Text

Insp Rept 50-298/98-12 on 980316-19.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Plan & Implementing Procedures,Emergency Facilities & Equipment,Organization & Mgt Control,Training & Audits
	ML20216F872
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	04/14/1998
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20216F863	List: ML20216F858; ML20216F872;
References
	50-298-98-12, NUDOCS 9804170268
	Download: ML20216F872 (16)
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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-298-

License No . DPR 46 ,

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Report No.: 50-298/98-12 l

Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District

Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station

Location: P.O. Box 98 l

Brownville, Nebraska

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Dates: March 16-19,1998 l

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inspector (s): Gail M. Good, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst

Mary H. Miller, Senior Resident inspector

Christopher E. Skinner, Resident inspector

Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch '

Division of Reactor Safety l

Attachment: Supplemental Information

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9804170268 980414 "

gDR ADOCK 05000298

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cooper Nuclex Station ,

NRC inspection Ret art 50-298/98-12 l

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A routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the licensee's emergency

preparedness program was conducted. The inspection included the following areas:

emergency plan and implementing procedures, emergency facilities and equipment,

organization and management control, training, audits, and effectiveness of licensee controls.

Emphasis was placed on changes that had occurred since the last routine emergency

preparedness inspection.

Plant Sucoort

- Overall, implementation of the emergency preparedness program was good. Emergency ;

response facilities were operationally maintained. Emergency preparedness l

management expanded the use of performance indicators to focus on areas of weak

performance, and emergency preparedness staffing was strengthened. The emergency

response organization training program was enhanced to increase emphasis on drill

participation and performance evaluation. Program audits, surveillances, and

self-assessments identified many good issues and program vulnerabilities.

- An opportunity was missed to assess emergency plan implementation during an actual

event (Section P1).

- Emergency response facilitie' were operationally maintained and appropriate equipment

and supplies were readily available (Section P2).

- The process for conducting emergency action level reviews with offsite agencies was

effective, because copies were provided prior to coordination meetings and offsite

agency representatives were given an opportunity to ask questions in a face-to-face

forum. Changes to emergency plan implementing procedure: ind positionalinstruction

manuals were properly reviewed (Section P3).

- The failure of one crew to effectively implement key elements of the emergency plan

(e.g., emergency director oversight, protective action recommendations, offsite agency

notifications, and emergency classification) during simulator walkthroughs was identified

as an exercise weakness. Appropriate remedial actions were implemented for the

affected crew and actions were initiated to assess the generic implications by performing

a root cause analysis (Section P4).

- The training program was enhanced to include increased emphasis in drill participation

and the use of evaluation criteria for knowledge and performance-based training.

Required training was properly corducted and documented. Records were complete but

the track;ng system was complex and difficult for users to explain. Implementation of the

6-year objectives matrix was incomplete for backup emergency response facility testing

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and field monitoring drills and detracted from the otherwise comprehensive training

program (Section PS).

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Emergency preparedness management and staffing were strengthened. Offsite agency

agreement letters were properly reviewed and documented (Section P6).

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Program audits and surveillances were thorough and effective; many good issues and

program vulnerabilities were identified (Section P7.1).

Self assessments identified weaknesses and concerns that could lead to program

improvements. No longstanding action items existed (Section P7.2).

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' Actions to address emergency evacuation warning for personnel in high-noise aren !

were slow and compensatory actions were insufficient for some plant areas. The issue i

stemmed from what appeared to be a weak response to a 1979 NRC Bulletin, since a i

subsequent study identified areas where the system was inadequate. Engineering

support to correct system inadequacies has been lacking. In the interim, the emergency

preparedness staff notified security personnel of the need to take compensatory

measures in certain areas; however, two areas were missed (Section P8.1).

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Report Details

IV. Plant Suonort

P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities

a, insoection Scoce (93702)

The inspector reviewed event notifications made since the last inspection (June 1996) to

determine if events were properly classified. The fo!!owing event report / declared

emergency event was reviewed:

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November 19,1996, Fire Lasting More Than 10 Minutes - Notification of Unusual

Event (Event Report 31353)

b. Observations and Findinas

l The inspector reviewed Event Report 31353 and determined that the event was properly

l classified. However, no emergency preparedness report or corrective actions could be

l found to show that the licensee had reviewed the event to assess emergency plan

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implementation for lessons leamed. Due to the lack of documentation, the inspector

determined that emergency plan implementation was not assessed following a declared

event.

l c. Conclusi201

An opportunity was missed to assess emergency plan implementation during an actual

event.

