lit annunciator. The NRC inspectors observed selected shift turnover meetings and'noted that information concerning plant status was communicated to the oncoming operators. Maintenance requests were reviewed to verify that appropriate priority was assigned and that the maintenance was performed in a timely manne On November 17, 1987, at approximately 8 a.m., while operating at steady state power, an increase above normal operating temperatures in the generator for "8" Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator (RRMG) set was noted by control room personnel. Reactor operators decreased reactor power in an attempt to decrease generator temperatures. Decreasing reactor power did not result in decreasing generator temperatures. At 9:27 a.m. , reactor operators tripped "B" RRMG set because temperatures were continuing to increase to a level where damage to the equipment was imminent. Subsequently, the licensee cleaned and replaced the brushes on the generator. Upon completing this corrective maintenance, at 2:31 p.m.,

"B" RRMG Set was restarted and placed into service.- Generator temperatures were monitored and normal operating temperatures were observed. At 4:38 p.m., the "A" RRMG set was removed from service to clean and rebrush the generator. At 6:22 p.m., "A" RRMG Set was restarted and placed into service. The NRC inspectors observed the licensee's actions during the occurrence including the proper use of General Operating Procedure (G0P) 2.1.10, " Station Power Chanaes," Revision 14, dated April 30, 1987, andSystemOperatingProcedure'(S0P)2.2.68,

" Reactor Recirculation System," Revision 27, dated March 19, 1987 Tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to confirm

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operability of plant equipment including the fire suppression syste:as and other emergency equipment. The NRC inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the service water syste Results of this salkdown are ,

documented in paragraph 3 of this report. Facility operations were ;

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performed in accordance with the requirements established in the CNS Operating License and T During a tour, on November 9, 1987, the NRC inspectors noted that the inner door to the reactor building railroad air lock was open. Upon entering the airlock the NRC inspectors noticed light passing through the 1

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seal between the rail and the outer airlock door. Closer examination by the inspectors revealed that several gaps existed between the outer door and the ground. These gaps, in conjunction with the open inner door, constitute a failure to maintain secondary containment integrity. Failure to maintain secondary containment integrity with the reactor critical is 1 an apparent violation of TS 3.7.C.1 (298/8728-03).

When informed of the problem, the licensee took immediate action to repair the gaps that existed in the outer doo I i

No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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L-8- Radiological Protection Observations The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in.conformance with facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements. Radiation work permits contained appropriate information to ensure that work could be performed in a safe and controlled manner. Personnel in radiation controiled areas were wearing the required personnel monitoring equipment and protective clothing. Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled based on the activity levels within the area. Radiation monitors were utilized to check for contaminatio .No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Exit Interviews An exit interview was conducted on~ December 1, 1987, with licensee representatives -(identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the senior resident inspector and the resident inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio >

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