P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Faciilties, Equipment, and Resources

a, insoection Scoce (82701-02.02)

The inspector reviewed the status of emergency response facilities, equipment,

instrumentation, and supplies to ensure that they were maintained in a state of

operational readiness. The inspectors toured the following facilities:

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Control room

- Technical support center

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Operational support center

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Emergency operations facility

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l b. Observations and Findinos

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j The licensee's emergency response facilities continued to be dedicated facilities. All of

the facilities were tidy and contained current copies of the emergency plan and

procedures. Appropriate equipment and supplies were found in the facilities, including

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calibrated radiological survey and air sampling equipment, respirator glasses, respiratois

(all mediums in the control room), potassium iodide, etc. The inspector verified that. all

control room personnel were fit to medium-sized respirators,

c. Conclusions

Emergency response facilities were operationally maintained and appropriate equipment

and supplies were readily available.

P3 Emergency Preparedness Amcedures and Documentation I

a. insoection Scoce (82701-02.01)

The inspector used Inspection Procedure 82701 to determine whether the emergency l

plan and procedures were maintained. The inspector reviewed:

. The process used to satisfy annual offsite agency reviews of emergency action

levels (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.8),

. The process used to make revisions to emergency plan implementing procedures

and positional instruction manuals, and

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Selected portions of the emergency plan and procedures for continuity.

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspector verified that emergency action levels were reviewed annually with offsite ;

authorities. The reviews were conducted during periodic emergency preparedness

coordination meetings (captured in meeting minutes). The licensee's current practice

was to transmit the emergency action levels with the meeting agenda to give the offsite

agencies an opportunity to review the document prior to the meeting (to prepare l

questions, if necessary). The process for conducting emergency action level reviews

with offsite agencies was effective, because copies were provided prior to meetings and

offsite agency representatives were given an opportunity to ask questions in a

face-to-face forum. i

The inspector verified that changes to emergency plan implementing procedures and

positionalinstruction manuals were reviewed to ensure that changes did not decrease l

the effectiveness of the emergency plan. This area of the licensee's program was

properly implemented.

! Based on a review of selected portions of the emergency plan and implementing

I procedures, the inspector identified the following areas that needed additional review:

(1) evaluate inconsistencies with NUREG-0654. Table B-1 minimum staffing levels (no

30-minute responders); (2) evaluate the adequacy of radiation protection training

provided to operators who perform health physics duties specified in NUREG-0654,

Table B-1; and (3) determine whether the emergency plan sufficiently described the

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responsibilities of certain onshift personnel (operators and staff to perform dose

assessment / communications) as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and Appendix E.IV.A to

Part 50. The status of the emergency plan in these areas will be tracked as an

inspectior, followup item (50-298/98012-01).

c. Conclusions

The process for conducting emergency action level reviews with offsite agencies was

effective, because copies were provided prior to coordination meetings and offsite

agency representatives were given an opportunity to ask questions in a face-to-face

forum. Changes to emergency plan implementing procedures and positionalinstruction

manuals were properly reviewed.

P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness

a. Insoection Scooe (82701-02.01)

The inspectors conducted walkthroughs with two operating crews using a dynamic

simulation on the plant-specific control room simula;or. During the walkthroughs, the

licensee was evaluated on the ability to:

- Evaluate plant conditions,

+ Identify respective emergency action levels,

Perform and evaluate dose calculations,

Classify the emergency using the latest procedures,

+ Recommend appropriate protective actions, and ,

Make timely notifications to offsite agencies. !

The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring escalation of emergency J

classifications, culminating in a general emergency. A tornado warning was in effect at j

the start of the scenario. The initiating event was a notification of unusual event based

on sustained high winds greater than 74 miles per hour. The winds continued to rise

until the alert threshold of 95 miles per hour was exceeded. A tornado touched down

and caused the loss of the emergency transformer. The storm caused a load rejection.

A site area emergency condition existed when two rods failed to insert during the plant

scram. The general emergency was based on a turbine building steam leak and

potential clad damage (fuel pin leakage). Each walkthrough lasted approximately

120 minutes.

b. Observations and Findinas

Crew performance during the walkthroughs was mixed. The first crew satisfactorily

implemented the emergency plan; however, the second crew did not. Specific crew

findings are discussed below:

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Crew 1 1

Crew 1 promptly recognized and declared all four events using the correct emergency

action levels. Corresponding notifications to state / local authorities were usually correct

! and timely. Three exceptions were observed. First, the wrong wind direction was used

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for the notification of unusual event. The error had little effect since there were no i

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classification levels could cause offsite agencies to take actions in the wrong areas.

Second, the wrong release point was used on one notification form (elevated versus

ground). Transmitting the wrong release path information could affect the accuracy of

offsite agency dose calculations. The error was caught and quickly corrected. Third,

24 ~inutes elapsed before the offsite agencies were notified of the release. Such a

dela/ could have a detrimental effect on offsite response actions.

Offsite agency protective action recommendations were correctly developed and

promptly communicated to offsite agencies. Protective action recommendations were

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The radiation protection technician demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the dose

assessment process (computer program and its use to formulate protective action

recommendations). l

l Protective measures for plant personnel (alarms, announcements, and radiological

precautions) were performed satisfactorily with one exception. The plant alarm was not

sounded for the notification of unusual event announcement as required by procedure. i

Both alarms and announcements were made for the other emergency classifications.

Notifications to NRC were complicated due to the closely-timed events. Only 27 minutes i

elapsed between the alert and the general emergency declarations. The mock-NRC (via i

control cell) was informed of the alert declaration during the notification of unusual event ;

call. No details concerning the basis of the alert were provided. Subsequently, a site j

area and general emergency were declared before the next NRC contact (initiated by the l

control cell). The public affairs duty officer and NRC resident inspector were notified of

each emergency declaration, immediately after the offsite agency notifications. The

inspectors expressed concern about the manner in which the NRC notifications were

conducted. Negative training resulted because the control cell did not request a

continuous open line with the control room crew. As a result, the crew did not have to

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consider options for prioritizing notifications.

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Crew 2

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The second crew failed to adequately demonstrate the ability to effectively implement

key elements of the emergency plan. The inspectors based this finding on the following

observations:

(1) Due to an apparent preoccupation with event mitigation efforts and crew

I briefings, the shift supervisor did not effectively perform required emergency

l director responsibilities. There was insufficient supervisory oversight of those

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performing emergency plan duties (shift technical engineer, radiation protection

technician, and communicator).

(2) The crew failed to make default protective action recommendations as part of the

offsite agency notifications following the general emergency declaration. The

default recommendations were to evacuate a 2-mile radius /5 miles downwind and

shelter the remainder of the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The default

protective action recommendations were issued after controller prompting.

(3) When dose calculations indicated the need to upgrade the protective action

recommendations (evacuate 5-10 miles downwind), the crew did not inform the

offsite agencies in a timely manner (22 minutes elapsed).

(4) Important changes in plant conditions were not communicated to offsite

authorities in a timely manner. Forty-three minutes elapsed before the offsite

agencies were informed of the radiological release.

(5) The shift technical engineer recognized that conditions warranted the declaration

of a site area emergency but did not discuss the declaration with the emergency

director. As a result, the site area emergency was not declared. The shift

technical engineer inappropriately instructed the communicator to inform the

emergency response organization (via pagers) of the site area emergency

condition. The communicator completed this notification. The emergency

director declared a general emergency 9 minutes later.

(6) The communicator did not demonstrate familiarity with the position

responsibilities:

(a) Pagers were not activated for the notification of unusual event in

accordance with procedures.

(b) The communicator used the wrong telephone number to contact the

public affairs duty officer.

(c) The notification of unusual event offsite agency notifications were made

prior to obtaining emergency director approval (the form was not signed).

As a result, unauthorized information was communicated to the offsite

agencies. l

The communicator did not understand affected sectors and how to I

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determine them, or how to fill out the protective action !

recommendation / projected dose information sections of the notification

form. Interactions with the radiation protection technician contributed to

the communicator's difficulties. )

l (e) The communicator mistakenly thought that the NRC (both the resident

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inspector and headquarters operations officer) had copies of the site's 1

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notification form. Information was communicated by referencing form

sections (fill-in the blanks).

(7) Inspectors also made the following less significant, but notable, observations:

(a) The pager code used at the alert classification level was confusing and

could have resulted in an unwanted response. The transmitted code

indicated that an alert had been declared, emergency response facilities

were being activated, but emergency response personnel were not to

respond. Simulated conditions included hazardous conditions (winds at

95 miles per hour). The crew did c eate a voice-mail message

(retrievable by pager holders) that explained the reason for the code.

(b) The emergency director did not add an event description to the notification

form completed by the communicator. The form only referenced an

emergency action level number. As a result, on several occasions the

communicator had to put the telephone down to refer to the emergency

action levels for a narrative description of the event.

(c) Plant announcement forms were not completed as expected.

(d) Boilerplate plant announcement forms were incomplete in that there were

no cautions or optional wording for security events / severe weather '

conditions.

The failure of the second crew to effectively implement key elements of the emergency

plan was identified as an exercise weakness (50-298/98012-02).

Independent of the NRC evaluation, the emergency preparedness staff evaluated the

crew performance using established cnteria and a grading system. The emergency

preparedness evaluation was thorough and critical. The staff identified most of the

issues identified by the NRC inspectors and one additional issue involving the failure to

activate the automatic dialer to recall the full emergency response organization (both

crews).

The inspectors reviewed emergency preparedness simulator evaluations of the second

crew's performance during past training cycles and found no training problems that

appeared to be precursors. The inspectors were informed that the shift communicator

had completed all required training and was considered qualified.

The operations department took appropriate actions in response to the second crew's

performance. Specifically, three crew members were removed from watch duties, the

entire crew received remediation training the following day, " tailgates" were held with

other shift crews to discuss the poor performance (s), and a root cr.ase analysis was

initiated. On March 31,1998, the emergency preparedness manager informed the lead

inspector that three members of the crew failed to perform in a satisfactory manner

during the remediation training. The second failure involved en ors in dose calculations

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that would have affected protective action recommendations. The three members failed

to recognize that the degraded core condition existed (the wrong source term was used).

Additional dose assessnient training was provided, - "dina a proficiency test, and the

three members resumed watch duties on March 20

There was insufficient time during the inspection to determine if other crews or ;

emergency response organization personnel needed supplemental training to ensure !

consistent and proper implementation of the emergency plan. This aspect will be l

pursued as part of the licensee's response to the exercise weakness. j

c. Conclusions i

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. The failure of one crew to effectively implement key elements of the emergency plan i

(e.g., emergency director oversight, protective action recommendations, offsite agency !

notifications, and emergency classification) during simulator walkthroughs was identified :

as an exercise weakness. Appropriate remedial actions were implemented for the

affected crew and actions were initiated to assess the generic implications by performing

a root cause analysis. l

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PS Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness

a. 10agg- 1 Scone (82701-02.04) j

The inspector reviewed the training program, training records for selected individuals, ;

and documents associated with emergency drills / exercises. :

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b. ' ' Observations and Findinas

Since the last inspection, the licensee initiated several changes to the emergency

preparedness training program. For example: (1) training materials, such as lesson

plans, were updated to focus on position-specific responsibilities; (2) qualification cards

were developed for each emergency response organization member which itemized ;

knowledge requirements and performance evaluation criteria; (3) greater emphasis was

placed on drill participation; and (4) evaluation criteria were developed to trend operating

crew performance during emergency plan scenarios run on the simulator during 6-week

training cycles. The changes to the training program were considered improvements. l

The inspector verified that the training program was implemented in accordance with '!

. Training Program Guide 302, " Emergency Response Organization," Revision O. Records l

for several emergency response organization members were compared to corresponding

training requirements. The records were complete; however, the tracking system was

complex and difficult for the users to explain.

Since the last inspection, responsibility for the training guide (ownership) was transferred

to the emergency preparedness manager to ensure that changes were controlled to

. prevent the training department from decreasing the effectiveness 'of the emergency plan

[10 CFR 50.54(q)). The transfer was considered an improvement. ' Historically, the

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emergency preparedness training guide has been distributed internally, unlike other

emergency plan implementing procedures which get submitted to extemai :opy holders,

such as the NRC. The acceptability of this practice is under consideration by the Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

The inspector verifed implementation of the drill and exercise program and found that

implementation of the 6-yu objectives matrix was incomplete in two areas. First, the

matrix included an objective to evacuate and relocate to a backup emergency response

facility, in practice, the licensee only performed evacuation and relocation to one backup

emergency response facility (alternate emergency operations facility). The emergency

plan also identified alternate / backup locations for the technical support center and

operational support center that were not being tested for functional, procedural, or

training adequacy.

Similarly, the inspector noted that the matrix contained an objective for annual field I

monitoring, including soil, vegetation, and water sampling. The inspector found that this

element was not fu!!y implemented. Controls to ensure that all sample media were

collected were not factored into the annual drills.- In pursuing this matter, the inspector

noted that Section . 2.2.3 of the licensee's emergency plan indicated that collt.Jion and

analysis of enviro' .ntal sample media "may" be included in the annual radiological .

monitoring drills. . e inspector concluded that there was no violation of the emergency ,

plan but noted the discrepancy between the matrix and the emergency plan. Licensee .

personnel indicated that the intent was to include the collection and analysis

of environmental sample media in annual radiological monitoring drills.

c. Conclusions

The training program was enhanced to include increased emphasis in drill participation

and the use of evaluation criteria for knowledge and performance-based training.

Required training was properly conducted and documented. Records were complete,

but the tracking system was complex and difficult for users to explain. Implementation of

' the 6-year objectives matrix was incomplete for backup emergency response facility

testing and field monitoring drills and detracted from the otherwise comprehensive

training program.

P6 Emergency Preparedness Organization and Administration

a. Insoection Scone (82701-02.03)

( - The inspector reviewed emergency planning organization staffing and management and

offsite support organization agreements

b.' Observations and Findinas

There were several changes to the emergency preparedness management and staff. A

new manager was named in January 1997, an additional staff member was added to

fulfill newly acquired ' raining responsibilities, and, since June 1997, the department

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reported to a new senior manager. The relatively new emergency preparedness

manager had health physics experience and initiated training program and performance

indicator enhancements. Emergency preparedness management and staffing were

strengthened.

The inspector verified that offsite agency agreement letters were reviewed annually as

required by Emergency Plan, Appendix D. Review documentation was complete and

retrievable.

c. Conclusions

Emergency preparedness management and staffing were strengthened. Offsite agency

agreement letters were properly reviewed and documented.

P7 Quality Assurance in Emergency Preparedness Activities

P7.1 Indeoendent and Internal Reviews and Ati;iits (82701-02.05)

a. Insoection Scoce l

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Using inspection Procedure 82701, the inspector examined the latest emergency

preparedness program audit reports (97-02 and 98-01) and surveillances to determine !

compliance with NRC requirements and licensee commitments. I

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b. Observations wwi Findinos

The 1997 and 1998 audits to meet 10 CFR 50.54(t) requirements were thorough and

identified many good issues and program vulnerabilities. Six problem identification l

reports and four recommendations were identified in the 1997 report, and seven problem I

identification reports and two recommendations were identified in the 1998 report. The l

1998 audit concluded that the emergency response organization was " adequately"

prepared for emergencies; however, a concern was identified concerning the

qualifications of joint information center personnel. The adequacy of the offsite interface

was evaluated in a manner that would identify problems, and the audit results were

provided to offsite agency representatives during periodic coordination meetings.

Surveillances focused on specific program areas, such as the emergency broadcast

system tone-activated radios, drills, training, and exercise performance. The

surveillances were an effective tool to focus on specific program areas.

c. Conclusions

Program audits and surveillances were thorough and effective; many good issues and

program vulnerabilities were identified.

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P7.2 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls (82701-02.06)

a. Insoection Scone

The inspector reviewed self assessments and open action item tracking system items.

b. Observations and Findir1gs

Two assessments by emergency preparedness staff members from other sites were

conducted. One assessment focused on drill and scenario evaluation. The other

assessment was more comprehensive. The self assessments identified weaknesses

and concems that could lead to program improvements.

Eighteen open Nuclear Action item Tracking system action items were reviewed. No

longstanding action items existed. ,

c. Conclusions

Self assessments identified weaknesses and concerns that could lead to program

improvements, No longstanding action items existed.

P8 Miscellaneous Emergency Preparedness issues

P8.1 (QJLn) IFl 50-298/96011-01: ability to warn personnel in high-noise areas

During an inspection conducted in June 1996, the inspector identified a concern

regarding the licensee's ability to warn personnel in high-noise areas. The licensee's

September 7,1979, response to NRC Bulletin 79-18, ' Audibility Problems Encountered

on Evacuation of Personnel From High-Noise Areas," dated August 7,1979, stated that

the existing system was adequate; however, there was no evidence to show that sound

tesis were conducted while equipment was running. Flashing blue lights were

subsequently installed in the diesel generator rooms due to high-noise levels. Problem

identification report Serial No. 2-03503 was issued to address the problem.

Actions to resolve this personnel safety issue have been slow. Responsibility for closure

was transferred to the engineering department in January 1997. Due dates were

extended on at least four occasions. The initial due date was August 1996; the due date

at the time of this inspection was August 1998. !

The emergency preparedness staff completed an emergency alarm coverage study in

March 1997 and provided recommendations to engineering. The study identified l

10 high-priority areas. As a compensatory measure, while engineering action was l

pending, the emergency preparedness staff provided security personnel with a list of I

areas for security to " sweep" if the need to conduct assembly and accountability

occurred The list was provided in December 1996. Additional areas were added in ;

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January 1998. The inspector reviewed the high-priority areas identified in the study and

the list provided to security and found two areas that were not covered by the

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compensatory measures: the chemistry count room and the administration building

elevator equipment room. The two areas were immediately added to security's list. The

inspector concluded that compensatory actions were incomplete and not fully effective.

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Engineering and emergency preparedness personnel met on March 18,1998, to discuss

upgrades to the emergency alarm system. An engineering project request was issued

the same day which indicated an increase in priority.

P8.2 (Closed) IFl 50-298/97008-01: failure to staff the technical support center in a timely

manner

During an off-hours emergency preparedness call-in drill conducted on September 10,

1997, the technical support center was not activated because the center's director did

not respond within the required time. The duty individual had not remained within

45 minutes of the site and hrd not designated a replacement. Problem identification

report Serial No. 2-17875 was issued to track resolution of the issue.

Corrective actions included disciplinary actions against the individual, temporary removal

from emergency response organization duties, and modification of the automatic dialer I

(Dialogics) to notify more than one responder for key positions. Corrective actions were l

tested during the off-year exercise conducted on September 30,1997. All facilities were

activated in a timely manner (62 minutes). The inspector interviewed several"on-call

personnel" and determined that all understood the restrictions that applied to duty

responders (distr ~e from site and fitness for duty). The inspector also verified that

those who were unauilable during the duty week had identified a replacement.

Corrective actions to resolve this issue were complete and effective.

V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at

the conclusion of the inspection on March 19,1998. The licensee acknowledged the

findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

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ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

D. Bremer, Operations Support Group

T. Brown, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

P. Caudill, Senior Manager

L. Croteau, Manager, Training

R. Hayden, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

B. Houston, Manager, Licensing

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J. Kelsay, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator i

M. Peckham, Plant Manager j

B. Pergerson, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

C. Sunderman, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator {

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B. Waddell, Simulator Specialist / Training

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l - LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

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82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program !

92904 Followup - Plant Support

l 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Reactors

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LIST OF ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED

Ooened

50-298/98012-01 IFl Verify emergency plan staffing and augmentation times

(Section P3)

50-298/98012-02 IFl Exercise weakness - Failure of one crew to implement the

emergency plan (Section P4)

Closed

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50-298/97008-04 IFl Failure to staff the technical support center in a timely manner

(Section P8.2)

Discussed

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50-298/96011-01 IFl Ability to warn personnel in high noise areas (Section P8.1)

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Emeroency Plan imolementina Prpcedures

5.7.1 Emergency Classification Revision 23

5.7.2 Shift Supervisor EPIP Revision 10

5.7.6 Notification Revision 24, Change 1

5.7.20 Protective Action Recommendations Revision 11

ML20216F872

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